MOHANBHAI GEMABHAI v. BALUBHAI SAVJIBHAI — 1992 DIGILAW 313 (GUJ)

BHATT, J. ( 1 ) IN this Civil Appeal, some interesting and important questions have surfaced for examination and adjudication, in connection with the amount of compensation, arising out of an unfortunate vehicular accident, under the motor Vehicles Act. ( 2 ) WITH a view to appreciate the merits of the question raised before us, it would be necessary to set out some salient facts, giving birth to the present appeal. The appellant, herein, is the original claimant, who sustained serious injuries in a road accident, which occurred, at 7-30 a. m. , on 1 4/03/1980. The appellant-claimant was proceeding from his residence on cycle, on the unfateful day, for attending his work. When he reached near the gate of M. S. University, on Polytechnic Road, a truck bearing No. GTS 6337, driven by respondent No. 1 (original opponent No. 1), came from behind and dashed against the claimant, resulting into serious injuries to the claimant. The respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are original opponents nos. 1, 2 and 3 being driver, owner and insurer in respect of offending truck, respectively. The parties are hereinafter, referred to as claimant and opponents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, for the sake of convenience. ( 3 ) THE injured claimant was removed to the hospital, where he was treated, and on radiological examination, it was found that he had sustained two fractures on the right hand. It was the case of the claimant that he sustained permanent injuries and partial disablement on the right hand, on account of rash and negligent driving, on the part of the driver of the offending truck. The claimant was earning Rs. 600 per month, at the time of the accident, by way of employment, in Alemblic Chemical Company Ltd. , baroda. The claimant, therefore, filed a Claim Petition, under Sec. 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (the "old Act" for short), and claimed Rs. 80,000 by way of compensation, for economic and personal loss. ( 4 ) ORIGINAL opponent No. 3-Insurance Company, appeared and resisted the claim, by filing written statement, at Exh. 13, which came to be adopted by original opponents Nos. 1 and 2, the driver and the owner of the offending truck. They, inter alia, contended that the accident in question occurred, on account of the carelessness and mistake in riding on the bicycle by the claimant. 13, which came to be adopted by original opponents Nos. 1 and 2, the driver and the owner of the offending truck. They, inter alia, contended that the accident in question occurred, on account of the carelessness and mistake in riding on the bicycle by the claimant. It was denied that the driver of the truck was rash and negligent and responsible for the accident. The amount of compensation claimed by the claimant of rs. 80,000 was, also, seriously, challenged. Thus, the entire claim was questioned. ( 5 ) ON appreciation of the evidence, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Main), at Baroda, reached to the conclusion that original opponent No. 1 driver of the truck bearing No. GTS 6337 was rash and negligent and responsible for the accident. The Tribunal found that the injured claimant had sustained two fractures on his right hand and it had also resulted into 16% permanent partial disablement. The claimant was serving in Alembic Chemical Company, at the relevant point of time, and he was earning a consolidated salary of Rs. 600 per month. Therefore, the Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the claimant is entitled to a consolidated amount of compensation of Rs. 18,060 by way of compensation with running interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the application, till realisation, the break-up of which, is as follows : sr. No. Head of Award Rs. 1. Conveyance charges, etc. 500 2. Past economic loss 5,560 3. Pain, shock and suffering, and physical discomfort 12,000 18,060 the Tribunal, also, found that the original opponent No. 1 was the driver, original opponent No. 2 was the owner, and original opponent No. 3 was the Insurer, in respect of the offending truck bearing No. GTS 6337 and therefore, the aforesaid award, came to be passed against all the three opponents, against the original claim of Rs. 80,000. The Tribunal also directed the applicant to pay the cost of the opponents on the remaining amount of claim disallowed. This impugned judgment and award came to be passed, on 29/04/1981. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and award, the original injured claimant has, now come up before this Court, challenging its legality and validity, by invoking the aids of Sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Sec. HOD of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ). This impugned judgment and award came to be passed, on 29/04/1981. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and award, the original injured claimant has, now come up before this Court, challenging its legality and validity, by invoking the aids of Sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Sec. HOD of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 ). ( 6 ) THE following three contentions are raised : (1) That the amount of compensation awarded, under the head of pain, shock and suffering, is highly inadequate. (2) That the Tribunal has committed serious error in not awarding reasonable and just amount of compensation under the head of prospective loss of earning. (3) That the rate of interest awarded at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of application till payment, is also very low, and it requires upward revision and enhancement. The aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the appellant arc, seriously, countenanced by the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondents. Contention No. I ( 7 ) IN so far as the first contention is concerned, it may be noted that, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the amount of Rs. 12,000 awarded under the head of non-pecuniary loss arising out of the accident, is inadequate. It requires to be revised upwardly. It is not in dispute that the claimant is a living victim of violent truck accident. The claimant had sustained the following injuries :1. C. L. W. on extensor aspect of fore arm and arm with skin lose. The muscles and bones were exposed. In the palm, there was loss of skin. 2. Compound fracture ulna and radius. 