NANAVATI, J. ( 1 ) ). Petitioner No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as thepetitioner) is Gujarat Pesticides Formulators Association, and the other petitioners are the members of the Association. The members of the petitioner-Association are carrying on the business of pesticides formulations and for that purpose, are having their small manufacturing units in different industrial estates, which were formerly situated outside the limits of Ahmedabad City, but which are now included within the city limits and thus brought under the administrative jurisdiction of the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation. It is the petitioners case that the areas, where their factories are situated, were either parts of some Gram Panchayats or Nagar Panchayats. These local authorities were resource-wise very small and it was difficult for them to provide civil amenities in those areas. It was for that reason that subsequently they were declared as notified areas under the provisions of Sec. 16 of the Gujarat Industrial Development Act. The said notified areas were managed and administered by the Gujarat Industrial Development corporation (gidc for short) in accordance with the provisions of the Gujarat industrial Development Act and the Gujarat Municipalities Act. The G. I. D. C. has provided civic amenities and facilities, like roads, electricity, water supply, drainage etc. The said facilities have been provided by the G. I. D. C. from the income received from the persons, who have put up their industrial units within those industrial estates. Earlier also, local authorities, like Vatva Nagar panchayat, Odhav Nagar Panchayat, Naroda Nagar Panchayat, Saijpur Bogha nagar Panchayat had resisted the declaration of those areas as notified areas by filing writ petitions in the High Court. But all those attempts had failed and were given up in 1978. ( 2 ) ). When the area was under the process of development by the G. I. D. C. , the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had consistently resisted every attempt to extend the limits of Ahmedabad city so as to include those areas within the city limits, as it did not want to bear the burden of developing those areas. But, after passage of about 7 or 8 years, when the said areas became developed, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was tempted to get those areas included in the city limits in order to substantially raise its revenue. But, after passage of about 7 or 8 years, when the said areas became developed, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was tempted to get those areas included in the city limits in order to substantially raise its revenue. The State Government also, in order to achieve the above object, issued a notification on 5-11-1985, proposing to alter the limits of Ahmedabad Municipal corporation so as to include the notified areas within the limits of Ahmedabad city and invited suggestions or objections from all the persons likely to be affected by the said proposal. It is the case of the petitioners that it was a mere show as the State Government had already decided to include those areas within the limits of Ahmedabad city and that the said decision was taken in order to improve the financial position of the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation, which had become otherwise very precarious. Large number of persons, who were likely to be affected by the said Notification, had filed their objections. The said proposal was objected to by different trade associations by holding meetings and making representations. In the said representations, it was pointed out that the proposal was not bona fide and that it would become almost impossible for the industries situated in the notified and surrounding areas to bear the additional burden of taxation prevailing in the city of Ahmedabad. It is the petitioners case that without seriously taking those objections and suggestions into consideration, the state Government, as it was predetermined, included those areas within the city limits of Ahmedabad by issuing a Notification dated 5-2-1986. It is the petitioners case that, as a result thereof, they are deprived of the benefits, which those areas enjoyed as notified areas and they are also deprived of the benefit of having elected representatives. Moreover, they will be now subjected to octroi, which was not levied by the local authorities in those notified areas, and also property taxes. As the petitioners will now be subjected to octroi and property taxes and as they are deprived of other benefits, which they were enjoying earlier, they have filed this petition, challenging the constitutional validity of Secs. 3 and 127 (2) (a) of the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporations Act and Gujarat Ordinance No. 3 of 1986, on the ground that they are ultra vires Arts. 14, 19, 265 and 304 of the Constitution of India. 