B.C. Basak, C. J. The question involved in these two writ petitions is whether the 'home workers rolling the beedis cut of the raw materials of the petitioner received from the Commission Agents/Contractors are "'employees" of the petitioner within the meaning of the “Employees" of the provident Fund and miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. In C.W.J.C. No, 1114 of 1990 the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ quashing the order dated 18.12.89 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner Bihar Patna, (hereinafter referred to as 'R.P.F.C.) as contained in Memo No. BR/7A – Cell/1365/88/3445 dated 15.1.90 served on the petitioners on 20.1.90, whereby the R.P. F.C. had directed the petitioner to pay within 15 days a Sum of Rs. 66,84,920.50, being employer and employees' contributions for the period July, 1977 to August 1986, being Annexure - 1 to the petition. In C.W.J.C. No. 1115 of 1990, the same petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ quashing the same order dated 18.12.1989 passed by the same R.P.F.C. directing the petitioner to pay within 15 days a sum of Rs. 28,72,383.85 being employer and employees contributions for the period September, 1986, to February, 1988. After the two writ petitions were filed, there have been some subsequent changes in the position including Supreme Court proceedings which I shall narrate later and which are also now the subject matter of the present hearing. These two writ petitions were heard together. 3. 28,72,383.85 being employer and employees contributions for the period September, 1986, to February, 1988. After the two writ petitions were filed, there have been some subsequent changes in the position including Supreme Court proceedings which I shall narrate later and which are also now the subject matter of the present hearing. These two writ petitions were heard together. 3. The facts or both the writ petitions are all common except regarding the period and the amount involved, The facts sought to be made out by the petitioner are as follows: The petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacture of Bidis, Since the Bidi Industry was brought within the scope or the Act with effect from 31.5.1977, there have been various proceedings wherein it has been contended by the petitioner that the 'home workers are not its employees within the meaning of the Act, Ever since the Bidi Industry came within the scope of the Act, the petitioner never deposited any, money or taken any step under the said Act in compliance thereof, inasmuch, according to the petitioner, no home worker was engaged by it either directly or through any contractor, By a show cause notice dated 24.11.1987, the petitioner was directed to treat the borne workers employed by the Commission Agent as the home workers of the petitioner, In reply the~ petitioner contended inter alia as follows The relationship between the petitioner and the suppliers contractors/commission agents was that of principal to principal and not that of principal employer and contractor as understood under the law. It was contended that the suppliers/contractors/commission agents were themselves the principal employers. They do not engage workers on behalf of the petitioner. The Workers engaged by them do not come to the petitioner either for collection of Bidi leaves, tobacco or thread or for depositing the rolled Bidis. There was no right of rejection by the petitioner. Accordingly, the test of control/supervision envisaged rejection of damaged bidis do not show that the workers engaged by the suppliers/Contractors/commission agents the employers of the petitioner and thus covered under the said Act. Another notice under section 7-A of the Act was issued to the petitioner on 6.4.1988. There was no right of rejection by the petitioner. Accordingly, the test of control/supervision envisaged rejection of damaged bidis do not show that the workers engaged by the suppliers/Contractors/commission agents the employers of the petitioner and thus covered under the said Act. Another notice under section 7-A of the Act was issued to the petitioner on 6.4.1988. On 12.4.1988 an order dated 11-3-1988 was issued by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner to the petitioner with regard to the non-compliance of the provisions of the Act and asking the petitioner to comply with the Rules in respect of all the eligible employees including employees employed by or through contractors. In reply to above, by a letter dated 27.4.1988 the petitioner asked for hearing of the matter about the applicability of the Act with respect to home workers engaged by different firms and independent contractors operating with their own L-2 Licences independently and doing jobs without depending on petitioner. Various pleas were taken therein. In response to the notice issued the petitioner appeared on 24.5.1988 and asked for time which was granted and taking advantage of the same it filed a writ petition in July, 1988 (being C.W.J.C. No. 4089 of 1988). By its judgment and order dated 27.7.1989 the Division Bench of the High Court at Patna dismissed the said writ petition holding that the home workers were employed in connection with the work of the petitioners establishment and hence they were employees of the petitioner under section 2(f) of the Act. By a letter dated 2.8.89 the Respondent no.1 directed the petitioner to appear on 18.8.1989 at 10.30 A.M. along with all the relevant records. On 18.8.1989 the petitioner company appeared and prayed for adjournment for a month to file the reply against the said notice The resfiondent no. 1 rejected the application of the petitioner on the same day and observed that the establishment should furnish the details required for assessing the same. On 31.8.1989 the petitioner filed an application for adjournment on the ground of illness of its Manager. Shri Kamal Hassan, through its Advocate Shri B.K. Sinha. By an order dated 1.9.1989 it was directed that the establishment of the petitioner be visited and .he books and records inspected. Taking advantage of the time gained on 4.9.1989 a S.L.P. was filed by the petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India against the judgment dated 27.7.1989. Shri Kamal Hassan, through its Advocate Shri B.K. Sinha. By an order dated 1.9.1989 it was directed that the establishment of the petitioner be visited and .he books and records inspected. Taking advantage of the time gained on 4.9.1989 a S.L.P. was filed by the petitioner before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India against the judgment dated 27.7.1989. By an order dated 3.10.1989 the petitioner Company was asked to furnish the following details; (i) Payment of rolling charges being made monthwise and contractorwise for the notice period i.e. from June, 1977 on wards. (ii) Details of the contractors to whom payments made. (iii) Copy of returns filed with R.P.F.C. West Bengal. (iv) Total number of employees working in establishment in detail centre wise. (v) Other relevant paper/documents. (vi) Balance sheet audited up to date. 4. On 18. 12. 1989 an order was passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner holding, inter alia, that the establishment in depositing the provident fund deduction with R.P.F.C., West Bengal, has been done so in respect of its regular and office/depot emplyees only and has not reported compliance in regard to bidi rollers which is necessary from July, 1977, by virtue of the notification issued by the Central Government and directed the establishment to pay the dues as determined and indicated in the order within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the said order failing which the same shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue under section 8 of the Act On 14.2.1990 these two writ petitions (being C.W.J.C. Nos. 1114 of 1990 and 1115 of 1990) Were filed before this High Court, challenging the impugned order dated 18.12.1989, alleged to have been received by the petitioner on 20.1.1990. Thereafter on 20.12.1990 two more writ petitions (being C.W.J.C. Nos. 8181 of 1990 and 8182 of 1990) were filed by the petitioner challenging the orders for arrest and attachment. The High Court stayed orders of the Certificate Officer in the above petitions. By a judgment and order dated 22.8.1991 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Special Leave petition, being No. 10538 of 1989 (arising out of W.P. 4089 of 1988) held that since two writ petitions, being C.W.J.C. Nos. The High Court stayed orders of the Certificate Officer in the above petitions. By a judgment and order dated 22.8.1991 the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Special Leave petition, being No. 10538 of 1989 (arising out of W.P. 4089 of 1988) held that since two writ petitions, being C.W.J.C. Nos. 1114 and 1115 of 1990 are pending before this High Court, challenging the final and passed by the provident Fund Commissioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not inclined to consider those questions. It was directed that the High Court at Patna will consider and decide those questions in accordance with law including the question as to who are the employees within the meaning of section 2(f) of the Act. It was further directed that in deciding the above writ petitions, the impugned judgment of the High Court dated 27.7.1989 shall not, in any way, stand as a bar. 5. Meanwhile the hearing of these writ petitions in this High Court was postponed in view of the pendency of the matter before the Supreme Court. After the order of the Supreme Court as above when this matter came up before us we passed an order on 6.12.1991 to the following effect: "This matter has come before us with a chequered career. There has been a long proceeding since 1977. But unfortunately, it appears that there cannot be an end of this proceeding even now. We need not go into the facts of the case in details. having regard to the fact that we are not disposing of the writ petitions at this stage but only giving some directions. The facts of the case would appear from the proceeding of the earlier writ case filed in this Court against which there has been an appeal to and an order of the Supreme Court. Shortly speaking there were certain proceedings in respect of petitioners by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bihar. These proceedings were challenged in this Court (C.W.J.C. No. 4089 of 1988) and this Court by its judgment and order dated 27th July, 1989, dismissed the writ petition. This related to home workers employed in connection with work of the petitioner's establishment. The question was and is whether they were employees of the petitioner within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred. This related to home workers employed in connection with work of the petitioner's establishment. The question was and is whether they were employees of the petitioner within the meaning of Section 2 (f) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred. to as the said Act.) This Court held that the "Home workers" were 'employed in connection with the work of the petitioner's establishment and hence employees of the petitioner within the meaning of section 2 (f) of the said Act. This decision of this Court was challenged before the Supreme Court which was disposed of by an order dated 22.8.91 in Special Leave petition No. 10538 of 1989 by the following order : "After the Passing of the final award by the Provident Fund Commissioner there has been a challenge by the petitioners of that award in W.P. Nos. CWJC Nos. 1114/90 and 1115/90, and the said writ petitions are pending for decision before the High Court, Patna. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to consider those questions here The High Court, Patna will consider and decide those questions raised in the said two writ petitions in accordance with law, after hearing both the parties. Including the question as to who are the employees within the meaning of section 2 (f) of the Provident Fund Act. The interim order passed by this Court will continue for a period of on month to enable the parties to approach the High Court for appropriate orders. In deciding the above writ petitions, the Impugned judgment shall not, in any way, stand as a bar. The special leave petition is, thus, disposed of." What had happened in the meanwhile is that an order had been passed by the R.P.F.C. Bihar, in the proceeding under Section 7-A of the Act. The admitted position is that the 7-A proceeding order, was based on the judgment of this Court against which the said appeal was preferred to Supreme Court. We cannot decide this matter Oil the order or the Supreme Court as above. However, admittedly the order under section 7A, which is challenged in the present proceedings, is based on that judgment of this Court. This is obviously because the order under section 7 A was passed when the Supreme Court order was not there. We cannot decide this matter Oil the order or the Supreme Court as above. However, admittedly the order under section 7A, which is challenged in the present proceedings, is based on that judgment of this Court. This is obviously because the order under section 7 A was passed when the Supreme Court order was not there. Naturally 7-A order proceeded on the basis of the High Court's order/Judgment, but in view of the Supreme Court's order we are not to be bound by the said High Court order. Various points have been raised before us Including the main point that 7-A order having been passed on the basis of High Court's judgment which has no longer any binding effect, the impugned order cannot be upheld and the question has to be determined afresh. A question was also raised that sufficient opportunity was not given for furnishing information and materials with respect to this matter. The main complication is created by the fact that section 7-A order which Is impugned in these proceedings was passed before the Supreme Court order. This Court, on the basis of the facts available, must decide this question afresh. Accordingly, in order to expedite the disposal of the matter and so that the question of violation of principle of natural justice can no longer be raised and further so that there is some finding of fact by the authority concerned on the basis of all materials produced before them, we passed the following orders, "The petitioner is directed to comply with the directions given by the letter dated 3.10.89 (Annexure 23) which are to the following effect : (i) Payments of rolling charges being made monthwise and contractorwise for the notice period i.e. from June, 1977 on wards for centres in Bihar. (ii) Details of the Contractors to whom payments are made and rollers detail. (iii) Copy of returns filed with Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, W. B. and details of the Parsons working centrewise in Bihar for whom Compliance has been made and left out persons. (iv) Total number of employees working in Bihar in detail centrewise. (v) Other relevant papers/documents. (vi) Balance sheet audited op to date. (iii) Copy of returns filed with Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, W. B. and details of the Parsons working centrewise in Bihar for whom Compliance has been made and left out persons. (iv) Total number of employees working in Bihar in detail centrewise. (v) Other relevant papers/documents. (vi) Balance sheet audited op to date. Out of the above items, So far item no (ii) is concerned, necessary particulars Including addresses are to be supplied by the petitioner within seven days from this date Regarding furnishing or documents or materials other than item (ii), the petitioner shall comply with the same by 31st December 1991. It is also made clear that the R.P.F.C. shall be entitled to call for any further information or documents from the petitioner but in that event notice regarding the same must be issued to the petitioner within a fortnight from this date and must be complied with by the petitioner within a. fortnight thereafter. The petitioners shall allow the officers and the representatives of the R.P.F.C to Inspect all original documents either at its factory or otherwise. The R.P.F.C. shall also entertain any representation of any worker or contractor and for this purpose they shall give notice to the contractors immediately after receipt of and in accordance with the list which will be furnished by tile petitioner us directed hereinabove. However, we make it clear that even the contractors, or labourers or employees concerned do not participate in the proceedings the R.P.F.C shall proceed with the hearing of this matter without, them. Personal hearing will be started from 6th January, 1992, at the Office of the R.P.F.C., Bihar Patna. Such enquiry shall be completed by 21st January, 1992, holding day to day hearing for at least 2 hours daily. No adjournment under any circumstances shall be allowed to anyone and if the petitioners do not appear, the R.P.F.C. shall proceed ex parte. Thereafter a report is to be submitted to this Court on the basis of sue h enquiry on the questions involved in the matter with particular details regarding persons employed and the amount due. The report will be submitted in a sealed cover addressed to the Registrar of the Court with a copy to the petitioner by 31st January. 1992. This matter is adjourned to 3rd February, 1992.” 6. The report will be submitted in a sealed cover addressed to the Registrar of the Court with a copy to the petitioner by 31st January. 1992. This matter is adjourned to 3rd February, 1992.” 6. Pursuant to our order a hearing was given by R.P.F.C. The records or the Proceeding show that the bearing took place before the R.P.F.C. on 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th. The R.P.F.C. visited Biharsharif and thereafter hearing took place again on 20th January 1992. Thereafter a fresh order was passed pursuant to such hearing and this is the order now challenged before us, 7. Thereafter further hearing of these writ petitions started and it was heard on 25th, 26th and 27th of February, 1992. After summer vacation the hearing of the case resumed and it was again heard on 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th of July, 1992, when the hearing was concluded and judgment reserved. 8. The relevant portions of the said Act are set out hereinbelow : Sec. 2 (c) - employer' means i) in relation to an establishment which is a factory, the owner or occupier of the factory, including the agent of such owner of occupier the legal representative of a deceased owner or occupier and, where a person has been named as a manager of the factory under Cl. (f) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 7 of the Factories Act. 1948 (63 of 1948), the person so named. and (ii) in relation to any other establishment the person who, or the authority which, has the ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, and where the said affairs are entrusted to a manager, managing director of managing agent, such manager managing director or managing agent " Sec, 2 (f) - employees means any person who is employed (or Wages In any kind of work, manual or otherwise, In or In connection with the work of an establishment and who gets his wages directly or Indirectly from the employer, and includes any person. (i) employed by or through a contractor in or in connection with the work of the establishment: (ii) engaged as an apprentice, not being an apprentice engaged under the Apprentices Act, 1961 (52 of 1961), or under the standing orders or the establishment." Sec. 7- A" (1) The Central Provident Fund Commissioner, and Additional Central Provident Fund Commissioner or any Deputy provident Fund Commissioner, or any Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner may, by order (a) in a case where a dispute arises regarding the applicability of this Act to an establishment, decide such dispute: and (b) determine the amount due from any employer under any provision of this Act, the Scheme or the Family Pension Scheme or the Insurance scheme, as the case may be, and for any of the aforesaid purposes may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary. (b) The officer conducting the inquiry under sub section (1) shall, for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely: (a) enforcing the attendance of ant person or examining him on oath, (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents: (c) receiving evidence on affidavit (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and any such inquiry shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of secs. 193 and 228; and for the purpose of sec, 196 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1960). "(3) No order shall be made under sub section (1), unless the employer concerned is given a reasonable opportunity of representing his case. (3-A) where the employer, employee or any other person required to attend the inquiry under sub-Section(1) falls to attend such inquiry without assigning any valid reason or fails to produce any document or to file any report or return when called upon to do so. the officer conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or determine the amount doe from any employer as the case may be, on the basis of the evidence adduced during such Inquiry and other documents available on record (4) Where an order sub section (1) is passed against an employer exparte. the officer conducting the inquiry may decide the applicability of the Act or determine the amount doe from any employer as the case may be, on the basis of the evidence adduced during such Inquiry and other documents available on record (4) Where an order sub section (1) is passed against an employer exparte. he may within three months from the date of communication of such order, apply to the officer for setting aside such order and if he satisfies the officer that the show cause notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the inquiry was held, the officer shall make an order setting aside his earlier order and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the inquiry : Provided that no such order shall be set aside merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of the show cause notice if the officer is satisfied that the employer had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear before the officer. Explanation - where an appeal has been preferred under this Act against an order passed exparte and such appeal has been disposed of otherwise than on the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal. no application shall lie under this sub-section for setting aside the exparte order. (5) No order passed under this section shall be set aside on any application under sub-section (4), unless notice thereof has been served on the opposite party." 9. A very detailed submission was made in support of the petitions. Such submissions, however, can be broadly divided into two parts Firstly, that there was no material before the authority concerned in support of the finding that the 'home workers' were "employees" within the meaning of the Act secondly, that there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice. A detailed written argument was also submitted on behalf of the petitioner to which an answer was submitted by the respondents in writing The petitioner filed a written argument in reply thereto. 10. So far as the contention regarding principle of natural justice is concerned, the arguments made come under the following headings. It consists of 24 pages of typed argument. 10. So far as the contention regarding principle of natural justice is concerned, the arguments made come under the following headings. It consists of 24 pages of typed argument. Boradly speaking, the allegations are of the following nature : (a) The petitioner never had any chance to test the veracity or authenticity of any of the identity cards taken on record and relied upon (b) Pre-recorded typed statements of various persons were taken on record by the R.P.F.C. behind the back of the petitioner. Various criticisms were raised regarding the veracity of these statements. (c) 100 persons examined behind the back of the petitioner were not allowed to be put to cross-examination. 