3. Compound communited condyle fracture humerus. The claimant was, immediately, shifted to S. S. G. Hospital; at Baroda, where he was kept as an indoor patient, upto 17/04/1980. The accident recurred on 14/03/1980. The claimant was discharged with a plaster on his right arm. The claimant was, again, required to be admitted in the same hospital, on 6/05/1980, for physiotherapy treatment. There was swelling on the hand. He was discharged again, on 12/05/1980. It is clear from the evidence on record that the Medical Officer found that there was dislocation of the 4th meta tarpo carpal joint. The claimant was, again, required to be admitted in the same hospital, on 6/05/1980, for physiotherapy treatment. There was swelling on the hand. He was discharged again, on 12/05/1980. It is clear from the evidence on record that the Medical Officer found that there was dislocation of the 4th meta tarpo carpal joint. ( 8 ) IT is very clear from the medical evidence on record that the claimant has sustained permanent partial disablement to the extent of 16% in the working of the right arm. It is also found from the evidence that claimant is not in a position to lift or carry heavy weight. This is also substantiated by the medical evidence of Dr. Mehta. According to the medical evidence on record, the claimant will experience difficulty in normal pursuits of life for which the help of right hand is required, due to the permanent partial injuries sustained by him. It is also testified by Dr. Mehta, who is a Surgeon of S. S. G. Hospital, at Baroda, that the functions of the right arm are restricted. According to the opinion of Dr. Mehta, 30% function of the arm is reduced and the whole arm function is reduced to 50%. Thus, the integrity of the right arm of the. claimant is very much affected. Over and above, there was a loss of skin. The movement of the right arm is restricted to 140, which, undoubtedly, would mean that the claimant is unable to bend forehand and carry and lift heavy weight. The claimant was 30 years of age at the time of the unfortunate road accident. Considering the "aturcand number of injuries, exent of permanent partial disablement in the right arm, and the age of the claimant, the amount of compensation is required to be re-examined and enhanced under the head of pain, shock and suffering. ( 9 ) IT appears that (he Tribunal has taken not only conservative view in the matter while assessing the damages under this head, but has, unfortunately, lost sight of certain important facts and the principles of law, governing the amount of compensation. We are also reminded of a passage in a Supreme court decision, which is most appropriate, and it is, therefore, found expedient to refer to it at this juncture. The Apex Court in the case of Concord of india Insurance Co. We are also reminded of a passage in a Supreme court decision, which is most appropriate, and it is, therefore, found expedient to refer to it at this juncture. The Apex Court in the case of Concord of india Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala, reported in 1980 AC J 55, observed :"the jurisprudence of curopcnsation for Motor Accidents must develop in the direction of no fault liability and the determination of the - quantum must be liberal. not niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country in generous scales. " (Emphasis supplied) while pointing cut the seriuus error committed by the Tribunal, we also think it necessary to mention that Sec. 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (New Act) and correspondingl Sec. HOB of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Old Act) designedly ircorporutes the expressions just and compensation. the word just employed under this Section is of very wide amplitude. While irtcrpretirg the fpid provision, the Court is obliged to consider and it is its supreme dlty to award just compensation to the eligible claimants. The interpretation must be meaningful, since such a provision is designed to compensate, as far as possible, the victim of the road accident for the losses and injuries sustained by him or her on account of unfortunate road accident. ( 10 ) IT is true that what we estimate and assess is not the value of loss of life or loss of limbs or effect on the integrity of the body, which is, otherwise, invaluable. No amount of money can substitute the effect on the bodily frame or integration cf the body. Thus, money cannot renew a shattered human frame. But, what we awcird is to re-compensate the claimant, as far as possible, under the head of pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, so as to makr an attempt to place the claimant in the same financial position as be would have been, had there been no accident. ( 11 ) TRIBUNALS must also be conscious of the fact that the compensation awarded should neither be punitive to the person against whom the claim is awarded nor should it be a Windfall or bonanza to any person in whose favour it is awarded. The amount of compensation should be just and reasonable in the circi. iaistar. crs, and keeping an eye on all the relevant aspects. The amount of compensation should be just and reasonable in the circi. iaistar. crs, and keeping an eye on all the relevant aspects. No doubt, precise assumption or eandtimation of the loss suffered in such cases may be hardly obtainable. In such cases, arithmatic may be a servant, but