3 and 127 (2) (a) of the Bombay Provincial municipal Corporations Act and Gujarat Ordinance No. 3 of 1986, on the ground that they are ultra vires Arts. 14, 19, 265 and 304 of the Constitution of India. They have aslo challenged the validity of the Notification dated 5- 2-1986 and the Notes below Circulars dated 2/04/1986 and 9/04/1986. They have further prayed for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents to exempt the raw materials, packing materials and machineries pertaining to pesticides formulation industries from payment of octroi duty and other taxes levied by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. ( 3 ) ). After the filing of the petition, the State Legislature has passed the bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations (Gujarat Amendment and Validation) act, 1986, which has now come into force on and from 9/04/1986, replacing Gujarat Ordinance No, 3 of 1986. Though the petition is not amended inspite of this change, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners sought permission to challenge the vires of Sec. 3a, which has now been included in the Act. As this petition was heard alongwith some other petitions and as validity of Sec. 3a has been challenged in those petitions, we have permitted the learned Counsel to make his submissions regarding validity of Sec. 3a without first insisting upon formal amendment of the petition. ( 4 ) ). Though validity of Sec. 3 has been challenged on various grounds in the petition, at the time of hearing, the learned Counsel pressed only one contention based upon Art. 14 only. He submitted that the function of declaring any local area as city or including any local area in a city is essentially a legislative function and, therefore, such an essential legislative function cannot be delegated to State Government. In the alternative, he further submitted that even if it is assumed that the said function can be delegated by the Legislature, then, in that case. the Legislature ought to have provided guidelines for exercise of those powers and functions by the authority, to whom the powers have been delegated. As no guidelines have been provided in the Act, the exercise of powers by the delegated authority would become arbitrary and, therefore, the said provision is ultra vires Art. 14. Second limb of the contention was that, Sec. 3 provides for consultation only with the Municipal Corporation before any area can be included within the city limits. As no guidelines have been provided in the Act, the exercise of powers by the delegated authority would become arbitrary and, therefore, the said provision is ultra vires Art. 14. Second limb of the contention was that, Sec. 3 provides for consultation only with the Municipal Corporation before any area can be included within the city limits. It does not provide for consultation with local authorities, from whose administrative jurisdiction certain areas are to be excluded, nor does it provide for objections and suggestions from those persons, who are likely to be affected by such inclusion and hence, the said provision is discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) ). Validity of Sec. 3a (l) (a) is challenged on the ground that it extends all taxes etc. , prevalent in the city to the included area without giving the persons having their premises in the included area an opportunity of making suggestions or raising objections as regards imposition of such taxes etc. Thus, the persons having premises in the included area are deprived of the procedural guarantee, which is conferred upon and enjoyed by the persons residing within the existing city limits. The said provision is also challenged on the ground that it creates impediment in the free intercourse of trade as a consequence of extension of liability to pay octroi and as no previous sanction of the president of India has been obtained as required by Art. 304 of the Constitution, it is illegal and void. ( 6 ) ). The Notification dated 5-2-1986 is challenged on two grounds. It was submitted that there is clear non-application of mind on the part of the State government on certain vital aspects, such as : (i) which better facilities will be provided by the Municipal Corporation to the notified area after inclusion; (ii) whether notified areas are required to be denotified; and (iii) what was the necessity of including the notified area within the jurisdiction of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation. The second ground on which the said Notification is challenged is that no reasons are given in the impugned notification regarding the necessity of the action taken by the State Government. ( 7 ) ). The second ground on which the said Notification is challenged is that no reasons are given in the impugned notification regarding the necessity of the action taken by the State Government. ( 7 ) ). In support of his contention that declaration of local area as a city is an essential legislative function, the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhathija and Ors. v. The Collector, Thane, maharashtra and Ors. , AIR 1990 SC 261 and particularly the observations made in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the judgment. In that case, what had happened was that on 19/06/1982, the Government of Maharashtra issued a draft notification under Sec. 3 (3) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949, proposing formation of "kalyan Corporation", by merging municipal areas of kalyan, Ambarnath, Dombivali and Ulhasnagar. After considering the objections and representations made by the affected parties, the Government decided to exclude Ulhasnagar from the proposed Corporation and accordingly issued a notification under Sec. 3 (2) of the Act, constituting the new Corporation without ulhasnagar. The residents of Ambarnath Municipal area challenged that notification inter alia, on the ground that the action of the Corporation of giving an opportunity only to the Federation and not to the other objectors was contrary to Art. 14 and it amounted to hostile discrimination. While opposing the said petition, the state Government had contended