SHAH, J. ( 1 ) BY this Civil Revision Application filed under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner, original judgment-creditor challenges the judgment and order passed by the Executing Court below Exh. 75 in Misc. Civil Application No. 799 of 1986 (Obstruction removal application) dated 1-11-1991 whereby the City Civil Judge stayed the hearing of Execution application No. 715 of 1986 and Obstruction removal application No. 799 of 1986 in purported exercise of powers under Sec. 10 of C. P. Code. ( 2 ) IN order to ascertain the compass of inquiry and exact nature-of proceedings and nature of challenges to the impugned order, it is, necessary to set out few relevant facts hereunder : (i) The petitioner, judgment-creditor, instituted Civil Suit No. 1154 of 1984 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad against respondent Nos. 1 and 2, judgment-debtors, for possession of premises bearing Municipal Census no. 13-C-6-2 situated at Bhairavnath Road, Maninagar, inter alia, on the ground that respondent No. 1 a public trust and respondent No. 2 its managing Trustee were the licencees of the suit premises and that the licence was lawfully revoked and therefore they were liable to be evicted. (ii) Said suit of the petitioner was decreed by the learned city Civil Judge by judgment and decree, dated 17/10/1984. It may be stated that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 appeared, filed written. statement and contested the suit and even applied for time to vacate the premises. (iii) The petitioner, thereafter, filed Execution Application No. 715 of 1986 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad and the Court issued warrant for possession. (iv) In this Execution Application, present respondent No. 3 resisted the execution and filed written objections on 16-10-1986. The holder of decree for possession was thus resisted or obstructed by third party in obtaining possession of the property. (v) Thereupon, the present petitioner filed an application under 0. 21 R. 97 being Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986 complaining to the Court about resistance or obstruction offered by third respondent. To such application the third respondent filed written statement at Exh. 15. It is required to be stated that when a decree-holder for possession is resisted or obstructed, under R. 97 (2) of 0. 21 R. 97 being Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986 complaining to the Court about resistance or obstruction offered by third respondent. To such application the third respondent filed written statement at Exh. 15. It is required to be stated that when a decree-holder for possession is resisted or obstructed, under R. 97 (2) of 0. 21 the Court is required to adjudicate upon the claim put forth by the third party as well as entitlement of the decree-holder to remove the obstructions of the third party. In short, the Court is required to determine all questions arising between the parties to a proceedings under 0. 21 R. 97 of C. P. Code. The Court is required to determine all such questions including the questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, in this very application as if the proceeding is a separate suit. It is also required to be noted that any order which the Court would pass after adjudication is to be treated as a decree as provided under R. 103 of 0. 21 of C. P. Code. (vi) Consistent with the statutory requirement the City Civil Court treated the proceeding of Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986 as separate suit and proceeded to record evidence. Oral evidence of one maniial Narandas was recorded on 2-1-1989. (vii) It should also be noted that the present respondent No. 3 instituted H. R. P. Suit No. 4437 of 1984 against present petitioner as well as respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad for declaration that he is the tenant of the suit premises claiming through respondent No. 1 and 2 and also for permanent injunction. He also applied for temporary injunction against the present petitioner restraining him from, in any way, interfering with the possession. It may be stated that application for temporary injunction was dismissed by learned Small Causes Judge, dated 13-2-1985 and appeal from order preferred before appellate bench of Small causes Court was also dismissed on 16-9-1986. Civil Revision Application no. 1343 of 1986 preferred to High Court was also summarily rejected. It may be stated that application for temporary injunction was dismissed by learned Small Causes Judge, dated 13-2-1985 and appeal from order preferred before appellate bench of Small causes Court was also dismissed on 16-9-1986. Civil Revision Application no. 1343 of 1986 preferred to High Court was also summarily rejected. (viii) Having failed before the Rent Court, present respondent No. 3 instituted Civil Suit No. 6437 of 1987 in the City Civil Court for declaration that the decree passed in Civil Suit No 1125 of 1984 in favour of present petitioner was collusive, fraudulent and based on misrepresentation and was therefore null and void and was not binding on the third party, viz. the obstructionist. In such suit, application for temporary injunction was filed but ultimately it was not pressed. (ix) On 3-5-1991 present respondent No. 3 filed application at Exh. 75 in Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986 to stay the further proceedings of that application till final disposal of the HRP Suit No. 4437 of 1984 as well as Civil Suit No. 6463 of 1987. Such application was given under Sec. 10 of C. P. Code. (x) The learned City Civil Judge has after hearing the parties passed the