would be a bad master. Therefore, the Tribunal is also required to take in to account various circumstances including several imponderables and uncertainties of life. ( 12 ) IT is true that the word just is not statutorily defined like the word compensation under the Act. However, one can safely conclude that no method of calculation of compensation would be justified if it is. not appeared to be just, looking to the peculiar facts in a given case. Therefore, in a case of personal injury like the one on hand, the Tribunal-is requited to accord its anxious thoughts to the relevant facts, and important principles while determining the quantum of compensation even under the head of "pain, shock and suffering". _ , ( 13 ) THE Claims Tribunal is expected to assess and determine such. compensation which may appear to be just. It may be recalled that just. compensation would mean reasonable compensation. Therefore, just would mean appropriate, equitable or proper determination of compensation, being dependent on several imponderables. In the assessment of compensation, there is likely to be some margin of error. However, it is settle? that compensation must be reasonably or justly assessed with moderation, The word compensation is of wide import and according to Blacks. Law Dictionary, "compensation" implies indemnification or reparation, making amends or balancing of loss and gain and so on and so forth. ( 14 ) THE claimant is a living victim of violent accident, by which, he sustained serious injuries. He was kept in the hospital for almost 45 days for the two fractures on the right hand and the functional movements of the right hand are substantially effected He is unable to stretch and bend fully his right arm, as found from the evidence on record. He is a young man. He has many more years to go ahead. Thus, the Tribunal" ought to have considered nil these facts and circumstances while determining the amount of compensation under the head of pain, shock and suffering. He is a young man. He has many more years to go ahead. Thus, the Tribunal" ought to have considered nil these facts and circumstances while determining the amount of compensation under the head of pain, shock and suffering. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal has committed an error while determining the quantum of compensation under the head of pain, shock and suffering. Even while taking a conservative view in the matter, it can safely be concluded that the claimant should be entitled to at least an amount of Rs. 16,500, instead of Rs. 12,000, under the head of pain, shock and suffering. In other words, the claimant would" be entitled to an additional amount of Rs. 4,500 under this head. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant is required to be accepted. We, therefore, award an additional amount of rs. 4,500 under the head of pain, shock and suffering to the claimant. Contention No. II ( 15 ) NEXT, it will lead to the appreciation of second contention, with regard to the amount of compensation under the head of prospectiveeconomic loss. Surprisingly, the Tribunal has remained oblivious to the principles governing the compensation under this head, while refusing to award any amount of compensation under this head to the claimant, the learned Counsel for the claimant, has, seriously, agitated before us that the Tribunal has committed serious illegality in not awarding reasonable amount under this head. This contention is vehemently opposed by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Having heard the learned Counsels on this question and having examined the evidence on record in this connection, and while viewing it in the light of the relevant principles of law, we find much force and substance in the second contention also raised by the learned Counsel for the claimant. ( 16 ) IT appears that the amount of compensation under this head is refused, as there was no ostensible or manifest immediate loss in the salary income of the claimant. With due respect, this approach of the Tribunal is not only erroneous, but is illegal. The Tribunal is required to consider various aspects and relevant circumstances while determining the issue of award under the head of prospective economic loss. The claimant has sustained permanent partial disablement and there is no dispute about this aspect. With due respect, this approach of the Tribunal is not only erroneous, but is illegal. The Tribunal is required to consider various aspects and relevant circumstances while determining the issue of award under the head of prospective economic loss. The claimant has sustained permanent partial disablement and there is no dispute about this aspect. The bodily integrity of the claimant is also substantially affected. The functions of the right arm are found to have been restricted and reduced to the extent of 50%. The claimant was a young man of 30 years at the relevant time. Could it be, even for a moment, conceived that the effect on the bodily integrity like that the permanent partial disablement to the extent of 16% in the use of right hand, would not affect the earning capacity of the claimant ? What is required to be examined is the effect sustained by the claimant on account of the accident on the earning capacity. The effect of earning capacity must be judged in the light of loss or permanently affected limb arid the profession of the claimant, or the employment of the victim of the road accident. Firstly, it is necessary to ascertain the extent of physical disability. Thereafter, it is necessary to find out to what extent the earning capacity of the injured is affected. No doubt, it is true that the percentage of disablement may not correspond to the percentage of loss of earnings. It is not entirely right to always make the future loss of income co-existent with that of disability. It is not an algaebraic problem which can be solved by the abstract formula. What the