that the formation of the Municipal Corpo ration under Sec. 3 of the Act is an ectension of the legislative process and, therefore, Sec. 3 is nothing but a piece of conditional legislation and, therefore, the principles of natural justice are not applicable to such legislative function. The Bombay High Court did not consider it proper to quash the notification as a whole, but directed the State Government to reconsider within six months, the proposal made under Sec. 3 (3) of the Act. This decision was challenged by those persons, who were impleaded as interveners in the writ petitions. The Supreme Court, while considering the nature of the function, observed that the function of the Government in establishing a Corporation under the act is neither executive nor administrative. It is a legislative process. But it did not hold that the said function was an essential legislative function and, therefore, could not have been delegated to the State Government. The Supreme Court, while considering the nature of the function, observed that the function of the Government in establishing a Corporation under the act is neither executive nor administrative. It is a legislative process. But it did not hold that the said function was an essential legislative function and, therefore, could not have been delegated to the State Government. On the contrary, such function was regarded by the Supreme Court as in the nature of a conditional legislation. No other decision was cited by the learned Counsel in support of his contention that such is an essential legislative function and, therefore, could not have been delegated to the State Government. ( 8 ) ). In reply to this contention, learned Advocate General rightly drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in The Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The Notified Area Committee, Tulsipur, AIR 1980 SC 882 , wherein, while dealing with a similar provision contained in Sec. 3 of the U. P. Town area Act, the Supreme Court has pointed out the distinction between conditional legislation and delegated legislation and held that the notification issued under sec. 3 of that Act, which had the effect of making the Act applicable to a geographical area, was in the nature of a conditional legislation and, therefore, could not be characterised as a piece of subordinate legislation. The Supreme court quoted with approval the following observation made by it earlier in in re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, AIR 1951 SC 332 :"thus, conditional legislation has all along been trated in judicial pronouncements not to be a species of delegated legislation at all. It comes under a separate category, and, if in a particular case all the elements of a conditional legislation exist, the question does not arise as to whether in leaving the task of determining the condition to an outside authority, the legislature acted beyond the scope of its power. s"in view of this clear observation of the Supreme Court regarding the nature of the function of the State Government while making a declaration under sec. s"in view of this clear observation of the Supreme Court regarding the nature of the function of the State Government while making a declaration under sec. 3 of the Act, not only the contention that the said function being an essential legislative function, could not have been delegated by the State legislature, but also the contention that issuance of a declaration under Sec. 3 of the Act being a piece of subordinate legislation, the Legislature ought to have provided guidelines and in absence thereof, the said provisions should be regarded as violative of Art. 14, will have to be regarded as untenable. As we are of this view, it is not necessary to refer to the two decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. , in Kunnathat Thathunni Moopil Nair v. State of kerala, AIR 1961 SC 552 and A. N. Paraswaman v. State of Tamil Nadu, air 1990 SC 40 , relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention. ( 9 ) ). Validity of Sec. 3 is also challenged on the ground that, whereas it provides for consultation with the Municipal Corporation, no provision is made for consultation with other local authorities and persons likely to be affected. We do not thirik it proper to consider the merits of this contention, because, in this case, before exercising the power under Sec. 3 the State Government had invited suggestions and objections from all concerned. That fact is not in disputa and, one of the contentions of the petitioners is that numerous suggestions and objections, which were made, were not properly considered by the State government. ( 10 ) ). As regards Sec. 3a, it was contended that it is vioiative of Arts. 14 and 304 of the Constitution of India. In the petition, various contentions have been raised, but at the time of hearing, Mr. Vakharia, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in Special Civil Application Nos. 1976 of 1986 and 1269 of 1986, submitted written submissions and the contention raised therein in this behalf is that Sec. 3a is violative of Art. 14, inasmuch as it denies an opportunity to the residents within the included area of making suggestions and raising objections against the imposition of taxes etc. , though such a procedural guarantee is available to the persons residing within the limits of the Municipal Corporation. , though such a procedural guarantee is available to the persons residing within the limits of the Municipal Corporation. Challenge based upon Art. 304 