B. J. SHETHNA, N. J. PANDYA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-detenu is detained as per the order dated 18-3-1992 of the District Magistrate of Bhavnagar under the provisions of prevention of Black-marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as PBM) The grounds of detention are at Annexure-B to the petition from pages 10 to 18. The alleged activities either by way of Commission or omission have been narrated at length in the grounds of detention and being satisfied, the detaining authority has passed the detention order. ( 2 ) ON behalf of the petitioner L. A. for A. R. Thakkar appearing for Mr. Y. S. Lakhani has urged that the copies of documents supplied along with grounds of detention, some of them, are either wholly illegal or partly illegible. At page 3 paragraph 4 in Ground A the details of these various illegible documents have been given. However, on verification of the papers that are supplied to the detenu, the various number of pages as set out in Ground A were found to be legible. This contention, therefore, cannot be sustained. ( 3 ) THE second ground urged on behalf of the detenu was that he made a representation dated 9/04/1992. It was submitted to the Advisory Board on the date on which the detenu was to be heard by the Advisory Board. The Advisory Board submitted its report on 1-5-1992, but, before that, however, it had forwarded the representation of the detenu to the State Government which came to be considered by the State Government after the receipt of the report inasmuch as the date of consideration of the representation is 4-5-1992. It is also clarified after ascertaining the position from the learned APP that the representation was also considered by the Board independently as was expected of it. The point raised on behalf of the detenu that the representation was considered during the pendency of the reference in view of the aforesaid dates therefore would not survive. The attempt made on behalf of the detenu to get the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. M. Abdulla kunhilkand B. Abdul Khander v. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 574 therefore is no longer available to the detenu. The attempt made on behalf of the detenu to get the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. M. Abdulla kunhilkand B. Abdul Khander v. Union of India reported in AIR 1991 SC 574 therefore is no longer available to the detenu. ( 4 ) THE Union of India exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Section 14 of the PBM has filed affidavit-in-reply twice. First is dated 26-6-1992, pages 19 to 20 and the second is dated 17-7-1992, page 21. However, with regard to first affidavit paragraph 4 the deponent on behalf of the Union of India Shri S. C. Brahma, Director in the Ministry of Civil Supplies and Public distribution, came out with dates, clearly there was a mistake, because, he has referred to the impugned order having been passed on 23-3-1992 in his affidavit paragraph 4, while the order in fact, has been passed on 18-3-1992. The rest of the dates, therefore, obviously, would not tally. Naturally, on behalf of the detenu, L. A. Mr. Thakkar has strongly urged that these details themselves would be enough to upset the order. At the same time, in fairness to Mr. Thakkar, it must be stated that he had also requested the Court to direct the Union of India to keep present in the Court the original file, so that facts can be verified. Accordingly, original file was kept present and on verification, it was found by us that the dates which are mentioned in paragraph 4 are recorded in that file, but, they are recorded in respect of another case of PBM and so far as the dates pertaining to the present detenu are concerned, they are correctly recorded with regard to the passing of the order, receipt of the report of the State Government and the date of its consideration. ( 5 ) THE details ascertained in this regard from the file shown to the Court by L. A. Mr. Bhagat for respondent No. 4 show the following details the detention order dated 18-3-1992 was approved on 26/27-3-1992, received by the Director on 30-3-1992 and was placed for consideration on 16-4-1992 and was actually considered on 20-4-1992. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid details as correctly placed on ascertainment from the original file, l. A. Mr. Thakkar thereafter, submitted that the Union of India which is required to exercise its supervisory power u/sec. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid details as correctly placed on ascertainment from the original file, l. A. Mr. Thakkar thereafter, submitted that the Union of India which is required to exercise its supervisory power u/sec. 14 of P. B. M. has to do so as expeditiously as possible. The supervisory power necessarily means that in exercise of its supervision, the Union of India can certainly revoke, modify or vary the order. L. A. Mr. Thakkar has, therefore, chosen to constantly use with reference to the said power the word revocation because, naturally, then only it will be beneficial to the detenu. However, coming to the Section itself, the power is reserved to the Central Government to revoke or to modify the order. ( 7 ) THE result of the consideration, so far as respondent No. 4 is concerned, as revealed from the file and as stated in the affidavit-in-reply, is to the effect that the order has remained as it is. It has neither been modified, nor there is any question of it being revoked. That is the reason why the present petition is being dealt with extensively. ( 8 ) THE next submission made on behalf of the detenu is that the power required to be exercised u/sec. 14 is to be taken at part with the requirement of the PBM as well as that of the Constitution under Article 22 (5) with regard to consideration of the representation, as the duty is cast on the various authorities under the relevant detention law as well as the Constitution of India that the detenu should be afforded an opportunity of making epresentation and that the representation, if made by the detenu, should be considered as arly as possible and they should also likewise be exercised without any delay. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to L. A. Mr. Thakkar, the aforesaid dates indicate that there has been nreasonable and unexplained delay and therefore, benefit thereof should go to the etitioner-detenu. The learned Advocate has relied on a decision rendered in Cr. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to L. A. Mr. Thakkar, the aforesaid dates indicate that there has been nreasonable and unexplained delay and therefore, benefit thereof should go to the etitioner-detenu. The learned Advocate has relied on a decision rendered in Cr. A. No. 806/86 of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of learned Judges S. B. Majmudar and R. J. Shah, where S. B. Majmudar speaking for the Bench on 17/11/1986 after considering the Supreme Court decision in Sabir Ahmad v. Union of India reported in (1980) SCC 295 and other relevant decisions held that the report sent by the State Government to the Central Government u/sec. 3 (2) was not expeditiously considered by the Cental Government. Once that conclusion was reached, the obvious result was to set aside the order. However, this conclusion arrived at, at page 9 of the judgment, as it has been shown to us from the judgment of the learned Judges, is preceded by the factual aspect of the case where the Union of India, to say the least, has taken a very peculiar stand of keeping everything secret to itself and thus, had even chosen to keep everything to it as closely as possible, and the actual expression used in the judgment is hold tight it to its chest. It was, therefore, not possible at all to submit that the report of the State Government was considered by the Union of India, much less, therefore, there could be any question of expeditious consideration thereof and naturally, therefore, the result will be to strike down the order. ( 10 ) ANOTHER decision relied on is Sabir Ahmads case (supra) where at para 12, the learned judges had said that the report received u/sec. 3 (2) of COFEPOSA which was required to be considered by the Union of India as per Section 11 thereof, should be considered with reasonable expedition. The learned Judges, however, are even cautious enough to observe that what is reasonable expedition is a question depending on the circumstances of the particular case. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down. But it certainly does not cover the delay due to negligence, callous inaction, avoidable red-tapism and unduly protracted procrastination. The portion of the judgment in para 12 relied on by Mr. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down. But it certainly does not cover the delay due to negligence, callous inaction, avoidable red-tapism and unduly protracted procrastination. The portion of the judgment in para 12 relied on by Mr. Thakkar and the cautionary remarks referred to by us, they all, appear at page 299 of the aforesaid decision. ( 11 ) IN the course of the argument, a decision of the Supreme Court in Mohmad Dhana Alikhan v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1976 SC 734 was shown to L. A. Mr. Thakkar and particularly para 5 thereof, where it has been observed by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that the supervisory power of the Central Government in relation to the maintenance of Internal Security Act, popularly known as MISA Section 14 thereof, is merely a discretion vested in the Government and it is not a matter of right so far as the detenu is concerned. ( 12 ) PROMPTLY, L. A. Mr. Thakkar has pointed out that in Sabir Ahmads case this very decision has been referred to in paragraph 10 and later on according to Mr. Thakkar, this decision has been considered and aforesaid remarks are to be found in