S. K. MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revisional application is directed against Order No. 153, dated 5th September, 1991, passed by the learned Assistant District Judge, Third Court, Alipore, in Title Suit No. 110 of 1966. By the said impugned order, the learned Assistant District Judge rejected an application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a petition under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing the said application. ( 2 ) FROM the materials, produced before us as parts of records of the case, it appears that in a proceeding for eviction, instituted by the opposite party/landlord, the defence of the petitioner-tenant had been struck-out under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The trial culminated with an ex parte decree for eviction. Till that dale, there was no application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. From the ex parte decree, there was an appeal and the Lower Appellate Court by its judgement and decree dated 15th of December, 1977, remanded the suit for decision afresh, inter alia, with liberty to the parties to adduce afresh evidence, in support of their contentions. Against the said order of remand, a First Miscellaneous Appeal was preferred, being F. M. A. 614 of 1978, which was ultimately disposed of on 13th of May, 1987 by a Division Bench of this Court by dismissing the appeal and categorically affirming the directions of the learned Additional District Judge. At the time of disposal of such appeal by the Division Bench, on a point being raised by the learned Advocate for the landlord/appellant, the Division Bench observed : "the Trial Court shall decide the suit sent back on remand afresh to accordance with law and keeping in view the order under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, already passed by the Trial Court. "after the matter went back on remand, the tenant/petitioner made an application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, along with another application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in preferring such application, inter alia, averring in the said application that the delay occurred due to absence of proper advice from the learned Advocate for the tenant. As stated above, by the impugned order, the said two applications stood rejected. ( 3 ) BEFORE proceeding to deal with the contentions raised before us, we would like to keep on record fresh that the learned Assistant District Judge had no jurisdiction to reject the application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act on merit, after dismissing the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, because, due to such dismissal of the application for condonation of delay, the application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act should be deemed to be non-est in the eye of law. ( 4 ) ON behalf of the petitioner, it has been urged, by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, that since the Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the order of remand of the learned Additional District Judge and categorically permitted fresh evidence to be adduced by the parties, at the point of time, it became necessary for the Division Bench, as rightly prayed for by the learned Advocate for the landlord/appellant, to indicate the scope of further evidence in the perspective of existence of an order striking out the defence in the state of law as it then stood. That direction/observations of the Division Bench cannot be interpreted to take away from the tenant/defendant its right to prefer and sustain an application under section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, if it could make out sufficient ground for condonation of delay in filing the same and prayer for condonation was to be considered irrespective of the merit of the application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In support of this contention, Mr. Roy Chowdhury relied on, amongst others, a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1980 (1) CLJ 309. Mr. Roy Chowdhury further contended that there could not be any estoppel against a statutory right of the tenant to file and press an application under section 17a of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, and, in support thereof, he relied on the ratio propounded by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 1327 . Mr. Sakti Nath Mookherjee, appearing on behalf of the landlord/opposite Party, however, adopted a completely different approach which, if accepted, would render all the above submissions ineffective and useless. According to Mr. Mookherjee the contention raised by Mr. Mr. Sakti Nath Mookherjee, appearing on behalf of the landlord/opposite Party, however, adopted a completely different approach which, if accepted, would render all the above submissions ineffective and useless. According to Mr. Mookherjee the contention raised by Mr. Roy Chowdhury, although available and necessary before the earlier Division Bench, not having been argued or pressed, must be deemed to have been abandoned. According to Mr. Mookherjee such abandonment would be effective even if the same was implied one or an express one and irrespective of changes of legal position so as to divest the petitioner of the right to agitate such points now before the Trial Court. The finality of the order under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act could not, according to him, be disturbed after remand. ( 5 ) WE have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective counsel. It can hardly be gainsaid that at the time the earlier Division Bench made its order, the statutory restrictions embodied in section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act were treated as inflexible and rigid such rigor, however, became relaxed through subsequent judicial pronouncement and as such a tenant could not be deemed to have the necessary consciousness or knowledge about his right arising out of or based on such relaxation born subsequently through judicial decisions. Consequently, no argument or contention, founded on such unknown right could be expected to be advanced at the point of time. When the matter was being considered by the earlier Division Bench the word "abandonment", according to Black's Dictionary, 5th Edition, means "to relinquish utterly; it includes the intention and also the external act by which it is carried into effect". In the Chambers 20th Century Dictionary the said term has been defined as "to give up all claims to". Principle of abandonment can, therefore be applied only with regard to a known right or a right consciousness about which can be attributed to a party. In the instant case, as indicated earlier, the tenant had no idea about the flexibility of the criteria imposed by section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and as such it would be unjust to hold that he had abandoned his right to take recourse to the said section for obtaining the benefit conferred by the Statute. In the instant case, as indicated earlier, the tenant had no idea about the flexibility of the criteria imposed by section 17 (2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and as such it would be unjust to hold that he had abandoned his right to take recourse to the said section for obtaining the benefit conferred by the Statute. The ratio laid down in 64 CWN 103 does not come conflict with the Principle as discussed hereinabove but is fully compatible with the same. Even on merit, the Division Bench merely indicated that Trial Court should decide the suit sent back on remand, 'keeping in view the order under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act'. This Direction of the Division Bench must have permitted a decision, according to law and also it can be presumed that the existing order under section 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was intended to be given effect to, at the time of decision after remand, also according to law, as it may then be. ( 6 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons we are not in a position to accept the submissions of Mr. Mookherjee as correct. We are of the view that the tenant/ petitioner's application, with a prayer for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act is maintainable and deserves consideration according to law. ( 7 ) MOREOVER, regarding the reasons given by the teamed Trial Judge in rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, we also must express our views against the propriety of the same, as we find that the learned Trial Judge was under a misconception about the fact of the defendant/tenant having been represented throughout by the same lawyer, though it is stated on oath in the affidavit-in-reply that a different Advocate represented the petitioner at the time of filing of the section 5 application. The assertion about mistaken advice or absence of advice, as made by the tenant/ petitioner, has not been effectively denied. The reasons of the learned Assistant District Judge, therefore, in rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay, also cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) IN the result, the Revisional application succeeds and is allowed by setting aside the impugned order. The assertion about mistaken advice or absence of advice, as made by the tenant/ petitioner, has not been effectively denied. The reasons of the learned Assistant District Judge, therefore, in rejecting the prayer for condonation of delay, also cannot be sustained. ( 8 ) IN the result, the Revisional application succeeds and is allowed by setting aside the impugned order. The application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, is allowed and the learned Assistant District Judge is directed to consider the application under section 17a of the West Bengal premises Tenancy Act, according to law and on merit on the lines of observations made by us hereinabove regarding the effect of the order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 13th May, 1987. There will be no order as to costs. S. K. Hazari, J. I agree. Application allowed.