M. RAMAKRISHNA RAO, J. ( 1 ) IN this writ petition under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution, the petitioner has called in question the legality and correctness of the Order, annexure-a, made by the taluk executive magistrate, respondent-3 herein and has sought for quashing the same on more than one ground. ( 2 ) A few facts that are necessary for the disposal of this writ petition are asfollows: the undisputed facts as disclosed from the pleadings are that respondent-1 is the owner of land bearing sy. No. 24/4a measuring 1 acre 23 guntas of lakhanpur village, chikodi taluk, belgaum district. He mortgaged this land by a registered mortgage deed dated 4-4-1972 in favour of the petitioner for Rs. 2,000/- and pursuant to the mortgage, the petitioner was put in possession of the property. Subsequently, however, during the subsistence of the mortgage, respondent-1 executed a simple mortgage on 20-5-1974 in favour of respondent-2 by raising a loan of Rs. 3,000/ -. There are entries in the record of rights disclosing these facts. ( 3 ) AFTER coming into force of the Karnataka debt relief ordinance of 1975, respondent-1 made an application before the taluk executive magistrate for reliefs under the ordinance (karnataka ordinance No. 31 of 1976) which later became the act called the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 (karnataka act No. 25 of 1976) (hereinafter called the 'act' ). Sections 3, 4, 7 and 8 shall be deemed to have come into force on 21-10-1975, while sections 5 and 6 shall be deemed to have come into force on 11-11-1975 and Section 9 shall be deemed to have come into force on 28-11-1975. ( 4 ) THAT application of respondent-1 came to be considered by respondent-3 andon 29-2-1976 he made an order as per Annexure-C rejecting the application on the ground that the opposite party was shown to be the tenant of the land in question. A true copy of the Order, anncxure-c, produced along with the writ petition bears in the operative portion of the order the date 29-3-1978 though at the beginning it was shown as 29-2-1976. It is pertinent to note that the order rejecting the application of respondent-1 was not challenged by him and hence it became final. A true copy of the Order, anncxure-c, produced along with the writ petition bears in the operative portion of the order the date 29-3-1978 though at the beginning it was shown as 29-2-1976. It is pertinent to note that the order rejecting the application of respondent-1 was not challenged by him and hence it became final. ( 5 ) SUB-SEQUENTLY, however, on the coining into force of the Karnataka debt reliefact, 1980 (Karnataka Act No. 29 of 1980) which came into force on 31-12-1980, respondent-1 filed one more application before respondent 3-taluk executive magistrate seeking relief from indebtedness. Respondent-3, having heard both parties, made an order on 31-12-1981 by which he allowed the application of respondent-1 by discharging the debt of Rs. 2,000/- due to the petitioner, with a direction to restore the land to respondent-1. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the said Order, the petitioner has approached this court in this writ petition. ( 7 ) BEFORE this writ petition was filed, the petitioner filed criminal revision petition No. 6 of 1982 on the file of the I additional sessions judge, belgaum, against the said order. The said revision petition was dismissed on 28-5-1982 as not maintainable. ( 8 ) THIS court by an order dated 18-6-1984 admitted the writ petition and granted interim stay. Thereafter, the matter was heard finally. ( 9 ) SMT. S. n. sudha, advocate, for Sri G. S. Visweswara, learned counsel for the petitioner, mainly urged the following points: (1) the application of respondcnt-1 seeking relief under the act of 1976 having been rejected by the Order, Annexure-C and that order having not been challenged before this court, it became final and conclusive. That being so, it was not open for respondent-1 to file another application afresh under the 1980 act seeking similar relief. In that view of the matter, the application of respondent-1 should have been rejected as not maintainable. (2) the subsequent application of respondcnt-1 should have been dismissed on the ground that it was hit by the principles of resjudicata, inasmuch as once the matter on the same cause of action has been directly and substantially decided between the same parties, it cannot be re-agitated on the same cause of action be- tween the same parties as is done in the present case. In other words, she submitted that the matter once was decided under the Order, Annexure-C , made under 1976 act and therefore, rcspondent-3 could not have allowed respondent- 1 to seek relief on the same cause of action under subsequent act. Hence, annexure-a, is liable to be quashed. ( 10 ) PER contra, Sri