JUDGMENT R.C. Lahoti, J. 1. The defendant/appellant has come up in appeal feeling aggrieved by the judgments and decrees of the Courts below directing a suit for ejectment of the appellant based on landlord/tenant relationship on the ground available under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") to be decreed. 2. Vide order dated 26-3-1991, this Court admitted the appeal for hearing parties on the following substantial question of law : -- (i) Whether in the absence of pleading and proof that the room situated behind the garage was a non-residential accommodation, decree for ejectment for non-residential need of the plaintiff could have been passed ? (ii) Whether a finding that the plaintiff's son has been carrying on business in rented premises, without more, is enough to sustain the finding for genuine need of the suit accommodation ? 3. First, the facts not in dispute The suit accommodation, though forming part of a singular premises, has come to be occupied by the defendant/appellant in two parts under two tenancy agreements. As the plaint map indicates, there is a room behind a garage. This room and garage taken together are surrounded by other house properties on the three sides. The garage opens on the public road situated on its east. The room situated behind the garage does not have any other approach except from the garage. The garage admittedly a non-residential accommodation, is held on a monthly rent of Rs. 90/- under the rent note dated 1-1-1971. On 1-10-1971, the defendant secured the room situated behind the garage also on a monthly rent of Rs. 45/- having executed a separate rent note on that date. Consolidated rent of Rs. 135/- per month is being paid by the defendant to the plaintiff thereafter. 4. The case of the plaintiff is that the entire accommodation that is the. room and the garage is required by him bonafide for the purpose of continuing the provision goods shop of his son Ashok Kumar who at present was running his shop in a tenanted premises situated in a different locality away from the suit premises. The need was denied by the defendant. However, as already stated, it has been found proved by the two Courts below. Question No. 1 :-- 5. The need was denied by the defendant. However, as already stated, it has been found proved by the two Courts below. Question No. 1 :-- 5. Placing reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad AIR 1981 SC 1711 , the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant submitted that it was for the plaintiff/respondent to have pleaded that the room situated behind the garage was a non-residential accommodation and unless and until it was so pleaded he could not have claimed ejectment from the room for a non-residential need and the suit for ejectment to that extent of the premises should have been dismissed. No doubt, the plaintiff has to plead the ingredients of the provision constituting pre-requisites to the claim for ejectment. But, in so far as the present case is concerned, no such fault can be found with the pleadings as would disentitle the plaintiff to the relief sought for. 6. The rent note (Ex. P/1) relating to garage is undisputedly a nonresidential accommodation let out for nonresidential purpose. In rent note (Ex. P/1), the garage is described as Dukan (shop). The rent note (Ex. P/2) executed in respect of room describes it as "Kotha Dukan Ke Sathwala" (room appurtenant to the shop) At yet another place, it is mentioned that the room was being taken on rent after connecting the same with the garage already held on lease by the tenant and the terms and conditions would remain the same as were about the garage. The rent note clearly suggests the room being taken on rent as appurtenant to the garage and for continuing the non residential activity of the tenant. 7. The plaint clearly stated that the accommodation was required by the plaintiff form the business activity of his son, to satisfy which need the plaintiff was not possessed of any other reasonably suitable accommodation of his own. Para 6 of the plaint clearly stated that in the suit accommodation, the defendant had installed a letho machine which was run day and night. The defendant nowhere in the written statement denied the entire premises being used for non-residential purpose at that time. The very fact that the garage with the appurtenant room was alleged being used for non residential purpose and not denied by the tenant, is sufficient to infer the nonresidential nature of the suit accommodation. The defendant nowhere in the written statement denied the entire premises being used for non-residential purpose at that time. The very fact that the garage with the appurtenant room was alleged being used for non residential purpose and not denied by the tenant, is sufficient to infer the nonresidential nature of the suit accommodation. If it was not so, it was expected of the defendant/tenant to have come out with a plea that the room was being used for residential purpose, was taken on rent for residential purpose and hence the plaintiff's claim for eviction to satisfy the alleged non-residential need was not maintainable Moreover, such a plea raised before this Court appears to have been so raised for the first time and does not appear to have been raised before any of the Courts below. There is, therefore, no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the claim for ejectment from the suit accommodation to satisfy the non-residential need of the plaintiff for his son was not maintainable. 