11. During the stage of reply a point was also sought to be raised that inasmuch as section 7 A of the Act expressly provides for enquiry that the reasonable opportunity should be given, this test is much more strict than the cases where ordinary principle of natural justice applies. 12. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that it was not correct to say that the findings are perverse of without application of mind. It was submitted that there are materials in support of the reasons. In this context reference is made to the records of the proceedings before the R.P.F.C. which were produced before this Court. It was also submitted that the petitioner cannot challenge the finding of facts in this proceeding. It was also submitted that there was no violation of the principle of natural Justice. It was strongly contended that whatever material was relied upon, the petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its case. It was further submitted that in such as enquiry R.P.F.C., is not required to function like an ordinary court of tribunal, as long as reasonable opportunity is given that is sufficient. 13. On the specific question regarding natural justice it was submitted as follows: The identity cards available on the pre-recorded statements file were not used by the R.P.F.C., on the other hand, identity cards submitted by the R.P.F.C. in Supreme Court in S.L.P. No. 10538 of 1989 were used by him, Only those facts which are not in dispute have been mentioned in report, and they were not used for the purpose of identifying any home worker in connection with determination of the dues payable in respect of them. Pre-recorded statements were all shown to the learned advocate for the petitioner and they were handed over to its counsel on 20.1.92, Bundles of documents were not made use of by the R.P.F.C. in arriving at his conclusion. He had not used the pre-recorded Statements for coming to the conclusion during the course of enquiry. 14. Before I deal with the said arguments I shall refer to some portions of the detailed report submitted. In the report the R.P.F.C. after referring to various matters, inter alia, has stated that a notice was inserted in the leading English and Hindi dailies for two days inviting the attention of the petitioner, contractors/commission agents, home workers of commission agents of the petitioners unions and any person that The R.P.F.C. would be conducting an Inquiry under section 7A of the Act. Separate notices were also given to the advocates. It was further stated that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner and the contractors/commission agents to state their respective cases. A few home workers were also examined in their presence. 15. So far as the facts of the case are concerned, the finding of facts as found by R.P.F.C. are as follows: "6. M/s S.K. Nasiruddin Bidi Merchants (P) Ltd. is engaged in the manufacture of beedis. The head office is at Calcutta and has various branches at Bihar. The branch at Bihar Sharif is a major centre where raw materials for rolling beedis are given and rolled kutcha beedis are collected The petitioners trade mark holder gets the beedi leaves from Madhya Pradesh and tobacco from Gujrat. According to the petitioner, he him, self is not engaged in roiling beedie. He supplies the raw materials such as leaves, tobacco and thread to the commission agents who get them rolled into kutcha beedis either by themselves in their places or through home workers and give the kutcha beedis rolled out of the raw materials to the petitioner. These commission agents are paid at agreed rates. Before supplying the tobacco to the commission agents, the tobacco is blended by the experts in the head office and this is kept a trade secret in order to distinguish the trade mark holders beedis from others. Further each trade mark holder has some specifications of his beedis. These commission agents are paid at agreed rates. Before supplying the tobacco to the commission agents, the tobacco is blended by the experts in the head office and this is kept a trade secret in order to distinguish the trade mark holders beedis from others. Further each trade mark holder has some specifications of his beedis. For example the petitioners beedis are longer than the ones locally used and the sealing of beedi" is also differently from that of the local variety. The petitioner uses 'Gulabi' colours thread or white thread. It is informed that the petitioner's beedis are not consumed in Bihar but consumed mainly in Assam. 6.2 The petitioner enters into contract with the contractors/commission agents for supply of rolled beedis at agreed rates. These contracts are oral contracts. The petitioner is having a L.2 licence Similarly, the commission agents are also having L-2 Licences. The petitioner Supplies leaves, blended tobacco and thread to the contractors/commission agents. A sale note is prepared which indicates the quantity of raw materials (tobacco) supplied and the manner of transport. No consideration passes and there is no payment of money by the contactor commission agent and no receipt of money by the petitioner trade mark holder When the contractor/Commission agent delivers the rolled kutcha beedis to the petitioner, the trade mark holder tallies the same with the quantity of raw materials supplied by him and if there is any shortage, the money equivalent to that shortage is recovered from the contractors commission agents The petitioner trade mark holder makes payment to the contractors/commission agents at agreed rates. A transit note indicating the number of received beedis is prepared. Payment at regular intervals (say a week) is made and receipt from the contractor/commission agent is obtained. Then entries are made in the R.G. 12A register "by the petitioner. It is informed that though specification for their beedis are informed to, the contractor/commission agents at the time of supplying raw materials the petitioner accepts the rolled beedis from the contractors/commission agents in good faith. Practically he does not reject them. He knows that their contractors/commission agents thoroughly checks them at their levels. occasionally when it is found at the head office that some mischief had taken place the matter is investigated such commission agents/are either black listed or contracts with them are discontinued. Practically he does not reject them. He knows that their contractors/commission agents thoroughly checks them at their levels. occasionally when it is found at the head office that some mischief had taken place the matter is investigated such commission agents/are either black listed or contracts with them are discontinued. Shri B K. Sinha, advocate for the petitioner informed that they are dropping a few Contractors like that every year. Thereafter, the rolled kutcha beedis are sent to their centres where baking, labelling and packing is done. At the time of sale excise duty is paid. "7 The contractors/commission agents who are having L 2 Licence receive the raw materials from the petitioner trade mark holder keeps them in their godowns and get the beedis rolled either in their premises or through home workers according to the specifications of the trade mark holder. All the home workers when I met and talked said that 50-60 workers were rolling beedis in the godowns of commission agents about a year back and now alt or them have been asked to roll beedis at their homes. On 17.1.92 I could see two such contractors. Their places are small rooms where raw materials received from the petitioner and the rolled beedis received from the home workers were kept. One of them is Md. Jahangir L 2 licence no. 120, Biharsharif when asked. informed that be worked for M/s Shyam Beedi prior to 1981 but could not produce any records to that effect. However, he said that he has never worked for "two different trade mark holders at the same time. The room is so small that it cannot admit of storage of raw materials of two different trade mark holders simultaneously. Possibility of mixing may not in such cases, be ruled oat, However, he is working as the petitioners commission agent for the last ten years. The other contractor Shri Abdul Talib, Asha nagar. Biharsharif, L 2 143 also confirms that he was working for the petitioner for the last five years and earlier to him his father was working for the petitioner Firm. "7. These contractors supplying the petitioner's raw materials to the home workers who roll them into beedis of the petitioner's specification with or without the help of their family members and bring the rolled beedis to the contractor the next day. "7. These contractors supplying the petitioner's raw materials to the home workers who roll them into beedis of the petitioner's specification with or without the help of their family members and bring the rolled beedis to the contractor the next day. The contractor/commission agent checks them, rejects defective ones and accepts the properly rolled beedis. By testing or smoking he is able to find out that they are rolled out of the Taw materials specially of the tobacco supplied by him. Out of 750 grams of leaves and 300 grams of tobacco 1000 beedis can be rolled. After receiving the rolled beedis he issues equal quantity of raw materials for the next day's work. This process goes on and on every Friday payments are made based on the number of beedis rolled. The contractor makes entries on long papers or note book but does not get the signatures/thumb impressions of the home workers. Everything goes on in good faith. The advocate for the contractor/commission agents informs that such rejections of beedis by his clients are far and few between. "8. The home workers who gave their evidence during the enquiry and those who gave their statements and those whom I met at Biharsharif during my visit on 17.1.92 confirmed the above facts. All these home workers informed that they work for the petitioner's contractor/commission agents for several years. About a year back these workers were working in the godowns and now they have been asked to work at their homes. They all informed that they are aware that they are working on the raw materials supplied by the petitioner trade mark holder through the commission agents. They are paid according to the minimum wages which Is Rs. 17.50 per thousand beedis. These home workers hand over the rolled beedis to the commission agents who alone take them to the petitioner. 8.2 Under sub-rule (L) of Rule 41 of the Beedis Workers Welfare Fund Rules, 1976, the owner of an establishment factory or contractor engaged in the manufacture of beedi shall issue to every employee an identity card In Form (2) on which a photograph would also be affixed. Under sub rule (2) of ibid, non-issue of such identity card is a punishable offence. On seeing, such cards issued to the home workers, there is a clear indication that the contractor is the petitioner's commission agent. Under sub rule (2) of ibid, non-issue of such identity card is a punishable offence. On seeing, such cards issued to the home workers, there is a clear indication that the contractor is the petitioner's commission agent. The cards of home workers of a different trade mark holder, commission agent informs that fact The medical centre at Biharsharif keeps a record of these particulars and allows medical treatment to the home workers and their families. It is also known that cases are where such identity cards have not been issued." 