JUDGMENT 1. 1. In this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a declaration to the effect that he is entitled to the benefit of waiver of minimum charges in respect of period 8th November, 1990 to 14th December, 1990. It has prayed for striking down the demand of minimum charges and also for striking down part of notifications dated, 7th March, 1989 and July 1989, whereunder the benefit of waiver of minimum charges has been restricted to the units whose supply is lying disconnected. It has also prayed that the petitioner be given the benefit of waiver of minimum charges in terms of clause 17(b) of the agreement because it is a sick industrial company. 2. The petitioner is a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, and is engaged in the manufacture of M. S. Ingots, in its factory at Alwar. It has entered into an agreement with the Rajasthan Electricity Board (for short 'the Board') for supply of electrical energy. According to the petitioner it has incurred huge losses and upto 31.3.90 it had suffered loss to the tune of Rs. 94 lacs. The reasons for the losses, according to the petitioner, are strike, riots, insurrection etc. The petitioner made a reference to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction. In its meeting held on 4.9.90, the Board took certain decisions and certain guidelines were given for preparation of the rehabilitation scheme. The rehabilitation scheme was submitted before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, the same has been considered by the Board in its meeting held on 17.7.91. According to the petitioner, the representative of the Government of Rajasthan has agreed for waiver of the minimum charges during the periods of non-working. The petitioner's case is that on account of various reasons, it was not able to consume the electrical energy for the period between 8.11.92 to 14.12.90 and, during this period, no production was done in the factory. Despite the non-consumption of energy, the respondent Board has served a demand for minimum charges amounting to Rs. 13,45,500/-. The petitioners submitted a representation dated, 1.1.91 before the Chairman of the respondent Board for waiver of minimum charges in view of its industrial sickness. Another representation dated, 3.1.91 has been submitted to the Dy. Despite the non-consumption of energy, the respondent Board has served a demand for minimum charges amounting to Rs. 13,45,500/-. The petitioners submitted a representation dated, 1.1.91 before the Chairman of the respondent Board for waiver of minimum charges in view of its industrial sickness. Another representation dated, 3.1.91 has been submitted to the Dy. Secretary (Energy) to the Government of Rajasthan, with the request that the Government may advise to respondent Board to waive the minimum charges, But, no action has been taken in this regard. The Government of Rajasthan issued directives under section-78A vide its notification dated, 4/7th March 1989 in respect of sick industries. The respondent Board issued exactly identical notification on the basis of the directives issued by the Government. Subsequently, another notification dated, July 24, 1990, has been issued by the respondent Board. The Government of Rajasthan has also announced its industrial policy 1990 and according to this industrial policy the Board is not entitled to raise demand of minimum charges against the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that notwithstanding the directives issued by the Government under section-78A and the industrial policy declared by the Government in the year 1990, which also amounts the directive issued under section-78A of Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the respondent is insisting on payment of minimum charges by the petitioner for the period between 8.11.90 to 14.12.90. The petitioner has placed reliance on the provisions contained in Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and has submitted that in the light of the provisions contained in sections 19, 22 and 32 of 1985 Act, the respondent Board has no jurisdiction to demand minimum charges from the petitioner. 3. In their reply, respondents No.2 and 3 have stated that the petitioner is bound to pay minimum charges irrespective of the fact that the electricity has or has not been actually consumed. Respondents have denied the statement of the petitioner that it was not able to consume any electricity for manufacturing purposes. It has been asserted that electricity was in fact, consumed for manufacturing purposes. It has then been stated that the State Government has power to issue directions on the question of policy and final decision in respect such direction is required to be taken by the Central Electricity Authority as per the provisions of Section-78A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. It has then been stated that the State Government has power to issue directions on the question of policy and final decision in respect such direction is required to be taken by the Central Electricity Authority as per the provisions of Section-78A of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Regarding industrial policy of the State Government it has been asserted that under that policy the State Government could not have given directions in respect of minimum charges. Such policy cannot be considered as directives given by the State Government under section 78-A of 1948 Act. It has then been stated that the supply of energy to the petitioner's unit were never disconnected. Regarding representation (Annex.5), it has been stated that it was merely a formality, because, in the representation no sufficient time was given to the respondents to take a decision. The petitioner immediately rushed to the Court without waiting for the decision. It has been stated that the petitioner is under an obligation to make payment of the minimum charges. 