Fousia v. State of Kerala — 1992 DIGILAW 309 (KER)

JUDGMENT 1. The original petition is for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, or any other writ, order or direction directing the first respondent to produce the detenu, the husband of the petitioner and to set him at liberty, to quash Exts. P-1 detention order and P-8 confirmation, and for other reliefs. 2. On 10th December 1990, the detenu arrived at the Trivandrum Airport from Dubai by Air India Flight. When he was about to go for customs clearance the Intelligence Officer intercepted him on suspicion and examined his travel documents. The detenu gave a declaration of the goods brought by him. But, when examined, the Customs Officer recovered 12 gold bars weighing 1398 grains valued at Rs. 4,54,350 concealed in a cradle. The Officer seized the gold bars. The detenu gave a statement under S.108 of the Customs Act, 1962 to the effect that the said gold bars were given to him by one Saidu of Thrissur District working in Dubai, that since he was without job and was facing financial difficulty the said Saidu used to give him financial assistance, that when the detenu expressed his desire to go home Saidu informed that he would arrange the air ticket provided he carried the goods entrusted to him, that the said Saidu gave air ticket and cradle, told him about the concealment of the gold in the cradle, saying that he would be paid Rs. 10,000 when he hands over the cradle to Saidu's man. 3. The detenu was arrested under S.104 of the Customs Act and was produced before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam who remanded him to the judicial custody. He was later enlarged on bail on 1st January 1991. After the completion of investigation, the sponsoring authority sent the proposal to the detaining authority, who passed Ext. P-1, the detention order. Consequent upon the detention order dated 27th February 1991, the detenu was arrested and detained on 3rd December 1991. Ext. P-2 grounds of detention was supplied to the detenu. He sent a written representation Ext. P-3 to the State Advisory Board requesting to cancel the detention order. Petitioner sent Ext. P-5 representation on 27th December 1991 to respondents 1 and 2, and the State Advisory Board requesting them to supply the Malayalam translation of the documents supplied to the detenu. The detaining authority as per Ext. He sent a written representation Ext. P-3 to the State Advisory Board requesting to cancel the detention order. Petitioner sent Ext. P-5 representation on 27th December 1991 to respondents 1 and 2, and the State Advisory Board requesting them to supply the Malayalam translation of the documents supplied to the detenu. The detaining authority as per Ext. P-7 letter furnished the Malayalam translation of the documents demanded by the petitioner. 4. On a reference made by the State Government, the State Advisory Board considered the case of the detenu and gave its opinion on 25th January 1992 stating that there is sufficient cause for detention of the detenu. The State Government passed Ext. P-8 confirmation order on 21st February 1992. Detenu's representation was rejected by Ext. P-9 dated 20th February 1992. Detenu had filed Ext. P-11 petition for bail on 12th December 1991. It was rejected by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Ernakulam by Ext. P-12 order dated 20th December 1990. 5. Adjudication proceedings was initiated against the detenu and show cause notice Ext. P-13 was issued. To Ext. P-13 show cause notice the detenu sent Ext. P-14; and Ext. P-15 is the order of adjudication. The detaining authority passed Ext. P-1 detention order under S.3(1)(i) and 3(1)(ii) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1974 (Act 52 of 1974) (for short 'the Act') on 27th February 1991 and Ext. P-8 confirmation on 21st February 1992. 6. Respondents 1 and 2 have filed counter affidavit. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that inasmuch as the ground under S.3(1)(ii) was non existent there was non application of mind, that the order is vitiated because Ext. P-11 bail application and the order thereon were neither placed before the detaining authority nor copy of the same furnished to the detenu, that the opinion of the Advisory Board was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, that, the documents which came into existence after Ext. P-1 were not placed before the Advisory Board or the detaining authority that Ext. P-8 was rendered mechanically and without any application of mind, that the Malayalam translations of all the documents were not supplied and that there was delay in disposing of the detenu's representation as well as executing Ext. P-1. 7. P-1 were not placed before the Advisory Board or the detaining authority that Ext. P-8 was rendered mechanically and without any application of mind, that the Malayalam translations of all the documents were not supplied and that there was delay in disposing of the detenu's representation as well as executing Ext. P-1. 7. Relying on the decision in Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal AIR 1969 SC 1028 , the learned counsel contended that the procedural safeguards under Art.22 of the Constitution of India are mandatory and that non compliance of anyone of the same would render the detention illegal. Learned counsel contended, the ground under S.3(1)(ii) of the Act since was non existent there was non application of mind in rendering the detention order for it was not possible to discern that he applied his mind with respect to ground under S.3(1)(i) only. S.3(1)(ii) is with respect to abetting the smuggling of goods. As per S.3(1) of the Act, the detention is with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange, to prevent him from smuggling goods, abetting the smuggling of goods, or engaging in transporting, concealing or keeping smuggled goods, etc. Ext. P-1 detention order is under S.3(1)(i) and 3(1)(ii) to prevent the detenu from smuggling goods [S.3(1)(i)] and abetting the smuggling of goods S.3(1)(ii) 8. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that one cannot be at once the offender as well as its abettor. It may be correct to say that a person cannot be an abettor of the offence committed by him. But it will be seen, the detention is to prevent the smuggling of goods or abetting the smuggling of goods. The application of the mind by the detaining authority is with respect to the said two specific acts. In the decision in" Narendra v. B. B. Gujral AIR 1979 SC 420 it is held that, clauses (i) and (ii) of S.3(1) of the Act may operate on different fields, which may sometimes overlap, still a wider meaning is given to the term 'smuggling' in S.2(e) of the Act, with a view to broaden the scope of preventive detention. In the decision in" Narendra v. B. B. Gujral AIR 1979 SC 420 it is held that, clauses (i) and (ii) of S.3(1) of the Act may operate on different fields, which may sometimes overlap, still a wider meaning is given to the term 'smuggling' in S.2(e) of the Act, with a view to broaden the scope of preventive detention. The intention of the legislature was to treat the smuggling of goods and abetting the smuggling of goods as grounds separate and distinct, and both are separate grounds for detention i.e., to take in all such activities which result in accomplishment of smuggling of contraband goods. 9. The question for consideration is whether the ground under S.3(1)(ii) was non existent as is contended. The statement of the detenu recorded by the sponsoring authority at the seizure of the contraband article reveals that he was a carrier of the article. Thus, he offered himself as accessory for smuggling goods. The two factors that emerge from the said statement are that, he demonstrated his willingness to be a carrier and the other, he smuggled goods to India. He smuggled goods, and also offered his service as a carrier. The second aspect thus brings out a potential abettor for future smuggling; that could also be prevented by detention. The ground and incident need not be the same or synonymous. An incident may generate more than one ground. Therefore, in this case, the incident though was only smuggling, in the context of his statement before the sponsoring authority, it was eminently clear that two grounds existed. In that view the decisions in Bhavani Shankar v. Assistant Collector (Preventive) 1981 CriLJ 505 and K. Satyanarayanan Subudhi v. Union of India 1991 CriLJ 1936 relied on by the petitioner's counsel cannot have application. We see no force in the argument of the learned counsel in this regard. 10. Learned, counsel then contended that the detenu had filed Ext. P-11 application for bail which was dismissed by Ext. P-12 order of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate of Ernakulam. But neither of Exts. P-11 and P-12 were placed before the detaining authority nor were copies of the same furnished to the detenu. It was, therefore, contended that, the said omission has vitiated the application of the mind by the detaining authority and also disabled the detenu from making an effective representation. It is pointed out that, Ext. But neither of Exts. P-11 and P-12 were placed before the detaining authority nor were copies of the same furnished to the detenu. It was, therefore, contended that, the said omission has vitiated the application of the mind by the detaining authority and also disabled the detenu from making an effective representation. It is pointed out that, Ext. P-11 contains retraction of the confession by the detenu and inasmuch as the earliest retraction was not placed before the detaining authority the same would vitiate the detention order. Learned counsel relied on the decisions in Ashadevi v. K. Shivraj AIR 1979 SC 447 , Sita Ram v. State of Rajastan AIR 1986 SC 1072 , State of U.P. v. Kamal Kishore Saini 1988 (1) SCC 287 , M. Ahamedkutty v. Union of India and another JT 1990 (1) SC 143, and O.P. No. 4454 of 1991-S and the decision in P. U. Abdul Rahiman v. Union of India 1991 CriLJ 430. Ext. P-11 bail application was on 12th December 1990. The detenu moved another bail application on 22nd December 1990 which was allowed. Now the contention of the petitioner is that since Ext. P-11 bail application dated 12th December 1990 which was rejected was not placed before the detaining authority, the same has vitiated the order of detention. In P. U. Abdul Rahiman's case 1991 CriLJ 430 reliance was placed by the detaining authority on the orders on bail applications but copy of the same was not served to the detenu, therefore it was held the same would amount to denial of effective opportunity to the detenu. 11. These orders and bail applications are not relied on in the grounds of detention. - The only case now is, that the first bail application which was rejected and the order thereon were not placed before the detaining authority and the copies of the same were not served on the detenu. In M. Ahmmedkutty's case JT 1990 (1) SC 143 bail was granted on condition and it was held that, the bail application and the order were vital material for consideration. 12. There is distinction between a bail application that is rejected and the one that is allowed in the matter of effective opportunity under Art.22(5) of the constitution. This aspect is considered in the decision in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 2261 . 12. There is distinction between a bail application that is rejected and the one that is allowed in the matter of effective opportunity under Art.22(5) of the constitution. This aspect is considered in the decision in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 2261 . It is held therein that, when the detenu has moved for bail, then the application and the order thereon refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not amount to suppression of relevant material and that the question of non application of mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody. It is further held that the non supply of the copies of bail application or the order refusing bail to the detenu cannot affect the detenu's right of being afforded a reasonable opportunity guaranteed under Art.22(5) when it is clear that the authority has not relied or referred to the same. It is also held that when the detaining authority has merely referred to them in the narration of events and has not relied upon them, failure to supply bail application and order refusing bail will not cause any prejudice to the detenu in making an effective representation. Thus only when the detaining authority has not only referred to but has also relied upon the same in arriving at the necessary satisfaction can failure to supply these documents, may, in certain cases depending upon the facts and circumstances amount to violation of Art.22(5) of the Constitution of India. In a case where the detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu. In the decision in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and another AIR 1991 SC 1640 at 1649 it is held: "Demand of any or every document, however irrelevant it may be for the concerned detenu, merely on the ground that there is a reference thereto in the grounds of detention cannot vitiate an otherwise legal detention order." In view of the fact that the authority . has not relied on Exts. P-11 and P-12 and since there is no case that the bail application dated 22nd December 1990 which was allowed was not placed before the detaining authority, we have no hesitation to hold that the failure to place Exts. P-11 and P-12 or the copies of the same having been not given to the detenu could in any way affect the validity of the detention order. 13. The next contention by the petitioner is that the Advisory Board transgressed its jurisdiction and the same influenced the detaining authority to confirm the detention order mechanically without application of mind. Confirmation order Ext. P-8 inter alia stated that the Advisory Board's opinion had said there are sufficient and good grounds to detain the detenu and confirmed the order of detention. It is for the detaining authority, on an independent application of mind, to satisfy that there are sufficient grounds for confirming the order of detention. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is not for the Advisory Board to confirm the order of detention as per S.8(f) of the Act; but it is for the detaining authority on being satisfied as to the grounds to confirm the order of detention. It was contended that the said opinion of the Advisory Board influenced the detaining authority in confirming the detention and fixing the period of detention, for Ext. P-8 after adverting to the opinion of the detaining authority said: "Accordingly, under S.8(f) of the Act, Government confirm the detention." 14. It was contended that the said opinion of the Advisory Board influenced the detaining authority in confirming the detention and fixing the period of detention, for Ext. P-8 after adverting to the opinion of the detaining authority said: "Accordingly, under S.8(f) of the Act, Government confirm the detention." 14. S.8(f) of the Act enjoins that where the Advisory Board has reported that there is sufficient cause in its opinion for detention, the appropriate Government may confirm the detention and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it may think fit and in every case where the Advisory Board has reported that in its opinion there is no sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned, the appropriate Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person to be released forthwith. The wording of the section is such that there is certain amount of discretion with the Government in the matter of confirming the detention even where the Advisory Board has reported that in its opinion there is sufficient ground for detention. But, there is no such discretion to the Government where the Advisory Board reports that in its opinion there is no sufficient ground for detention; on such opinion the Government should revoke the detention Thus independent application of mind is necessary before confirming the order of detention. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the Government confirmed the detention merely adopting the opinion of the Advisory Board without application of mind. In this regard the learned counsel relied on the decision in Abdul Karim's case referred to earlier ( AIR 1969 SC 1028 ) to contend that procedural safeguards under Art.22 of the constitution are mandatory and on the basis of the decision in A. K. Roy v. Union of India AIR 1982 SC 710 contended that it is for the appropriate Government to decide whether continued detention is necessary. It is true, the procedural safeguards under Art.22 of the constitution are mandatory, and it is for the appropriate Government to decide whether the detention is to be confirmed and continued; and also the period of detention, 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended, the detaining authority has to consider the matter independently before the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board and also after its receipt. According to him there was no such consideration. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended, the detaining authority has to consider the matter independently before the receipt of the opinion of the Advisory Board and also after its receipt. According to him there was no such consideration. He relied on the decision in Rosa Paily v. State of Kerala 1991 (2) KLT 378 to support his contention that the very statement in Ext. P-8 after adverting to the opinion of the Advisory Board to the effect that, "accordingly" under S.8(f) of the Act, Government confirm the detention order of the detenu would show that there was no second consideration of the question or independent application of mind by the Government in confirming the order of detention. In the said decision also, the order contained the word "accordingly" after adverting to the opinion of the Advisory Board. It was held that, the said order is vitiated. One important aspect to be noted is, in that case the detaining authority did not consider Ext. P-4 representation therein independently and it acted merely on the views of the Advisory Board. On the other hand the case in hand is different. Ext. P-10 dated 20th February 1992 is the communication rejecting the representation by the detenu. Ext. P-8 confirmation was on 21st February 1992. A reading of Ext. P-10 would show that, the representation by the detenu was independently considered after adverting to all relevant matters and then only his representation was rejected; on the next day Ext. P-8 was rendered. The fact that the representation by the detenu was thus independently considered before Ext. P-8 itself would show that, the detaining authority had independently considered the matter after the receipt of the report from the Advisory Board. The report of the Advisory Board was on 25th January 1992. In fact Ext. P-8 itself mentions that the representation by the detenu was rejected, an indication that there was independent consideration. In such circumstance the decision in Rosa Paily's case 1991 (2) KLT 378 is distinguishable. Merely because the opinion also said, the detention is confirmed cannot vitiate the opinion. That statement in the opinion of the Advisory Board can have relevance and importance only if the same has influenced the detaining authority in deciding to confirm the detention. As has already noticed, in view of Ext. P-10 it is clear, the detaining' authority considered the question independently. That statement in the opinion of the Advisory Board can have relevance and importance only if the same has influenced the detaining authority in deciding to confirm the detention. As has already noticed, in view of Ext. P-10 it is clear, the detaining' authority considered the question independently. In such circumstance we do not find our way to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no independent consideration and application of mind in rendering Ext. P-8. 16. Yet another contention of the petitioner is that the documents that came into existence subsequent to Ext. P-1, viz. Ext. P-13 show cause notice, Ext. P-14 detenu's reply and the order of adjudication Ext. P-15 since were not placed before the Advisory Board or the appropriate authority the detention is invalid. Learned counsel for the petitioner stressed that in the given circumstance it was mandatory for the sponsoring authority to have placed Exts. P-13 to P-15 before the confirming authority. He made reliance on the decisions in A. K. Roy's case AIR 1982 SC 710 , K. V. Jesudasan v. State of T. N. 1989 Crl. L. J. 637 and the decision in O. P. 1138 of 1992. The question whether the detenu is to be kept in detention and how long is for the detaining authority to decide. 17. In K. V. Jesudasan's case 1989 Crl. L. J. 637 a subsequent information which showed the earlier information was false was not placed before the detaining authority. Certainly such an information is material and relevant ia deciding whether the order of detention has to be confirmed and whether the detenu should be continued to be detained. In this case though Ext. P-14 contained the assertion that the detenu is innocent, in Ext. P-15 adjudication proceedings the gold rods and cradle used for concealment of the same were confiscated under the Customs Act and a penalty was also imposed. The detention being to prevent acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange and also with a view to prevent smuggling of goods, abetting smuggling goods etc. and Ext. P-15 being incriminatory in nature and against the detenu the non production of Exts. P-13 to P-15 cannot adversely affect the confirmation. The detention being to prevent acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange and also with a view to prevent smuggling of goods, abetting smuggling goods etc. and Ext. P-15 being incriminatory in nature and against the detenu the non production of Exts. P-13 to P-15 cannot adversely affect the confirmation. In the decision in O.P. 1138 of 1992 the petitioner requested that the documents relating to the adjudication proceedings against the detenu and the other two coaccused be supplied to him. The documents relating to the adjudication proceedings were not given to him. But one significant aspect to be noted is that the adjudicating authority had dropped the proceedings against one of them. In that circumstance it was certainly necessary that the documents were made available to the detenu for making effective representation. On the other hand, as has already noticed, Ext. P-15 is incriminatory in nature and his contentions in Ext. P-14 were not accepted. These documents though came into existence after Ext. P-1 their character is such that the non production of the same cannot in any way affect the application of mind in confirming the order. In the decision in Prakash Chandra v. Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala AIR 1986 SC 687 the detaining authority took into consideration the confessional statement of the detenu under S.131 of the Customs Act, which was subsequently retracted, without taking note of the retraction. The nature of the document has got relevance. In the decision in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 2261 the court rejected the challenge against the detention pointing out that, there was other evidence of gold biscuits of foreign origin having been found in the possession of the detenu. In the decision in Asha v. Union of India AIR 1986 SC 283 it is held that the satisfaction under law being subjective, it is not for the court to test the adequacy of the material on which satisfaction was reached. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exts. P-13 to P-15 since could have had effect in deciding atleast the period of detention the non production of the same would vitiate the detention. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that Exts. P-13 to P-15 since could have had effect in deciding atleast the period of detention the non production of the same would vitiate the detention. An assumption like that in the circumstance, appears to us unreal and even desperate as the said documents could have only supported the involvement of the detenu in the acts alleged against him. The period of detention is not a sentence, its function is preventive so that the confiscation and imposition of penalty cannot normally function as a circumstance advantageous to the detenu. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner when he contended that because of the failure of the sponsoring authority to place Exts. P-13 to P-15 before the authority, the detention is vitiated. 18. The next attack of the learned counsel for the petitioner against the detention is on the basis of delay in executing Ext. P-1 order. Ext. P-1 detention order was on 27th February 1991, but the detenu was arrested only on 3rd December 1991. According to the learned counsel inasmuch as the delay is not explained the same should affect the detention. The learned counsel relied on the decision in T.D. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala AIR 1990 SC 225 and the decision in O. P. (H.C.) 4922 of 1992-S. In Abdul Rahman's case AIR 1990 SC 225 there was unsatisfactory and un-explained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest, of the detenu. Therefore, it was held that the same would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. In the decision in Abdul Salam v. Union of India 1990 (3) SCC 15 considering the delay in arresting the detenu it is observed in. Para.15. "That apart there is no decision where a court has gone to the extent of holding that a mere delay in arresting the accused renders the detention invalid. In the instant case, the delay, if at all, is only about "21/2 months and the explanation offered for the delay is reasonable". In the decision in O.P. (HC) No. 4922 of 1992-S Para.6 of the counter affidavit only stated the detenu was absconding, that Superintendent of Police made confidential enquiries on dates mentioned the said para. In the instant case, the delay, if at all, is only about "21/2 months and the explanation offered for the delay is reasonable". In the decision in O.P. (HC) No. 4922 of 1992-S Para.6 of the counter affidavit only stated the detenu was absconding, that Superintendent of Police made confidential enquiries on dates mentioned the said para. It did not mention the places he visited or the persons he contacted. Therefore it was held the detention was bad. 19. The learned Government Pleader would maintain that the delay is properly explained in the counter affidavit. Para.10 of the counter affidavit not only mentions the various dates in which the Circle Inspector of Police, Malappuram made enquiries for apprehending the detenu, it also mentions the places where he made such visit. It is stated that at those places several persons mentioned in the report filed by the Superintendent of Police were contacted to apprehend the detenu, but the attempt was not successful as he was absconding. The letter of the Superintendent of Police referred to in the counter affidavit is obtained at pages 31 to 33 of the file. The said letter mentions the persons whom the Circle Inspector of Police had contacted and interviewed. Thus it is a case where the respondents have explained with data as to the reason for the delay in executing the detention order. In such circumstance we find no force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of detention is vitiated on account of the delay in executing the same. 20. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was delay in disposing of the representation by the detenu. The representation dated 1st January 1992 was disposed of on 20th February 1992. As we have already pointed out, the representation was independently considered by the detaining authority. One significant fact to be noted is that the representation was to the Advisory Board, the same was received along with the opinion of the Advisory Board. The opinion of the Advisory Board was on 25th January 1992 and the representation was considered and disposed of on 20th February 1992. One significant fact to be noted is that the representation was to the Advisory Board, the same was received along with the opinion of the Advisory Board. The opinion of the Advisory Board was on 25th January 1992 and the representation was considered and disposed of on 20th February 1992. In the decision in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India AIR 1991 SC 574 it is held that the time imperative for consideration of representation can never be absolute or obsessive, and that it depends upon the necessities and the time at which the representation is made. It is also held that merely because the representation was considered subsequent to the confirmation of detention the same cannot vitiate the confirmation. In the circumstance the said argument too gains no force. 21. There is yet another contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, the petitioner filed a representation on 27th December 1991 and the copies of the documents supplied on 8th January 1992. According to the learned counsel the Malayalam translation of the passport, customs clearance card, tickets and tag were not given. In the confession of the detenu under S.108 of the Customs Act, he said he could write, read and understand English. One significant factor to be noted is, he did not state in his representation dated 1st January 1992 that he did not know English. In such circumstance his present stand that he does not know English can only be taken as a vain attempt at, improvement. In the decision in Jagannath v. State of West Bengal AIR 1972 JC 1564 after noting that at the time of arrest the petitioner was served with order of detention, ground of detention, translation thereof and that no ground was taken by the petitioner either by representation submitted by him or the petition sent to the court it was held that, no grievance be made by the petitioner on that score. In the decision in Prakash Chandran's case AIR 1986 SC 687 also there was a contention that the detenu did not know English. After adverting to the conduct of the detenu the Supreme Court made an observation which has all embracing importance while interpreting the depth of procedural safeguards. In the decision in Prakash Chandran's case AIR 1986 SC 687 also there was a contention that the detenu did not know English. After adverting to the conduct of the detenu the Supreme Court made an observation which has all embracing importance while interpreting the depth of procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court said at page 696: "There is no rule of law that common sense should be put in cold storage while considering the constitutional provisions for safeguards against misuse of powers by authorities though these constitutional provisions should be strictly construed". It is also observed: "Court is not the place where one can sell all tales. The detaining authority came to the conclusion that he knew both Hindi and English. It has been stated so in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent. We are of the opinion that the detenu Venilal Mehta was merely feigning ignorance of English." Then at page 701 alerted: "We must remember that observance of written law about the procedural safeguards for the protection of the individual is normally the high duty of public official but in all circumstances not the highest. The law of self preservation and protection of the country and national security may claim in certain circumstances higher priority." With due regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that this argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner does not have any force. No other point was urged. On a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the grounds raised by the petitioner against the detention of the detenu are unsustainable and therefore, the Original Petition is liable to be dismissed. In the result the Original Petition fails and the same is dismissed.