PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THE judgment of conviction under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, 'ipc') and sentence of imprisonment for life passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sambalpur is assailed by Malik Ram Bhoi (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused' ). ( 2 ) SANS unnecessary details, the accusations which led to the trial of the accused are as follows : one Bipin Bihari Pradhan (hereinafter described as the 'deceased') lost his life for intervention in a family quarrel. Khenjad Khadia (P. W. 6) and his wife were quarrelling inside their house. The deceased who is brother of one Jagadish Pradhan, the informant (P. W. 5) went to the house of P. W. 6 and requested him and his wife not to quarrel with each other. The differences between them subsided, and while the deceased was coming back the accused came running and challenged the deceased as to why he had come there. Suddenly he gave a knife blow on the lower abdomen and receiving the injury the deceased ran on the village road. After running a few yards he fell down near a tube well. He was shouting that the accused had stabbed him with a knife. Near that tube well, Upendra Chandra Badhei (P. W. 1), Hrudananda Majhi (P. W. 3) and Nabakishore Pradhan (P. W. 4) were sitting and they came near the deceased and asked as to what had happened. The deceased disclosed that he was stabbed by the accused. P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 noticed that the deceased was seriously injured and therefore, he was taken to the Orient Colliery Regional Hospital, Brajrajnagar. P. W. 5 was informed about the occurrence. P. Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 5 accompanied the deceased to the hospital. Coming to know that the deceased sustained a stab injury, the Sub-Inspector of Police in charge of the Orient Colliery Out Post made a station diary entry and sent a message to Brajrajnagar Police Station. On receipt of the message another station diary entry was made. The Sub-Inspector in-Charge of the Out Post came to the hospital where an oral report was made by P. W. 5. The Medical Officer of the hospital was requested to record the dying declaration of the deceased. On receipt of the message another station diary entry was made. The Sub-Inspector in-Charge of the Out Post came to the hospital where an oral report was made by P. W. 5. The Medical Officer of the hospital was requested to record the dying declaration of the deceased. Accordingly the doctor (P. W. 8) recorded the dying declaration in the presence of Parsuram Saha (P. W. 12) and others. The dying declaration has been marked as Ext. 9. Subsequently the deceased succumbed. Investigation was undertaken and on completion of investigation charge sheet was submitted. ( 3 ) THE accused took a plea of false implication. He took a positive stand that the case has been falsely foisted against him on account of previous enmity. ( 4 ) IN order to further its case 14 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. P. W. 6 is an eye witness to the occurrence. In addition to the evidence of P. W. 6, the dying declaration made before several witnesses and the recorded dying declaration in terms of Ext. 9 were considered to be sufficient by the learned trial Judge to fasten guilt on the accused. Accordingly, he was convicted under S. 302, IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the accused has urged that the evidence of P. W. 6 is not acceptable because he could not have seen the occurrence from a distance of about 30 cubits in a moonlight, as deposed by him. Evidence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 was not recorded immediately and therefore, grave doubt arises about authenticity of the same. The post mortem report indicated that the deceased was intoxicated and there was previous enmity between the deceased and the accused. The dying declaration should not have been relied upon because the same was recorded after about two hours of the assault. The certificate of the doctor that the deceased was in a fit condition to give the statement is hardly acceptable. In the station diary entry the name of the accused has not been indicated though it was recorded after a considerable length of time and that is a suspicious circumstance. In addition it is submitted that the only single blow was given which rules out application of S. 302, IPC. In the station diary entry the name of the accused has not been indicated though it was recorded after a considerable length of time and that is a suspicious circumstance. In addition it is submitted that the only single blow was given which rules out application of S. 302, IPC. The learned counsel for State, however, submitted that soon after the occurrence the deceased had disclosed the name of the assailant before P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4. There was no delay in examination of P. W. 6, who was examined shortly after lodging of FIR. So far as visibility aspect is concerned, it is submitted that the witness and the accused are known to each other and there was no difficulty for the witness to