4. In its rejoinder filed in respect of the reply of respondents No. 2 and 3, the petitioner has asserted that the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction appointed the Punjab National Bank as the operating agency and certain guidelines for preparation of rehabilitation scheme of the petitioner Company were given. The operating agency could not submit its report by 15.12.90 as directed. It has now submitted its report on 24.5.91. On the basis of extension of time given by the Board the petitioner has reiterated its claim that its case is covered by the directions dated 4/7.3.89. (sic 4/7.3.89) Government of Rajasthan has further issued directions for levy of 50% minimum charges for running sick industrial units. A copy of Circular dated, 18.5.91 as been placed on record as ANNEXURE-10. However, the benefit has been extended only from the billing month of March 1991. According to the petitioner, this cut-off date is arbitrary and unreasonable and once the concession is to be extended to the type of industries like the petitioner, it cannot be restricted to a particular date. 5. However, the benefit has been extended only from the billing month of March 1991. According to the petitioner, this cut-off date is arbitrary and unreasonable and once the concession is to be extended to the type of industries like the petitioner, it cannot be restricted to a particular date. 5. The first contention advanced by Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the scheme for rehabilitation has been approved by the Board for industrial and Financial Reconstruction, such scheme is binding on all concerned by virtue of section 19(3) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. On the strength of non-obstante clause contained in section-32, Shri Kuhad argued that the provisions contained in 1948 Act stand displaced by virtue of the provisions of 1985 Act and, therefore, the Rajasthan Electricity Board is bound to act in conformity with the provisions of the scheme. It is not open to the Board to raise a demand for minimum charges in the face of the draft scheme. Shri Kuhad drew my attention to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft scheme as also Annexures 7 and 8 and urged that there is no justification for raising the demand for minimum charges from the petitioner company and the respondent Board has acted arbitrarily in insisting on payment of minimum charges. 6. Shri U. N. Bhandari, learned counsel for the respondent Board, on the other hand, submitted that the provisions of section-19 are not applicable in the present case, because, the scheme has not been framed in accordance with the provisions of section-19 of 1985 Act. The scheme has not been sent to the Board and the Electricity Board was not a party before the Board for Industrial and Financial reconstruction. He argued that the scheme to which reference has been made under section-19 can be treated as binding only when the conditions specified in other clauses of section-19 are fulfilled. It these conditions are not fulfilled, the provisions of 1985 Act cannot be invoked against the Electricity Board. 7. A perusal of section 19 of 1985 Act shows that the scheme contemplated by section 19 (1) has to be circulated to every person who is required by the scheme to provide financial assistance to the sick industrial company and such person is required to give his consent within a period of sixty days from the date of circulation. 7. A perusal of section 19 of 1985 Act shows that the scheme contemplated by section 19 (1) has to be circulated to every person who is required by the scheme to provide financial assistance to the sick industrial company and such person is required to give his consent within a period of sixty days from the date of circulation. In terms of section 19 (3), the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction is empowered to sanction the scheme after receipt of the consent referred to in section 19 (2). From the date of sanction of the scheme the scheme shall be binding on all concerned. In case, the consent is not given, the Board is empowered to adopt such other measures as it may consider appropriate and such measures may include the winding up of sick industrial company. The term 'person' used in section 19(2) will have to be given wider interpretation and it would include a juristic person. Section 19 which envisages preparation of scheme for financial assistance seeks to impose financial burden on the Central or State Government, Scheduled Banks or other Banks, public financial institutions or any institution or other authority clearly postulates that such body must be given an opportunity to examine this scheme and take a decision to agree or not to agree for such financial assistance. Only when the consent as contemplated by section 19 (2) is given, the Scheme becomes binding on all concerned. The provision regarding consent of the concerned person is of vital importance. It entitles the concerned person to examine the merits and demerits of the scheme and then to decide as to whether he should/it should or should not agree to the grant of financial assistance. If the scheme is not circulated for the consent of the concerned person, he obviously cannot apply his/its mind to give or not to give such consent. If this condition is not satisfied, section 19 (3) which makes the scheme binding on all concerned, after it is sanctioned by the Board, cannot be invoked. In the case in hand, it has specifically been stated by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board that the scheme which is said to have been formulated under section 19 (1) was not circulated to it and it has not given its consent to such a scheme. In the case in hand, it has specifically been stated by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board that the scheme which is said to have been formulated under section 19 (1) was not circulated to it and it has not given its consent to such a scheme. Since, the conditions precedent which were required to be satisfied so as to make the claim binding on the respondent Board have not been satisfied, it is not possible to accept the submission of Shri Kuhad that by virtue of section 19 (3) the scheme formulated by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction in respect of the petitioner company, which envisages grant of concession in the matter of payment of minimum charges, is binding on the respondent Electricity Board. In this view of the matter section 32 of 1985 Act, even though, it begins with non-obstante clause, is of no help to the petitioner and, on the basis of the scheme the petitioner cannot claim that the respondent Board is precluded from raising demand for minimum charges. 