B. S. Kamate, learned counsel for respondent-1, urged that since both the acts viz. , 1976 and 1980 acts are operating, it is open to the aggrieved person to seek relief under either of them. He further submitted that merely because respondent 1-failed in getting relief on the first application presented under the 1976 Act, nothing prevented him from filing another application under 1980 act seeking relief from indebtedness as there is no such prohibition in law. He also submitted that respondent-3 taluk executive magistrate, having applied his mind to the facts of the case and having held that rcspondent-1 was a debtor within the meaning of the Act, passed the order under challenge discharging respondent-1 from indebtedness, which cannot be interfered within this writ petition. Lastly, he argued that the question of doctrine of res judicata operating against respondent-1 would not arise in a case like this as the Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not made applicable to the case on hand in particular Section 11 thereof. Consequently, according to him, respondent-3 was competent to grant relief in favour of respondent-1 even on the subsequent application. He prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. ( 11 ) THE point therefore that arises for my consideration in this writ petition is whether respondent-3 was justified in allowing the application of rcspondent-1 by his Order, annexure-a, inspite of the fact that similar relief on the same cause of action claimed by respondcnt-1 was rejected as per Annexure-C. ( 12 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions urged on both sides, it is necessary to refer to Section 4 of 1976 act. It reads:"4. Relief from indebtedness. It reads:"4. Relief from indebtedness. Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force or in any contract or instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, with effect from the date of commencement of this Section, (a) every debt advanced before the commencement of this Section including the amount of interest, if any, payable by the debtor to the creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged;xx xx xx. ( 13 ) BASED upon the said Provisions, any person who is in indebtedness incurred before the commencement of the act of 1976 can certainly seek relief there under by filing an application before the taluk executive magistrate. Earlier to the Karnataka debt relief (Amendment) Act, 1976 (karnataka act No. 63 of 1976) which came into force on 27-10-1976, the competent authority to grant relief under Section 4 was the sub-divisional magistrate and subsequently the taluk executive magistrate. Accordingly, on the application made by rcspondent-1 on 22-12-1975, the sub-divisional magistrate, then competent authority, held an enquiry and passed an order as per Annexure-C rejecting the application on the ground that the opposite party was shown to be the tenant of the land. Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of 1976 act says that every order of the sub-divisional magistrate made under Section 5 shall be final. Therefore, the order made by the sub-divisional magistrate as per Annexure-C by which the claim of respondent-1 was rejected became final, it having not been challenged before this court under Article 226 of the constitution, in the absence of any provision for appeal or revision. Therefore, the question is whether such a person can redress his grievances by filing a fresh application under the subsequent enactment i. e. , 1980 act. ( 14 ) NO doubt, as we have already noticed, by virtue of the ruling of this court in Chikkabalusa v Nagaraju, 1983 (2) kar. Lj. Short notes 24 both the acts are in force and it is for the concerned person to avail of the benefit of any of the acts which is more beneficial to him. But the real question is whether a person, having once approached the competent authority for relief under the act of 1976 and failed, can once more approach the said authority under the subsequent enactment for the same relief. But the real question is whether a person, having once approached the competent authority for relief under the act of 1976 and failed, can once more approach the said authority under the subsequent enactment for the same relief. The submission of Sri Kamate is that he can. To say so, he placed strong reliance upon the decision of this court in Sebastin Antony v Ramananda Bhatt and another, 1981 (2) kar. L. j. 409. In that case, the question that arose for consideration was whether a person, whose claim for discharge of debt under 1976 act having been rejected and the debtbcing in existence as on the date of the commencement of 1980 Act, was disabled to apply for relief under the 1980 act. The answer given by this court to that question is found in paragraph 31. Referring to the objects and reasons