16. After consideration. or all the questions Involved it was held that the home workers, who rolled beedis out of the raw materials supplied by the contractors/commission agents or the petitioner trade mark holder are employees of the petitioner through the contractors/commission agents as defined under section 2(f) of the said Act for the following reasons : (a) The petitioner supplies his raw materials which include tobacco of his blending to the contractor for the purpose of getting them rolled into beedis under an oral contract. When the rolled materials are handed over, no consideration passes except a note intimating the quantity of tobacco Supplied. The contractor handles the petitioners raw materials and not these of his Own. (b) The contractor/commission agents get the beedis rolled with the help of home workers according to the specification of the petitioner trade mark holder. (c) The petitioners contention that he does not exercise any right of rejection or damaged bidis rolled by the home workers and that the contractor/commission agent alone does it effectively is not wholly acceptable. It is admitted that the petitioner is satisfied about the checking done by his contractor/commission agent and hence accepts the rolled beedis brought by him. Even this satisfaction comes out of his long experience during which he should have found out that the contractor does this check effectively on their behalf and does not cheat him. No prudent person will simply accept beedis rolled out of the raw materials supplied by him without satisfying that those beedis are his only and rolled according to his specifications. It is also admitted by the petitioner that whenever the head office finds that some mischief has been done, the matter is investigated and the concerned commission agents are either black listed or entering into further contracts with them discontinued. It is also admitted by the petitioner that whenever the head office finds that some mischief has been done, the matter is investigated and the concerned commission agents are either black listed or entering into further contracts with them discontinued. This is also an act of supervision of checking as the petitioner says that every year some contractors are dropped like that. (d) The petitioner gets back the kutcha beedis rolled out of his raw materials from the contractor/commission agent and at this stage they are not fit for sale or commercial use The petitioner then gets them baked, labelled and picked and then sells them in the market after paying the excise duty. The contractor only gives back the rolled kutcha beedis to the petitioner. He does not sell them in the market as his finished products. He cannot also sell as the beedis have not reached that stage by them. He gets remuneration at agreed rates is so much per thousand beedis which is higher than the wages paid by the contractor to the home workers. The beedis which are in the intermediate stage at the hands of the contractor reaches the final stage after reaching the hands of the petitioner. Thus the borne workers roll the beedis of the petitioner firm through the contractor/commission agents. (e) The Identify cards issued to the home workers under rule 41 the Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Rule 1976 has the photograph of the home workers particulars of his family members and indicate that the contractor is the agent of a particular trade mark holder. These are accepted by the medical centre for giving treatment to the worker and his family. Cases of non issue of such cards and a few cases of wrong issue cannot effect the authenticity or undermine the genuineness of the statement of the issuing authority. (f) Though the contractors/Commission agents say that they are principal employers, in fact they are not so. They simply get the raw materials from the petitioner trade mark holder get the beedis rolled by home workers out of them, check whether they are according the petitioners specifications and hand them over to the petitioner and gets remuneration of an agreed amount per thousand rolled Kutcha beedis. They do not buy the raw materials from the petitioner and sell the rolled beedis to the petitioner. They do not buy the raw materials from the petitioner and sell the rolled beedis to the petitioner. They simply get the kutcha beedis rolled by the home workers on petitioners raw materials as per his specifications. They are intermediaries between the petitioner and the home workers. These rolled beedis have not yet become fit for sale and use. (g) These contractors/commission agents do not purchase raw materials in their own right, get the beedis rolled by their own employees in their godowns or by the home workers, bake them, label them, pack them and sell them in the open market. They depend upon this or that trade mark holder for getting the raw materials and for getting remuneration for getting the beedis rolled out of these raw materials. They do not have an independent existence. (h) They are required to hold L 2 licence because they handle tobacco in rolling beedis. The petitioner trade mark holder has to give finishing touches to the beedis rolled by the contractor/commission agent for making them finished products fit for sale and use. (j) Even though the contractors are not prevented from entering into contacts with any trade mark holder, in practice they do the work of one trade mark holder at a time by engaging home workers for that purpose. (k) Even if a home worker is assumed to work for two different trade mark holders contractors. he can under the E.P.F scheme' 1952 be a member in two convered establishments with different account numbers. 17. I shall first deal with the decisions cited before us. 18. In the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hedge and others v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (A.I.R. 1960 S.C, 137) it was observed that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. 19. Where an alleged error is far from self evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior Court to issue such a writ. 19. In the case of Birdhichand Sharma V. First Civil Judge, Nagpur and others (A.I.R 1961 S.C. 644), the appellant was the manager of a bidi factory in Nagpur and respondents 2 to 4 were working in that factory. In that case the respondents applied for leave for 15 days and did not go to work during that period. The appellant did not pay their wages and they applied to the Payment of Wages Authority for payment of wages. The claim was made under sections 79 and 80 of the Factories Act. 1948. The Authority allowed the claim and granted some amount. Thereafter the appellant filed an application under Article 226. The main contention was that respondents 2 to 4 were not workers within the meaning of the Factories Act and could not therefore, claim the benefit of Section 79. The High Court came to the conclusion that respondents 2 to 4 were workers under section 2(1) of the Factories Act and dismissed the writ petition. Thereafter they came up before the Supreme Court by Certificate and in that appeal the question Involved was interpretation of section 2(1) of the Factories Act, which defines a Worker to mean a person employed directly or through any agent, whether for wages or not, in any manufacturing process etc. It was found that the respondents worked at the factory and were not at liberty to work at borne. In this context it was pointed out that the facts of the case were substantially different from the facts in Shri Chintaman Rao's case (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 388). The question before the Supreme Court was whether on the facts of case before them it could be said whether the appellant merely directs what work is to be done but cannot control the manner in which it is to be done. In this context it was pointed out that the nature and extent of control varies in different industries and cannot by its very nature be precisely defined. In this context it was pointed out that the nature and extent of control varies in different industries and cannot by its very nature be precisely defined. Taking the nature of the work in that case the Supreme Court observed that it can hardly be said that there must be supervision all the time when biris were being prepared and unless there was such supervision there can be no direction as to the manner of work. It was held that the operation ill that case being a simple one, the control of the manner in which the work was done was exercised at the end of the day when the biris were ready by the method of rejecting those which do not come up to the proper standard. In such a case it was the right to supervise and not so much that mode in which it was exercised which was held to be important. Upon the consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case it was held that there can be no doubt that respondents 2 to 4 were workers within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Factories Act. It is to be pointed out that through this was not a case or “home workers” the observation regarding the right to supervise and not actual supervision with reference to '"Bidi Workers" which is relevant for consideration in the case before us. 20. In the Case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S Radhakrishnan and others A.I.R. 1964 SC 477) the scope of writ jurisdiction was considered. In this context it was pointed out that it was in the nature of supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned In writ proceeding. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of certiorari can be Issued if it is shown that in recording the laid finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of certiorari can be Issued if it is shown that in recording the laid finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly if a finding of fact is based on evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal the points cannot be agitated before a writ court. 21. In the case of D. M. Sahib & Sons V. Secretary, United beedi Workers Union, Slem and another (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 370), the appellants were proprietors of two bidi concerns. A reference was made by Government of Madras of dispute between the appellants and their: workmen with respect to a matter namely whether reduction of annas two in the wages of workers employee under the agents to the appellants was justified and to what relief the workers were entitled. The contention of the appellants was that the workers in question were not their workmen and therefore there being no relation of employers and employees between them and the workmen, the reference itself was incompetent. In that case the facts were that the contractors took leaves and tobacco from the appellants and they employed workmen for manufacturing Bidis. After Bidis were manufactured the contractors took then back from the workmen and delivered them to the appellants. The workmen took the leaves home refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly if a finding of fact is based on evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. The workmen took the leaves home refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly if a finding of fact is based on evidence that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal the points cannot be agitated before a writ court. 21. In the case of D.M. Sahib & Sons V. Secretary, United Beedi Workers Union, Slem and another (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 370), the appellants were proprietors of two bidi concerns. A reference was made by Government of Madras of dispute between the appellants and their workmen with respect to a matter namely whether reduction of annas two in the wages of workers employee under the agents of the appellants was justified and to what relief the workers were entitled. The contention of the appellants was that the workers in question were not their workmen and therefore there being no relation of employers and employee between them and the workmen, the reference itself was incompetent. In that case the facts were that the contractors took leaves and tobacco from the appellants and they employed workmen for manufacturing Bidis. After Bidis were manufactured the contractors took then back from the workmen and delivered them to the appellants. The workmen took the leaves home and cut them there, however the process of actual rolling by filling the leaves with tobacco took place in what were called contractors factories. 