JUDGMENT - SAVANT A.V., J.:—This Revision Application seeks to challenge the Order dated 16th October, 1989 passed by the Court of Small Causes, at Bombay, in Injunction Notice No. 3202 of 1989 in R.A.D. Suit No. 2222 of 1989. Under the impugned order, the learned trial Judge has answered the preliminary issue in the affirmative. The preliminary issue framed was as unders: “Whether this Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the plaintiff's Declaratory Suit?” 2. A few facts may be stated as under: On 5th December, 1975 there was an Agreement of Sale between the Oshiwara Land Development Company Private Limited (in short, “the Company”) and the first petitioner Vinod Mahajan for the purchase of land out of Survey No. 41 , situate at village Oshiwara, taluka : Andheri, District: Greater Bombay. On 8th February, 1979, there was a modification of this Agreement dated 5th December, 1975. On the 21 st September, 1980 there was an Agreement of Sale in favour of the petitioners, who are defendants Nos. 1 to 3 in the present suit filed by the first respondent Abdul Rehman Kashmiri. This agreement relates to an area of 1,40,000 sq. yds. from out of said Survey No. 41 mentioned above. On the very day viz. 21st September, 1980 the possession of the said portion of the land was handed over by the Company to the petitioners and it is the petitioners' case that they are in actual possession of the said land since thereafter and have been paying the taxes and assessment in respect thereof which is the 'suit property'. 3. On 6th February, 1986 there is a conveyance executed in favour of the petitioners by the Company for a consideration of Rs. 52,75,000/-. This conveyance has been produced at Exh. “C”, Page 51 of the Civil Revision Application. In September 1988 defendant No. 2 Yasin S. Rasool M. Khan threatened to trespass into the suit property in the petitioners possession. This resulted in the petitioners filing Suit No. 7383 of 1988 in the City Civil Court, at Bombay, for injunction on 13-9-1988 and on that day itself the petitioners were able to obtain ad interim injunction against the said Yasin Khan who is defendant No. 2 in the present suit - respondent No. 3 in this Civil Revision Application. This resulted in the petitioners filing Suit No. 7383 of 1988 in the City Civil Court, at Bombay, for injunction on 13-9-1988 and on that day itself the petitioners were able to obtain ad interim injunction against the said Yasin Khan who is defendant No. 2 in the present suit - respondent No. 3 in this Civil Revision Application. On the 13th September, 1988 itself the City Civil Court appointed a Commissioner to visit the suit property and make a Report about the actual possession of the suit property. On the 14th September, 1988 the Commissioner visited the suit property and made a Report to the effect that the petitioners were in actual possession of the suit property. On the basis of the material before it, on 3/5th December, 1988 the City Civil Court made the Notice of Motion absolute in Suit No. 7383/88, being Notice of Motion No. 5758/88. Defendant No. 2 Yasin Khan preferred Appeal from Order No. 100 of 1988 to this Court challenging the said order dated 3/5th December, 1988. On 10th February, 1989 this Court summarily dismissed the said Appeal from Order. A special leave petition was filed to the Supreme Court being S.L.P. No. 3560 of 1989. It appears that after arguments the said S.L.P. was withdrawn and in the result the said SLP was dismissed as withdrawn on 7th April, 1989. 4. The plaintiff has filed the present suit on the 14th June, 1989 on the basis of the alleged tenancy agreement executed by the first defendant Virendra Gaur in his favour. It appears that Virendra Gaur claims to have a Power of Attorney in his favour executed by the Company on 15th January, 1981. He also claims to have development agreement in his favour executed by the Company on the same day. Defendant No. 2 Yasin Khan also claims to have a sub-development agreement from the defendant No. I Virendra Gaur executed on the 30th August, 1988. In fact on the 6th September, 1989 Yasin Khan filed Suit No. 7012 of 1988 against one Ashok Padekar, security agent of the petitioners and obtained injunction against the said Padekar. Immediately on the next day viz. 7th September, 1988 there were consent terms filed between the said Padekar and Yasin Khan, who was the plaintiff in Suit No. 7012 of 1988. Immediately on the next day viz. 7th September, 1988 there were consent terms filed between the said Padekar and Yasin Khan, who was the plaintiff in Suit No. 7012 of 1988. It appears that it was on the basis of this consent decree obtained by said Yasin Khan on 7th September, 1988 that he tried to interfere with the possession of the petitioners in the month of September 1988 resulting in the petitioners filing Suit No. 7383 of 1988 on 13th September, 1988, as referred to above. As already stated, the interim order passed in favour of the petitioners in the said City Civil Court suit has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. 