JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent for damages against the appellant State of Rajasthan. The suit was dismissed by judgment and decree dated, 24.8.85 passed by the Munsiff and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bundi, in Civil Suit No. 268/81. On appeal, the learned District and Sessions Judge, Bundi, decreed the suit vide his judgment dated, 23.2.88 and the appellant has been directed to pay Rs. 2,000/- with costs and interest at the rate of 6% w.e.f. 4.4.78 till the date of realisation. 2. The prosecution was launched against the respondent in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bundi, on 23.4.73 by the Enforcement Officer of the District Supply Office, Bundi, under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. In that case it was alleged that the plaintiff-respondent was carrying 87 Qtls. 50 Kg. 700 Gms. wheat in truct No. RSR 315. The truck was checked by the Enforcement Officer, near village Khatkar. The plaintiff-respondent failed to produce the declaration regarding wheat and had therefore, committed violation of clauses 3 and 4 of the Rajasthan Food Grains (Prevention of Hoarding) Order 1973. The case was decided by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on 31.7.77 and the plaintiff-respondent was acquitted. The Court also held that the wheat which had been seized belonged to the plaintiff-respondent, Shiv Prasad, Hira Lal, Ram Kishan and Fateh Chand, residents of Ganjhaliji of Barana and, it therefore, ordered the return of price realised from the sale of the said wheat. 3. According to the plaintiff-respondent, the Enforcement Officer had with mala fide intention seized the wheat and with an ulterior motive prosecuted him with an object of causing mental, physical and economical injury. A notice under section 80 C.P.C. was given by the plaintiff-respondent and, thereafter, he filed suit for damages. The defendant-appellant contested the suit and stated that although, the plaintiff-respondent had been acquitted by the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, he was not entitled to claim damages because the action of the Enforcement Officer was not actuated by any malice or ulterior motive. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned Munisff framed three issues. The first issue was, as to whether the Enforcement Officer of the Supply Department had filed prosecution against the plaintiff-respondent with mala fide intention and without any reasonable cause. 4. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the learned Munisff framed three issues. The first issue was, as to whether the Enforcement Officer of the Supply Department had filed prosecution against the plaintiff-respondent with mala fide intention and without any reasonable cause. The second issue related to the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the last one was regarding relief. The plaintiff examined himself and produced Hira Lal, Fateh Chand and Dinesh Kumar in support of his claim. Kana Ram was examined as a witness on behalf of the defendant-appellant. After analysing the evidence of the two panes, the learned Munsiff recorded a finding of fact that the plaintiff had failed to prove mala fide on the part of the Enforcement Officer and had not been able to prove that the action was taken against him without any reasonable or probable cause. It further held that the suit was not maintainable in view of the provisions contained in section-15 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. On that premise, the suit was dismissed by the learned Munsiff. In appeal, learned District Judge, Bundi, reversed the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff by holding that the report submitted by Kana Ram itself shows that the goods were belonging to the agriculturists and Mohan Lal was also an agriculturist and, therefore, it was not proper for the Enforcement Officer to have filed the prosecution against Mohan Lal. The prosecution was launched without any basis and, therefore, it is justified to hold that the prosecution was launched with mala fide and without any probable cause and there was a lack of bona fide. Therefore, section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act was not attracted in the facts of the case. In these circumstances, it was not possible to sustain the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 5. None has appeared to advance arguments on behalf of the appellant, even though, the case was heard on 16.3.92 and 17.3.92. 6. Shri Subhash Jindal, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that once the Enforcement Officer had submitted a report (Ex. 6). When he himself had found that the wheat belonged to the five persons, it was not permissible for him to have filed the prosecution against the plaintiff. 