is to the effect that Sec. 3a creates an impediment in free intercourse of trade by extending liability to pay octroi to the area which is included and yet no previous sanction of the President was obtained, as required by Art. 304 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, the said provision is bad. No other contention was pressed. ( 11 ) ). So far as the challenge based upon Art. 14 is concerned, what is required to be noted is that competence of the Legislature to enact such a provision is not challenged. Section 3 is challenged only on the ground that the procedural guarantee, which was available to the persons residing within the limits of the municipal Corporation, has not been made available to the persons residing in the included area. Section 3a was first introduced into the Act by the Bombay provincial Municipal Corporations (Gujarat Amendment) Ordinance, 1986. The said Ordinance was subsequently, replaced, by the Bombay Provincial Municipal corporations (Gujarat Amendment and Validation) Act, 1986, being Gujarat Act no. 19 of 1986. The said Act is deemed to have come into force on 9/04/1986. As is evident from its object, the said provision has been made with a view to deal with the situation which had arisen as a result of extension of limits of Cities of Ahmedabad and Surat. Moreover, persons residing in the area to be included cannot be said to be similarly situated. Municipal facilities-wise and with respect to similar other facilities the persons residing within the limits and those residing outside would constitute separate and different types of classes. IF persons residing in the area to be included are treated as a separate class, it cannot be said that such classification is not reasonable. If in view of large facilities, which would become available to them on their area being included within the limits of big Municipalities, like Ahmedabad and Surat, some separate treatment is given to them as regards imposition of taxes etc. , it cannot be said that such a provision suffers from such a vice of discrimination as would reader it illegal or void. , it cannot be said that such a provision suffers from such a vice of discrimination as would reader it illegal or void. The object of the provision is to see that there is an automatic extension of all the taxes to the newly added area. The provision, which has been made, has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The said provision, therefore, cannot be said to be violative of Art. 14 and the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners in this behalf has to be rejected. ( 12 ) ). Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel for the petitioners in Special Civil application No. 1746 of 1986, while adopting the submissions made by Mr. Vakharia, relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in Bagalkot City municipality v. Bagalkot Cement, AIR 1963 SC 771 , and Visakha-patnam municipality v. Kandregula Nukaraju and Ors. , AIR 1975 SC 2172 . Both these cases have been distinguished by the Supreme Court in Bhaskar Textile Mills ltd. v. Jharsuguda Municipality and Ors. , AIR 1984 SC 583 . The same ground on which the Supreme Court distinguished these decisions is available in these cases also, as Sec. 3a specifically provides for automatic extension of taxes etc. , on inclusion of new area within the Cities of Ahmedabad and Surat. ( 13 ) ). As stated earlier, Sec. 3a provides for automatic extension of taxes to the included area. It is not a provision imposing levy of octroi. Power to levy octroi and the steps taken by the Municipal Corporation for levy of octroi are not challenged. What is challenged is only the liability to pay octroi because of the inclusion of the area within the city limits of Ahmedabad. Such a provision, in our opinion, cannot be regarded as a provision, creating an impediment in the free intercourse of trade. As we do not find any merit in this contention, the same also deserves to be rejected. ( 14 ) ). Such a provision, in our opinion, cannot be regarded as a provision, creating an impediment in the free intercourse of trade. As we do not find any merit in this contention, the same also deserves to be rejected. ( 14 ) ). The third contention of the learned Counsel is that the Notification dated 5-2-1986 is illegal and invalid because of the following reasons : (1) There is a clear non-application of mind on the part of the State government on very vital subject such as : (i) What better amenities will be provided by the Municipal Corporation to the notified Area if it is included within the jurisdiction of the ahmedabad Municipal Corporation.- This aspect is not considered and mind is not applied on this issue; (ii) The State Government has not applied mind on the crucial point as to whether Notified Area requires to be abolished; (iii) Whether there is any necessity, and if yes what is the necessity to include the Notified Area within the jurisdiction of Ahmedabad municipal Corporation. The State Government has not applied mind on this very crucial issue. Since if there is no necessity, it is an exercise in futility undertaken by the State Government. (2) No reasons are given in the impugned notification regarding the necessity of the action proposed to be taken and, therefore, the notification dated 5-2-1986 is illegal and invalid. ( 15 ) ). The learned Counsel submitted that the City is defined by Sec. 2 (8) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 to mean the city of Ahmedabad or any other local area constituted