identify the accused in a moonlight. The dying declaration being a solemn piece of evidence and the doctor before whom the dying declaration was made being an independent person having no axe to grind against the accused, the evidence has been rightly accepted. Though only one blow was given, it is not sufficient to make S. 302, IPC inapplicable, the force with which the blow was given is a very relevant factor. ( 6 ) WE shall first deal with the dying declaration aspect. Relying on the dying declaration alone the conviction can be maintained. No corroboration is necessary if the dying declaration is believed to be truthful one and not vitiated in any other manner. See Kusa v. State of Orissa; AIR 1980 SC 559 : (1980 Cri LJ 408); and State of Assam v. Mafizuddin Ahmed, AIR 1983 SC 274 : (1983 Cri LJ 426); and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 : (1986 Cri LJ 836 ). Court must not look out for corroboration unless it comes to a conclusion that dying declaration suffered from any infirmity by reason of which it is necessary to look out for corroboration. See Munna Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2199 : (1976 Cri LJ 1718 ). The Court as a matter of prudence has to gauge whether the statement of the deceased was the result of either tutoring, prompting or product of his imagination. A dying declaration is admitted in evidence on the principle of necessity. See Munna Raja v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2199 : (1976 Cri LJ 1718 ). The Court as a matter of prudence has to gauge whether the statement of the deceased was the result of either tutoring, prompting or product of his imagination. A dying declaration is admitted in evidence on the principle of necessity. The fact that it is not tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused necessitates the obligation on the Court to scrutinize these aspects. A dying declaration is an independent piece of evidence like any other piece of evidence - neither extra strong nor weak - and can be acted upon without corroboration if it is found to be otherwise true and reliable. As observed by the apex Court in Suresh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1987 SC 860 : (1987 Cri LJ 775), conviction based on the evidence of doctor that the deceased was capable of deposing and was in a fit condition and senses at the time of recording of statement would not be lightly interfered with. Doctor is an independent witness and there is no reason for him to depose falsely. Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short, the 'act') is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is excluded. The exceptions embodied in this Section are with regard to statements or declaration by persons since deceased. One of such exceptions is the declaration relating to the cause of death. The general ground of reception of such evidence is that in the cases in question no better evidence is to be had. Such statements are admitted on the principle of necessity. In cases of homicide, statements made by a person, since deceased, are admissible to prove the cause and circumstances of the man's death. Such statements are called 'dying declarations'. In certain cases, English Judges have observed that such statements should be made when the person is in "settled, hopeless expectation of imminent death". For the first time, the phrase was used by willes, J. in R. v. Peel, 2 F and F 21. Their admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath - Nemo moriturus praesumuntur mentiri. As observed by Eyre CB, in R. v. Woodcock, (1987) 1 Leach 500 :". Their admissibility rests on the principle that a sense of impending death produces in a man's mind the same feeling as that of a conscientious and virtuous man under oath - Nemo moriturus praesumuntur mentiri. As observed by Eyre CB, in R. v. Woodcock, (1987) 1 Leach 500 :". . . . . . . THE general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, a situation so solemn and so awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a Court of Justice. "these aspects have been highlighted by us in the case of Narayan Behera v. State of Orissa (Criminal Appeal No. 187 of 1988 disposed of on 18-9-1992.) It was observed by the apex Court in Rabi Chandra v. State of Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 1738 : (1980 Cri LJ 1257) that dying declaration should preferably be in question and answer form. The dying declaration in the instant case has been recorded in question and answer form by the doctor. Judged in the above background, we find no reason to discard the dying declaration wherein the role played by the accused and the presence of P. Ws. 3 and 4 has been detailed. ( 7 ) SO far as identification by P. W. 6 is concerned, the plea is that in the moon light identification was improbable at a distance of 30 cubits. Identification depends on several factors like proximity between the identifier and the person identified, visibility condition and similar other factors. There can be no rigid guideline in that regard. Hans Gross, the learned author, in his Criminal Investigation, has indicated that the distance from which identification would