5. For the purpose of the present Civil Revision Application, it is enough to look to the plaint filed by Respondent No. 1 plaintiff and the agreement on the basis of which he claims to have entered upon the suit property. The agreement between defendant No. 1 Virendra Gaur, acting as the landlord, and the present plaintiff Abdul Kashmiri, the alleged tenant, is of 14th March, 1981. After describing the parties the recitals in the opening part read as under:— “WHEREAS the landlord is well and sufficiently entitled to and seized and possessed of the piece and parcel of land admeasuring approximately 82,027 sq. yds. S. No. 41 (part), situate lying and being at village Oshiwara, Taluka South Salset, Bombay Suburban District and WHEREAS the landlord has been approached by the tenant to allow him to occupy the said land and structure to enter into and make use of the said land for the purposes of cultivating grass cutting or collecting javli and grass and other produce of the land to which request the landlord has acceded on the terms and conditions hereinafter incorporated.” (Emphasis supplied) Clause (3) of the Agreement reads as under:— “The tenant shall be fully entitled to enter the above land, keep security, cutting materials and implements and put up temporary sheds for the purposes of residence of servants, workers etc. but under any circumstances, he shall not sublet the land or any part thereof.” (Emphasis supplied) Clause (5) of the Agreement reads as under:— “The tenant shall be fully entitled to cut javli, grass, cultivation and other items and produce of the land and sell the same at his disposal and he only shall be entitled to cut trees, dig the land for the purposes of removal of earth and murram and sale thereof and shall not excavate the land, however, he shall till the land for the purpose of cultivation only.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. On the basis of this Agreement, the present suit has been filed and the averments in Para 2 of the plaint read as under:— “2. The plaintiff submits that at the time of creating tenancy in pursuance of tenancy agreement dated 14-3-1981, the entire area was jungle area, however, the land was obtained by the plaintiff for the purpose of cutting Javli, Grass, cultivation and other items and produce of the land and sell the same at his disposal and constructed additional structures as provided in the tenancy agreement clauses of which will be relied upon plaintiff for true meaning and interpretation thereof, which business is being conducted even presently.” (Emphasis supplied) In Para 8 of the plaint, the plaintiff has averred as under :— “8. the plaintiff submits that he has been doing Grass cutting and selling to local Milk-producers and stables, for which he has grass contract sale, transport receipts and letters which he would rely upon when produced.” (Emphasis supplied) 7. After filing the present suit on 14-6-1989, the plaintiff issued a Notice in “Loksatta” on 21st June, 1989 and on perusing the said Notice, the petitioners made an application on 6th July, 1989 for being joined as necessary parties in the suit, On the 14th August, 1989 the Small Causes Court passed an order granting the petitioners' application and after hearing the parties on the point of preliminary issue, passed the impugned order. It is this order which has been challenged in this Civil Revision Application. 8. I have heard both the learned Counsel viz. the Advocate General appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Palekar appearing for the first respondent. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that apart from the background of proceedings initiated by the petitioners in the City Civil Court viz. 8. I have heard both the learned Counsel viz. the Advocate General appearing for the petitioners and Mr. Palekar appearing for the first respondent. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that apart from the background of proceedings initiated by the petitioners in the City Civil Court viz. Suit No. 7383/88 in which interim order passed in favour of the petitioners has been confirmed by the Supreme Court, the present suit would not be maintainable in the Court of Small Causes inasmuch as what was let out to the first respondent-plaintiff was not “premises' within the meaning of the provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (in short, the Bombay Rent Act). The learned Advocate General invited my attention to the terms of the Agreement dated 14-3-1981 and, in particular, to Clauses (3) and (5) reproduced above and contended that there is no manner of doubt whatsoever that the land was at all times being used for growing grass and javli and that the purpose of the lease was cultivating grass, cutting and producing javli or grass. The respondent plaintiff was permitted to enter upon the land for the purpose of keeping security, cutting material and implements and to put up temporary sheds for the residence of the servants, workers etc., as stated in Clause (3). The closing words of Clause (5) specifically required the plaintiff that he shall till the land for the purpose of cultivation only. Clause (5) opens with the word that “the tenant shall be fully entitled to cut javli, grass, cultivation and other items and produce of the land and sell the same at his disposal...” 