22. It is to be pointed out that this was on a special leave from writ petition filed In High Court where it was challenged that the Tribunal was wrong In holding that the contractors and the workmen employed by the contractors were the workmen of the appellants. The learned Single Judge on a review of the terms of the contract and the evidence on record held that neither the bidi roller nor the intermediary was an employee of the appellants. The learned Single Judge on a review of the terms of the contract and the evidence on record held that neither the bidi roller nor the intermediary was an employee of the appellants. Accordingly the award was set aside. There was an appeal against the same. The appeal court held that the appellants were the real employers of the workmen and the so called intermediaries or so called independent Contractors who were in some cases ex-employees, were no more agents of the appellants. In this view of the matter the appeal Court held that the conclusion reached by the tribunal that the intermediaries were merely branch managers appointed by the management and the relationship of employer and employees subsisted between the appellants and bidi rollers was correct. The appeals were, therefore, allowed, and order of the tribunal was restored. 23. In this case it was held, inter alia, that (1) the correct approach in such a case was to consider whether having regard to the nature of the work, there was due control and supervision by the employer, (2) that the nature of the control required to make a person a servant of the master would depend upon .the facts of each case, (3) on the evidence in the case that the so called independent contractors were mere agents or branch managers as the so called independent contractors were indigent persons who were in all respects under the control of the appellants, (4) that the sale of raw materials to the so called independent contractor and resale by him of the manufactured bidis was a mere camouflage the nature of which was apparent from the fact that the so called contractor never paid for the materials. (5) that the workers employed by the so-called contractors were really the workmen of the appellants who mere employed through their agents or servants whom they choose to call Independent contractors, (6) that it was hardly likely that the so called independent contractor would accept bidis which were not upto the standard, for that was usually the system which prevailed in this trade. It was, therefore. not possible to hold in the absence of any evidence one way or the other that there was no supervision whatsoever of the work done by the workers. It was, therefore. not possible to hold in the absence of any evidence one way or the other that there was no supervision whatsoever of the work done by the workers. in the circumstances the relationship of master and servant between the appellants and the workmen employed by the so called independent contractors was established, (7) that the intermediaries were merely branch managers appointed by the management and the relationship of employers and employees subsisted between the appellants and bidi rollers. 24. The Supreme Court considered the question as to whether relationship of master and .servant subsists between an employer and employee and in this context referred various earlier decisions of the Supreme Court. Reference was made to Dharangdhora Chemical Works Ltd. V, State of Saurashtra (A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 264) where it was held that the question whether the relation between the parties was one as between an employer and employee or master and servant was a pure question of fact, depending upon the circumstances of each case. The court also considered the case of Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 388) That was a case of bidi manufacture, and the question that arose for determination was whether certain persons known as sattedars and those who worked under the sattedara were workmen or not. Reference was also made to Birdhichand Sharma V. First Civil Judge, Nagpur A.I.R. (1961) S.C. 644 referred to earlier which was also a case of bidi manufacture and where it was pointed out that the nature of the Control required to make a person a servant of the master would depend upon the facts of each case. Supreme Court next considered the case of Shankar Balaji Waja V. State of Maharashtra A.I.R. (1962) S.C. 517 which was also a bidi manufacturing case. On the facts of that case the majority held that the decision in Birdhichand Sharma's case was distinguishable and the appellant was not a worker within the meaning of the Factories Act. Reference was made next to the case of Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd V Union of India A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 1591 and it was observed as follows ; It has been found by the tribunal and this view has been confirmed by the appeal court that the so-called independent contractors were mere agents or branch Managers of the appellants. Reference was made next to the case of Bhikusa Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd V Union of India A.I.R. (1963) S.C. 1591 and it was observed as follows ; It has been found by the tribunal and this view has been confirmed by the appeal court that the so-called independent contractors were mere agents or branch Managers of the appellants. We see no reason to disagree with this view taken by the tribunal and confirmed by the appeal court on the facts of these cases." (Para 12) It was argued before the Supreme Court that there was no control by even the agent over the bidi workers. In this context it was pointed out as follows :- "...In the present case we have not got the full terms of the agreement and it is, therefore not possible to say that there was no kind of supervision or control over the workers and that the so called independent contractors had to accept all kinds of bidis whether made up to standard or not. It is hardly likely that the so-called 'independent contractor will accept bidis which are not up to the standard, for that is usually the system which prevails in this trade as will be apparent from the facts of the many bidi manufacturing cases to which we have referred. We are, therefore, not prepared to hold in the absence of any evidence one way or the other that there is no supervision whatsoever of the work done by the workers. In the circumstance we are opinion that the relationship of master and servant between the appellants and the workmen employed by the so called independent contractors is established.” (para 13). Accordingly, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that on the facts found in these cases, the appeal court was fight in holding that the conclusion reached by the tribunal that the intermediaries were merely branch managers appointed by the management and the relationship of employers and employees subsisted between the appellants and the bidi rollers was correct. In that view of the matter the appeals were dismissed with costs. 25. In the case of the State of Maharashtra Vs. Babulal Kriparam Takkamore and ors. ( AIR 1967 SC 1353 ) a distinction was made between an order of preventive detention and other orders and in this context it was observed as follows :- ..... In that view of the matter the appeals were dismissed with costs. 25. In the case of the State of Maharashtra Vs. Babulal Kriparam Takkamore and ors. ( AIR 1967 SC 1353 ) a distinction was made between an order of preventive detention and other orders and in this context it was observed as follows :- ..... ..an administrative or quasi Judicial order based on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustained if it be found that some of the grounds are non extent or irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order based on several grounds some of which are found to be non existent or irrelevant, can be sustained if the court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the other relevant and existing grounds and the exclusion of the Irrelevant or nonexistent grounds could not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision." (para 15) 26. In the case of Silver Jubilee Talloring House and others Vs. Chief Inspector of shop a and Establishments & ors. ( AIR 1974 SC 37 ), the question was whether employer and employee relationship existed between appellants and their workers in the tailoring house referring to various decision of the Supreme Court including Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. Vs. State of Saurashtra ( AIR 1957 SC 264 ), Birdhichand Sharma Vs. First Civil Judge, Nagpur and others ( AIR 1961 SC 644 ), D.C. Dewan Mohideen Sahib and Sone Vs. Industrial Tribunal Madras ( AIR 1966 SC 370 ), Shankar Balaji Waje Vs. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1962 SC 517 ), the Supreme Court observed that it is not surprising that in recent years the control test as traditionally formulated bas not been treated as an exclusive test. In this context, the Supreme Court observed as follows ;- "It is exceedingly doubtful today whether the search for a formula in the nature of a single test to tell a contract for service from a contract for service will serve any useful purpose. In this context, the Supreme Court observed as follows ;- "It is exceedingly doubtful today whether the search for a formula in the nature of a single test to tell a contract for service from a contract for service will serve any useful purpose. The most that profitably can be done is to examine all the factor that have been referred to in the cases on the topic, Clearly, not all of these factors would be relevant in all these cases or have the same weight in all cases. It is equally clear that no magic formula can be propounded which factors should in any case be treated as determining ones. The plain fact is that in a large number of cases, the court can only perform a balancing operation weighing up the factors which point In One direction and balancing them against those pointing in the opposite direction. See Atiyah P.S. 