evidence is as to the permanent disablement, and what is the extent of impairment of the body or whether it is complete or partial ? Whether it is temporary or permanent ? An assessment must be made as to what effect such disability would have on entire function of the body and how it would consequently affect the earning capacity. It may happen that a person who has sustained significant impairment on a particular part of the body, and yet,, it may not affect seriously his earning capacity, in so far as, his particular type of avocation or employment is concerned. It may happen that a person who has sustained significant impairment on a particular part of the body, and yet,, it may not affect seriously his earning capacity, in so far as, his particular type of avocation or employment is concerned. Conversely, it may happen that an impairment of hand or arm or legs to a person like labourer would materially affect his earning capacity. Therefore, it is not the only extent of the disablement and, also, the extent of the impairment of body, but its resultant impact on the earning capacity which matters and has a role to play in the determination of reasonable and just amount of compensation. ( 17 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances, the nature and number of injuries, the extent of disablement and the resultant effect on the earning capacity, the Tribunal is bound to award just and reasonable amount of compensation under this head. Unfortunately, the appellant, herein, the original claimant, is totally denied of this by the Tribunal, under the head of prospective economic loss. ( 18 ) THE claimant was a class-IV employee and working as a Peon in Alembic Chemical Company, at the relevant time. There is no dispute that he was earning Rs. 600 per month and that he was aged about 30 years at the time of the accident. The Tribunal is required to take consolidated earnings of the claimant, at the time of the accident and also his average prospective income and present monetary value of the prospective earning so as to determine- just and reasonable amount of compensation. We are taken through the relevant evidence. We have found that earlier the claimant was working on a duplicating or franking machine. Thereafter, the claimant was given light work on account of his permanent partial disablement in the right hand. There is nothing on record to show as to whether the promotional chances of the claimant are fully affected on account of disablement. One witness, Mr. R. M. Parikh. an employee of the Alembic Chemical Company was examined at Exh. 30, and he has admitted that the claimant was getting the same salary which he was getting, on the post, as a Peon. In short, he was working in the mailing section of the Alembic Chemical Company. Earlier, he was assigned the work on duplicating or franking machine, but on account of injuries, be was entrusted light work. 30, and he has admitted that the claimant was getting the same salary which he was getting, on the post, as a Peon. In short, he was working in the mailing section of the Alembic Chemical Company. Earlier, he was assigned the work on duplicating or franking machine, but on account of injuries, be was entrusted light work. ( 19 ) THE Tribunal is bound to consider the resultant disablement arising on account of the accident and its impact on earning capacity. It is obligatory to consider the loss of earning capacity. If the loss of earning capacity is not estimated by the Medical expert, then in the facts and circumstances of the case, even the Tribunal can make the rough assessment and estimation of loss of earning capacity in so far as possible, so as to award just and reasonable amount of compensation under the head of prospective economic loss. It is submitted and pointed out that this Court, in a Division bench judgment in the case of "gurdipsinh Birensing v. Chauhan Bhupendra kumar Udesing", reported in (1980) XXI GLR 221, has held that the Court can make rough estimate about loss of earning capacity in the light of the facts and circumstances and the available data of medical evidence on record. In that case, there was no specific evidence of an expert as to what was the exact permanent partial disablement to a particular limb of the anatomy and considering the limited movements and impairment on the knee, this Court had conservatively estimated the loss of earning capacity at 25%. It is true that in that case, the claimant was awarded Rs. 45,000, though there was no immediate reduction in his salary as a Technical Assistant in O. N. G. C. ( 20 ) NO doubt, it is imperative for the Tribunal to consider the facts and circumstances, and the medical evidence, showing the extent of physical impairment. If no precise and direct evidence showing the percentage or extent of the disablement is spelt out, the Tribunal can make rough and reasonable estimate of loss of earning capacity so as to determine the just amount of compensation under the head of prospective economic loss. With due respect, this aspect is, totally, ignored by the Tribunal. . ( 21 ) IN the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the claimant was earning Rs. With due respect, this aspect is, totally, ignored by the Tribunal. . ( 21 ) IN the case on hand, it is not in dispute that the claimant was earning Rs. 600 per month at the time of the accident as a Peon in Alembic chemical Company. It is true that what rise he would have received in his salary during the entire course of his employment, would be a matter of anybodys guess. Needless to mention that the Tribunal, at times, has to make speculative guess, so as to determine the just and reasonable amount of compensation. It is found from the evidence on record that the claimant was given light work as a Peon, and immediately, there was no deduction or reduction in his salary income, on account of disablement. But that is not all. We are bound to consider the effect