Judgment :- 1. By consent of parties, the writ petition itself was taken up for hearing in as much as the scope of argument in W.M.P. No. 5304 of 1992 and the main writ petition is one and the same. 2. The prayer in the writ petition is as follows:— “To issue a writ of mandamus or any other form of writ, order or direction in the nature of writ directing respondents 1 and 2 to provide police protection to the petitioner, his men, employees and servants in the course of his lawful conduct of the business of felling, loading and transporting timber from Estates in Kanyakumari District without any obstruction from respondents 3 to 14, men or men or any other person claiming through or under them and pass such further or other orders.” 3. Respondents 3 to 9 are registered trade unions. It is the case of the petitioner that he is engaged in the business of felling, loading and transporting of timber from several estates in Kanyakumari District for the past 20 years and that he has his own set of employees whom he engages whenever he secured a contract for such felling, loading and transporting. The petitioner was engaged in felling old rubber trees in the Greenham Division of New Ambadi Estates Private Limited. On 17.2.1992 respondents 10 to 14 along with others surrounded the lorry in which the load was taken and threatened to set fire to the lorry if the petitioner did not agree for engaging persons nominated by them for the work of loading and unloading the lorries. One C. Arumugham Pillai, manager of the petitioner, had lodged a complaint on 17.2.1992 with the 2nd respondent when he was about to be assaulted. Again on 19.2.1992 at about 7.30 AM, when the lorry bearing No. TNK 3778 was engaged in the transportation of felled timbers, it was stopped at the entrance of the estate by the respondents and a few others and threatened to assault the lorry driver and loading men. Hence, the material was unloaded from the lorry and kept in the estate. Attempts made to remove the lorry from the place were in vain. This incident was reported to respondents 1 and 2 on 19.2.1992 and a request was made for grant of police protection. Hence, the material was unloaded from the lorry and kept in the estate. Attempts made to remove the lorry from the place were in vain. This incident was reported to respondents 1 and 2 on 19.2.1992 and a request was made for grant of police protection. On account of the inaction on the part of the police authorities, the petitioner lodged a complaint with the Judicial Magistrate, Kuzhithurai, on 20.2.1992, which resulted in the registration of a case in Crime No. 116 of 1992 by the 2nd respondent under Ss. 147, 148, 341, 506(2), 379 and 427 I.P.C.. The petitioner also claims that respondents 10 to 14 are trade union activists and belong to the unions respondents 3 to 9. It is the specific case of the petitioner that respondents 10 to 14 are not his employees at any point of time. Further, the petitioner has felled 60 loads, which are ready for loading and transportation, which is prevented by respondents 3 to 14. Since no action was taken by respondents 1 and 2, the petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition. 4. Counter affidavit has been filed by one V. Thulasiraman on behalf of respondents 5 and 6. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the loading and unloading operations around Mancode village in Kanyakumari District are done by head load workers, who are members of respondents 3 to 8 unions, and that has been the practice in Kanyakumari District. It is stated that contrary to the said practice, the petitioner felled and carried timbers from rubber plantations by bringing cheap labour, which is objected to by the respondent unions. Further, the petitioner in the past has been engaging the members of the respondents unions for loading and unloading operations. 5. The unions have not disputed the fact that they obstructed the lorry which was engaged in the transportation of felled rubber trees. The relief claimed by the petitioner is resisted by the unions. 6. I have heard Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, Senior Advocate for the writ petitioner, Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, Senior Advocate for respondents 5 and 6 and Mr. N. Paul Vasanthakumar, counsel for respondents 3, 4 and 10 to 14. 7. It is the contention of Mr. The relief claimed by the petitioner is resisted by the unions. 6. I have heard Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram, Senior Advocate for the writ petitioner, Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, Senior Advocate for respondents 5 and 6 and Mr. N. Paul Vasanthakumar, counsel for respondents 3, 4 and 10 to 14. 7. It is the contention of Mr. N.G.R. Prasad, that no direction should be given to police as prayed for by the petitioner because no public interest is involved and what is involved is only the private interest of the petitioner. Mr. N.G.R. Prasad besides elaborating the line of argument as above would also submit that the petitioner wants to carry on the work of felling, loading and unloading of timber by bringing cheap labour from outside which practice should be deprecated. Strong reliance was placed on the judgments reported in Coimbatore Periyar District Motor Transport Munnetra Sangam v. Sivakumar Transports, Tirupur 1986 (II) L.L.N. 551 (Justice V. Ramaswami as he then was and P. Bhaskaran, J.) Balaji Fabricators (P) Ltd., Madras v. Inspector of Police, Thiruvanmiyur1990(I) L.L.N. 880 Srinivasan, J.) GwaliorRayons Silks Manufacturing (Weaving) Co. Ltd. Calicut v. District Collector, Alleppey 1982 I L.L.J. 356 at 361, (T. Chandrasekhara Menon, J.) Kannan v. Supdt. of Police, Cannanore 1975 I L.L.J. 83 (Subramania Poti, J.) B.R. Singh v. Union of India 1989 II L.L.J. 591 (K. Jagannatha Shetty and A.N. Ahmadi, JJ.) order in W.P. No. 19330 of 1990 (Selvamony v. Deputy Inspector General of Police, Tirunelveli) of K.S. Bakthavatsahm, J., dated 26-2-1991 and the judgment reported in K.C.P. Ltd. v. The Inspector of Police Thiruvottiyur 1991 Writ L.R. 562. 