'Vicariou Liability in the law of Torts, pp. 37 38. (para 29) "During the last two decades the emphasis in the field has shifted and no longer rest so strongly upon the Question of control. Control Is obviously an important factor and in many cases it may still be the decisive factor. But it is wrong to say that in every case it is decisive. It is now no more than a factor, although an important one." (para 30) In this context it was further observed as follows :- "Quite apart from all, these circumstances as the employer has right to reject the end product if it does not conform to the instruction of the employer and direct the worker to restitch it, the element of control and supervision as formulated in the decisions or this court Is also present. "(para 35) A person can be a servant of more than one employer. A servant need not be under the exclusive control of one master. He can be employed under more than one employer. (para 37) 27. In the case of Mangalare Sanesh Beedi works etc. etc V. Union of India etc A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1832), the main point involved was the validity of Beedi and Cigar workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. A servant need not be under the exclusive control of one master. He can be employed under more than one employer. (para 37) 27. In the case of Mangalare Sanesh Beedi works etc. etc V. Union of India etc A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1832), the main point involved was the validity of Beedi and Cigar workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966. In this context the Supreme Court observed as follows:- “In cases where the manufacturer or trade mark holder himself employees labour there is direct relationship of master and servant and therefore liability is attracted by reason of that relationship. There cannot be any question of unreasonableness in such a case. In the second category the manufacture or trade mark holder engages contract labour through & contractor and he becomes the principal employer. Though such labour may be engaged by a contractor with or without the knowledge of the manufacturer or trade mark holder, this contract labour is engaged for the principal employer who happens to be the trade mark holder or the manufacturer. The liability arises by reason of contract labour engaged for or on behalf of the principal employer. In the third category, the contractor becomes the principal employer because the contractor engages labour for or on his own behalf. Where the contractor engages labour for the manufacturer it is not unreasonable restriction to impose liability on the manufacturer for the labour engaged by the manufacturer through the Contractor. It is important to notice that the Act fastens liability on the person who himself engages labour or the person for whom and on whose behalf labour is engaged or where a person has ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment by reason of advancement of money or of substantial interest In the control of the affairs of the establishment. (para 34). "Therefore, the manufactures or trade mark holders have liability in respect of Worker a who are directly employed by them or who are employed by them through contractors. Workers at the industrial premises do not present any problem. The manufacturer or trade mark bolder will observe all the provisions of the Act by reason of employing such labonr in the industrial premises. When the manufacturer engages labore through the contractor the labour is engaged on behalf of the manufacturer and the letter has therefore liability to such contract labour. The manufacturer or trade mark bolder will observe all the provisions of the Act by reason of employing such labonr in the industrial premises. When the manufacturer engages labore through the contractor the labour is engaged on behalf of the manufacturer and the letter has therefore liability to such contract labour. It is only when the contractor engages labour for or on his own behalf and supplies the finished product to the manufacturer that he will be the principal employer in relation to such labore and the manufacturer will not be responsible for implementing the provisions of the Act with regard to such labour employed by the contractor If the right of rejection rests with the manufacturer or trade mark holder, in such a case, the contractor who will prepare beedis through the contract labour will find it difficult to establish that he is the independent contractor. If it is a genuine sale transaction by the contractor to the manufacturer or trade mark holder it will point in the direction of an independent contractor. (para 35). 28 Referring to the Silver Jubilee Tatloring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (A.I.R 1974 S.C. 37), it was observed as follows :- "Mathew J Speaking for the Court referred to the decisions of this Court and English and American decisions and came to these conclusions First, in recent years the control test as traditionally formulated has not been treated as an exclusive test. Control is an important factor. Second, the organisation test, viz., that the workers attend the Shop and work there is a relevant factor. It he employer provides the equipment this is some indication that the contract is a contract of service. If the other party provides the equipment this is some evidence that he is an independent contractor. No sensible Inference can be drawn from the factor of equipment where it is customary for servants to provide for their own equipment. Little weight can today be put upon the provisions of tools of minor character as opposed to plant and equipment on a large scale. Third, if the employer has a right to reject the end product if it does not conform to the instructions of the employer and direct the worker to re-stitch it, the element of control and supervision as formulated in the decisions of this Court is also present. Third, if the employer has a right to reject the end product if it does not conform to the instructions of the employer and direct the worker to re-stitch it, the element of control and supervision as formulated in the decisions of this Court is also present. Fourth, a person can be a servant of more than one employer. A servant need not be under the exclusive control of one master. He can be employed under more than one employer. Fifth that the workers are not obliged to work for the whole day in the shop is not very material. In the ultimate analysis it would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case in determining the relationship of master and servant." (para 39) Thereafter the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "The present legislation la intended to achieve welfare benefits and amenities for the labours. That is why the manufacturer or trade mark holder becomes the principal employer though he engages contract labour through the contractor. He cannot escape liability imposed on him by the statute by stating that he has engaged the labour through a. contractor to do the work and therefore he is not responsible for the labour. The contractor in such a case employs the labour only for and on behalf of the principal employer. The contractor being an agent of the principal employer for manufacturing beedis is amenable to the control of principal employer. That is why the statute says that even if the contractor engages labour without the knowledge of the employer the principal employer is answerable for such labour because the labour is engaged for or on his behalf The Act and the Rules thereunder prescribe maintenance of log books and registers. Where the manufacturer or the trade mark holder engages labour directly, the manufacturer maintains registers and log books, Where the manufacturer engages contract labour through a contractor the manufacturer will require tile contractor to maintain such log books of the contract labour and through such books and registers will keep control over not only the contractors but also the labour," (Para 40). 29. In the case of Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 965) on the question of principles of natural Justice it was observed as follows:- " Natural justice is no unruly horse. no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. 29. In the case of Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee (A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 965) on the question of principles of natural Justice it was observed as follows:- " Natural justice is no unruly horse. no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt that is the conscience of the matter.(Para 13). 30. In the case of Hussainbhai. v. The Alath Factory Tezhilall Union and others (A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1410), it was a judgment of Krishna Iyer, J. who pointed out that the contention that the petitioner entered into agreements with intermediate contractors who had hired the respondent Union's workmen and so no employer employee relationship existed was to be totally rejected. In this context it was observed as follows :- “The true test may, with brevity, be indicated once again. Where a worker or group of workers/labours to produce good or services and these goods or services are for the business of another, that other is, in fact, the employer. He has economic control over the workers' subsistence, skill and continued employment. If he, for any reason, chokes off the worker is, virtually laid off. The presence of intermediate contractors with whom alone the workers have immediate or direct relationship ex contractu is of no consequence when, no lifting the veil or looking at the conspectus of factors governing employment. we discern the naked truth, though draped in different perfect paper arrangement, that the real employer is the Management, not the immediate contractor. Myriad devices, half hidden in fold after fold of legal form depending On the degree of concealment needed, the type of industry, the local conditions and the like, may be resorted to when labour legislation casts Welfare obligations on the real employer, based on Arts. 38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the constitution. Myriad devices, half hidden in fold after fold of legal form depending On the degree of concealment needed, the type of industry, the local conditions and the like, may be resorted to when labour legislation casts Welfare obligations on the real employer, based on Arts. 38, 39, 42, 43 and 43-A of the constitution. The court must be astute to avoid the mischief and achieve the purpose of the law and not be misled by the maya of legal appearances" (Para 5). "If the livelihood of the Workmen substantially depends on labour rendered to produce goods and services for the benefit and satisfaction of an enterprise, the absence of direct relationship or the presence of dubious inter- mediaries or the make believe trappings of detachment from the Management cannot snap the real life bond. The story may vary but the inference defies ingenuity. The liability cannot be shaken off.”(para 6) 31. In the case of K.L. Tripatht v. State Bank of India (A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 273) the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the question of general principle of natural justice in the case of a disciplinary enquiry. It was urged in that case that the requirement of rule 50 was not complied with. It was submitted that the materials against the appellant were gathered in his absence and he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses, evidence against him was not recorded in his presence. It was submitted that reasonable opportunity under the rules required that materials against a person should not be gathered behind his back and he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine, if necessary, the persons who had supplied the materials or given evidence against him. 32. Accepting the contention of the learned Advocate that rules of natural justice implied an opportunity to give evidence in respect of the charges or to deny the charges against him, it was Observed as follows:- "In respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an officer or an employee of Statutory Corporation like the State Bank of India there must be an investigation into the charges consistent with the requirements of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice as far as these were applicable to a particular situation. So whether a particular principal of natural justice has been violated or not to be judged in the background of the nature of charges, the nature of the investigation conducted, In the background of any statutory or relevant rules governing such enquiries. Here the infraction of the natural justice complained or was that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the materials gathered in his absence." (para 29) 33. Stating that the principle of natural justice would depend on facts and circumstances of each, it was held that it cannot be said that in conducting the enquiry or flaming of the charges or arriving at the decision, the authorities concerned have acted to violation of the principles of natural justice merely because the evidence was not recorded in his presence or that the materials gathered, the gist of which was communicated to him, were not in his presence. In that case it was pointed out that an action against a party which Involve penal or adverse consequences must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice but whether any particular principle of natural justice would be applicable to a particular situation or the question whether there has been any infraction of the application of that principle, has to be judged in the light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. The basic requirement is that there' must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons and it was reiterated that the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put to any rigid formula. 