6. Shri Subhash Jindal, learned counsel for the respondent has argued that once the Enforcement Officer had submitted a report (Ex. 6). When he himself had found that the wheat belonged to the five persons, it was not permissible for him to have filed the prosecution against the plaintiff. He very well knew that the goods belonged to the agriculturists and still with an oblique motive he prosecuted the plaintiff-respondent. There was absolutely no cause for prosecution of the plaintiff-respondent. In that view of the matter it should be held that the action of Kana Ram, Enforcement Officer, was mala fide. That being so, the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court does not call for interference, argued Shri Jindal. Shri Jindal placed reliance on the decision of Privy Council in Mohmmad Amin v. Jogendra Kumar, AIR 1947 PC 108 , Ramdeo and others v. M/s Birdi Chand, AIR 1962 Raj. 164 , Hazoor Singh v. Jagan Singh, AIR 1973 Raj. 82 , and Vijay Nath v. Damodar Das, AIR 1971 Allahabad 109 . 7. In a case filed for damages for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff has to prove that (1) he was prosecuted by the defendant (2) the proceedings relating to prosecution terminated in favour of the plaintiff (3) that the prosecution was without any reasonable or probable cause and (4) that the prosecution was due to mala fide intention and was not with the intention of carrying the law into effect. The burden of proving all these elements is on the plaintiff. He has to prove that there was no reasonable and probable cause for initiating the prosecution. He has also to prove that the prosecution was launched with malice. Absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice are two separate ingredients, which are to be proved. The absence of reasonable and probable cause does not necessarily lead to an inference of malice or ulterior motive. In a suit for malicious prosecution, though, the absence of reasonable and probable cause is a negative assertion, yet, the burden of proving it lies on the plaintiff. Merely because it is a negative fact, the burden does not shift to the defendant to show that the incident for which the plaintiff was prosecuted did take place and that there was a justification for prosecuting the plaintiff. Merely because it is a negative fact, the burden does not shift to the defendant to show that the incident for which the plaintiff was prosecuted did take place and that there was a justification for prosecuting the plaintiff. In the present case, the learned trial court took notice of the fact that the plaintiff-respondent had been prosecuted and, in case No. 648/74, filed under section 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, he was acquitted. Now, it was to be established by the plaintiff that the officer of the Supply Department had launched the prosecution maliciously and without any probable cause. The learned Munsiff also took notice of the fact that the plaintiff-respondent had been acquitted by being given the benefit of doubt and no finding had been recorded by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that the prosecution was baseless or without any probable cause or with malice. Learned Munsiff then discussed the evidence of P.W. 1, Hira Lal, P.W. 2 Fateh Chand and P.W. 3 plaintiff-respondent P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 stated that the wheat belonged to themselves brother Ram Kishan, father and uncle. The goods were being taken in one truck, because, the wheat of each individual was of lesser quantity. In the inquiry it was found that the wheat belonged to the five persons and yet, it was seized and prosecution was launched. Learned Munsiff then took notice of the fact that the plaintiff himself has not stated that any Officer of the District Supply Department or the Collectorate seized the goods with oblique motive and the mere statement is that the prosecution was not launched in good faith. The plaintiff admitted that the truck was carrying 76 Bags and 21 Kattas of wheat and that was in violation of clauses (3) and (4) of the Rajasthan Food grain (Prevention of Hoarding) Order, 1973. No declaration was produced. In the absence of this, the seizure of the goods and taking of action under Section 3/7 of 1955 Act was prima facie justified. No declaration was produced. In the absence of this, the seizure of the goods and taking of action under Section 3/7 of 1955 Act was prima facie justified. The learned Munisff observed that although, on the basis of the theory advanced by the plaintiff-respondent that the wheat belonged to other members of the family, was sufficient for raising a doubt in the prosecution case, but, that is not sufficient to hold that the prosecution was mala fide or without any reasonable or probable cause, particularly, when no allegation of mala fide has been levelled against the Enforcement Officer. Learned Munsiff had also taken cognizance of the statement of the plaintiff-respondent that Kana Ram was not known to the plaintiff and he had, for the first time, met with Mohan Lal at Village Khatkar. Learned District Judge has not at all discussed the evidence of the plaintiff-respondent or the appellant. He has merely recorded bald conclusion in one paragraph by observing that after hearing the arguments of the parties, having perused the pleadings and the evidence as also the judgment of the trial court, after having gone through the decisions placed before me and taking note of the fact that Kana Ram D.W.1, has stated that report Ex. 6 was given by him, it was not proper for Kana Ram to have launched the prosecution against Mohan Lal and the complaint filed was without any basis. It was, therefore, justified to hold that the complaint was filed without any probable cause and with mala fide. Therefore, Section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act was not applicable and the judgment of the trial court was not sustainable. 