S. RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act. It is calling in question the constitutional validity of the Karnataka Tax on Professions, Trades, callings and Employments Act, 1976 in so far as it levies tax on companies. ( 2 ) UNDER the Act, tax on professions, trades, callings and employments is leviedat the rate specified in the schedule to the Act. The schedule to the Act at Serial Number 19 refers to companies registered under the Companies Act and engaged in any professions, trades or callings and the rate of tax is at Rs. 2,500/ -. The petitioner calls in question the validity of this legislation in so far as it taxes the companies on the following grounds : (I) That there is no legislative competence to levy tax inasmuch as under entry 43 of List I to the VII Schedule to the Constitution of India, the incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations etc. , is with the Union Legislature and Entry 85 thereof provides for Corporation tax and the said entry read with Article 366 (6) of the Constitution must be understood that the tax on professions, trades or callings of the company will also be a kind of regulation of the company or is in the nature of a Corporation tax inasmuch as it is a tax on the doing of a business by an organisation. And in this context relies upon a decision in Flint v Stone tracey Company, 220 US (55 Law Ed. 389 ). (II) That the levy of tax under the Act is an unreasonable restriction on carrying on any trade, business or calling and there are many enactments under which it has to pay tax and is also subject to many enactments and in such an event if the company is asked to pay tax at the rate of Rs. 2,500/- per annum it would amount to unreasonable restriction. (III) That there are different companies of different sizes and the nature of work carried on by them also varies. In addition to it, some of the companies are in the joint sector and others in the public sector and where classification is permissible if it is not done the same would amount to discrimination lor lack of classification. (III) That there are different companies of different sizes and the nature of work carried on by them also varies. In addition to it, some of the companies are in the joint sector and others in the public sector and where classification is permissible if it is not done the same would amount to discrimination lor lack of classification. ( 3 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned, scheme of the Constitution will have to be borne in mind in appreciating the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner. Article 276 of the Constitution authorises the State or other local authorities in a State to levy tax on professions, trades and callings under Entry 60 of list II. Though it may virtually amount to a tax on income and is exclusively a Union subject, under Article 276 (1) States are empowered to levy tax declaring that such taxes will not be invalid on the ground that it is a tax relating to income provided it keeps within the limits available under sub-clause (2) thereof and this power will not in any way cut down or restrict the power of the Parliament with respect to taxes occurring or arising from professions, trades and callings is made clear in sub-clause (3) thereof. Therefore, even if the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is correct, still when Article 276 itself specifically authorises the legislature of a Slate to levy tax under Article 276 notwithstanding it may amount to tax on income I do not think it is any longer open to the petitioner to urge that the tax with which we are concerned is a corporation tax. In the definition at Article 366 (6) of the Constitution 'corporation Tax' is defined as tax on income so far as that tax is payable by companies and that aspect is duly taken care of by the Constitution itself under Article 276. Hence I do not think there is any substance in the first contention urged on behalf of the petitioner. ( 4 ) THIS point may further be looked at from another angle. Hence I do not think there is any substance in the first contention urged on behalf of the petitioner. ( 4 ) THIS point may further be looked at from another angle. When under the scheme of entries in Lists I and II of Schedule VII to Constitution there is distribution of fields of legislation between the Union and the States with certain aspects overlapping, in such an event, the question that is to be examined is whether the tax levied concerns an aspect not covered by one or the other entry. This precise question has been considered by the Supreme Court in Federation of Hotel and Restaurant association of India and Others v Union of India and Others, 178 ITR 97:"the law "with respect to" a subject might incidentally "affect" another subject in some way; but that is not the same thing as the law being on the latter subject. There might be overlapping; but the overlapping must be in law. The same transaction may involve two or more taxable events in its different aspects. But the fact that there is an overlapping does not detract from the distinctiveness of the aspects. "while corporation tax is on the incident of income, the tax on professions is on the incident of carrying on an activity such as profession, trade or commerce. Therefore, if this distinction is borne in mind again the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner falls to the ground. ( 5 ) IT is next urged that in view of various regulations under labour enactments, Companies Act and other tax enactments, to burden the companies with additional tax of Rs. 2,500/- under the Act is an unreasonable restriction. It is difficult to appreciate or understand this contention. It is not the contention of the petitioner that the tax imposed under the Act is excessive. Nor is it its case that by reason of this burden it is unable to carry on its activities or results in annihilation or total extinction of its trade. As long as these factors are not established I do not think any case is made out for examination under Article 19 (l) (g) of the Constitution. ( 6 ) THE next argument advanced is one under Article 14 of the Constitution. The contention raised does not bear any close scrutiny in view of the decision of this court in Banaslitinkari Leasing Co. ( 6 ) THE next argument advanced is one under Article 14 of the Constitution. The contention raised does not bear any close scrutiny in view of the decision of this court in Banaslitinkari Leasing Co. Ltd v State of Karnataka, 1991 (35) Kar. L. J. 315 : ILR 1991 Kar 2238. Though there is scope for further classification and rationalisation of taxation mere absence of it would not result in discrimination has been explained by this Court in M/s. Galaxy Theatre v State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 Kant. 215 : ILR 1991 Kar 2468. Hence that contention also is not available to the petitioner. ( 7 ) CONSEQUENTLY, this petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. --- *** --- .