ORDER M. Jagannadha Rao, J. 1. This revision is preferred by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court in A. S. No. 85 of 1990 dated 18-12-1990 by which the judgment of the trial court in O.S. No. 54 of 1985 on the file of the Addl. Munsiff's Court, Cochin was reversed and the suit was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff is the owner of a building and the defendant is a tenant. This rent stipulated was Rs. 75/- per month. The plaintiff came to court contending that the defendant respondent has committed default in payment of the rent, and that a sum of Rs. 2,250/- is due towards arrears of rent. The respondent - defendant took the stand that he had paid an advance amount of Rs. 5000/-, and not merely Rs. 225/- as stated by the plaintiff. On the said question, the trial court framed the following issues; "1. What is the correct rent? 2. Whether the discharge pleaded is true? 3. What is the arrears of rent, if any, due from the defendant? 4. Reliefs and costs". The plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and a tenant of the plaintiff as PW2, while the respondent - defendant examined himself as DW 1. The plaintiff marked Ext. A1 which was a notice issued by him to the defendant on 5-10-1984 and also Ext. A2 dated 22-10-1984 which is a reply issued by the defendant. On the other hand, the defendant marked Ext. B1 dated 1-11-1987, which according to him, was a receipt for Rs. 5,000/- issued by the plaintiff to him. 3. The trial court came to the conclusion on issue No. 1 that the rent was Rs. 15/-. It took up issues 2 and 3 considered the oral and documentary evidence in the light of probabilities. In the judgment on issues 2 and 3, it is seen that it has not only looked into Ext. B1, but also examined the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 on the one hand, and the evidence of DW 1 on the other. It also looked into the probabilities of the case and considered that the absence of witnesses in Ext. B1 was one of the circumstances going against the case of the defendant. B1, but also examined the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 on the one hand, and the evidence of DW 1 on the other. It also looked into the probabilities of the case and considered that the absence of witnesses in Ext. B1 was one of the circumstances going against the case of the defendant. It also noticed that even though the plaintiff filed the suit in February, 1985, the defendant took more than one year to file his written statement, and that the same was filed on 11-3-1986 along with Ext. B1, and that was also a circumstance which created suspicion about Ext. B1. PW2 was examined to say that the defendant had told him that he had paid only three months' rent as advance, which could come to Rs. 225/-. The trial court clearly held that the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 was acceptable, and that of the defendant was liable to be rejected. The building in question came within the purview of the Rent Control Act (Kerala), and under that Act, the landlord was entitled to retain only one month's rent as advance. The trial court held that the defendant had not discharged the burden of proof. 4. Against the said judgment, initially the defendant preferred a revision in this Court, but this Court held that a revision should not be directly filed in this Court and that the defendant should approach the lower appellate court. Thereafter the appeal was filed with an application for condonation of delay. The delay was condoned and the appeal was registered. In the appeal, the lower appellate court has framed the following point for consideration : "Whether the advance paid is Rs 5,000/- or only Rs. 225/-." After framing the said point, the court considered the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 and DW1 and compared the signature in Ext. B1 purporting to be that of the plaintiff with the signature of the plaintiff in the vakalath, plaint and 1.A. and came to the conclusion that the signatures are similar, with the signature in Ext. B1. In the light of the said finding, the lower appellate court stated that Ext. B1 receipt was true. 5. It is against this judgment of the lower appellate court that the present revision is filed. Two points were urged before me by learned counsel for the petitioner. B1. In the light of the said finding, the lower appellate court stated that Ext. B1 receipt was true. 5. It is against this judgment of the lower appellate court that the present revision is filed. Two points were urged before me by learned counsel for the petitioner. One point was that in the subsequent suit, O. S. No. 819 of 1987 wherein a claim for Rs. 2485/- towards arrears of rent for the later period was made, the present defendant had taken the same defence, and the defendant had withdrawn that contention before the said suit was decreed. That suit ended in a decree dated 2-8-1989. According to the petitioner's counsel, the fact that the defendant gave up the same defence in the other suit would be a bar against raising the same issue in this suit, particularly when the appeal against the decree and revision are still pending. The second point raised is that under S.96(4) CPC the lower appellate court ought not to have interfered with the questions of fact. 6. So far as the first point is concerned, I am unable to permit the question to be raised, inasmuch as the documents relating to the fact that a similar defence was taken by the defendant in O. S. No. 819 of 1987 are not placed on record, in the lower appellate court at any time before the judgment of appellate court was rendered on 18-12-1990. Under Order XLI, R.27, he could produce before the lower appellate court ,the judgment in O.S. No. 819 of 1987. He did not do so. 7. Coming to the second point, I am of the view that this Revision is to be allowed on the ground that the lower appellate court has interfered with questions of fact decided by the Trial Court. 8. Under S.96(4) of the CPC as amended in 1976, it is provided as follows: "No appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree in any suit, of the nature cognizable by Court of Small causes, when the amount or value of the subject matter of the original suit does not exceed three thousand rupees." Admittedly, the present suit is for Rs. 2,430/-, and whose subject matter does not exceed Rs. 3,000/-, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is restricted to questions of law. 2,430/-, and whose subject matter does not exceed Rs. 3,000/-, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is restricted to questions of law. It will be noticed that prior to 1976 amendment, the jurisdiction of the High Court was similarly restricted to questions of law, and now restricted to substantial questions of law. In that view of the matter, the relevant case law which is applicable to S.100 CPC prior to 1976 would be attracted to cases coming within S.96(4), wherein the subject matter of the suit does not exceed Rs. 3,000/-. It is there fore clear that no appeal would lie on the question of fact under S.96(4). 9. As already stated, the lower appellate court has framed the point with regard to the genuineness of Ext. B1. By no stretch of Imagination can a question relating to genuineness of Ext. B1 be said to be a question of law. It has been held while dealing with S.100 in Sinha Ramanuja Jeer v. Ranga Ramanuja Jeer, AIR 1961 SC 1720 that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may be. It is true non consideration of material evidence or wrongly placed the onus of proof might, in some cases, come under S.96(4) as they did under S.100 before the 1976 amendment. In the present case, I do not find any error in the judgment of the trial court. 10. The learned counsel for the defendant, however, contended that the judgment of the trial court was perverse. In so far as the contention regarding that the judgment of the trial court being perverse, assuming that such a contention is permissible, I am unable to hold on facts that the judgment is in any way perverse. The judgment of the trial court has dealt with the entire oral and documentary evidence and the probabilities of the case, and having perused the said judgment, I find that in fact the trial court's judgment is better than the one rendered by the appellate court. Inasmuch as I have come to the conclusion that the appellate court has exercised a jurisdiction which was not vested in it by law, I have no option but to allow the revision, setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court, and restoring that of the trial court. Inasmuch as I have come to the conclusion that the appellate court has exercised a jurisdiction which was not vested in it by law, I have no option but to allow the revision, setting aside the judgment of the lower appellate court, and restoring that of the trial court. The Revision is allowed, the judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside, and the judgment of the trial court is restored. No costs.