A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner calls in question legality of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mayurbhanj, at Baripadas action in issuing a proclamation under section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, Cr. P. C.) and a writ of attachment of property in respect of one Om Prakash Agarwalla under section 83, Cr. P. C. by impugned order dated 8. 7. 1991. ( 2 ) THE background portrayed by the petitioner is as follows: The aforesaid Om Prakash is an opposite party in Misc. Case No. 46 of 1991 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mayurbhanj at Baripada. An application had been filed under section 7 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (in short. the Act) read with sections 82, 83, 84 and 85, Cr. P. C. by the District Magistrate, Mayurbhanj. Section 7 of the Act authorises a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, to take such action as contemplated under sections 82, 83, 84 and 85. where a person is believed to be an absconder in respect of an order of detention under the Act. The learned CJM passed an order directing the aforesaid Om Prakash Agarwalla to appear before the Court on or before 5. 4. 1991. An order of proclamation and attachment was also simultaneously issued. The said order was challenged by a partnership styled Mis Mulchand On karmall in this Court on the plea that the firm property was going to be attached. This Court, in Criminal Misc. Case No. 377 of 1991, dismissed the application as it was found on verification that the property of the firm was not going to be attached. It was, however, observed that section 82 (1), Cr. P. C. provides that if any Court has reason to believe that any person against whom a warrant has been issued by it has absconded or is concealing himself so that such warrant cannot be executed, the Court may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and at a specified time not less than thirty days from the date of publication of such proclamation. Since the order was passed on 22. 3. 199 1, and Om Prakash was directed to appear on 5. 4. 1991, re-issue of proclamation allowing time stipulated was directed as the one issued had already elapsed. Since the order was passed on 22. 3. 199 1, and Om Prakash was directed to appear on 5. 4. 1991, re-issue of proclamation allowing time stipulated was directed as the one issued had already elapsed. The impugned order was passed pursuant to the said decision. The same is assailed on various grounds of alleged legal infirmities. ( 3 ) A preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the application at the behest of the petitioner by Mr. A. N. Misra, learned Counsel for State. According to him the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order. The learned Counsel for petitioner submits that the petitioner being the wife of Om Prakash has interest in the property in respect of which attachment order has been passed and therefore, the petition is maintainable. ( 4 ) IN the aforesaid background the question whether the petitioner has locus standi to file the application need adjudication at the threshold. ( 5 ) SECTIONS 397, 401 and 482, Cr. P. C. are analogous to sections 435, 439 and 561 (A) of the old Code of 1898 except for certain substitutions, omissions and modifications. Under section 397, the High Court possesses the general power of superintendence over the actions of Courts subordinate to it; which discretionary power when administered on administration side, is known as the power of superintendence, and on the judicial side as the power of revision. In exercise of the discretionary powers conferred on the High Court under the provisions on this section, the High Court can, at any stage, on its own motion, if it so desires and certainly when illegalities and irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. By virtue of the power under section 401, the High Court can examine the proceedings of inferior Court if the necessity fordoing so is brought to its notice in any manner, namely, (1) when the records have been called for by itself, or (2) when the proceedings otherwise comes to its knowledge. By virtue of the power under section 401, the High Court can examine the proceedings of inferior Court if the necessity fordoing so is brought to its notice in any manner, namely, (1) when the records have been called for by itself, or (2) when the proceedings otherwise comes to its knowledge. The object of the revisional jurisdiction under section 401 is to confer power upon superior criminal courts a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of statement which has resulted, on the one hand, or on the other hand in some underserved hardship to individuals. The controlling power of the High Court is discretionary and it must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said facts and circumstances which vary greatly from case to Case. Section 482 which corresponds to section 561 (A) of the old Code and to section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim Quadolex aliguid alicui concedit, concedere vidoturid sine quo ipsa, es uonpotestt which means that when the law gives anything to any one, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist. ( 6 ) THE criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex-debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under section 482, Cr. P. C. are very wide and the very planitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. ( 7 ) SECTION 482 gives no new powers but only provides that those which Court already inherently possessed should be preserved. P. C. are very wide and the very planitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. ( 7 ) SECTION 482 gives no new powers but only provides that those which Court already inherently possessed should be preserved. This view of the Judicial Committee in Emperor v. Nazir Ahmed; AIR 1945 PC 18, and in Lala Jail Ram Das v. Emperor; 1945 (47) Bom. L. R. 634 (PC) was endorsed by the Supreme Court in The Janta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and Ors; 1992 II SVLR (Cr.) 124. Every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice. Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate Court of its powers. (See Dr. Raghubir Sharan v. The State of Bihar; 1964 (2) SCR 336 ). In Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra; AIR 1978 SC 47 , it was held that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Cr. P. C. for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party and that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code (See also State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agrawal; AIR 1979 SC 87 ). This inherent power conferred by section 482 Cr. P. C. should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. ( 8 ) THE enactment of section 482 rests on the principle that no legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that can possibly arise, and that, accordingly where the. Code has no specific provision to deal with a matter, the superior Court should have inherent power to deal with the matter, if it is necessary for the three purposes mentioned in the section, provided, further, the exercise of such inherent power would not be inconsistent with any specific provision of the Code. (See Pampapathy v. State of mysore; AIR 1967 SC 286 ). (See Pampapathy v. State of mysore; AIR 1967 SC 286 ). Ends of justice' is a wide expression. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law, though justice has to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. The considerations justifying the exercise of inherent power for securing the ends of justice vary from case to case and this wholesome jurisdiction cannot be encased within the strait jacket of a rigid formula. (See State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors. ; AIR 1977 SC 1489 ). ( 9 ) CAN a person who is not a party to the proceeding invoke the jurisdiction of the Court for exercise of powers under Section 482? Who has locus standi to do so? The concept of locus standi has undergone a sea-change. It is needless to emphasize that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the, legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specified remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold. The traditional syntax of law in regard to locus standi for a specific judicial redress, sought by an individual person or determinate class or identifiable group of persons, is available only to that person or class or group of persons who has or have suffered a legal injury by reasons of violation of his or their legal right or a right legally protected, the invasion of whiter gives rise to action ability within the categories of law. In a private action, the litigation is bipolar; two opposed parties are locked in a confrontational controversy which pertains lathe determination of the legal consequences of past events unlike in public action. The character of such litigation is essentially that of vindicating private rights, proceedings being brought by the persons in whom the right personally in hers or their legally constituted representatives who are thus obviously most competent to commence the litigation. The character of such litigation is essentially that of vindicating private rights, proceedings being brought by the persons in whom the right personally in hers or their legally constituted representatives who are thus obviously most competent to commence the litigation. In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed as a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere, busy body or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of Public Interest Litigation (in short, PIL) is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration, but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial, machinery any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public depict. This view has been expressed by the apex Court in several cases including The Janta Dalts case (supra ). ( 10 ) EVEN if there are million questions of law to be deeply gone into and examined in a criminal case registered against specified accused person (s), it is for him/them to raise all such questions and challenge the proceeding initiated at appropriate time before the proper forum and not for third parties either individually or under garb of Public interest Litigation. Ordinarily, the aggrieved party which is affected by any order has the right to seek redress by questioning the legality, validity or correctness of the order, unless such party is a minor, an insane person or is suffering from any other disability which law recognises as sufficient to permit another person e. g. next friend, to move the Court on his behalf. Similar view was expressed in the Janta Dalts case (supra), and Simarjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and another. Similar view was expressed in the Janta Dalts case (supra), and Simarjit Singh Mann v. Union of India and another. ( 11 ) IT has not been proved as to how any legal right or right legally protected has been invaded so as to give a cause of action for the petitioner to move this Court for interference: It is not disputed that the property in respect of which action has been taken belongs to Om Prakash. It is the assertion of the petitioner that being his wife she has interest in the property. That even if correct per se does not clothe the petitioner locus standi to seek exercise of power under section 482, Cr. P. C. ( 12 ) THE irresistible conclusion is that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this application, which is rejected. Petition rejected.