Judgment :- Jagannadha Rao, CJ. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in O.P. No. 2708 of 1988 allowing the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent, who has since died during the pendency of the Writ petition. 2. The appellants invited fenders for a particular work. The writ petitioner-first respondent obtained forms at 3.50 P.M. on 17-11-1987, that being the last date for submitting tenders. While submitting his tender, when he was filling up the column relating to rates, he scored off the word 'above' by mistake, while he intended to score off the word 'below'. The above words were relevant in the context of the estimated rales mentioned in the tender. The result was 'that he had quoted a rate above the estimated rate. The writ petitioner-first respondent immediately realised the mistake and sent up a letter Ext. P10 at 4.05 P.M. on the same day, that is 17-11-1987 seeking permission to correct the mistake or in the alternative to withdraw the offer. There is no dispute between the parties that the time for opening tenders %vas 4.30 P.M. The Superintending Engineer did not take any decision on Ext. P10. but issued Ext. P2 letter dated 30-11-1987 to the Chief Engineer requesting for direction. In Ext. P3 dated 4-1-1987, the Chief Engineer asked the Superintending Engineer to take appropriate decision. Obviously the Chief Engineer did not indicate that should be done, but threw the responsibility on the Superintending Engineer. Thereafter the writ petitioner moved the Government, and by Ext. P7 dated 11-2-1988 the Government turned down the request of the writ petitioner. The tender was cancelled by Ext. P9(a) dated 3-3-1988 by the Superintending Engineer. Therefore a fresh tender had to be called for, and the security deposit of Rs. 50,000/- made by the petitioner was withheld. The petitioner then filed the present Writ Petition on 29-3-1988 for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing Exts. P5 (a), P5(b), P7, P9(a) and P9(b), and for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the appellants-respondents to return the Earnest Money Deposit made by the Writ petitioner in the sum of Rs, 50.000/-. 3. In the counter affidavit Hied by the appellants, it was stated that the withdrawal of the offer by Ext. P5 (a), P5(b), P7, P9(a) and P9(b), and for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the appellants-respondents to return the Earnest Money Deposit made by the Writ petitioner in the sum of Rs, 50.000/-. 3. In the counter affidavit Hied by the appellants, it was stated that the withdrawal of the offer by Ext. P10 made by the writ petitioner was received by an Assistant in the Department before 4.30 P.M., but that the same could not be complied with as the same was in violation of the ruijs, By the word' Rules' the respondents-appellants obviously were referring to paragraph 15.6.1 of P.W.D, Manual which provides that 'a tenderer cannot withdraw his tender or make any modification not acceptable to the Department once the tender has been deposited in the tender box. Any contravention of she above rule will entail forfeiture of Earnest M;nie Deposit', 4. The learned Single Judge in his judgment dated .13-2-1992 while allowing the Writ Petition noticed that S.5 of the Indian Contract Act, governs the situation and that inasmuch as the offer made by the writ petitioner was withdrawn even before the tenders were opened, the appellants-respondents could not rely upon any clause in the PWD Manual for withholding the said amount. The learned Single Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753 to state that the rules contained in the PWD Manual are purely administrative instructions and do not have nay statutory force. The learned Single Judge also observed that the tenderer, namely, the writ petitioner, had undergone an eye-operation for cataract, and was old, and that the writ petitioner submitted his tender at 3.50 P.M. on 17-11-1987, that being the last date, and in that context he committed a mistake in scoring off the word 'above' while he intended to score off the word 'below'. Having realised that mistake, he immediately sent up Ext. P10 at 4.05 P.M. well before the time for opening of the tenders, which was 4.30 P.M. The learned Single Judge therefore held that the earnest money deposit could not be withheld by the authorities. The Writ Petition was allowed. 5. In this appeal, the learned Government Pleader contends that the validity of paragraph 15.6.1. P10 at 4.05 P.M. well before the time for opening of the tenders, which was 4.30 P.M. The learned Single Judge therefore held that the earnest money deposit could not be withheld by the authorities. The Writ Petition was allowed. 5. In this appeal, the learned Government Pleader contends that the validity of paragraph 15.6.1. of the P.W.D. Manual was not questioned by the writ petitioner, and that if the said paragraph of the Manual is followed, a tenderer cannot withdraw his tender or suggest any modification after the tenders are deposited in the tender box. Therefore the Government is entitled to forfeiture of earnest money deposit. 6. Before adverting to the legal question involved, it would be necessary to refer to the admitted facts. There is no dispute that the tender was submitted before 4 P.M. and that the time for opening tenders was 4.30 P.M. In the counter affidavit, there is no dispute that the letter withdrawing the tender was made by the writ petitioner before 4.30 P.M. and that the letter of withdrawal was received by the department officials before 4.30 P.M. which was the time for opening tenders. The question then would be whether the earnest money deposit could be withheld on the basis of para.15.6.1 of the PWD Manual. The said paragraph reads as follows: "A tenderer cannot withdraw his tender or make any modification not acceptable to the Department once the tender has been deposited in the tender box. Any contravention of the above rule will entail forfeiture of the Earnest Money Deposit." In other words, the appellants rely more on this clause. But, S.5 of the Indian Contract Act goes against their contention. 7. under S.5 of the Contract Act a proposal could be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, but not afterwards. The illustration under the said Section shows that 'A' proposes, by a letter sent by post, to sell his house to 'B'. 'B' accepts the proposal by a letter sent by post. 'A' may revoke his proposal at any time before or at the moment when B posts his letter of acceptance, but not afterwards. The illustration under the said Section shows that 'A' proposes, by a letter sent by post, to sell his house to 'B'. 'B' accepts the proposal by a letter sent by post. 'A' may revoke his proposal at any time before or at the moment when B posts his letter of acceptance, but not afterwards. It is also settled that the provisions of General Law of Contract are applicable to Government contracts also subject to the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India: vide Union of India v. S.S.H. Syndicate, Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879. Therefore when the withdrawal letter was received before 4.30 p.m. which was the time for opening tenders, there was no completed contract between the parties. 8. At a stage when the contract had not come into force, the action of the authorities was purely in the nature of administrative action as stated in Ramana v. I.A. Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628, and in fact the actions are subject to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9. So far as the clauses in the PWD Manual are concerned, it has been held by the Supreme Court in G. J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, AIR 1967 SC 1753 that the instructions contained in the PWD Manual are merely administrative instructions and not statutory rules. The question there arose in a Writ Petition filed by a citizen for enforcement of the Mysore Public Works Department Code. It was held by the Supreme Court that the rules not being statutory they were not enforceable. If the said rules are not enforceable at the instance of the tenderer they would also not be enforceable in a court of law at the instance of the Government also particularly when the said rules govern a situation before the contract itself is formed. When the action of the Government is purely an administrative action, it is governed by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramana's case (supra), as stated above. 10. When the action of the Government is purely an administrative action, it is governed by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramana's case (supra), as stated above. 10. If that be so, the withdraw a lot the offer by the writ petitioner before the time fixed for opening tenders was perfectly in order, and inasmuch as the Government is governed by S.5 of the Contract Act, it could not rely upon the PWD Manual for the purpose of negativing the statutory right of the petitioner which had accrued to him because of the clear provisions of S.5 of the Contract Act, and the administrative instructions cannot have the effect of overriding statutory provisions. We are therefore of the view that the learned Single Judge was right in allowing the Writ Petition. 11. A faint contention was raised relying upon the decision in Geetha Timbers v. State of Kerala (1990) 1 KLT 402 (FB) that the petitioner should have filed a civil suit. We find that the said contention was not obviously raised in the counter affidavit because, there is no dispute regarding the factual position. It is not the case of the appellants that the withdrawal letter by the writ petitioner was given after 4.30 p.m. It is an admitted case of the Government that the withdrawal letter was given before 4.30 P.M. that is the time fixed for opening tenders. That is the reason why no plea was taken in the counter affidavit filed by the appellants that the writ petitioner should be relegated to a suit. If there was any dispute in regard to factual position, namely, as to whether the withdrawal letter was given by the writ petitioner before 4.30 P.M. or after 4.30 P.M. we would not have interfered. Inasmuch as there is no dispute regarding the factual position, and inasmuch as a question has arisen in relation to a period before the formation of the contract, we find no difficulty in giving relief under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the learned Single judge is confirmed, and the appeal is dismissed.