of the l. a. bill No. 9 of 1980 regarding the Karnataka debt relief act introduced in the legislature, the learned judge held as follows:"31. Thus it is obvious that the legislature wanted to give relief to such debtors who incurred loans after the coming into force of the 1976 act and for such debts which were in existence on the date of the application of act No. 29 of 1980. " ( 15 ) BASED upon this ruling of this court in the above decision, Sri Kamate submitted that respondent-3 was entitled to file a fresh application under the act of 1980, as, as on the date when the act of 1980 came into force, the debt was in existence. I do not see any force in this submission, for, by a careful consideration of the ruling in sebastin's case, it is seen that such an opportunity was required to be provided having regard to the objects and reasons of l. a. bill. No. 9 of 1980 only in respect of the debts incurred after the coining into force of the 1976 act. Therefore, a person who incurred debt after the coining into force of 1976 act and the claim for discharge of such debt having been rejected, can claim afresh for relief under 1980 Act, if such debt exists on the date of the application of act No. 29 of 1980. Therefore, a person who incurred debt after the coining into force of 1976 act and the claim for discharge of such debt having been rejected, can claim afresh for relief under 1980 Act, if such debt exists on the date of the application of act No. 29 of 1980. In the instant case, it is not shown before me that the relief sought for by respondent-1 before respondent-3 in his second application filed under 1980 act was in respect of the loan raised by him after the coming into force of the 1976 act. Such an averment is not found in the Order, anncxure-a, nor has it been taken in the statement of objections opposing the writ petition. In fact, from the averments of the writ petition and the impugned Order, annexure-a, it is clear and not disputed by respondent-1 that he raised a loan of Rs. 2,000/- from the petitioner under a registered mortgage deed dated 4-4-1972. Therefore, it is a debt incurred earlier to the coming into force of the 1976 act in which event respondcnt-1 cannot seek relief once again under the act of 1980 once his claim was rejected under the act of 1976. The decision relied upon by Sri Kamate in sebastin's case will not be of no assistance to respondent-1. ( 16 ) FURTHER, as I have already observed, the decision of the sub-divisional magistrate, having not been challenged, has become final and conclusive as stated in sub-section (6) of sections of the act of 1976. It is nobody's case that respondent-1 challenged the Order, anncxure-c, before this court, by which his application for discharge of his debt was rejected. Therefore, it became final and conclusive. It is not open for respondcnt-1 to file another application under the subsequent enactment for the same purpose in which case the principles of res judicata arising under Section 11, CPC, operate against him, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ( 17 ) EVEN though the Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not made applicable to the case on hand as contended by Sri Kamate, nevertheless question of public policy has to be taken into account by the court apart from the specific law provided giving finality to the order made under Section 5 of the act. For this reason, Provisions are made in the 1980 act to override other laws. For this reason, Provisions are made in the 1980 act to override other laws. Section 12 thereof reads:"act to override other laws, contracts, etc. the Provisions of this act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908) or in any other law for the time being in force or any custom, usage or contract or decree or order of a court or other authority. "but such a provision was not found in the act of 1976. Further, there is nothing in the Provisions of Section 11, CPC, regard being had to sub-section (6) of Section 5 which provides for finality of the Order, which is inconsist ent with the Provisions of the act of 1980 so as to make it not applicable to the case on hand. Thus, I find no force in the submission of Sri Kamate. ( 18 ) THAT part, whether the learned taluk executive magistrate has any power to review his own Order, is the question. I am of the opinion, in view of the scheme of the Act, that he cannot. However, he has done it by passing another order as per Annexure-A in favour of respondent-1 on the same cause of action which was decided earlier between the same parties. On this ground also, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be quashed. ( 19 ) IN the result, I make the following:order this writ petition is allowed and the impugned Order, annexure-a, is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute. --- *** --- .