8. On the other hand, Mrs. Nalini Chidambaram learned senior counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance on the order of a learned single judge of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 6737/1990-B dated 31.7.1990 (K.A. Nayar, J.) and that of a Division Bench of the same High Court in W.A. No. 228 of 1988 dated 10.3.1988 (V.S. Malimalh, Chief Justice and V. Bhaskaran Namhiar, J.) 9. After giving my anxious consideration to the contentions of the parties, I am of the firm view that the writ petition should be allowed and the relief claimed by the petitioner should be granted. Admittedly, the claim of the petitioner is that he is engaging his own men for loading and unloading and transportation of felled timber in the estates in Kanyakumari District. Admittedly, the claim of the petitioner is that he is engaging his own men for loading and unloading and transportation of felled timber in the estates in Kanyakumari District. It is the claim of the respondent unions in their counter, which was repeated before me in the course of arguments, that there is a practice in Mancode village in Kanyakumari District that the members of the respondent union alone are engaged for loading and unloading operations. In other words, it is their claim that no outsider should be engaged for such work of loading and unloading of felled timbers in the estates. It is on the basis of a practice said to have been followed, which necessitated the filing of the writ petition by the petitioner. What is the right of the members of the respondents unions to insist that the loading and unloading operations should be done by them and not by the petitioner with his own men or men of his choice in the absence of actual agreement which gives rise to the dual relationship of master and servant? It is not open to the members of the unions to claim that the petitioner has to necessarily engage them for loading and unloading operations and none else. There is no specific denial in the counter affidavit of the claim of the petitioner that he is engaging his own men for his business. The unions have referred to a settlement dated 15.4.1986 reached under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, under which the rates for payment for loading and unloading operations in Salt Cotaurs, Madras, have been fixed, and to a Notification of the Government of Tamil Nadu bearing G.O.Ms. No. 383 Labour and Employment Department, dated 1.10.1990 referring the dispute between the workers and the management of Salt Cotaurs Clearing and Forwarding Agents Association to the Industrial Tribunal, Madras. 10. Both the documents referred to above have no bearing in deciding the issue under consideration. The decision of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 6737/1990-B (Justice K.A. Nayar) refers to a Division Bench ruling of the same High Court in W.A. Nos. 124 and 228 of 1988. 10. Both the documents referred to above have no bearing in deciding the issue under consideration. The decision of the Kerala High Court in O.P. No. 6737/1990-B (Justice K.A. Nayar) refers to a Division Bench ruling of the same High Court in W.A. Nos. 124 and 228 of 1988. It has been held in that decision that the unions of head load workers have no legal right to insist that the work of unloading goods that come by trucks should be done by the workers of the union only and not by the workers of the masters choice. The following principle enunciated therein is more apt for deciding the present case: “This court has held in Writ Appeal Nos. 124 and 228 of 1988 that the Unions of Headload workers have no legal right to insist that the work of unloading the goods that come by the truck should be done by the workers of the union themselves and not by the workers of the masters choice. Where the scheme is in operation the management can appoint their own staff. That is what has been done in this case. On enquiry the police reported that the petitioner is employing his own permanent workers for loading and unloading purpose. If the petitioner gets the work of loading and unloading done by engaging his own permanent workmen, the Headload workers represented by respondents 3 to 7 cannot insist that the work should be got done only employing their own members.” 11. In the absence of any legal prohibition for engaging workers of his own choice or in the absence of an agreement between the parties under which the petitioner has restricted his choice of workmen in any particular fashion, in my opinion, the petitioner has a legal right to engage workmen of his choice for carrying on his business. It is not open to the respondent unions to prevent the petitioner from exercising his fundamental right to carry on his business or trade. It is the duty of this court to ensure that a citizen of this country is allowed to exercise his fundamental rights and it is also the duty of the law enforcing agencies like police personnal to give protection for a citizen carrying on his lawful trade or business. It is the duty of this court to ensure that a citizen of this country is allowed to exercise his fundamental rights and it is also the duty of the law enforcing agencies like police personnal to give protection for a citizen carrying on his lawful trade or business. If that is not done, there would be no useful purpose served by the existence of courts and law enforcing agencies. Just as the workers are entitled to protection of their legal right by courts of law, the employers are also equally entitled to protection of their fundamental right to carry on their lawful trade and business. 12. Assuming that the claim of Mr. N.G.R. Prasad that the petitioner is engaging cheap labour is true, it is not open to the respondent unions to take law in their own hands and obstruct the workers of the petitioner from discharging their duties or prevent the petitioner from the transportation of the goods either directly or through his agents. Sufficient safeguards are provided under the Industrial Disputes Act to prevent exploitation of workers by employers. It is strange to find that one set of workers claim right in gel employment on the basis of sonic practice and prevent the employer from engaging labour of his choice. If the claim of the labour is allowed, then, a day will come when a citizen of this country has to seek his employment within his own village or taluk or district. Such a claim would run counter to the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India, Therefore, the right claimed by the respondents and the basis of some practice cannot be countenanced, at all. 13. Reliance placed by Mr. N.G.R. Prasad