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1992 DIGILAW 29 (ALL)

Mohammad Haroon Siddiqui v. Additional District Judge

1992-01-08

S.C.VARMA

body1992
JUDGMENT : S.C. VARMA, J. 1. The present dispute relates to House No. 15/216 Chamangan, Kanpur. Initially suit No. 406 of 1968 was filed by Respondent No. 3 against one Gyas Moizuddin, who was former tenant of the disputed premises for arrears of rent and eviction. Decree for eviction was ultimately confirmed by Hon. Supreme Court by order dated 6-4-1984 and the tenant was directed to vacate the premises by 10-4-1984. 2. An application for allotment dated 18-4-1984 was filed by the Petitioner, Mohammad Haroon Siddiqui in anticipation of vacancy. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer by his order dated 16-4-1984 allotted the premises in favour of the Petitioner. The Petitioner allottee claimed to have received the possession on 17-5-1984, which is disputed by the landlord. The landlord also moved an application for the release of the accommodation on 17th May 1984. By an order dated 18th October 1985 in Rent revision No. 170 of 1984 the learned Fourth Additional District Judge, Kanpur, set aside the allotment order and the case was remanded back to the court below for deciding it afresh after affording opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence. The said release application of the landlord was also directed to be considered in accordance with law. The Rent control and Eviction Officer in pursuance of the aforesaid order, by order dated 25-3-1987 allowed the release application of the landlord. While adjudicating the release application the alleged prospective allottee, the present Petitioner was not allowed to contest the release application on the ground that he has no locus-standi as prospective allottee, to contest these proceedings. This order was affirmed in revision by order dated 27-9-1991 by XII Additional District Judge, Kanpur and the release of the premises in dispute, in favour of the landlord, was confirmed. The orders dated 25-3-1987 and 27-9-1991 have been impugned in the present petition. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has assailed the orders on the ground that the courts below have erred in disallowing the prospective allottee, under the circumstances, to contest the release application. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Pilai v. Additional District Judge 1986 (1) All RC 220. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner placed reliance on a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Pilai v. Additional District Judge 1986 (1) All RC 220. 4. According to the Learned Counsel Hon'ble Supreme Court while setting aside exparte order of release passed in favour of the landlord, which was affirmed by the High Court G.S. Pilai v. Additional District Magistrate 1985 (2) ARC 174, remanded the case back to the prescribed authority to dispose of the release application after giving due notice and hearing to both the parties in accordance with law. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner in these circumstances vehemently contended that the High Court while affirming the release order in favour of the landlord had disallowed participation of the prospective allottee for consideration of the release application and since Hon'ble Supreme Court has permitted both the parties to be heard in accordance with the law, the courts below have wrongly held that the Petitioner has no locus standi to participate in the proceedings for release u/s 16(1)(b) of the Act. 5. In reply to these arguments Learned Counsel for the Respondent placed reliance on full bench decision of Talib Husain v. 1st Additional District Judge 1986 (1) All RC 1 and Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ashok Kumar Senai, 1990 (1) All RC 549 and in support of his contention stated that the prospective allottee has no locus standi to participate in a proceeding for consideration of the release u/s 16(1)(b). Learned Counsel further contended that the Full Bench case of Talib Hussain (supra) has neither been considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court for the detailed scheme under the statutory provisions of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 have been considered by Hon. Supreme Court in making these observations and, as such, it cannot be treated to be laying down law, in this regard. 6. Similar situation arose in the case of Smt. Sushila Devi (supra) and reliance was placed on the observations of Hon. Supreme Court in the case of G.L. Pilai. Learned Judge was of the view that full bench decision of High Court was neither referred nor law laid down, was discussed in the order of Hon. Supreme Court and the order of Hon. Supreme Court was passed in view of peculiar facts of the case. Learned Judge was of the view that full bench decision of High Court was neither referred nor law laid down, was discussed in the order of Hon. Supreme Court and the order of Hon. Supreme Court was passed in view of peculiar facts of the case. The law laid down by the High Court in full bench cannot be treated to be over ruled by Hon. Supreme Court. I am in full agreement with the aforesaid view. I cannot subscribe to the arguments of Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that observations of Hon. Supreme Court should be treated as a law and should be followed in preference to the law laid down by full bench, in the circumstances of the case. