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1992 DIGILAW 299 (PAT)

Suresh Narayan Sharma v. State of Bihar

1992-08-20

G.C.BHARUKA, S.B.SINHA

body1992
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha and G.C. Bharuka, JJ. In this application the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order dated 4.2.1989 passed by the Director General of Police-Cum Inspector General of Police of Home Guards and Fire Services as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioners at the material times were working as Leading Fireman. They were considered for promotion to the post of Fire-Sub-Station Officer. 4. By reason of an order bearing letter No. 654 dated 9.9.1988 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, the persons named therein were declared to have been passed examination conducted for the purpose of grant of promotion on the aforementioned posts. 5. The petitioner No. 1 allegedly joined on 27.8.1988. However, on 4.2.1989, the Inspector General of Police Fire Services, Bihar appointed a fresh Selection Committee. The said Selection Committee submitted its report and by reason of the impugned order the petitioners were reverted back on their own posts. 6. A counter affidavit has been filed in this case, wherein it has inter alia been contended that as the promotion of the petitioners was not in accordance with rules and instructions as prescribed in Rule 43 (e) & (f) framed under the Bihar Fire Service Act, 1948 (hereinafter the 'Act' only) the impugned order has been passed. 7. In the said counter affidavit it has further been stated as follows :- "That to examine and enquire into the whole-matters a Committee was constituted consisting of Sri N.N. Singh, Director-General-Cum-Inspector General (Bihar Home Guards and Fire Service), Sri S.K. Shakashena Deputy Inspector General, Criminal Investigation Department Bihar, Patna, Sardar Baljeet Singh, Deputy Inspector General of Police (Special Branch) Bihar, Patna and Sri J.B. Mahapatra, Deputy Inspector General, (Homeguard) Bihar Patna. The committee, after enquiry, came to a conclusion that due to lowering down the qualifying marks from 50% to 40% anomaly, has been created in the inter-se-seniority. The committed recommended that those person who get less than 40% marks and who have been declared passed should be kept below. That in such circumstances, the earlier decision has been reviewed in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee after proper examination. It is stated that Sl. No. 22 to 25 as mentioned in Annexure-2 to the writ application, are juniors to Sl. Nos. That in such circumstances, the earlier decision has been reviewed in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee after proper examination. It is stated that Sl. No. 22 to 25 as mentioned in Annexure-2 to the writ application, are juniors to Sl. Nos. 1 to 21 and as such they were given ad-hoc promotion against the vacancies of persons deputed to Central Coal Field Limited. That with regard to paragraph 4 of the writ application it is stated that it requires no comment have and except that the then Director General Sri S.N. Roy had taken a self decision in reducing the qualifying marks of written test from 50% to 40% in violation of the rule 43 (e) (f). In no case qualifying marks can be reduced, indiscriminately from time to time." 8. It has further been stated that as the petitioners did not obtain the minimum mark, the committee was constituted to review the matter. 9. It has further been staled that the control and superintendence of the Bihar Fire Service has been vested in the Inspector-General of Police. It has been asserted that by an instruction dated 26.12.1986 a circular, (Annexure-E to the counter affidavit) has been issued by the Inspector General of Police. 10. Mr. Teg Bahadur Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised two contentions in support of this application. The learned counsel firstly submitted that the petitioners having been promoted, by valid order and after their selection, the same could not have been cancelled without giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. 11. The learned counsel in this connection has strongly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka SRTC and another, reported in 1986 (3) S.C.C. 273 . 12. The learned counsel further submitted that in terms of the Police Manual only their Director General of Police is competent to pass an order in this regard and as the impugned order has not been passed by the Director General of Police, the same must be held to be bad in law. 13. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of one of us G.C. Bharuka J. in Ram Anugrah Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 502 . 14. 13. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a decision of one of us G.C. Bharuka J. in Ram Anugrah Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 502 . 14. It is not disputed that the services of the petitioners are governed by the provisions of Bihar Fire Service Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder. 15. Section 22 of the said Act empowers the Inspector General of Police to make rules regarding training, discipline and good conduct of the personnel of the Bihar Fire Services, their speedy attendance on engines, fire escapes arid all necessary implements on the occasion of any alarm of file, maintenance of the service in a state of efficiency, its inspection and such other matters as the Inspector General of Police shall from time to time feel expedient. 16. Section 23 of the said Act empowers the provincial Government to make rules for carrying out the purpose thereof and in particular and without prejudice to the generality thereof such rules providing inter alia for the manner in which the Bihar Fire Service shall be constituted and the number of Officers and men such service shall consist of under section 3. 17. Rules 43 (f) of the Rules framed by the State reads as follows :- "(f) The qualifying test will include the written and practical tests as prescribed in Appendix X. Those who obtain 50% marks in each test will be declared to have passed. Only such passed candidates having satisfactory service, shall be considered for promotion by a Board consisting of a least three members including the I.R. or his representative and the S.F.O." 18. The Inspector General of Police also accepted the recommendations of the S.F.O. Bihar for laying down the standard of qualifying tests for promotion to the post of Sub-Officers and reiterated therein that the qualifying marks however would be 50% each of three tests. 