Judgment S. K. Singh J, J. 1. The present writ application has been filed for quashins of Annexure-9, so far as it relates to the petitioner, which is an order of transfer by which the petitioner has been transferred from Patna to Ranchi. According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the said order, as contained in Annexure-9 is arbitrary and illegal, in view of the circular issued by the State Government in respect of the transfer and posting of the Government Servants. Tt has further been submitted that the said order is also by way of punishment, as the petitioner was not given an opportunity to show-cause, as such the same suffers from the vice of malice and arbitrariness and is in violation of the principle of natural justice. The petitioner was initially appointed as Superintendent, Industrial training Institute and subsequently was designated as principal and was posted at several places in that capacsity and his last posting was an assistant Director, Training Directorate of Employment Department of labour, Employment and Training Government of Bihar. 2. According to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, the petitioner, who has been working as Principal, Industrial training Institute, Gaya since January, 1989, was given additional charge of Regional Inspecting Officer, Patna vide office order dated 22-1-91 and in which capacity he was entrusted with enquiry into the illegal and irregular admission taken by the different Institutes in the region on the basis of forged and fabricated certificates in the year 1991. Subsequently, the petitioner was transferred to the post of Assistant Director, Training, directorate of Employment, Department of Labour, Employment and training Government of Bihar by order dated 31-12-91 on which he joined on 2-1-92 and was continuing on the said post till the present order of transfer was passed. It has been contended that the petitioner has still not handed over charge and he is continuing at Patna. The allegation of the petitioner is that in course of enquiry, he had detected several irregularities and as he had brought this matter to the knowledge of his superior authorities at the instance of the vested interest whose cause was going to be affected, he had been at first relieved from the additional charge, which he was holding and subsequently transferred to Ranchi by Annexure-9. It has been asserted that the present Director, Employment and Training, respondent No.4 joined on 8-4-92. The petitioner submitted his second report to the Respondent No.4 on the basis of which 215 students of various institutes were ordered to be discharged from the Institutes vide letter dated 4-5-92. 3. The further case of the petitioner is that the principals and students of many institutes who were affected by his enquiry report, approached the Respondent no.4 and it has been asserted by the petitioner that huge amount of money was also paid to Respondent No.4 and thereafter respondent No.4 called the petitioner and asked him to submit a fresh report of his liking. After the petitioner expressed his inability to do so, he was threatened with dire consequences and in colourable exercise of power, Respondent No, 4 withdrew from the petitioner the additional charge of Regional Inspecting Officer, Patna, thdugh no alternative arrangement was made for that post, On 14-5-92, Respondent No 4 issued another office order by which the works of all the Assistant Directors were reallocated, which led to further curtailment in the function and responsibility of the petitioner. The petitioner protested to Respondent No.4 against the said re-allotment of work stating therein that these orders were illegal, irregular and highly motivated. Copies of the said letters were also sent to the Minister and Secretary of the Department concerned. As the petitioner was trying to expose the vested interest in the Department and according to him, Respondent No.4 and other such persons made hectic efforts and political pairvis, as such, the impugned notification No.1533 dated 30-6-92 was issued transferring the petitioner from the post of Assistant Director, training at Patna to Ranchi. 4. For the reasons as stated above, it is stated that the order of transfer, as contained in Annexure-9, is bad in law and as such it is fit to be set aside. 5. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State in which it has been stated that the transfer of the petitioner is a chain transfer and a bare perusal of Annexure-9 will go to show that the same was passed in the month of June, 1992 when the case of the petitioner was considered along with persons and in administrative exigency, it was decided to transfer the petitioner. In this regard, learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State has relied upon Rules of the Executive Business. Rule 22 (5) (ii) states as follows :- "transfer and posting will generally be done twice, i. e. in May-June and November-December of each year but prior order of the chief Minister shall have to be obtained in other cases of transfer and posting done under special circumstances. " 6. According to him, the transfer and posting which are done in May-June and November-December, of each year do not require approval of the chief Minister because the Rule clearly envisages that the transfer and posting are generally done in May-June and November-December but prior approval of the Chief Minister is to be taken only if the transfer and posting is done otherwise. According to him, as in the present case the transfer was done in the month of June, 1992 and the same was a chain transfer by which 14 persons were transferred and as such no prior approval of the Chief Minister was required. It has further been stated that the said order of transfer was a transfer simpliciter and by perusal of the order, no aspersion is cast in any other way on the petitioner and as such, the petitioner cannot say that the said order of transfer was by way of punishment. 7. In reply to the assertions of the petitioner it has been pointed out that the counter-affidavit itself goes to show that there were certain allegations of omissions and commissions on the petitioner and even a vigilance case was pending against him. 8. It has been asserted by the learned Advocate-General that it is well settled principle of law that if some thing is being alleged in the writ petition and if the State controverts the same by bringing certain facts in the counter-affidavit, the petitioner cannot take benefit of those assertions made in the counter-affidavit by saying that it amounts to acceptance by the State that the transfer was by way of punishment. The said statement has come on the petitioners own asking and while considering the order of transfer, the Court should only see the impugned order of transfer. 9. The said statement has come on the petitioners own asking and while considering the order of transfer, the Court should only see the impugned order of transfer. 9. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgments in the cases of Taja Mal Hussain V/s. State of Bihar and others, 1975 PLJR 506, and in the case of State of Maharashtra V/s. Veerappa R. Saboji, AIR 1980 sc 42 . In the case of Taja Mal Hussain V/s. State of Bihar and others, in paragraph 7 of the said judgment it has been held that the statement made in the counter- affidavit cannot be considered as an admission on the part of the respondents that the order was passed on the basis of the enquiry report (case being considered was that of compulsory retirement) The court also held that whatsoever statement was made on behalf of the respondents in the counter-affidavit was by way of reply to the assertion made by the petitioner in the application. Therefore, nothing terms upon those statements made in the counter-affiidavit. In the case of Maharastra vrs-Veerappa R. Saboji and another, which related to the termination of govt. servant, it has been held by the apex court that where the services of a temporary Government servant or a probationer Government servant are terminated by an order which does not ex facie, disclose any stigma or penal consequences against the Government servant and is merely a termination order simpliciter, there was no case ordinarily for assuming that it is anything but what it purports to be. Where, however the order discloses on the face of it that a stigma is cast on the Government servant or that it visits him with penal consequences, then plainly the case is one of punishment. Deriving support from the said judgment, the learned Advocate-General has stated that the same ratio can be applied to the case of transfer and it is the order of transfer, which is to be judged and nothing should be read beyond that order. He has also placed reliance in the case of Kailash bihari Prasad and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1992 PLJR 209. He has also placed reliance in the case of Kailash bihari Prasad and others V/s. The State of Bihar and others, 1992 PLJR 209. In the said case it has been decided that in cases of transfer the recommend ations of the Establishment Committee are only directory and not binding on the competent authority-Minister-incharge of the concerned Department is competent to alter/modify recommendations and pass such transfer order as are necessary in public interest and in best interest of administration. 10. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned advocate-General and after perusing the writ petition, counter-affidavit, reply thereto and the case laws relied upon by the State as well as the petitioner, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and the order of transfer needs no interference by this Court. 11. In that view of the matter, the writ-petition is dismissed and any interim order granted earlier stands vacated.