of percentage of disablement and to ascertain the actual or likely loss of earning capacity. ( 22 ) THE Tribunal has to address itself on various aspects including certain contingenices in the case of an employed manual labourer or a worker. We would like to quote the following paragraphs from the Book of "kemp and kemp" on "the Quantum of Damages", Special Edition, on page 6006 . "the contingencies to be considered are likely to include the following : how secure was his job ? Did he have periods off work in the past when he was laid off by his employer ? Would that probably have happened in the future if he had not been injured ? Did he have prospects of promotion ? What increase or incieases in earnings could he expect if he had been promoted ? Even if he could not expect promotion, could he expect better pay as his skills and expeiience improved? If so, when and at what earnings? If he was in a dangerous and demanding job such as a steel erector, up to what age could he have continued his work? What would the chances be of his suffering an injury which would have ended that career in any event ? What would he have done and what would he have earned, when he gave up steel erecting ? of he was employed in a declining industry, how long would his employment have been likely to continue and what were his prospects of employment outside the industry ? What would he have done and what would he have earned, when he gave up steel erecting ? of he was employed in a declining industry, how long would his employment have been likely to continue and what were his prospects of employment outside the industry ? Many other contingencies may have to be considered in the circumstances of particular cases. "while determining the compensation under the head of future Pecuniary loss in the case of an employed manual worker, the Tribunal is also bound to consider where there is no net annual loss at the date of trial or only a comparatively slight one, but nevertheless the claimant has suffered considerable handicap in the labour market. The following observations of kemp and Kemp\ in this behalf on page 6010 in the aforesaid Book are relevant;"it sometimes happens that a plaintiff is earning at the date of the trial as much as, or even more than. he was earning at the date of his accident, but that he has nonetheless sufferred a substantial loss of earning capacily. If he were to lose hik present job, he would be at a disadvantage in the labour market in obtaining further employment. Or he may have had good prospects of promotion, which have now vanished or been considerably reduced; or there may have been other and betterpaid forms of employment open to him had he not been injured, but these are cow barred to him because of his injuries. In a case like this, in the words of Sellers l. J. "the subject-matter of estimation is very much what might be called a series of imponderables. We have already dealt with this topic, known in current jargon as Smith v. Manchester damages, in Chapter 5, paragraphs 5-009/7/1, et seq. In this class of case it may be difficult to make any direct comparison between one case and another; all one can do is to consider the Courts approach to the problem in comparable cases and try to gain some guidance from them. "the principles governing the damages are very well settled. The loss on account of deprivation of future earnings is divisible into two distinct categories. "the principles governing the damages are very well settled. The loss on account of deprivation of future earnings is divisible into two distinct categories. The loss of future earnings consisting of real assessable pecuniary loss likely to be suffered as a result of accident and the loss of earning capacity arising from reduction in capacity to earn money on account of injury sustained, which are required to be determined, considering the loss of earning capacity. If it is found that the loss of earning capacity is substantially affected, or there is a real risk of loss, it is required to be assessed, having regard to all sorts of variable factors, favourable and unfavourable. There is no doubt the fact that it is not easy to make an estimate of the present value of probable financial loss, which the claimant is likely to suffer, as a result of physical injuries. Under the circumstances, such as those which are present in the instant case, one has only to make an estimate, often a very rough estimate - taking into account several imponderables and uncertainties of life. ( 23 ) THE starting point for the assessment of the probable loss should be the amount that the claimant was getting or earning at the time of the accident. What he could have earned or what prospective rise he could have received in earnings, had there been no accident ? It is true that the prospective rise in earnings would be spread-over long years. It may be possible that the claimant might have got promotion at all, even if he had not sustained injuries. On the other hand, it is equally possible that he might have earned promotion even if he had sustained injuries which we have seen in the present case. Whether the claimant was likely to be thrown out of the job must also be taken into consideration. What he would have actually become, would be a matter of anybodys guess. Whether he would have earned the amount which is claimed by him, by way of loss on account of the accident, will also be a matter of permissible guess, depending upon several imponderables and uncertainties. Therefore, at times, we have to make an estimate, often very rough estimate, and the assessment may be based on the speculative guess, which is permissible in such cases. Therefore, at times, we have to make an estimate, often very rough estimate, and the assessment may be based on the speculative guess, which is permissible in such cases. The whole of the difference between the actual earnings and probable future earnings, obviously, could not be taken, as the present value of the financial damages caused to the claimant. Therefore present value thereof has got to be assessed and ascertained. Considering all these facts and circumstances, the claimant in this case would be entitled to at least an average amount of Rs. 225 per month by way of prospective economic loss. Therefore, annual loss works out to Rs. 225 x 12 = 2,700. We are inclined to adopt 15 multipliers as this is a case of young man of 30 and he has long working life ahead of him, Accordingly the damages under the head of future prospective earnings would come to rs. 40,500 on the ground of loss of earning capacity. Hence, the claimant is entitled to Rs. 40,500 (Rs. 2,700 x 15) under this head. Contention No III ( 24 ) LASTLY, it will bring into sharp focus, the question of award of interest. The Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6% per annum. from the date of application till realisation, on the amount awarded. The ,tribunal awarded only Rs. 18,060 against the claim of Rs. 80,000. Therefore. in this appeal, the original claimant has claimed an additional amount of Rs. 61,940, by way of compensation. The "award" of Compensation, as mentioned in sec. 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is not statutorily defined. However, it may be noted that the award made under Sec. 168 (1), has three important components : Firstly, it must determine the amount of compensation which appears to be just to the Tribunal if tort is established. Secondly, it must also specify the person or persons to whom compensation which has to be paid. Thirdly, it states by whom the compensation amount shall be paid either by the owner or by the driver or by the insurer or by any or some of them, as the case may be. However, the Tribunal has also discretion to award interest on the amount of compensation under the provisions of Sec. 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which corresponds to old Sec. 110cc of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. However, the Tribunal has also discretion to award interest on the amount of compensation under the provisions of Sec. 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which corresponds to old Sec. 110cc of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 171 of the Act of 1988, reads as under :"171. Award of interest where my claim is allowed: where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple intertst shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. "the expression, "may direct", in the aforesaid provisions incorporated in Sec. 171, undoubtedly goes to show the intention of the legislature. No doubt, it means that the power to grant interest is discretionary, but this discretion should, ordinarily, unless exceptional circumstances justify, otherwise, be exercised in favour of the claimants, so as to compensate them for delayed payment of compensation. It is, equally, true that this discretion has to be exercised judicially. The discretionary power to award interest has been vested in the Tribunal, and reasonable order, either positive or negative has to be passed. Otherwise, it may amount to failure to exercise the jurisdiction given to the Tribunal under the enactment, in the matter of awarding interest. Therefore, the Tribunal has to specify the rate of interest to be paid on the amount awarded and the date from which it shall apply. ( 25 ) IT may be mentioned at this stage that before the statutory provisions came to be incorporated in the Motor Vehicles Act, earlier the Tribunals or courts had inherent power to award interest. Later on, the statutory prescriptions came to be made, empowering the Tribunal to award interest from the date of application, under Sec. 110cc of the Old Act of 1939, In the New Act, almost similar provision is incorporated in Sec. 171, which is reproduced hereinabove. As could be seen from the plain perusal of the aforesaid provision of the Act, the Tribunal or Court could award interest only from the date of application. There is no doubt that the loss be fins or damage is caused from the very moment the accident takes place. As could be seen from the plain perusal of the aforesaid provision of the Act, the Tribunal or Court could award interest only from the date of application. There is no doubt that the loss be fins or damage is caused from the very moment the accident takes place. However, since the Court or Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award interest anterior to the date of making an application, it would not be possible to award interest from the date of accident, till the date of filing of the application. No doubt, we are of the opinion that now there is high time to make a suitable provision whereby the Tribunal could be empowered to grant interest not only from the date of the application, but also from the date of happening of the unfortunate accident or road mishap, as loss commences from the very moment of the occurrence of the accident. Needless to reiterate and we are conscious that task of the Court is to interpret the law and not to legislate it. Nonetheless, we could not resist the temptation of placing our feeling on record considering the very benign proceedings arising out of unfortunate accidents and more so when State is wedded to the doctrine of welfare State. The voice raised here by this Court on this point shall not be a cry in the wilderness. With this hope, we have placed our view on record. ( 26 ) BE as it may, in the present case there is no slightest doubt in our mind that the interest at the rate of 6% per annum awarded by the tribunal, from the date of the application, till realisation, is insufficient and inadequate. It is true that the minimum or maximum rate of interest is not prescribed in Sec. 