impugned order, dated 1-11-1991 staying the Darkhast Petition No. 715 of 1986 and Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986, which has given rise to the present revision application, ( 3 ) MR. M. C. Bhatt, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has seriously disputed the legality and validity of such order by contending that executing Court has erred in exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by law. By detailed reference to the provisions of Order 21, Rule 97 to Rule 104 of the C. P. Code he vehemently submitted that the legislature has given ample protection to the third party obstructionist to a decree for possession by providing a complete machinery of adjudication of his right, title and interest vis-a-vis the suit property as well as vis-a-vis right, title and interest of decreeholder and also by providing that such adjudication would be treated as a decree so as to provide further right of appeal. He further submitted that till such objections or obstructions are finally determined, the execution proceedings get automatically stayed because no possession warrant can be executed till objections filed by the obstructionist are decided. He further submitted that till such objections or obstructions are finally determined, the execution proceedings get automatically stayed because no possession warrant can be executed till objections filed by the obstructionist are decided. He further submitted that from the language of Rule 101 of Order 21 second or independent suit by the obstructionist is not maintainable or not competent and even if such suit is filed, the executing Court under Rule 101 is required to determine all questions in proceeding for removal of obstruction because power given to the Court is very wide so as to include power to determine all questions including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceedings and relevant to adjudication of the application. ( 4 ) MR. M. B. Gandhi, learned Counsel appearing for the third respondent, obstructionist, on the other hand strenuously urged that the question as to whether the decree obtained by the decree-holder was collusive and fraudulent decree or not, was pre-eminently fit to be tried in a suit to be filed by the third party who is alleging fraud and collusion and such a question cannot be gone into by the executing Court under Rules 97 and 101 of Order 21 of C. P. Code. Such a contention raised by third party obstructionist in his objections or reply to proceeding under Rule 97 Order 21 of C. P. Code cannot be decided by the executing Court because investigation of such question would amount to going behind the decree which, in the submission of Mr. Gandhi is not permissible exercise for the executing Court. He further submitted that even if executing Court is permitted to decide such contentions incidentally in view of employment of wider and broader terminology by legislature in Rule 101 of Order 21 C. P. Code, findings of the executing Court on such issues would operate as res judicata in a substantive suit filed by the third party obstructionist. He further submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case executing court was justified and was within its jurisdiction in passing the order of stay of execution proceedings till substantive suit of obstructionist is decided in exercise of powers under Sec. 10 read with Sec. 151 C. P. Code and the interference of this Court is not called for under Sec. 115 of C. P. Code. Lastly, he submitted that present revision application is filed by the Power of Attorney-holder on behalf of the landlord decree-holder and since he is local resident within the jurisdiction of the Court, under Order 3, Rule 2a as amended in the State of Gujarat very institution of revision is bad and incompetent. ( 5 ) FROM the aforesaid broad spectrum of factual dairies and still wider canvass of submissions, following legal questions arise for my decision : (a) What are the remedies of person other than Judgment-Debtor or person not in any way acting at his instigation or on his behalf and who is in possession of immovable property when the holder of a decree for possession or purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree comes with a warrant for possession ? (b) What are the remedies of holder of decree for possession when he is obstructed or resisted by third parties (parties other than Judgment- debtor or person claiming under him) ? (c) Is remedy of instituting a separate suit challenging the legality and validity of decree available to a third party over and above the remedy of filing resistance or obstruction under Order 21, Rule 97 of C. P. Code ? (d) If answer to question No. (c) is in affirmative, should further proceedings under Order 21, Rule 97 undertaken by a holder of decree for removal of obstruction be stayed till the independent suit is decided and is Sec. 10 of C. P. Code applicable so as to justify the stay of execution proceeding ? (e) Is present revision application filed by the Power of Attorney-holder of decree-holder competent ? (f) Is interference of High Court under Sec. 115 of C. P. Code called for in the facts and circumstances of this case ? ( 6 ) IN order to answer the questions formulated hereinabove, and to appreciate the rival submissions of the learned Counsel it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 to 104 of C. P. Code. ( 6 ) IN order to answer the questions formulated hereinabove, and to appreciate the rival submissions of the learned Counsel it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 97 to 104 of C. P. Code. The same are reproduced hereunder :"order 21 Rule 97 : resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property : (1) Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such propeity sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. (2) Where any application is made under sub-rule (1) the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. Order 21 Rule 98: orders after adjudlcation : (1) Upon the determination of the question referred to in Rule 101, the Court shall in accordance with such determination and subject to the provisions of subrule (2)- (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. (2) Where, upon such determination, the Court is satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment-debtor or by some other person at his instigation or on his behalf, or by any transferee, where such transfer was made during the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment-debtor or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. Order 21 Rule 99 : dispossession by decree-holder or purchaser : (1) Where any person other than the judgment-debtor is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where any such application is made, the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. Order 21 Rule 100 : order to be passed upon application complaining of dispossession: upon the determination of the questions referred to in Rule 101 the Court shall, in accordance with such determination : (a) make an order allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put into possession of the property or dismissing the application; or (b) pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. Order 21 Rule 101 : question to be determined : all questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such question: provided that when the Court is not competent to decide such question due to want of pecuniary jurisdiction the Court shall send the execution case to the Court of the District Judge to which the said Court is subordinate and thereupon the Court of the District Judge or any other competent Court to which, it may be transferred by the District Judge, shall deal with it in the same manner as if the case had been originally in that Court. Order 21 Rule 102 : rules not applicable to transferee pendenie lile : nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment-debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. Explanation : In this rule, "transfer" includes a transfer by operation of law. Explanation : In this rule, "transfer" includes a transfer by operation of law. Order 21 Rule 103 : orders to be treated as decrees : where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Order 21 Rule 104 : order under Rule 101 or 103 to be subject to the result of pending suit: every order made under Rule 101 or Rule 103 shall be subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the date of commencement of the proceeding in which such order is made, if in such suit the party against whom the order under rule 101 or Rule 103 is made has sought to establish a right which he claims to the present possession of the property. "aforesaid Rules 97 to 101 and Rule 103 deal with the subject of resistance to delivery of possession to a holder of a decree for possession of immovable property and/or to the auction purchaser at the sale held in the execution of decree. These rules are, therefore required to be read together as forming one scheme. After amendment of the C. P. Code by the Amendment Act, 1976, the scheme is altered. Prior thereto the position of law is briefly summarised by Mulla on Civil Procedure Code, 14th edition as under:"rule 97 enabled the holder of a decree for possession of immovable property and the purchaser at the Court sale of such property to apply to the executing court, if they were resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession of such property by any person, complaining of such resistance or obstruction. The inquiry by the executing Court was a summary inquiry concerned only with the question of present possession and the procedure laid down under the rules was not intended for decision to be made by hearing oral evidence tendered on behalf of the parties If the resistance was by the judgment-debtor or some other person at his instigation the court had to direct that the applicant be put in possession. But if the resistance was occasioned by a person other than the judgment-debtor claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own account or on account of a person other than the judgment-debtor the Court would have to dismiss the application. Rule 100, as it then was, enabled a person (other than the judgment-debtor) if dispossessed either by the decree-holder or the purchaser, to apply to the Court complaining of such dispossession and Rule 101 provided that if the Court found that such an applicant was in possession on his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor it could direct that the applicant be put in possession. There was no provision for an appeal against an order passed, under Rule 98 or 99 or Rule 101. Such an order was conclusive as between the parties except that a party, other than the judgment-debtor against whom the order was passed could under Rule 103 institute a suit to establish his right to the possession claimed by him; but subject to the result of such a suit the order was conclusive. The order was conclusive if the person against whom it was passed failed to file such a suit or if the suit filed by him was dismissed. "the effect of the aforesaid provision after amendment is summarised by the learned author Mulla as under :"the Amendment Act, 1976 has retained sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 but