para 12. However, in para 15 read with para 10 of the judgment respectively at pages 298 and 299, the learned Judges have observed that Mohmad Dhana Alikhans case stands on its own peculiar facts. ( 13 ) AS rightly observed in Sabir Ahmads case itself, delay necessarily would be a question of fact and will, therefore, be peculiar to the facts and circumstances of a given case and there annot be any state-jacket (sic.) formula. Each case will have to be evaluated in the background of set of facts as are curled out from the record and the details supplied. ( 14 ) L. A. Mr. Thakkar has proceeded further on the basis of Sabir Ahmads case (ADR 1980 SC 295) that not only there should be expeditious consideration but a duty is cast on the Central Government to communicate its decision to the detenu whether it has exercised its power under Section 14 or not Whatever may be the decision whether in favour of detenu or not, it must be communicated. No doubts he had conceded that the section itself does not prescribe this. No doubts he had conceded that the section itself does not prescribe this. But, according to him, when the learned Judges of this Court in the judgment given in Spl. Cr. Application No. 806 of 1986 referred to hereinabove had considered the aspect of representation along with the aspect of approval of the order by Union of india in exercise of its power on the same footing and when in Sabir Ahmads case the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have laid down that it should be done with reasonable expedition, it necessarily follows that the decision must be communicated. According to Mr. Thakkar, this would be nothing else, but discharge of its duly by the Central Government, as suty is certainly cast on it to consider the question whether power of revocation be exercised or not ? In that regard he had relied on a full Bench decision in Gauhati High Court reported in 1984 Criminal Law Journal, page 1558. However, we find from paragraph 33 of the judgment that it is considered to be a matter of duty on the Central Government so far as the exercise of power u/sec. 14 read with Section 1 read with Section 3 (5) of PASA. The duty, therefore, is to exercise its power, with which, we wholeheartedly agree. It cannot be said by the Central Government that it being a matter of discretion, it may choose not to exercise the power and thereby can claim that it will never consider the report of the State Government and will sit over it. If they do so, the consequences are quite clear as per the said earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 806 of 1986 referred to hereinabove. We are, however, not in agreement with the submission of Mr. L. A. Mr. Thakkar that this duty would further be extended to the act of communication of its decision to the detenu. ( 15 ) EVEN if it is not communicated, we fail to see what harm and prejudice would be caused to the detenu. He is otherwise also free to make representation as and when he likes, which he has exercised, the details of which are noted hereinabove. No representation is made to the Central Government, but in fact, representation is made to the Advisory Board as well as to the State of Gujarat. He is otherwise also free to make representation as and when he likes, which he has exercised, the details of which are noted hereinabove. No representation is made to the Central Government, but in fact, representation is made to the Advisory Board as well as to the State of Gujarat. The non-communication of the decision taken on 20-4-1992 has not come in the way of the detenu to make a representation to the Advisory Board and to the State Government. ( 16 ) INITIALLY, there appeared to be likelihood of there being some conflict between the judgment in said Special Criminal Application and the view which we are now taking with reference to 1976 S. C. case (supra ). As noted in Sabir Ahmads case (supra) it was decided on a peculiar facts of that very case and same is the position noted to be borne in mind by the learned udges in para 12 of the said case, remarks of which are already referred to. All told, herefore, what is now required to be considered on the basis of the dates given hereinabove is whether there has been delay due to negligence, carelessness, inaction, avoidable red-tapism and unduly protracted procrastination. In other words, whether the consideration of the report after its receipt on 30th March 1992 the process for which was initialed on 16-4-1992 and completed on 20/04/1992 could be said to be reasonable expedition. In our opinion, it is reasonable expedition and none of the factors noted by the learned Judges in sabir Ahmads case about delay due to negligence, etc. is found by us on examination of the file. We hold that this point urged on behalf of the detenu cannot be accepted. ( 17 ) IN the result, the petition is liable to be dismissed and it is accordingly dismissed Rule is discharged (DKM) Petition dismissed .