8. The second submission made by Shri Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that by virtue of Annexures 7 and 8, the petitioner has become entitled to claim exemption from payment of minimum charges. Annexure-7 being a policy direction given by the State Government under section 78-A of 1948 Act is binding on the respondent Board. The Board cannot claim minimum charges from the petitioner in the face of the clear language contained in Annexure-7, dated, 4/7th March, 1989 as also Annexure-8, dated 24th July, 1990. Shri Bhandari has, on the other hand, submitted that the respondent Board is required to apply the directives issued by the Board under section 78-A of Act of 1948 only in respect of close industrial units which have been declared sick and are being revived by BIFR or by RIICO or by RFC under the scheme of rehabilitation of sick units. Shri Bhandari urged that minimum charges cannot be levied by the Board for the period between the date of disconnection of electricity supply and the date of reconnection. However, in the case of the petitioner, the circular is not applicable because, unit of the petitioner Company has not remained closed and the supply of electricity has not been disconnected. Shri Bhandari urged that minimum charges cannot be levied by the Board for the period between the date of disconnection of electricity supply and the date of reconnection. However, in the case of the petitioner, the circular is not applicable because, unit of the petitioner Company has not remained closed and the supply of electricity has not been disconnected. After a careful perusal of Annexures-7 and 8 I am of the opinion that the argument advanced by Shri Bhandari, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 has to be accepted. The Preamble of the directive, Annexure-7, shows that it is applicable to the industrial units lying closed due to sickness. Paras 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Annexure-8 as also para-1 and 1 (1) of Annexure-8, make it clear that the concession in the form of non-payment of minimum charges is applicable only to the closed industrial units which have been declared sick and the supply of electricity to which has been disconnected. No other type of industrial units have been extended the benefit of non-payment of minimum charges. It is not the petitioner's case that its unit has remained close between 8.11.90 to 14.12.90. It is also not the case of the petitioner that supply of electricity had been disconnected in respect of its industry. Therefore, the basic conditions which are required to be fulfilled for claiming the benefit under the directives are not available in the case of the petitioner company. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to claim that it is not bound to pay minimum charges in view of annexures-7 and 8. 9. The next contention of Shri Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner is that Annexure-4 contains a policy decision of the Government. It is in the nature of a directive issued by the Government under section 78-A of 1948 Act. Therefore, the respondent, Rajasthan Electricity Board must be treated as bound by the directives issued by the Government. Shri Kuhad argued that in these directions of the Government, the Government has given exemption from payment of minimum charges to sick industrial units. The petitioner being one of the Sick industrial units is entitled to the benefit of exemption. Therefore, the respondent, Rajasthan Electricity Board must be treated as bound by the directives issued by the Government. Shri Kuhad argued that in these directions of the Government, the Government has given exemption from payment of minimum charges to sick industrial units. The petitioner being one of the Sick industrial units is entitled to the benefit of exemption. Shri Kuhad placed reliance on the decisions of Andhra Pradesh High Court, A.P. Electricity Board and v. A.P. Carbides Ltd., AIR 1985 A.P. 283 of Allahabad High Court in Ram Hari v. State of U.P., 1975 Lab I.C. 1240 of Rajasth High Court in Prahlad Singh and others v. State of Rajasthan and R.S.E.B., 1982 RLR 989 . He also placed reliance on Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-I, 1971 (82) ITR 913 . 10. Shri U.N. Bhandari argued that the Industrial Policy Statement of the State Government cannot be treated as policy directive envisaged by section-78A of 1948 Act. Shri Bhandari argued that a policy declaration made by the Government cannot be equated with the directions issued under section 78-A. He submitted that there is no reference to section-78A. He submitted that there is no reference to section-78A in Annexure 4. If the Government wanted to give any policy directive to the Board, specific provision to that effect would have been made. Shri Bhandari argued that if the Board is not to follow the directives issued by the State Government, the only course open in such matter is to make a reference to the Central Electricity Authority for decision and the decision of that authority is final. He placed reliance on Andhra Pradesh High Court in M/s. Podar Projects Ltd. v. A.P.S.E. Board, AIR 1982 A.P. 189 . 11. Section-78A of 1948 Act reads as under:- "78-A, Directions by the State Government:- (1) In the discharge of its functions, the Board shall be guided by such directions on questions of policy as may be given to it by the State Government. (2) If any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government as to whether a question is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the Authority whose decision thereon shall be final." 