to be a City under sec. 3. Section 3 also provides that the local areas within the limits specified by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette shall constitute the City of Ahmedabad. The said Section also empowers the State Government to include therein or to exclude therefrom such area, as may be specified in the Notification. It was submitted that what is contemplated by sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3 is the local area and not the notified area. Therefore, without first denotifying the notified area, such area cannot be included within the limits of the City of Ahmedabad. The learned Counsel also drew our attention to Sees. 4, 264a and 264d of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. (3) of Sec. 3 is the local area and not the notified area. Therefore, without first denotifying the notified area, such area cannot be included within the limits of the City of Ahmedabad. The learned Counsel also drew our attention to Sees. 4, 264a and 264d of the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963. Section 4 empowers the State Government to declare any local area to be a Municipal borough. Section 264a empowers the State Government to declare a specified area, which it is not expedient to constitute as a municipal borough under sec. 4 to be a notified area. Section 264d provides the procedure for issuing notification under Sec. 264a and for cancelling such notification. He also invited our attention to Sec. 264e, which provides for certain consequences on the specified area ceasing to be a notified area. He also invited our attention to Sec. 16 of the G. I. D. C. Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions for the time being in force relating to notified area in the Gujarat Municiplities Act, the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the provisions relating to notified areas and any other provisions of that Act shall extend to and be brought into force in any industrial area, and thereupon such area shall be deemed to be a notified area under that Act. Relying upon these provisions, it was submitted that the declaration regarding notified area is required to be cancelled before it can again be turned into a local area, and only thereafter, such local area can be included within the city limits of Ahmedabad under Sec. 3 of the B. P. M. C. Act. ( 16 ) ). As regards the meaning of the words local area, the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Diamond Sugar Mills Ltd. and Am. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. , AIR 1961 SC 652 . Therein, the supreme Court has held that the proper meaning to be attached to the words local area in Entry 52 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the constitution is an area administered by a local body like a Municipality, a district board, a local board, a union board, a panchayat or the like. It is difficult to understand how this decision can be of any help to the petitioners. It is difficult to understand how this decision can be of any help to the petitioners. In Gujarat, any area is bound to be either Gram, Nagar or City and, therefore, there can be no area, which does not have a local authority. Section 264c of the Gujarat Municipalities Act also makes it clear that, when a specified area is declared as a notified area, it has to be regarded as a municipal borough. The notified area does not cease to be a local area, even when the same is declared as a notified area. We, therefore, do not find any good reason for upholding the contention that Sec. 3 (3) of the B. P. M. C. Act does not contemplates inclusion of a notified area in the City limits of Ahmedabad. ( 17 ) ). It was further submitted that, once an area is declared as a notified area, it is required to be denotified first, before it can be included in any other area, as, otherwise, it would lead to an anomalous situation, where two local authorities will have power to administer the same area. In support of the contention that an area of a local authority cannot be included in another local authority without first cancelling the notification, whereby it became the part of the first local authority, the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Gram Panchayat, Shiaiawas Khurd and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , AIR 1971 Raj. 263 . Section 4 of the rajasthan Municipalities Act conferred power upon the Government to issue a notification to declare any local area in the Municipality, to define any area in the Municipality, to include or exclude any area, and otherwise alter the area of any Municipality. Sections 5 and 6 thereof prescribed the procedure, which was to be adopted for achieving any of the purposes mentioned in sec. 4. Interpreting Sec. 4, the Rajasthan High Court held that it cannot be so interpreted as to imply an automatic exclusion of an area from the panchayat- limits on its mere inclusion in the Municipalitys limits. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Nagabhushanam and Ors. v. Collector, Krishna District and Ors. , AIR 1982 AP 123 , wherein also. The learned counsel also relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Nagabhushanam and Ors. v. Collector, Krishna District and Ors. , AIR 1982 AP 123 , wherein also. it has been held that an area of Panchayat cannot be included in Municipality without first cancelling the Notification making it a part of the Panchayat. In our opinion, this contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is not tenable in view of Sec. 490 of the B. P. M. C. Act. The said Section provides that the Gujarat Municipalities Act, 1963 and the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1961 shall cease to apply to any area included in the City. It is this, provision, contained in the B. P. M C. , which makes all the difference and, therefore, the two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel lor the petitioners are also of no help to him. In view of Sec. 490, as soon as any area is included in the City limits of Ahmedabad, the provisions of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and the Gujarat Municipalities Act cease to apply to that area. Therefore, there will not be any anomalous position, as submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. The said provision also dispenses with the requirement, if any, of cancelling the Notification, making any local area as part of either a Panchayat or a Municipality. What was submitted by the learned Counsel with respect to Sec. 490 was that it cannot apply to a situation prior to the inclusion of the area in the City. What the learned Counsel overlooks is that, as a result of Sec. 490, the effect is simultaneous and hence, the area, in respect of which a Declaration under Sec. 3 of the Act was made, will immediately cease to be an area governed by the provisions of the Gujarat Municipalities Act and the Gujarat panchayats Act. It would, therefore, be redundant and unnecessary to issue a notification under those two Acts, cancelling the inclusion of those areas, either in the Panchayat or in the Municipality or Borough. As we do not accept the contention that cancellation notification is a must in such cases, it cannot be said that in the absence of a notification denotifying the notified area under Sec. 3 of the Act, the inclusion should be regarded as bad. As we do not accept the contention that cancellation notification is a must in such cases, it cannot be said that in the absence of a notification denotifying the notified area under Sec. 3 of the Act, the inclusion should be regarded as bad. It was however, submitted that, if Sec. 490 is interpreted in that way, then the valuable right of the persons residing in the included area of making a representation against cancellation of the Notification, whereby they were made a part of another local authority earlier, or notified area, will be lost. In this connection, what is required to be noted is that, making a representation is a statutory right conferred by the statute and it being a creation of the statute, no grievance can be made if a different provision is made in the Act in that behalf. ( 18 ) ). The second contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that there is non-application of mind on the part of the State Government, inasmuch as, it has not considered, before issuing the declaration, as to which facilities were available in the included area, while it was a notified area, and what better facilities were going to be provided by the Ahmedabad Municipal corporation. Similarly, the State Government had not applied its mind to the necessity of making this Notified Area a part of the City of Ahmedabad. The averments made in this behalf in the petition are denied in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Deputy Secretary of the State of Gujarat. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit, reference is mada to the Project Identification Mission Report by the world Bank Team. The affidavit shows that another alternative of constituting separate Corporation for that area, which was described as "novad Area", was also considered. It is also pointed out in the affidavit that various suggestions made and objections raised by the bodies and persons likely to be affected were also considered carefully by the Government. In fact, there were discussions with the representatives of the industries and as a result of the discussions, it was decided that the Municipal Corporation would see that no heavy burden fell on the Industries within that area to be included. In view of the pollution and other factors, it was found necessary to develop other area in a proper manner. It was also found that, approximately. Rs. In view of the pollution and other factors, it was found necessary to develop other area in a proper manner. It was also found that, approximately. Rs. 60. 00 crores would be required over a period of five years to develop that area in a proper manner. It was also found that this could never have been done by the local authority, which was administering the included area. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had also agreed and, subsequently, issued a notification, reducing Octroi on 16 items. As regards the property tax, the Government has received a proposal from the Corporation that it will collect only 1/5th tax in the first year and go on increasing it in the some proportion, so that it will recover full tax after cooaplstion of 5 years. After considering all these factor?, the Government had decided to issue the declaration. It, therefore, cannot be said that the Government had not applied its mind to the facilities, which were available in the included area and the facilities, which were to be provided by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and the necessity of including the area within the City of Ahmedabad. As we do not find any substance in this contention also, it has to be rejected. ( 19 ) ). In the result, this pstition is dismisssd. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .