Judgment : One Abdul Rasheed got married to one Naseema Begum in July 1969, according to Islamic rites and ceremonies. The spouses lived together happily for sometime. During the said period, two off-springs came into existence, one a male child and the other, a female child. The male child did having ephemeral existence in the world and the female child is surviving and she was named Riswana. .2. During the marital life, the husband appeared to have swerved away from the path of rectitude and developed illicit connection with a Hindu woman by name Saradha. Because of such influence, it was said, the wife was meted out cruelty at the hands of the husband. Consequently, she was stated to have been driven out of the matrimonial abode in the year 1975, along with her female child. She, along with the minor female child, was stated to have taken shelter in her parents’ house and was eking out their livelihood, leaving things to fate, without even claiming maintenance from the husband for his wilful refusal and neglet to maintain her and the child. When she was unable to sustain the onslaught of attack of her inability to maintain herself and her minor daughter, without there being any income or deriving any support from her parents, she decided to file an application under Sec.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Code’) claiming maintenance for herself and her minor daughter. In making the claim for maintenance, she would aver that her husband owns house property and three acres of arable lands, besides getting himself engaged in transacting business in tamarind for quite some years, earning a fabulous income. She, in fact, appeared to have presented such a petition on 14. 1984 before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (as he then was), Tiruppattur, which after having been taken on file, was transferred to the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court (as it then was), Tiruppattur from where it appears the case was again trasferred to Judicial Magistrate Ambur, and taken on file as M.C.No.31 of 1989. 3. 1984 before the Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate (as he then was), Tiruppattur, which after having been taken on file, was transferred to the Judicial First Class Magistrate’s Court (as it then was), Tiruppattur from where it appears the case was again trasferred to Judicial Magistrate Ambur, and taken on file as M.C.No.31 of 1989. 3. The husband resisted the maintenance claim of the wife and the- minor daughter pleading that there was neither, wilful refusal nor neglect on his part and what had happened was that his wife deserted matrimonial abode of her own accord and therefore it is that there was no justification for her to live separately and claim maintenance. He would alternatively plead that from the properties he owns, he was unable to derive any income and to say that he was transacting business in tamarind is shorn of the reality of the situation. He would however express his desire to pay maintenance to his minor daughter. .4. Learned Magistrate, on consideration of the materials placed, awarded maintenance in a sum of Rs.300 per mensum to each of them. The husband filed Crl.R.P.No.122 of 1991 before the Court of Session, North Arcot Division, agitating award of maintenance stating that the award is untenable while the wife, on her behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter, filed Crl.R.C.No. 12 of 1992 praying for the enhanced claim of maintenance. 5. Both the revisions were heard together by learned Sessions Judge. A common order had been passed by him, after perusal of the materials available on record and on hearing learned counsel for the respective parties, dismissing the revision filed by the husband, and partly allowing the revision filed by the wife, in the sense of enhancing her maintenance claim alone from Rs.300 to Rs.500 per mensem while confirming the award of maintenance to the minor daughter as had been done by the trial Courts. 6. The husband filed Crl.R.C.No.248 of 1992 before this Court as against the order of enhancement of maintenance to his wife. He however resorted to knock at the doors of this Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482of the Code by filing Crl.O.P.No.7925 of 1992 as against the dismissal of his revision petition by the Court of Session, North Arcot Division. 7. Both the matters were listed for admission on 7. 1992. He however resorted to knock at the doors of this Court by invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Sec.482of the Code by filing Crl.O.P.No.7925 of 1992 as against the dismissal of his revision petition by the Court of Session, North Arcot Division. 7. Both the matters were listed for admission on 7. 1992. Since both of them arose out of the same order, they were heard together. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the husband would in pith and substance, raise the following points for consideration: "1. The findings of the courts below as respects the wilful neglect and refusal by the husband to maintain his wife and minor daughter have to be construed as perverse, as they are not deriving any solidified support from the materials available on record. 2. His daughter Riswana, on the face of the materials placed on record, cannot at all be construed to be a minor, as on date, entitling to the award of maintenance as granted by the courts below, in the absence of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain herself. 3. As to the fixation of the quantum of maintenance to his wife and minor daughter, there is no relevant data, guidelines or particulars available on record in the shape of evidence documentary or oral. 4. The maximum amount, which could be awarded by way of maintenance under Sec.125 of the Code cannot at all exceed Rs.500 per mensem in the whole, irrespective of the number of claimants." 9. As to the first submission of wilful neglect or refusal to maintain the wife and his minor daughter, both the Courts below, as stated earlier, have recorded a concurrent finding against the husband. Such a concurrent findings of fact, this Court either in its revisional or in its inherent jurisdiction, cannot at all interfere, unless there are materials pointing out grave error of law, in legal fitment to the facts and circumstances of the case or there is perverse appreciation of the materials causing prejudice to the causeof justice. A cursory perusal of the impugned order does not at all reveal any such illegality or infirmity calling for interference. This submission as such has to be rejected outright as of no merits. 10. A cursory perusal of the impugned order does not at all reveal any such illegality or infirmity calling for interference. This submission as such has to be rejected outright as of no merits. 10. The source of strength for the second submission learned counsel would say, is traceable to the portion of the evidence of the wife, which had been extracted in the order of the court of the first instance, in the sense of herself admitting the birth of Riswana in the month of June, 1972. Learned counsel was frank enough to admit that neither of the parties resorted to take a specific plea as to the actual date of birth or of any physical or mental abnormality of the child at the time when the proceedings were initiated. Even if the evidence of the wife, as stated above, is reflecting the reality of the situation as regards the date of birth of the child, I am unable to affix my seal of approval to the contention that the minor child is not entitled to maintenance on and from th date of her attaining majority, which event, if calculated on the face of the evidence of the wife would happen by the end of the month of June, 1990 in as much as no materials were available as to what had happened to the physical or mental condition of the said child subsequent to the initiation of the proceedings for maintenance. If there were such materials negativing the claim of maintenance of the said child, it is very well open to the husband to file necessary and requisite application for the cancellation of the award of maintenance under Sec.127 of the Code. In this view of the matter, this submission also bristles next to nothing. 11. The third submission revolving on the question of lack of materials or guidelines in determining the quantum cannot, in my view, also be acceded to, as such, in the facts and circumstances of the case. A glance of the impugned orders of both the Courts below reveal articulated discussion of the materials placed by the parties, in the shape of evidence oral and documentary for arriving at a finding therefor. A glance of the impugned orders of both the Courts below reveal articulated discussion of the materials placed by the parties, in the shape of evidence oral and documentary for arriving at a finding therefor. It appears from the discussion of those orders that not only there were plethora of materials and data for arriving at an award in a reasonable sum of maintenance to be paid to the wife and his minor daughter; but also the appreciation of those materials does not suffer from any miz-or-mal-appreciation calling for interference. As such, there is little substance in this submission and consequently the same is rejected. 12. As to the fourth and the last submission, learned counsel would contend that Sec.125 of the Code empowers a Magistrate to order a person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or a minor child, father or mother, at such monthly rate, not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole and as such, the phraseology ‘in the whole’, he would say, would mean that the total award for the wife, child, father or mother together cannot exceed Rs.500 per mensem. The meaning ascribed to the phraseology in the whole’ by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot at all be countenanced, in the context and juxtaposition of those words ‘in the whole’ means that a sum of money not exceeding Rs.500 should be ordered to be paid, and no other payment, either in the shape of school fees or medical expenses etc., should be ordered to be paid. The words do not mean that a woman, making an application for herself and her children, shall only be awarded a sum of Rs.500 for maintenance for herself and her children, whatever be the number. The Magistrate can order a sum not exceeding the said limit to be paid for the wife and for each of the children unable to maintain itself. The words ‘in the whole’ are intended to prevent the courts from exceeding the statutory limit, in the case of any particular defendant and are not intended to restrict the powers of the court to order a monthly allowance in respect of maintenance of all the defendants.The expression ‘in the whole’ does not mean ‘in all’. The ceiling is not for all the claimants in a proceeding taken together. The ceiling is not for all the claimants in a proceeding taken together. It is for the sum total of the individual items for each claimant. 13. Support for such a view can be derived by the decision reported in Ramesh Chander v. Veena Kaushal, 1979 Crl.L.J. 3, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court made a lucid exposition of law by resorting to a scintilating discussion, which is reflected in paragraphs 9 to 13 and the same may be usefully extracted here: "9. This provision is a measure of social justice and specially enacted to protect women and children and fails within the constitutional sweep of Art.l5(3) reinforced by Art.39. We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling for construction by courts are not petrified print but vibrant words with social functions to fulfil. The brooding presence of the constitutional empathy for the weeker sections like women and children must inform interpretation if it has to have social relevance. So viewed, it is possible to be selective in picking out that interpretation out of two alternatives which advances the cause of derelicts. 10. Sri Desai contends that Sec.125 of the Code has clearly fixed the ceiling of the monthly allowance "for the maintenance of..... wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole". Assuming the Parliament not to be guilty of redundancy it is argued that the words ‘in the whole’ mean that the total award for the wife, child, father or mother together cannot exceed Rs.500 we do not agree. Both precedentially and interpretatively the argument is specious." 14. The words which connote that the total all together, cannot exceed Rs.500 namely ‘in the whole’ have been inherited from the previous Code although some ambiguity in the sense of the clause is injuncted by these words clarity, unfortunately has not been a strong point of our draftsmanship, at least on occasions and ligitation has been engendered by such deficiency. Luckily, these words have been subject to decision, which we are inclined to adopt as correct. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Prabhavati v. Sumantilal, A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 546: 1954 Crl.L.J. 1734 (F.B.), has held that the sum specified is not compendious but separate. Luckily, these words have been subject to decision, which we are inclined to adopt as correct. A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Prabhavati v. Sumantilal, A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 546: 1954 Crl.L.J. 1734 (F.B.), has held that the sum specified is not compendious but separate. Chagla, C.J., explained the position correctly, if we say so with respect: "The suggestion that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is limited to allowing one hundred rupees in respect of maintenance of the wife and the children jointly is, in our opinion, an impossible construction once it is accepted that the right of the wife and of each child is an independent right. Such a construction would lead to extremely anomalous results. If, "for instance, a wife applies for maintenance for herself and for her children and the Magistrate allows a maintenance of one hundred rupees, and if thereafter an illegitimate child were to come forward and to make an application for maintenance, the Magistrate having allowed an allowance to her up to the maximum of his jurisdiction would be prevented from making any order in favour of the illegitimate child, or, a man may have more than one wife and he may have children by each one of the wives. If the suggestion is that maintenance can be allowed in a compendious application to be made and such maintenance cannot exceed one hundred rupees for all the persons applying for maintenance, then in a conceivable case a wife or a child may be deprived of maintenance altogether under the section. The intention of the Legislature was clear, and the intention was to cast an obligation upon a person who neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or children to carry out his obligation towards his wife or children. The obligation is separate and independent in relation to each one of the persons whom he is bound in law to maintain. The intention of the Legislature was clear, and the intention was to cast an obligation upon a person who neglects or refuses to maintain his wife or children to carry out his obligation towards his wife or children. The obligation is separate and independent in relation to each one of the persons whom he is bound in law to maintain. It is futile to suggest that in using the expression ‘in the whole’ the Legislature was limiting the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to passing an order in respect of all the persons who he is bound to maintain allowing them maintenance not exceeding a sum of one hundred rupees." Meeting the rival point of view Chief Justice Chagla held: ".....we are unable to accept the view taken by the Division Bench that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is confined to making a compendious order allowing one hundred rupees in respect of all the persons liable to be maintained." 15. A recent ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Md.Basir v. NoorJahan Begum, 1971 Crl.L.J. 547 (Cal), has taken a similar view reviewing the case law in India on the subject. We agree with Talukdar, J., who quotes Mr.Justice Mocardie: "All law must progress or it must perish in the esteem of man." In short, the decided cases have made socialogical approach to conclude that each claimant for maintenance, be he or she wife, child father or mother is independently entitled to maintenance upto a maximum of Rs.500. 16. Indeed, an opposite conclusion may lead to absurdities. If a woman has a dozen children and if the man neglects the whole lot and, in his addiction to a fresh mistress, neglects even his parents and all these members of the family seek maintenance in one petition against the delinquent respondent, can it be that the court cannot award more than Rs.500 for all of them together? On the other hand if each filed a separate petition there would be a maximum of Rs.500 each awarded by the court. We cannot, therefore, agree to this obvious jurisdictional inequity by reading a limitation of Rs.500 although what the section plainly means is that the court cannot grant more than Rs.500 for each one of the claimants. "In the whole" in the context means taking all the items of maintenance together, not all the members of the family put together. We cannot, therefore, agree to this obvious jurisdictional inequity by reading a limitation of Rs.500 although what the section plainly means is that the court cannot grant more than Rs.500 for each one of the claimants. "In the whole" in the context means taking all the items of maintenance together, not all the members of the family put together. To our mind, this interpretation accords with social justice and semantice and, more than all, is obvious: "It is sometimes more important to amphasize the obvious than to elucidate the obscure" Attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes." 17. As such, this sort of a bizarre submission has to be rejected lock, stock and barrel. 18. In view of what has been stated above, it goes without saying that Crl.R.C.No.248 of 1992 and Crl.O.P.No.7925 of 1992 deserve to be dismissed even at the admission stage and they are accordingly dismissed.