34. In the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416) the Supreme Court was Considering the second proviso to clause (a) of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In this connection, the Supreme Court dealt with the general Principle relating to the rule of natural justice. 34. In the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416) the Supreme Court was Considering the second proviso to clause (a) of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In this connection, the Supreme Court dealt with the general Principle relating to the rule of natural justice. After referring to various decisions of the English Courts and the Supreme Court, It was observed as follows :- "The rule of natural justice with which we are concerned in these Appeals and writ petitions, namely, the audi alteram partem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that a person against whom an order to his prejudice may be passed should be Informed of the allegations and charges against him, be given an opportunity of submitting his Explanations thereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral or documentary by which the matter Is proposed to be decided against him, and to inspect the documents which are relied upon for the purpose of being used against him, to have the witnesses, who are to give evidence against him examined in his presence and have the right to cross examine them, end to lead his own evidence, both oral and documentary, in his defence. The process of a fair hearing need not however, conform to the judicial process in A court or law, because Judicial adjudication of causes involves a number of technical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessary and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing within the meaning of audi alterem partam rule in quasi judicial or administrative inquiry. (Para 96) Though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex In causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in Jaw and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are non etheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situation. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These roles are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situation. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not alike. These roles are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal strait-jacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adopted and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is concerned." (para 97) It was held that ordinary principles of natural justice should be kept flexible and must adopted to the circumstances prevailing in any particular case. It must depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or enquiry body appointed for that purpose. 35. Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioners to the case C.E.S.C. ltd. V. Subhash Chandra Bose and others A.I.R.(1992) S.C. 573. There the whole question for determination in the appeal before the Supreme Court was, whether on the facts found, the right of the principal employer to reject or accept work on completion, on scrutinizing compliance with job requirements, as accomplished by a contractor, the immediate employer, through his employees, is in itself and effective and meaningful supervision as envisaged under section 2(9) of the Employees State Insurance Act. This was a case or the Calcutta Electricity Supply Corporation (India) Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the C.E.S.C.), which engages various contractors to carry out work of excavation conversion of overhead electric lines and laying or underground cables under public road as well as for repair and maintenance of the aforesaid works. Subhash Chandra Bose and some others, the private respondents were given such contracts, terms and conditions in respect of each were reduced to writing The C.E.S.C. was on notice alerted by the Regional Director or the Employees state Insurance Corporation for short E.S.I.C.) by means of communication dated 26th August, 1975 that the employees whose wages were being paid through such a contractor would fall within the scope of Section 2(9) of the Act and for reasons and details mentioned in the communication. Thereupon the C.E.S.C. on its part engaged in correspondence with the Association of Electrical Contractors of Eastern India, a representative body of the contractors who are parties respondents, requiring them to comply with the provisions of the said Act immediately or else it will deduct a lump sum of 7% from their bills. The Association questioned the move and strongly refuted such obligation After indulging in some correspondence on the subject, the C.E. S.C. started making, deductions from their bills on account of contribution to the Employees State Insurance Fund on and from 1984 and continued deducting till 1985 at the rate of 10%, Some more correspondence ensured, but in vain. The electrical contractors moved the High Court of Calcutta in a writ petition against the E.S.I.C. as also its officers as also the C.E.S.C so as to have the entire basis of the demand and deduction from the bills annulled. Another writ petition was filed and they were dismissed by a learned single Judge of the High Court on 11.1.1986. The learned single Judge held that the Act was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case, The learned Judge inter alia, held that the C.E.S.C. retained the ultimate power or supervision and is fact did supervise the work executed by the contractors. The learned single Judge came to the conclusion that the principal employer could not escape the liability for the works of his contractors as the latter was acting as the agent of the principal and in sense confirmed the view of the Regional Director of the E.S.I.C. Two appeals were filed against the dismissal of the writ petitions before the Division Bench who, after reconsidering the matter, reversed the learned single Judge and thereafter the special leave was filed. On behalf of the appellants it was urged that the High Court fell 'In error in giving a restricted meaning to the work 'supervision' occurring, in section 2(9) of the Act and in taking out the final act of rejection or acceptance of work from the purview of that word. On behalf of the appellants it was urged that the High Court fell 'In error in giving a restricted meaning to the work 'supervision' occurring, in section 2(9) of the Act and in taking out the final act of rejection or acceptance of work from the purview of that word. One of the cases considered In that judgment was the patel's case in which context the Supreme Court observed- “In whatever manner the word 'employee' under section 2 (9) be construed, liberally or restrictedly, the construction cannot go to the extent of ruling out the function end role of the immediate employer or obliterating the distance between the principal employer and the immediate employer. In some situations he is the cut off. He is the one who stumbles in the way of direct nexus being established, unless statutorily fictioned, between the employee and the principal employer. He is the one who in a given situation is the principal employer to the employee, directly employed under him. If the work by the employee is conducted under the Immediate gaze or over seeing of the principal employer, or his agent subject to other conditions as envisaged being fulfilled, he would be an employee for the purpose of section 2 (9), Thus besides the question aforeposed with regard to supervision of the principal employer the subsidiary question is whether instantly the contractual supervision exercised by the immediate employer (the electrical contractors) over his employee was exercised on the terms of the contract, towards fulfilling a self obligation or in discharge of duty as an agent of the principal employer." (para 13). It was pointed out that P.M. Patel's case could not be of any help to interprete the word supervision in the C.E.S.C.'s case. The word as such was not found employed in section 2 (f) of the said Act but found used in the text of the judgment. It was held that what was done in Patel’s case cannot impso facto be Imported in the instant case since the word supervision' in the textual context requires independent construction. Accordingly, what is meant by supervision was considered. It was observed. "It is work under eye and gaze of some one who can immediately direct a corrective and tender advice. It was held that what was done in Patel’s case cannot impso facto be Imported in the instant case since the word supervision' in the textual context requires independent construction. Accordingly, what is meant by supervision was considered. It was observed. "It is work under eye and gaze of some one who can immediately direct a corrective and tender advice. In the textual sense supervision' of the principal employer or his agent is on work at the places envisaged and the word work can neither be construed so broadly to be the final act of acceptance or rejection of work, nor So narrowly so as to be supervision at all times and at each and every step of the work. A harmonious construction alone would help carry out the purpose or the Act which would mean moderating the two extremes. When the employee is put to work under the eye land gaze of the principal employer or his agent, where he can be watched secretly, accidentally, or occasionally, while the work is in progress, so s to scrutinise the quality thereof and to detect fault therein, as also put to timely remedial measures by directions given, finally leading to the satisfactory completion and acceptance of the work, that would in our view be supervision for the purposes of section 2 (9) of the Act. It is the consistency of vigil the proverbial' a stich in time saves nine The standards of vigil would of course depend on the facts of each case. Now this function, the principal employer, no doubt can delegate to has agent who in the eye of law is his second self, i.e., a substitute of the principal employer.” (Para14). The supreme Court then considered the meaning of the word “agent" within the meaning of section 182 of the Indian contract Act, 1872, examined the context and held that the supervision taken was to fulfil a contractual obligation simpliciter, Accordingly. on both the counts, the principal question as well as the subsidiary question, it was decided against the E.S.I.C. holding that on the facts and circumstances they do not come within the scope of the Act and that all demands made towards E.S.I contribution made against the C.E.S.C. and the electrical contractors were invalid. 36. In this case, long arguments have been made Which, in my opinion, was unnecessary and inmatarial. 