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner then placed reliance on supplementary affidavit filed by him today, a copy of which was served on 6-1-1992. 8. Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted his reply to the supplementary affidavit, which has also been taken on record. In para 4 of the supplementary affidavit the Petitioner has stated that the landlord Ehsan-dul Haq, had entered into agreement to execute sale deed in favour of Sri Anwar Iqbal in respect of a portion of the dispute premises for Rs. 1,25000/- and have also received payment through various cheques. A copy of sale deed in respect of permission, which has been sought from the Income tax department was also brought on record. Details of payment by cheque has also been indicated in this para Similarly in para 6, it has been stated that a portion of the aforesaid building has also been transferred by Sri Ehsanul Haq in favour of Inamul Haq son of Haziz Abdul Razzaq for a sum of Rs. 2.50,000/- . Details of payment by cheque of the aforesaid amount as also copy of draft sale deed for permission by the Income tax department have also been filed. The averments contained in the supplementary affidavit have been contested by the Respondents on the ground that neither any agreement for sale nor any sale deed have been executed. However, he has not denied the payments made through cheque in his affidavit. The averments contained in the supplementary affidavit have been contested by the Respondents on the ground that neither any agreement for sale nor any sale deed have been executed. However, he has not denied the payments made through cheque in his affidavit. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has alleged that the supplementary affidavit with these facts cannot be entertained and to be treated as subsequent event as transactions were all much before and even prior to the order of learned XII Additional District Judge dated 26-9-1991 and also prior to filing of present writ petition. According to him the Petitioner has not given any reason as to why he could not bring these facts earlier, and filing of the supplementary affidavit with these facts at this belated stage only indicate malafides of the Petitioner, who is merely a prospective allottee. 9. I do not find that the Learned Counsel for the Respondent is correct in racing the aforesaid point in as much as he has not indicated in any way as to whether the Respondent No. 3 had knowledge of these transactions earlier and for some ulterior reasons he did not bring these facts to the notice earlier. Obviously, the transaction being a private transaction it is not expected that the Petitioner or any one else would know about these transactions. 10. As these facts have now come on record and there is no material which may indicate that these facts are absolutely false and frivolous, I am not inclined to rule out the possibility of detailed consideration of these facts. In view of these subsequent events which have been placed on record, I consider it appropriate that the matter be sent back to the prescribed authority for fresh consideration regarding the need of landlord under the provisions of Section 16(1)(b) of the Act. I therefore, allow the petition and set aside the orders of the courts below only for consideration of the subsequent facts, which have been indicated above. As regards the other findings on the basis of material on record by the courts below the same are not disturbed. 11. Learned Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to allow both the parties to adduce evidence only in this regard as to whether the Respondent No. 3 has negotiated for sale of the disputed premises or not? As regards the other findings on the basis of material on record by the courts below the same are not disturbed. 11. Learned Rent Control and Eviction Officer is directed to allow both the parties to adduce evidence only in this regard as to whether the Respondent No. 3 has negotiated for sale of the disputed premises or not? and in that view of the matter alone, consider the release application of the landlord. The Petitioner has been permitted only to adduce evidence in this regard as these allegations go to the root of the matter and he is in a better position to bring on record the material otherwise being prospective allottee, he would not have been allowed to do so. The Rent control and Eviction Officer shall dispose of the matter expeditiously as far as possible within three months, of certified copy of this order being placed before him. 12. The Petitioner being only prospective allottee and the order of allotment has already been set aside on 18-10-1985 the interim order dated 11-10-1991 staying dispossession of the Petitioner till 28-11-1991 shall not be operative now.