on the judgments referred to above in support of his contention that police protection should be granted only when public interest is involved and not when private interest alone is involved cannot also be accepted. In this connection, I can refer to the decision of this Court reported in A.S.V. Varadachariar v. The Commissioner of Police, Madras 1969 (11) M.L.J. 1 (Kailasam, J. as he then was) wherein this court has recognised the principle that private interest is entitled to protection of law if the same is interfered with unlawfully. In this connection, I can refer to the decision of this Court reported in A.S.V. Varadachariar v. The Commissioner of Police, Madras 1969 (11) M.L.J. 1 (Kailasam, J. as he then was) wherein this court has recognised the principle that private interest is entitled to protection of law if the same is interfered with unlawfully. The Division Bench ruling reported in 1988 (II) L.L.N. 550, in my opinion, does not lay down that this Court can grant police protection only when public interest is involved and not otherwise, as could be seen from the following observation: “The above decisions cannot be taken as laying down any abstract proposition of law without any relation to the facts that in every case of strike workers are entitled to prevent the removal of the goods or ingress or egress of raw materials or other products, or that the workers are entitled to gherao and prevent people from entering or coming out of the factory or the industrial premises. The ratio of the judgments, in our opinion, is that if the preventing of removal of the goods would involve only t he monetary interest of the management and no public interest is involved, the Court may consider not helping the management and not interfering in the dispute by way of any injunction orders. However, if the facts and circumstances are such as that it is just and necessary to permit the goods to be removed in order to prevent any waste or loss of goods, or that the acts in relation to which injunction is prayed for will have no effect on public interest, then, injunction against interference with the r emoval of goods shall not be presented. If not granting an injunction will tantamount to affecting public interest, the Court is duty bound to give such protection as is needed. Therefore, each case will have to depend on facts.” 14. The above decision merely gives direction to the Court and it has not placed any embargo on the powers of this Court to grant police protection even in cases where a citizen of this country is prevented from exercising his lawful trade or business. I am not referring in detail to the cases which make a reference to the ruling of the Division Bench in 1986 (II) L.L.N. 550. I am not referring in detail to the cases which make a reference to the ruling of the Division Bench in 1986 (II) L.L.N. 550. A reading of the decision of this Court in 1969 II M.L.J. page 1, which is still holding good, is an authority for the proposition that private rights are entitled to protection by this Court as much as public rights. Further, all the cases referred to by Mr. N.G.R. Prasad relate to cases where the workmen of a particular employer claim that they are on strike or on some agitational programme and pending disputes between them and the employer, the employer should not be permitted to remove the goods, which will have the effect of weakening their strike or agitational programme. The present case on hand has no similarity with those cases. As already referred to by me, the respondents merely claim a right to get employment and there is no dual relationship of master and servant between the petitioner and the members of the respondent unions who assert their right to get work. Right of employment in the present case is not a statutory or a contractual right. Hence, the judgments relied on by Mr. N.G.R. Prasad have no bearing on the issue involved in this writ petition and are distinguishable. 15. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani AIR 1989 S.C. 1607 has considered in extenso the law relating to Mandamus in India. The Supreme Court has noted striking departure of Indian Law from the English Law in the light of the language used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The following observation of the Supreme Court is of relevance for the present case: “There however, the prerogative writ of mandamus confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The ‘public authority’ is for them means every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities and statutory undertakings and corporations are all ‘public authorities’. The ‘public authority’ is for them means every body which is created by statute and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities and statutory undertakings and corporations are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the “writ” in the nature of mandamus.” It has been further observed in paragraph 21 of the said decision as follows:— “The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.” 16. It is clear from the above pronouncement that a writ of mandamus could be issued to police authorities to enforce law. It is needless to say that duty is imposed on the police authorities to prevent the commission of crime including the commission of cognizable offences. It is immaterial whether such crime is committed against an individual or public at large. In this view of mine, it is necessary for me to grant relief to the petitioner because her is complaining of inaction on the part of police authorities to prevent the respondents from committing offences and also rescue the petitioner from the clutches of the respondents 3 to 14, who have taken law in their own hands and are preventing the petitioner from exercising his fundamental right to engaging his own men and carry on a lawful trade and business. 17. For the fore-going seasons, the writ petition is allowed and a mandamus shall issue to respondents 1 and 2 to provide adequate police protection to the petitioner, his men, employees and servants, in the course of his lawful felling, loading and unloading of timber from the estates in Kanyakumari District, without any obstruction from respondents 3 to 14 or members of the respondent union or any other person claiming through or under them. However, there will be no order as to costs.