9. The learned Advocate General further invited my attention to the specific averments made in the plaint in para 2, as reproduced above, which has to be read with Clauses (3) and (5) of the Agreement. He further invited my attention to the averments in para 8 of the plaint that the plaintiff was doing the business of grass cutting and selling to the local milk producers and stables. In the light of these averments in the plaint, on the basis of the agreement, the relevant recitals of which are reproduced above, he contended that the suit property cannot be termed as “premises” within the meaning of Clause (8) of section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. In the light of these averments in the plaint, on the basis of the agreement, the relevant recitals of which are reproduced above, he contended that the suit property cannot be termed as “premises” within the meaning of Clause (8) of section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. The said Clause (8) of section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act reads as under:— “8. “Premises” means— (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes, (b) any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately (other than a farm building) including— (i) the garden, grounds, garages and out -houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building, (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building, (iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include a room or other accumulation in a hotel or lodging house.” He also invited my attention to the provisions of section 6 appearing in Part of the said Rent Act which says that in areas specified in Schedule I, this Part shall apply to premises let or given on licence for residence, education, business, trade or storage. His submission was that, in the first place, the suit property must be “premises” within the meaning of Clause (8) of section 5. It is only if the suit property is “premises” that the question of applicability of the provisions of section 6 appearing in Chapter II would become relevant. In support of his contention, the learned Advocate General has first invited my attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Mst. Subhadra v. Narsaji Chenaji Marwadi)1, reported in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 806, which decision was cited before the learned trial Judge. Subhadra's case was under the Bombay Rent Act and the question was as to whether the provisions of the said Rent Act would apply so as to entertain the application for fixation of standard rent under section 11 of the said Act. In Subhadra's case there was a lease dt. 15-10-1934 and the lessees were permitted to construct buildings on the land after obtaining sanction in that behalf. Till 11th November 1949, the plot was assessed to agricultural purposes under the Bombay Land Revenue Code. In Subhadra's case there was a lease dt. 15-10-1934 and the lessees were permitted to construct buildings on the land after obtaining sanction in that behalf. Till 11th November 1949, the plot was assessed to agricultural purposes under the Bombay Land Revenue Code. Dealing with the question as to whether the land amounted to “premises” within the meaning of Clause (8) of section 5, the Supreme Court observed in para 3 at Pages 807, 808 of the report as under:— “(3) Reading section 5, sub-clause (8) with section 6(1) it is manifest that Part II of the Act can apply in areas specified in Sch. II to lands (not being used for agricultural purposes) let for residence, education, business, trade or storage. The material date for ascertaining whether the plot is “premises” for purposes of section 6 is the date of letting and not the date on which the application for fixation of standard rent is made by the tenant or the landlord.” Agreeing with the High Court that the plot in dispute could not be regarded as “premises” inviting the application of Part II of the Rent Act, the Supreme Court dismissed the Appeal. 10. My attention was then invited to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (Commissioner of I.T., West Bengal, Calcutta v. Bency Kunar Sahas Roy)2, reported in A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 768. Reliance was placed on the observations appearing in Para 10, at page 772, and para 16 at page 773. On consideration of the various dictionary meanings of the word “agriculture”, the Supreme Court observed that it was significant to note that the term has been used both in the narrow sense of the cultivation of the field and the wider sense of comprising all activities in relation to the land including horticulture, forestry, breeding and rearing of livestock, dairying, butter and cheese making, husbandry etc. 11. Reliance was also placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (Krishna Beharilal dead, by his legal representatives v. Gulabchand and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1041, to contend that the ordinary rule of construction of a document is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in a document. 12. 