8. Principles governing ejectment of the tenants sought for by the landlords on the ground of bona fide need are well settled. Entitlement to such ejectment on such ground is one of the limited reliefs allowed by Rent Control Laws to the landlords and to that extent it can be said that such laws are beneficial to the landlords too. It is not the bona fides of the landlord but the bonafides of the requirement which have to be kept in view while objectively assessing a case of genuine seed. The term "bonafide" is similar to the term "genuine" which means something that which precedes from its reputed source, sincere and not false, fictitious, simulated or spurious. Bona fide requirement has to be meaningfully construed so as to assign a practical meaning to the phrase (see : Mansharam v. Bhagwandas (1992) (1) MPJR 191 and Shushila Devi v. Maharaj Singh 1990 MPJR 504 , and several other decisions referred to therein). 9. The picture which emerges from the pleadings, the evidence, adduced and the facts found proved by the two Courts below is that the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff is one of his major son Ashok. He is competent and capable of doing the business as having been engaged already in an independent business activity of his own. 9. The picture which emerges from the pleadings, the evidence, adduced and the facts found proved by the two Courts below is that the requirement pleaded by the plaintiff is one of his major son Ashok. He is competent and capable of doing the business as having been engaged already in an independent business activity of his own. However, the shop which he is running is situated in a tenanted premises and that too at a distance from his residence. The suit accommodation is situated on the ground floor of the residential house of the landlord himself. There was another tenant in the premises whose eviction was sought for setting in business Subhash the second son of the plaintiff and younger brother of Ashok. That need of the plaintiff stands fulfilled and the plaintiff has been in a position to settle his second son close to the residence of the family. Ashok, whose requirement is in question cannot be said to have been well settled as yet for he is still running his shop in tenanted premises. The plaintiff and Ashok have both deposed on oath that on the suit premises being vacated Ashok should shift his business into the suit accommodation and relinquish the tenanted premises. Nothing has been brought out in cross-examination to disbelieve that testimony which has been rightly believed by the two Courts below. 10. Section 12(1) (f) of the Act reads as under :-- 12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : ... Section 12(1) (f) of the Act reads as under :-- 12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely : ... (f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is owner thereof or of any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned: (Emphasis supplied) Availability of any accommodation does not bear maintainability of a suit for ejectment; the plaintiff must be possessed of an accommodation of his own to act as an alternate accommodation so as to bar the availability of ground under clause (f). That is the scheme of the Act 11. In Chander Kali v. Jagdish Singh AIR 1977 SC 2262 , interpreting the above said clause, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, held :-- Under the 1961 Act, mere occupation of another premises is not sufficient. The premises must be his own, meaning thereby that they must be owned by or belong to the landlord and he must be in occupation of the same It is, therefore, plain that the tenanted shop in occupation of the plaintiff landlord was not sufficient to deny him a decree for eviction against his tenant under S. 12 (1) (f) of the Act. 12. Occupation of tenanted premises is wholly irrelevant while adjudging the need of a person needing his own premises occupied by the tenant for starting his own business is the view taken by this Court. (See : Babulal v. Lalchand 1983 MPWN 132. 13. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellant cited a few decisions in support of the contention that so long as the plaintiff's son was comfortable carrying on his business in intented premises, without demonstrating anything more, he was not entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant from his own premises to satisfy the same need. 13. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellant cited a few decisions in support of the contention that so long as the plaintiff's son was comfortable carrying on his business in intented premises, without demonstrating anything more, he was not entitled to seek ejectment of the tenant from his own premises to satisfy the same need. He cited Hameedia Hardware Stores v. B, Mohanlal Sowcar AIR 1988 SC 1060 , Makhan Lal v. Shivnarayan 1987 MPRCJ SN 18, Karam Singh v. Taharali & Ors. 1984 MPRCJ 65, and Bhagwandas Pawaiya v. Regd. Firm Kailashnarain & Bros. 1991 (1) MPJR 361. However, none of the decisions relied on strengthens the contention raised. 14. In Hameedia Hardware Stores case (supra), their Lordships observed by reference to the provisions of T.N. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960;- If the requirement of "claim" being "bona fide" as contained in Section 10 (3) (e) is construed to mean that genuineness of the need of the landlord for the non-residential building is not to be considered and the circumstances that the landlord on the date of making the application is factually carrying on business and has no non-residential building of his own in his occupation in the city, town or village concerned is to be construed sufficient to make his claim bona fide, the tenancy of no non-residential building will be secure. It will be preposterous to attribute such an intention to the legislature. Such a contingency should be avoided as it would be against the very object of the Act itself. The need of the landlord should be genuine. That is the object of enacting clause (e) of Section 10 (3) of the Act. When once we reach the above conclusion it is not enough that the landlord should merely desire to use or occupy the premises. What is necessary is that he should bona fide need them for his own use and occupation or for occupation by any of the members of his family as held by this Court in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel (1974) 3 SCR 267 : AIR 1974 SC 1059 and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal (1975) 1 SCR 127 : AIR 1974 SC 1596 . The learned Judge who decided the case out of which this appeal arises was, therefore, in error in holding that the landlord need not prove that his requirement was bona fide but that his claim was bona fide as provided in clause (e) of Section 10 (3) of the Act. The learned Judge has made a distinction between 'requirement' and 'claim' in the present case without there being a difference. Their Lordships have emphasized the necessity of objectively determining bona fides of the requirement. A claim is not to be decreed merely for asking. Desire has not to be distinguished from need that too qualified bonafides. Nothing can be read in the decision to hold that occupation of tenanted premises might negative the need of the landlord, proved otherwise to be bona fide 15. Makhan Lal's case (supra) is reported as a short note and the impression created by the Head Note does not find support from the short noted report It appears to be a case where available alternate accommodation belonging to joint Hindu family of the landlord of which he was as much the owner as only other member of the coparcener was concealed. It does not appear to be a case of the landlord having been in occupation of a rented accommodation. 16. Karamsingh's case (supra) and Bhagwandas Pawaiya's case (supra also do not lay down anything contrary to view taken hereinabove. 17. Before parting with the point at hand, it will be useful to refer to a single bench decision of this Court in Ramswaroop & Another v. Prem Narain Verma 1973 JLJ 541 wherein after reading the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Netaram v. Jiwanlal AIR 1963 SC 499 and Sarvate, T. B. v. Nemichand 1966 JLJ 973 SC, this Court held while examining a case of bona fide need for residential purpose : -- ...Where be is in occupation of another's premises two considerations are vital: (a) if the accommodation in his occupation is not his own, nothing else is to be seen and he will be entitled to eviction, because the policy of the law is not to deny the landlord the use of his own property for his occupation, or for his business and it is no answer that he is residing or carrying on business comfortably in rented premises. (b) But where he is in occupation of a residential accommodation of his own, then he has further to satisfy the Court that it is not reasonably suitable for his purposes. The word "reasonably" is indicative of an objective test. Here again, it is not the whim of the landlord that the accommodation in his occupation does not suit him. If it were not so, nothing would have been easier than to make this ground a pretext and throw out a tenant. The same principles to the case of bona fide need for non residential purpose because the Phraseologies of the two provisions contained in Clauses (e) and (f) are more or less similarly worded. 18. This Court is positively of the opinion that no fault can be found with the findings of the Courts below holding the plaintiff's requirement to be bona fide and merely because the plaintiff's son is running his business in other tenanted premises does not in any manner dent the finding and negative either the need or its bona fides. Finding as to bona fide need is primarily a finding of fact ordinarily not open to interference in second appeal (see Jahejo Devi v. Moharam Ali AIR 1988 SC 411 and Mattulal v. Radhe Lal AIR 1974 SC 1596 . 19. Both the questions on which this appeal was admitted for hearing parties are answered against the defendant/appellant The appeal is held to be devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. The judgments and decrees of the Court below are affirmed. No order as to the costs of this appeal. 20. 19. Both the questions on which this appeal was admitted for hearing parties are answered against the defendant/appellant The appeal is held to be devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed accordingly. The judgments and decrees of the Court below are affirmed. No order as to the costs of this appeal. 20. However, to relieve the defendant/appellant from the peril of sudden ejectment, it is directed that decree for ejectment shall not be available for execution until 30-4-1993 subject to the appellant filing an undertaking on affidavit before the Executing Court within a period of two weeks from today to the effect that on or before 30-4-1993 he shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession over the suit premises to the plaintiff/ landlord and shall not induct any one else in possession of the same, that he shall deposit for payment to the landlord entire money part of the decree under appeal including costs and arrears of rent up-to-date on or before 30-11-1992 and shall thereafter continue to deposit the rent falling due month by month by the 15th day of that month. Failing filing of the undertaking or failing compliance with any of the terms above said, the decree for ejectment shall be available for execution forthwith but after the expiry of a period of two weeks above said.