be probable depends on various factors. Circumstances indicated in his book are only approximate indications and they are of but slight value. The witness being illiterate had some confusion about distance as observed by the learned trial Judge, when he was questioned about the distance in cubits between the witness-box and the court verandah. Circumstances indicated in his book are only approximate indications and they are of but slight value. The witness being illiterate had some confusion about distance as observed by the learned trial Judge, when he was questioned about the distance in cubits between the witness-box and the court verandah. The witness, however, has stated that he was at a distance of 5 ft. when he saw the occurrence. So the evidence of this witness cannot be faulted on the presumptuous ground of improbability of identification. ( 8 ) IT is also submitted that P. Ws. 3 and 4 were not examined immediately. The occurrence took place on 10-4-1987 at about 10-30 p. m. These witnesses were examined on 11-4-1987. The first-information-report was lodged on 11-4-1987 at about 12-45 a. m. They were examined a few hours after. This cannot be certainly considered to be-an unreasonable delay in examination of the witness. It cannot be laid down as a principle of general application that whenever there is delay in examination, suspicion is to be attached. True it is, the eye witnesses are to get preference over other unimportant witnesses. But, if plausible explanation is offered for the delayed examination, the Court has to consider it. In the instant case, that situation has not arisen. The plea is that these witnesses were present at the hospital and therefore, the evidence should have been recorded there. As rightly observed by the learned Sessions Judge, they were frantically busy in their attempt to save the life of the deceased. That is a sufficient ground for their non-examination at the hospital. ( 9 ) NON-MENTION of the name of the accused in the station diary entries cannot be a ground to disbelieve the otherwise credible prosecution evidence. We find no substance in the plea that non-mention of the name rendered the prosecution version fallible. ( 10 ) THE alternative plea is that only one blow was given with a knife and, therefore, it is not a case where the provisions of S. 302, IPC are applicable. There is no force in this contention. It cannot be laid down as a rule that whenever a single blow is given, a case under S. 302 is not made out. It would depend on the nature of injury, part of the body where the injury was caused and several other circumstances. There is no force in this contention. It cannot be laid down as a rule that whenever a single blow is given, a case under S. 302 is not made out. It would depend on the nature of injury, part of the body where the injury was caused and several other circumstances. It is not always the number of blows dealt by the accused which is decisive of the issue whether a case under S. 302, IPC made out or not. What is material is the kind of weapon used, the nature of injury caused and the circumstances under which the assault took place, and not the number of blows. Where a single blow is given by an accused with a deadly weapon either with the intention of causing the death of the victim or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death and consequently he dies, it would be a case covered under S. 302, IPC. In this context a decision of the apex Court in the case of Vasant v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 361 (1) : (1983 Cri LJ 693) is relevant. In the case at hand a big knife was used and the blow was given on a vital part of the body with sufficient force as is apparent from the injury described by the doctor. The injuries as noticed by the doctor on post mortem examination are as follows : (1) A gapping incised wound horizontal in position 2" x -" x communicating with the abdominal cavity directed posteriorly and upwards over the abdomen 2" above the umbilicus slightly left to the midline. (2) A right paramedian incision 9" x 1/4" stitched with silk by mattress sutorian. Wound bandaged with cotton and gauze soaking blood. On dissection following injuries were noticed : (i) One bleeding incised wound causing an opening of 1/2" x 1/2" over the mesentery 2" in front of attachment to the posterior wall corresponding to injury No. (1) (ii) Incised wound over the mesentery 2 1/2" x 1/2" corresponding to injury No. (i) (iii) One incised wound over the small intestine 3" x 1/4" communicating with the lumen repaired with catgut. (iv) One incised wound over the small intestine 1" x 1/2" two feet below injury No. (iii) and repaired with catgut. (iv) One incised wound over the small intestine 1" x 1/2" two feet below injury No. (iii) and repaired with catgut. (v) Collection about 500 C. C. of fluid blood in the abdomen cavity posteriorly. The learned Sessions Judge has, therefore, rightly held that the case is one covered under S. 302, IPC. We find no infirmity in the judgment to warrant any interference. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. D. N. PATNAIK, J. :- 11. I agree. Appeal dismissed.