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but it should be just and reasonable, in the facts and circumstances of the case. The rate of interest, in earlier days, was 4% per annum. In other words, the Tribunal used to award interest at the rate of 4% per annum, in appropriate cases, in the early seventies. Later on, conventional rate of interest came to be revised by many judicial pronouncements to 6% per annum, and thereafter, it came to be revised at the rate of 9% per annum. In other words, the Tribunal used to award interest at the rate of 4% per annum, in appropriate cases, in the early seventies. Later on, conventional rate of interest came to be revised by many judicial pronouncements to 6% per annum, and thereafter, it came to be revised at the rate of 9% per annum. ( 27 ) THERE are many reported cases, in which, interest came to be revised and awarded at the rate of 10% per annum. Subsequently, the interest rate came to be enhanced to 12% per annum. This is mainly because of the supreme Court judgment in the case of Narchinva V. Kamat and Anr. v. Alfredo antonio Deo Martins and Ors; reported in AIR 1985 SC 1281 . In that case, the accident occurred on 17/05/1976. The Supreme Court awarded interest on the amount of compensation at the rate of 12% per annum. In this connection, a decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Smt Chamelf watiand Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. , reported in AIR 1986 sc 1191 , is required to be mentioned, wherein, the question was whether interest should not have been awarded on the amount of compensation, from the date of the making of the claim application when such amount of compensation was finally assessed. The Apex Court of the lard referred in this connection to the provisions of Sec. 110cc of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939 and held that the Court had discretion to award interest at such rate, and from such date. not earlier than the date of the application, as it may think fit in the exercise of its discretion. It will be interesting to mention that the learned singi; Judge and the Division Bench of the High court, while enhancing the amount of compensation, had directed the award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount from the date of applcation. In that context, it was held by the Supreme Court that the learned single Judge, as well as the Division Bench of Delhi High Court had, totally, ignored the fact that the enhanced amount of compensation awarded by them was, in their judgment, the correct amount of compensation payable to the claimants on account of the death of the deceased arising out of the vehicular accident. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decisioq of the Delhi High Court, on this point, and it was held that the Delhi high Court should have awarded interest on the enhanced amount of compensation from the date of application. It was further directed by the supreme Court that the interest shall be payable on the enhanced amount of compensation as finally determined by the High Court at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application for compensation. ( 28 ) IT may also be noled that there is cne more relevant decision of the Supreme Court, on this point, rendered in the case of jagbir Singh and Ors. v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways and Ors. , reported in AIR 1987 sc 70 . In that case, with regard to interest, it was held that the claimants are entitled to a higher rate of interest than that was awarded by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. Considering the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, it was held that the claimant should be entitled to interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application for compensation till the date of payment. This question of award of conventional interest was in sharp frcus in that case. It will be also interesting to mention that in that case, a fatal accident occurred on 13/02/1971, which resulted into death of the breadwinner of the family and the Tribunal had awarded an amount of Rs. 93. 600. 00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum to the widow and minor children. Challengirg the said decision, the claimants filed an appeal, claiming to be awarded enhanced compensation. The Punjab Roadways had also preferred an appeal. The High Court dismissed the appeal, filed by the claimants, and partly allowed the appeal, filed by the Punjab Roadways. The High Court sliced down the amount of compensation to Rs. 79,200, against the award amount of Rs. 93,600, but confirmed the award of interest made by the Tribunal at 6% per annum. In the Special leave Petition, filed by the claimants, before the Supreme Court, it was lield on 24/10/1986, that the High Court had committed error in reducing the amount of compensation. 79,200, against the award amount of Rs. 93,600, but confirmed the award of interest made by the Tribunal at 6% per annum. In the Special leave Petition, filed by the claimants, before the Supreme Court, it was lield on 24/10/1986, that the High Court had committed error in reducing the amount of compensation. The significant aspect to be noted and which has material bearing on the point before us, at this juncture, is that while resorting the award of compensation of Rs. 93,600 awarded by the Tribunal, in that case, referring to the aforesaid two decisions (Narchinva V. Kamut and Am. v. Alfredo Antonio Deo Martins and Ors. and smt. Chameli Wati and Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors.) Supreme court awarded interest on the entire amount of compensation at the rate of 12% per annum from the date cf application till payment. ( 29 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the runaway inflation and the sky-rocketing prices are the unpleasant phenomena prevalent in our present economy, and this Court, while determining the amount of compensation, cannot be oblivicus to this aspect, as the law mandates to grant compensation which is just and reasonable, in the facts