8. After having carefully gone through the decisions of the two courts below I must observe that the judgment passed by the learned District Judge, Bundi, is wholly lacunic and shows a complete lack of application of mind by the learned District Judge. The judgment of the lower appellate court shows that the learned District Judge has not at all applied his mind to the facts of the case nor has he cared to consider the requirements of law. He has not discussed any evidence which has been produced by the parties. He has also not given any sound reason for reversing the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Munsiff. He has not discussed any evidence which has been produced by the parties. He has also not given any sound reason for reversing the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Munsiff. The judgment of lower Appellate court smacks of arbitrary, casual and whimsical approach of the learned District Judge. A Court deciding first appeal is the final court for deciding the questions of fact and, therefore, it is the bounden duty of the first appellate court to make an evaluation of the evidence produced by the parties before the trial court and then examine, as to whether the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court are correct or not. Only on a proper appreciation and evaluation of evidence, the first Appellate Court can come to the conclusion, as to whether the findings recorded by the trial court are justified or not. The first appellate court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial court without analysing the evidence and without giving reasons for holding that the trial court has erred in appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence of the parties or that the trial court has not correctly applied the principles of law. The scope of interference by the first appellate court has been indicated by the Apex Court in Sarjoo Prasad v. Jwaleshwari, AIR 1951 SC 120 , in the following words: "The question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case. In such cases, the appellate Ct. has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule is-and it is nothing more than a rule of practice-that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact." 9. The learned District Judge has completely ignored the basic principles which are to be applied by the first appellate court for reversing a judgment of the trial court. In the present case, the learned Munsiff has not only analysed the evidence produced by both the parties, but, has adopted sound approach on the principles of law applicable to the cases of malicious prosecution. Learned Munsiff has taken note of the principle that it is for the plaintiff to establish that the prosecution was without any reasonable or probable cause. He was also conscious of the principle of law that while in a criminal case, the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of the accused to the hilt, in a civil case, the plaintiff is required to establish the facts by firm and clear evidence and is not required to prove that the prosecution was impossible. As already observed, the learned Munsiff carefully analysed the evidence and then concluded that the plaintiff-respondent had failed to establish that the prosecution was without any reasonable and probable cause and that it suffered from malice. 10. P.W. 1, Hira Lal, has stated that his sons Shri Mohan Lal and Fateh Chand had independent lands in their Khatedari and about 10 years back, he, his sons Mohan Lal, Ram Kishan and Fateh Chand and brother Chothmal had sent the wheat for being sold at Kota. The truck was seized by the officers of the Supply Department. P.W. 2, Fateh Chand, made similar statement. P.W. 3, Mohan Lal stated that the wheat was seized near Villiage Khatkar. The truck was seized by the officers of the Supply Department. P.W. 2, Fateh Chand, made similar statement. P.W. 3, Mohan Lal stated that the wheat was seized near Villiage Khatkar. Even though, the wheat belonged to five persons and the Enforcement Officer had treated the wheat as belonging to five persons, but, still he launched the prosecution. He alleged that on account of seizure and sale of wheat he suffered physically and mentally and that the action taken against him was not in good faith. In cross-examination, he has categorically admitted that he had not seen Kana Ram previously. Statement of P.W. 4 is not of much relevance. Kana Ram, in his statement, has stated that he had seized the goods according to law and he did not know Mohan Lal earlier nor he had any ill intention towards Mohan lal. Ex. 1. is the judgment dated, 31.1.77, passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate in case No. 648/74. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate observed that the statement of the accused to the effect that the wheat belonged to his brothers and that they were doing agricultural operations separately, seems probable. Moreover, the Driver of the Truck, who was an important witness, had not been produced. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the principle of law that the benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused in case if the prosecution fails to prove the offence to the hilt and in that case, the prosecution had failed to prove beyond doubt that the goods did not belong to Mohan Lal. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate further observed that Kana Ram should have made a search of the houses of the accused Mohan Lal and his brothers in the light of the provisions contained in Rajasthan Food grains (Prevention of Hoarding) Orders, 1973. On finding more quantity of food grains he should have launched prosecution and, then only a correct decision could have been given. On the basis of his analysis of evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate gave the benefit of doubt to the accused Mohan Lal. It is true that Ex. On finding more quantity of food grains he should have launched prosecution and, then only a correct decision could have been given. On the basis of his analysis of evidence, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate gave the benefit of doubt to the accused Mohan Lal. It is true that Ex. 6 does indicate that Kana Ram had recorded in his report that according to Mohan Lal the wheat belonged to Mohan Lal himself and his brothers, but, no evidence has been produced to show that the prosecution of the plaintiff was actuated by mala fide intention. From the facts which have come on record, it is not possible to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that the acquittal of the plaintiff-respondent, Mohan Lal, together with the report Ex. 6, by itself is sufficient to establish the absence of reasonable and probable cause for prosecution of the plaintiff-respondent. Admittedly, the plaintiff-respondent had not produced the declaration about the wheat and merely because, he had stated that the goods were belonging to himself and his brothers, father and uncle, it cannot be said that the action of the appellant in prosecuting Mohan Lal was without any element of justification. Moreover, mere absence of reasonable and probable cause by itself is not sufficient to hold that the prosecution was mala fide. The plaintiff-respondent has not been able to adduce any cogent evidence to establish the plea of malice against Kana Ram. The very fact that Kana Ram had not even known to the plaintiff-respondent prior to the seizure of the truck goes to show that there was no ill intention on the part of Kana Ram. It is not the case of the plaintiff-respondent that Kana Ram had prosecuted plaintiff-respondent for any extraneous consideration or with some oblique motive. 11. In Mohammad Amin's case (supra), the Privy Council has held that, in an action for damages for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove that the proceedings instituted against him were malicious, without reasonable and probable cause, that they terminated in his favour and that he suffered damages. 12. 11. In Mohammad Amin's case (supra), the Privy Council has held that, in an action for damages for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must prove that the proceedings instituted against him were malicious, without reasonable and probable cause, that they terminated in his favour and that he suffered damages. 12. In Ramdeo's case (supra), a Division Bench of this Court observed that, in an action for damages based on malicious attachment, which is analogous to a malicious prosecution, it is necessary for the plaintiff to allege and prove malice and also that the defendant acted without reasonable and probable cause, apart from saying that the proceedings ultimately terminated in his favour. The Court further observed that, even if, it is assumed that the defendant acted with malice, that by itself, cannot suffice to obtain relief in a claim for malicious abuse, because, the plaintiff has also to prove that proceedings were undertaken without reasonable and probable cause. Probable cause is not the same thing as sufficient cause and has to be adjudged from the standard of a manner of prudent man. Similar views have been expressed in Hazoor Singh case (supra) and also in Vijay Nath's case (supra). None of these decisions, to which reference has been made by Shri Jindal, in any manner, help the plaintiff-respondent. The principles of law which have been laid down in these decisions, if applied to the facts of the present case, it is clearly established that the plaintiff-respondent has failed to prove that the prosecution initiated against him by the Supply Department was malicious and that it was without reasonable and probable cause. Once I have come to this finding, by virtue of section 15 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the suit for malicious prosecution could not have been maintained against the appellant, State of Rajasthan. 13. In the result, this appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Bundi, is set aside and the one passed by the learned Munsiff is restored. The natural consequence of it is that the suit of the plaintiff-respondent stands dismissed. 14. Parties are left to bear their own costs.Appeal allowed. *******