19. It is not disputed that the petitioners did not obtain the qualifying marks in the written examination. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners were promoted on an ad hoc basis. 20. Rule 43 (1) (f) of the Bihar Fire Service Rules appear to be mandatory in nature. No statutory provision bas been brought to our notice for the purpose of showing that any authority has the power to relax the provisions of the said mandatory rules. 21. 20. Rule 43 (1) (f) of the Bihar Fire Service Rules appear to be mandatory in nature. No statutory provision bas been brought to our notice for the purpose of showing that any authority has the power to relax the provisions of the said mandatory rules. 21. In this situation in our opinion, there cannot be any doubt that the orders of promotion in favour of the petitioners was not in accordance with law. 22. In S. Gobindraju v. Karnataka S.R.T.C. and another reported in 1986 (3) S.C.C. 273 the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "Admittedly the appellant was selected by Selection Committee constituted under the aforesaid regulation and his name was included in the select list prepared for the purpose of appointment as conductor as and when vacancy would arise. His name was also included in the badli list of workers and in pursuance thereof he was given employment. There is no dispute that the appellant was allowed to be in continuous service for a period of more than one year and while he was in continuous service the impugned order of termination was issued in accordance with regulation 10 (5). The relevant provisions of Regulation (19) (5) provides that during temporary/badli appointment a candidate if terminated/removed from service as unsuitable for the post he will forefeit his chance for the appointment in terms of his selection. There is no dispute that the appellants services were terminated on the ground of his being found deleted from the select list, and he forfeited his chance for appointment. Once a candidate is selected and his name is included in the select list for appointment in accordance with the Regulations he gets a right to be considered for appointment in as and when vacancy arises. On the removal of his name from the select list serious consequences entail as he forfeits his right to employment in future. In such a situation even though the Regulations do not stipulate for affordings any opportunity to the employee, the principles of natural justice would be attracted though no elaborate enquiry would be necessary:"- 23. This case, however, urgently stands on a different footing. In such a situation even though the Regulations do not stipulate for affordings any opportunity to the employee, the principles of natural justice would be attracted though no elaborate enquiry would be necessary:"- 23. This case, however, urgently stands on a different footing. The promotion of the petitioners was admittedly made on ad hoc basis and was subsequently found to be contrary to the statutory rules framed for promotion as stated above, since the petitioners have not got the minimum qualifying marks prescribed under the rules. Neither the Act nor the Rules vests any power in any authority much-less Inspector General of Police to grant any relaxation in respect of the minimum qualifying marks which were to be obtained by the candidates seeking promotion. Therefore it is obvious that the petitioners had not acquired any legal right to continue on the post on which they were promoted on ad hoc basis. 24. So far as the ground of challenge based on non-grant of any opportunity to the petitioners before passing the impugned order by which their promotion was found unsustainable resulting in cancellation thereof is concerned, it will be relevant to mention herewith nothing bas been placed on behalf of the petitioner before us that they were given promotion in accordance with the relevant rules. Therefore, even if the petitioners would have been given an opportunity of hearing in this regard that would have made no difference. It has been held by the Supreme court in the case of S.L. Kapoor v Jagmohan and others reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court, 136, at P. 145 (Pre. 17) that, where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. For this reason, we are not inclined to issue the writ as prayed for on the ground of non-observance of the principles of natural justice. 25. So far as the second ground of challenge for assailing the impugned order is concerned, the submission is that the same has been passed by the Director, General, Fire Services, whereas under the above referred Rules the competent authority is the Inspector General of Police. 25. So far as the second ground of challenge for assailing the impugned order is concerned, the submission is that the same has been passed by the Director, General, Fire Services, whereas under the above referred Rules the competent authority is the Inspector General of Police. According to him statutorily the ‘I.G. of police’ has to be understood as per the definition thereof given under the police Act, 1861, in view of Section 2 (f) of the present Act and since in that sense the Director General of Fire Services can not be deemed to be Inspector General of Police. Therefore, keeping in view the decision of this Court in the case of Ram Anugrah Singh (supra), the impugned order cannot be sustained. 26. In our opinion the said submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the power of promotion and appointment has been conferred on the I.G. of police by the State Government itself as is evident from the order as contained in Annexure 'C' to the counter affidavit, bas clearly stated the powers which have been vested in the Inspector General of Police in respect of fire services under the provisions of the Act, rules resolutions or orders of the Government, have been vested in the Director General of Fire Services, Bihar. It cannot be disputed that such a delegation was within the competence of the State Government. 27. In this view of the matter, the decision in the case of Ram Anugrah Singh (supra) is of no assistance to the petitioner. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this application. It is accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.