and circumstances of the case. Obviously, had the claimant received the amount of compensation awarded, within the reasonable time, from the date of the happening of the unfortunate accident, the claimant would have at least invested that amount in any suitable securities of his choice if not in business or commerce, and would have received, in turn, good returns. The award of interest, till payment of compensation, not only compensates the claimant for delayed payment, but also, as times, puts pressure on the persons who are liable to pay compensation, to see that the due amount is cxpeditiously paid or deposited. ( 30 ) IN our opinion, the conventional rate of interest at 12% per annum, as accepted and adopted, long before, deserves to be enhanced in view of the significant fall in value of rupee and high inflationary, trend, prevalent in our economy. It could very well be seen that interest rate has been periodically reviewed and revised and lastly Apex Court adopted and awarded and raised conventional rate of interest at 12%. Thereafter, money value has substantially gone down and there has been material effect on purchasing power of rupee. It could very well be seen that interest rate has been periodically reviewed and revised and lastly Apex Court adopted and awarded and raised conventional rate of interest at 12%. Thereafter, money value has substantially gone down and there has been material effect on purchasing power of rupee. In our opinion, the rate of interest awarded, in the recent past, at the rate of 12% per annum, requires upward revision. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we deem it expedient and find that the claimants or the victims of such unfortunate road accidents, are entitled to interest at least at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of application till its realisation, on the amount of compensation to be awarded. ( 31 ) THE view which we are inclined to take, at this juncture, on the question of enhancement of award of interest at the rate of 15% per annum is also reinforced by the recent decision of the Supreme Court rendered in Rukmani Devi and Ors. v. Om Prakash and Ors. . decided on 17/01/1990, reported in 1990 0 ACJ 687. The Supreme Court in that case, allowed the interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the petition before the Tribunal till realisation. Subsequently, a Division Bench of Bombay high Court, in the case of Ayesha Mohammad Khan and Ors. v. Jyoti M. Asawa and Anr , reported in 1991 0 ACJ 739, decided on 2 2/03/1991, has also awarded interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of application till realisation while allowing the appeal, ( 32 ) IT is pointed out that the maximum rate of interest on fixed deposit in any nationalised bank at the relevant time was much less than 15% pet annum and, therefore, the claimant should not be awarded interest at the rate of 15% per annum. This contention cannot be subscribed to in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and, especially, the decision in the case of Rukmani Devi and Ors. v. Om Prakash and ors. (supra ). We may also mention that we are not dealing with a case fur award of interest falling under the provisions of Interest Act, 1969. This contention cannot be subscribed to in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and, especially, the decision in the case of Rukmani Devi and Ors. v. Om Prakash and ors. (supra ). We may also mention that we are not dealing with a case fur award of interest falling under the provisions of Interest Act, 1969. In our opinion, there is no justification for the submission or proposition that in any event, the rate of interest to be awarded on the amount of compensation should not be more than the rate of interest paid by the nationalised banks in the relevant year of accident or at the best, in the year of filing of the claim petition. Such contention was also raised before the Division Bench of this Court, consisted of Brother Judges n. B. Patel and K. G. Shah, in Civil Appeal No. 176 with Civil Appeal nos. 177 to 180 of 1979, decided on 5/6-7-1990 and it was, rightly, rejected. Therefore, in our opinion, such a contention cannot be sustained as it is, totally, meritless. 34. Before parting with the matter, we may mention that out of the additional amount of Rs. 45,000, with proportionate cost and interest as aforesaid, an amount of Rs. 5,,000 only shall be paid to the claimant by an account payee cheque. The remaining amount of Rs. 40,000 with proportionate cost and interest shall be invested in Fixed Deposit in any nationalised bank or in any Government Security of the choice of the claimant or any scheme of State or Union of India Undertaking wherein rate of interest is higher, for a period not less than 72 months, and the claimant shall be entitled to interest which shall accrue periodically. This direction is issued, considering the fact that the claimant would not be in a position to exercise fiscal discipline so as to make prudent investment or best use of the amount awarded by this Court, and also, the fact that the larger amount out of the said award of compensation is under the head of prospective economic loss. No loan, charge or enumbrance on deposits shall be allowed without prior approval of the Tribunal. 36. In the result, the appellant-original injured claimant is found entitled to an additional amount of Rs. 45,000 by way of compensation. No loan, charge or enumbrance on deposits shall be allowed without prior approval of the Tribunal. 36. In the result, the appellant-original injured claimant is found entitled to an additional amount of Rs. 45,000 by way of compensation. The claimant is also found entitled to interest at the rate of 15% per annum instead of interest at the rate of 6% per annum, as stated hereinbefore, with proportionate cost thereon, and accordingly, the appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent. .