12. Further, relying upon the observations in the case of (Timblo Irmaos Ltd., Margaon v. Jorge Anibal Matos Sequeira and another)4, reported in A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 734, it was contended that the words used in the document have to be interpreted as a part of or in context of the whole and that the purpose of the powers conferred by the document is to be ascertained having regard to the need which gave rise to the execution of the said document. The Supreme Court further observed in Timblo's case that the mode of construing a document and the rules to be applied to extract its meaning correctly depend not only upon the nature and object, but also upon the frame, provisions and language of the document. In the light of these principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the learned Advocate General contended that reading the alleged tenancy agreement dated 14-3-1981 and in particular, reading the relevant portions extracted above, viz. Clauses (3) and (5) there is no manner of doubt whatsoever that the land was let wholly and solely for the purpose of agriculture. It was, therefore, contended that it could never amount to “premises” within the meaning of Clause (8) of section 5 of the Bombay Rent Act. He, therefore, contended that finding of the learned trial Judge on the preliminary issue is clearly perverse in law. The learned trial Judge has in para 14 of the judgment observed as under:- “Now the question is whether the suit premises is intended to be used for agricultural purposes?” This shows wholly erroneous approach of the trial Court. 13. Admittedly the parties led no evidence whatsoever beyond the documents referred to above. In fact there is a clear statement appearing in para 2 of the judgment that on the 29th September, 1989, the Advocates for the parties made a statement before the learned Judge that they did not wish to lead any oral or documentary evidence at the stage of deciding the preliminary issue. The learned Judge, with respect, has completely misread the provisions of Clauses (3) and (5) of the Agreement of tenancy and, if I may say so, completely ignored the relevant portion of the said two clauses to come to the conclusion that the purpose of cultivating grass, grass cutting or collecting Javli and grass was only consequential use of the suit premises. It is not possible to sustain the reasoning of the learned Judge on the basis of the material on record. 14. However, Shri Palekar for respondent No. 1 did contend that for the purpose of deciding the preliminary issue, regard must be had to not only sub-clause (a) of Clause (8) of section 5, but also to sub-clause (b) thereof. Clause 8(b) reads as under: “(8) “premises” means- (a) ........ (b) any building or part of a building let or given on licence separately (other than a farm building) including- (i) ...... (ii) ...... (iii) (Emphasis supplied) However, the learned Counsel was not in a position to point out from the tenancy Agreement dt. 14-3-1981 that it was an agreement of letting out a building or a part of the building. Bearing in mind the rules for interpretation of a document as summed up in the three Supreme Court decisions referred to above viz. (i) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 768, (ii) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1081, (iii) A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 434. It is clear that the only purpose for which the agreement was entered into between defendant No.1 Virendra Gaur and the present plaintiff Abdul Kashmiri is making use of the land for the purpose of cultivating, grass cutting or cultivating javli and grass and other produce of the land. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the suit property governed by the agreement of tenancy dated 14-3-1981 would be “premises” within the meaning of Clause (8) of section 5 so as to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. The findings of the learned trial Judge on this issue are wholly unsustainable and are clearly contrary to the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Subhadra's case (supra). 15. In the result, the C.R.A. succeeds. The preliminary issue as to whether the Court of Small Causes has jurisdiction to try and entertain the plaintiff's declaratory suit is answered in the negative. The impugned order dated 16-10-1989 is set aside. It is held that the Court of Small Causes has no jurisdiction to entertain R.A.D. Suit No. 2222 of 1989 filed by the first respondent plaintiff. The said suit would, therefore, stand dismissed. All interim and ad interim orders passed by the Court of Small Causes in the said R.A.D. Suit No. 2222/1989 and in the Interim Notices in the said suit would stand vacated forthwith. The said suit would, therefore, stand dismissed. All interim and ad interim orders passed by the Court of Small Causes in the said R.A.D. Suit No. 2222/1989 and in the Interim Notices in the said suit would stand vacated forthwith. Rule in the C.R.A. is, therefore, liable to be made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 16. At this stage, Shri Palekar prays for an order directing the parties to maintain status quo as of today for a period of 10 weeks from today. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case and the clear and unequivocal terms of the tenancy agreement and the averments in the plaint, I am afraid, the plaintiff has approached the wrong forum. In view of my findings as above, it is difficult to see as to how the plaintiff is entitled to any relief whatsoever: However, since the respondent plaintiff wants to challenge this order in the Supreme Court, I am directing the parties to maintain status quo as of today for a period of 4 weeks from today. 17. Certified copy of the order to be issued expeditiously on payment of charges. Order accordingly. -----