36. In this case, long arguments have been made Which, in my opinion, was unnecessary and inmatarial. Certain basic principles were ignored in the course of the argument The writ court is not a court of appeal. It cannot appraise the evidence. It cannot correct any error of fact but only error or law. Reference may be made in this connection to Syed Yakoob's case (ibid). The only question involved ill this case is whether the so called home workers are the employees of the petitioner within the meaning of section 2(f) or the Act and, therefore, covered by the provisions of the Act. This is not a pure question or law. There is no question of any error of law involved in this case. It is not within the scope or enquiry or the writ court to examine whether one particular material was considered or not considered, whether a. particular fact/contention/document was specifically referred to in the reasoned order or not, but whether the finding arrived at was without any bash or material or that it may be branded as perverse. As pointed out in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (ibid) the process of a fair hearing before such an authority need not conform to the judicial process in a court of law, because judicial adjudication of causes involves a number or technical rules or procedure and evidence which are unnecessary, and not required for the purpose of a fair hearing with the meaning of audi alteram partem rule in a quasi judicial or administrative enquiry. The detailed written argument, which was given in support of the petition and the reply in answer there to and the detailed argument made before us on behalf of the petitioner, show an attempt to argue an appeal against the R.P.F.C.’s order in this writ petition which is not. permissible. An appeal is provided against such an order to a tribunal to be constituted under the Act but unfortunately no such Tribunal has yet been constituted but that does not mean that the writ court should function as a substitute for the Tribunal as contemplated under the Act. As a matter of fact, if I may be permitted to point out, the manner in which arguments were advanced would not have even entitled the petitioner to succeed even If this was an appeal. As a matter of fact, if I may be permitted to point out, the manner in which arguments were advanced would not have even entitled the petitioner to succeed even If this was an appeal. Even the scope of appeal on facts is limited and a judgment/decree of lower court can not be set aside in the appeal on, the grounds it was sought to be argued before us. 37. I have gone through the reasons, seen the written arguments, gone through the records of the proceeding which will speak for themselves and accordingly, in my opinion, I do not find any support for the contention that there is no material in support of the findings given. Each and every reason given is a finding of fact or an inference drawn from a finding of fact. This being not an appeal these findings cannot be challenged. The materials in support of the finding of facts are given in the impugned order itself. This is also clear from the records of the proceedings. Accordingly, there is no merit in this contention. It is not necessary for us to point out in respect of each and every finding of fact, the different materials on records. I have gone through the said report and the records of proceeding and I have quoted the relevant excerpts from the report of the R.P.F.C. Accordingly, I do not want to burden this judgment by repeating the same. 38 On the question of natural justice, at the outset I may point out that I do not find any merit in the contention of Mr. Ray, made at the fag end of his lengthy argument, that duty to give a reasonable opportunity to the employer as provided by section 74 (3) of the Act is different from the ordinary principle of natural justice and in cases under the Act the duty of R.P.F.C. is more onerous. In my opinion, this argument is fallacious. Sometimes it is argued and in some cases it has been held that the principle of natural justice does not apply in a particular case, e.g. confirmation of a sentence under the Army Act. Accordingly, it has been made clear that in respect of an adjudication under section 7 A, the duty of giving a fair hearing shall apply. Nothing more, nothing less. 39. Accordingly, it has been made clear that in respect of an adjudication under section 7 A, the duty of giving a fair hearing shall apply. Nothing more, nothing less. 39. On the question of compliance of the principle of natural justice, it may be pointed out, on some occasions what is argued in effect is not the principle of natural justice but the principle of unnatural justice. As pointed out in the case of Board of Mining Examination (ibid) natural justice is no unruly horse. Natural justice does not mean unnatural extension of natural justice. Finical and fanatical approach is not the correct approach. In substance, it means a fair opportunity of a fair hearing 40. In this case, as it appears from the records of the case pursuant to this Court's direction dated 6.12.91, the enquiry was conducted on all working days from 6.1.to 21. 1.92 for two hours on each day. R.P.F.C. himself went to Biharsharif, that is, the place of business of the petitioner, and visited the petitioner's office, commission agents, few home workers, the medical centre to acquire first hand knowledge of the matter. As per directions of this Court dated 6.12.91, the petitioner was directed to comply with the directions given by the R.P.F.C. by his letter dated 3.10.89, pursuant to which the petitioner submitted various documents, which, according to R.P.F.C. did not throw any light on the details of the home workers and rolling charges paid to them on the ground that they were the employees of the commission agents and that they did not have record commented with them. A notice was Inserted in the leading English and Hindi dailies for two days inviting the attention of the petitioner, contractors/commission agents home workers of commission agents of the petitioners Unions and any person that the R.P.F.C. would be conducting an inquiry under section 7A of the Act from 6.1.92 to 21.1.92 for two hours on this matter. Separate notices were also given to the advocates for the petitioner and the advocates who appeared earlier for certain contractors commission agents. The petitioner's advocate was also requested to use his good offices in advising the contractors/commission agents to actively participate in the inquiry. Several lawyers appeared for the petitioner and several lawyers appeared for the contractors. Separate notices were also given to the advocates for the petitioner and the advocates who appeared earlier for certain contractors commission agents. The petitioner's advocate was also requested to use his good offices in advising the contractors/commission agents to actively participate in the inquiry. Several lawyers appeared for the petitioner and several lawyers appeared for the contractors. One lawyer, who appeared for the contractors, namely, Shri Jagdish Prasad went to Biharsharif to have conference of contractors/commission agents so that he could represent as many contractors as possible and place their view points. Advocates also appeared on behalf of several labour unions. 41. During enquiry sufficient opportunities were given to all concerned for representation of their case and production of documents, as directed by the High Court to have a fresh look on the matter and to ensure that sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner and others. As appears from the report, sufficient opportunity was afforded to the petitioner and the contractors/commission agents to place their respective cases, before him A few home workers were also examined in their presence. 42. It is to be noticed as pointed out in the report of the R.P.F.C. that the only point raised before the R.P.F.C. for the time being and before us in this writ petition was on the question as to whether ‘home workers' are employees of the petitioner. As pointed out by the R.P.F.C., perusing whatever records that might have been made available by the 527 contractors/commission agents in respect of thousands of workers for several years and determining the dues would certainly be a time consuming process, which could be taken after the main issue was decided finally. 43. We have also gone through the records or the said proceedings which were produced before us and which were allowed to be inspected by the learned advocates appearing for the petitioner. From this, it is quite clear that it is not open to the petitioner to make any complaint that no fail hearing or reasonable opportunity to represent its case was given to it. Some specific instance of the same may be given herein below, which relate to the specific points raised on this question. Statements of three witnesses were recorded. namely, Nazim Ahmad-examined and cross examined on 10.1.92, Md. Mukhtar examined and cross-examined on 20.1.92 and Abdul Mazid examined and cross-examined on 20.1.92. Some specific instance of the same may be given herein below, which relate to the specific points raised on this question. Statements of three witnesses were recorded. namely, Nazim Ahmad-examined and cross examined on 10.1.92, Md. Mukhtar examined and cross-examined on 20.1.92 and Abdul Mazid examined and cross-examined on 20.1.92. Medical registers and identity cards we're statutorily maintained. Medical 'register is a public document. Certain facts were found upon inspection by the R.P.F.C at Bihar Sharif after due notice to the writ petitioner. The fact that the R.P.F.C. was to visit Bihar Sharif was communicated to the petitioner. which is not disputed. 44. So far as identity cards are concerned, they were to be maintained under rule 41 of the Bidi Workers welfare Rules, 1976. It has been stated by the R.P.F.C that the identity cards available on the recorded statements file were not used by him but those, which were submitted by him in the Supreme Court were used by him. Further, according to the R.P.F.C. only those facts, which are not in dispute are mentioned in the report and nothing else. 45. So far as the pre-recorded statements are concerned, it has been stated in the report that all were shown to the learned advocates for the petitioner and they were handed over to the petitioner's counsel on 20.1.92. It is further mentioned in the report that an the bundles of documents were not relied upon by him. There were overwhelming materials on the records, as recorded in the report The stand of the R.P.F.C. is that the alleged pre-recorded statements were not accepted by the R.P.F.C. behind the back of the petitioner, they were produced on 20.1.92 and were immediately shown to the petitioner's counsel. Photo copies thereof were given to the petitioners counsel at the earliest opportunity. Further it is stated, as would appear from the report, those statements were not used in arriving at the conc1udon after completion or enquiry. 46. On the aforesaid facts, it is quite clear the no grievance can be made for not giving proper hearing, Since the introduction of the Act bringing the Bid! Industry within the ambit thereof 15 years back, up till now no payment has been made. On the other hand protracted litigations are being carried on in order to avoid payment. All opportunities as far as practicable were given. Industry within the ambit thereof 15 years back, up till now no payment has been made. On the other hand protracted litigations are being carried on in order to avoid payment. All opportunities as far as practicable were given. In any event, as held in State of Orissa v. Vidya Bhushan A.I.R. 1963 S.C 779 even if some of the findings are bad on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice, on that ground the whole order must not be held to be bad. This is not a case like preventive detention. Accordingly, even if it may be found that in anyone aspect or few minor aspects of the matter the principle of natural justice might not have been strictly followed, having regard to the nature of the opportunity given in this case and the totality of the matter. I am of the opinion that such one or two minor deviations here and there, cannot vitiate the report as much and it cannot be get aside on the ground of violation of the principle of natural justice. Accordingly, there is not merit in this contention and this is rejected. 47. Accordingly all the-contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are rejected The application is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs All interim orders are vacated. I agree Application dismissed.