12. (2) If any dispute arises between the Board and the State Government as to whether a question is or is not a question of policy, it shall be referred to the Authority whose decision thereon shall be final." 12. A perusal of Section 78-A of 1948 Act shows that the State Government can give directions on the question of policy and the Electricity Board is to be guided by such policy directions of the Government in discharge of its functions. Shri Bhandari is right in arguing that Annexure-4 does not make a reference to Section-78A of 1948 Act. However, if Annexure-4 can be held to be a document containing directions of the Government on the question of policy, mere absence of reference to Section-78A will not be of much consequence. It is a settled principle of law that if an order contains a reference to a wrong provision of law or does not make a reference to the provision of law in which source of power can be traced, nevertheless, the order cannot be declared illegal if the source of power can be traced in some provision of law which empowers the authority to make that order. Likewise, an application made under a wrong provision of law cannot be rejected by the court only because, it has been made under a wrong provision of law, provided some other available provision of law permits the making of such an application. That principle can be attracted in the case like the one in hand. Therefore, if it is found that the document Annex.4 contains directives of the State Government on the question of policy, absence of reference to section 78-A of 1948 Act will not be of much consequence. 13. In Ram Hari's case (supra), the Government order provided for absorption in the permanent service of the Board of those Government employees who were serving the Board on deputation. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court took the view that even though, the order issued by the Government was administrative in character, nevertheless, the Government order amounted to direction on the question of policy regarding absorption of Government employees and the same is binding on the Board. 14. A Division Bench of Allahabad High Court took the view that even though, the order issued by the Government was administrative in character, nevertheless, the Government order amounted to direction on the question of policy regarding absorption of Government employees and the same is binding on the Board. 14. In Prahlad Singh's case (supra), the question which arose for consideration before a learned Single Judge of this Court was, as to whether the assurance given by the Chief Minister to the employees on strike can be treated as a policy direction under section-78A. After having carefully gone through the decision in Prahlad Singh's case, I am unable to find any definite decision of the learned Single Judge on the question, as to whether the assurance of the Chief Minister can be treated as a policy direction of the State Government. The entire judgment of the learned judge turned on the statement made by the learned Government Advocate, who stated that the Electricity Board is excepted to act according to the assurance given by the Chief Minister. The learned Single Judge was of the view that it was moral as well as legal obligation of the Board to give effect to the assurance given by the Chief Minister. 15. In A.P. State Electricity Board v. A.P. Carbides Ltd. (supra), the question which arose for consideration before a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court was as to whether it was open to the Government to withdraw the concessional tariff retrospectively. The facts which have been disclosed in the judgment show that on the basis of certain directions given by the State Government concessional tariff rates were fixed between the company and the Electricity Board by mutual agreement. The Division Bench held that once the parties had entered into an agreement on the basis of the concessional tariff, it was not open to the Government to withdraw those concessions with retrospective effect. 16. In A.M. Mani v. State Electricity Board, A.I.R. 1968 Kerala 876, a Full Bench of Kerala High Court held that the Electricity Board is an autonomous Corporation having its own statutory existence and it is not open to the State Government to direct the Board to function in a particular manner. A similar view has been expressed in A.P. Electricity Board v. N.R. Rao, AIR 1969 A.P. 328 . 17. A similar view has been expressed in A.P. Electricity Board v. N.R. Rao, AIR 1969 A.P. 328 . 17. In Poddar Projects Ltd. v. A.P.S.E. Board (supra), another Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that the State Government can issue directions on the questions of policy in general and not in relation to any particular consumer and, although, the Board may be guided on the question of policy by the directions given by the State Government. These direction are not intended to regulate the contractual relationship between the State Electricity Board and the consumer. 18. None of these authorities deal with a case of general policy decision of the Government in respect of the industrial development in the State. Clearly, Annexure-4 is not a document which has been issued under section-78A of 1948 Act. A perusal of the abstract of the policy declaration of the Government made in the year 1990 shows that it is a comprehensive document containing various policy decisions of the Government in different matters. It is not confined to the Rajasthan State Electricity Board. It gives an overall oral indication of the steps which the Government intends to take for industrial development of the State; development of Cottage Industries with particular benefit to the members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, rural masses and women. Para- 26 of this policy declaration cannot be construed as direction given by the State Government on the question of policy. Had there been an intention on the part of the State Government to extend the benefit of Annex.7 to the sick industrial units which are not closed and electricity supply have not been disconnected, nothing prevented the State Government from giving specific policy directions to the Electricity Board. Even Annex.l0 shows that with reference to Board's letter dated, 2.3.90, the concession of 50% in payment of minimum charges has been extended only from the month of March 1991. A general policy declaration made by the Government cannot be treated as directions issued by the State Government on the questions of policy which are required to be followed by the State Electricity Board. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of Annex. 4 cannot be accepted. 19. A general policy declaration made by the Government cannot be treated as directions issued by the State Government on the questions of policy which are required to be followed by the State Electricity Board. Therefore, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the strength of Annex. 4 cannot be accepted. 19. The next submission of Shri Kuhad, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the respondent Board cannot take coercive steps for realisation of the demand in respect of minimum charges. He invited the court's attention to section 22 of 1985 Act and argued that in view of the specific provisions contained in section 22 read with section 32 of 1985 Act, the provisions contained in 1948 Act must be treated held inapplicable and there is a bar against taking of any forcible recovery of the electricity dues. Shri Bhandari, on the other hand, submitted that section 22 of 1985 Act is not attracted in the present case, because, that section can be made applicable only after the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction makes a declaration as contemplated by section 22 (3). In the absence of such a declaration, the Electricity Board cannot be prevented from making recovery. I have given my serious consideration to the submissions advanced by the learned counsel. A bare reading of section 22(3) makes it clear that the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction is required to make a declaration that with respect to a sick industrial company, the operation of all or any of the contracts or assurances of property, agreements, settlements, awards, standing orders or other instruments in force to which such sick industrial company is a party or which may be applicable to such sick industrial company, shall remain suspended or that all or any of the rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities accruing or arising thereunder shall remain suspended or shall be enforceable with such adaptations and in such manner as may be specified by the Board. It is, therefore, clear that making of declaration by the Board, constitutes a condition precedent for suspension of the operation of the contract etc. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that any such declaration had been made by the Board in this case. It is, therefore, clear that making of declaration by the Board, constitutes a condition precedent for suspension of the operation of the contract etc. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that any such declaration had been made by the Board in this case. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission of the learned counsel that the Board cannot realise the amount of minimum charges from the petitioner. 20. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that respondents are bound by the principles of promissory/equitable estoppel. The respondent cannot enforce the recovery of minimum charges from the petitioner. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 621 : Lotus Hotel v. Gujarat Financial Corporation, AIR 1983 SC 848 : Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1988 (1) SCC 86 : Asstt. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Asst.) Dharwar and others v. Dharmendra Trading Company and others, 1988 (3) SCC 570 M/s. Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of Jammu an Kashmir, 1989 (3) SCC 115 : State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd., 1990 (1) SCC 176 . This argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any merit. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has been evolved as a measure of equity to avoid injustice. The principle which underlines the doctrine of promissory estoppel is, where a party by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties. It is, therefore, evident that before this principle can be invoked, making of a promise by one party and acting upon such promise by the other party is a must. It is, therefore, evident that before this principle can be invoked, making of a promise by one party and acting upon such promise by the other party is a must. If the fact situation obtaining in a case does not disclose that one party has made a promise and the other has acted upon it, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. In the present case, the material which has been placed on record does not show that the Rajasthan State Electricity Board has made any promise to the petitioner company, upon which the petitioner company has acted in a particular manner and now the Board is seeking his back out from that promise. So far as the State Government is concerned, its representative has, no doubt, made some statement before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction and the policy declaration of the Government might contain some concessions for sick industries, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner has acted on such concession, statement or promise and has been put to any prejudice on account of which having acted in that particular manner. Thus, the fundamental ingredients for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel are not available in the present case. 21. The result of the above discussion is that none of the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner merits acceptance. The Writ Petition fails and it is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******