has substituted a new sub-rule (2) in place of the earlier sub-rule (2 ). Rules 98 to 106 are new. Those amendments are in conformity with the legislative policy of entiusting the determination of all questions including questions as to the title of the concerned property by the executing Court. The general scheme of the new Rules 97 to 103 has been altered on the lines of the amendment made in Rules 58 and 59, The main feature of the amendments made by the 1976 Act is that all questions (including the question as to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to the proceedings under Rule 97 or Rule 99 must be determined by the executing Court and not left to be decided by way of a separate suit. To ensure this the earlier Rule 103 has been omitted and a new Rule 103 has been enacted providing that the order passed under these rules shall have the same force and shall be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal as if it were a decree. Consistent with these changes in the nature of the enquiry and the order passed therein sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 has been amended by substituting the words "to adjudicate" for the words for investigating". " ( 7 ) IN 10th Edition of AIR Commentaries on the Civil Procedure Code the remedy of a holder of decree for possession is summarised in a tabular form as under : person Obstructed Remedy obstructed 1. Hoder of (a) On obstruction by (i) May proceed under Rule 97. decree for judgment-debtor or (ii) May apply again in execution possession by person claiming of the decree under Rules 95 under him. and 36, and if obstructed again, may apply under Rule 97 (2 ). (b) On obstruction by (i) May proceed under Rule 97. third parties. (ii) May apply again in execution of the decree under Rules 85 and 36. (iii) May institute a regular suit for possession. From the aforesaid gist of the rights of holder of decree for possession it can be said that when holder for decree of possession was obstructed by third party, Rule 97 provides him a remedy to apply to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction and sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 which is substituted for old sub-rule (2) provides that the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions contained therein. The sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 is major departure from the scheme of removal of obstruction enacted under Old Rule 97. It is pertinent to note that once such application is given by the holder of decree for possession, the executing Court is obliged to proceed to adjudicate upon the application. The use of the words "shall" proceed to "adjudicate" leave no room for doubt that the exercise which the Court is to undertake is that of adjudicating the claims of the parties. The use of the words "shall" proceed to "adjudicate" leave no room for doubt that the exercise which the Court is to undertake is that of adjudicating the claims of the parties. The legislature has by introduction of the aforesaid sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 substituted the summary remedy provided to a decree-holder by a full-fledged adjudication proceeding and the order made therein has the force of the decree and is subject to an appeal. The period of limitation to an application complaining of resistance or obstruction to delivery of possession of immovable property is 30 days from the date of resistance or obstruction under Art. 129 of the Limitation act, 1963. It therefore becomes clear that remedy which is provided to a holder of decree for possession of immovable property under Rule 97 of order 21 is now a substantive remedy wherein even adjudication of right, title and interest of the obstructor can be gone into by the executing Court in view of the language employed in Rule 101 of Order 21 of C. P. Code. It may be mentioned that over and above the remedy provided by Rule 97 (2), it is open to him to file a regular suit for possession when obstruction is by third party. ( 8 ) FROM the facts which are set out hereinabove it becomes abundantly clear that the present holder of a decree for possession has resorted to his remedy under sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 of Order 21 of the C. P. Code by making an application to the executing Court to remove the obstruction caused by the third party and executing Court has, consistent with the statutory obligation, embarked upon adjudication of the right, title and interest of the parties, i. e. , of the decree-holder as well as the third party obstructing the decree-holder. The power given to the Court is of widest amplitude and is plenary. The power is not qualified or hedged by any restriction. According to amended Rule 101 the executing Court is bound to go into and decide all questions including the question relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding in an application. The power is not qualified or hedged by any restriction. According to amended Rule 101 the executing Court is bound to go into and decide all questions including the question relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to a proceeding in an application. In view of such a wide power which is given to the executing Court in my opinion there is no scope for the controversy about the nature of enquiry which the executing Court is to undertake under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of c. P. Code. On an application made under Rule 97 (2) the Court shall proceed to adjudicate in accordance with the provisions contained therein. All questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 shall be determined by the Court not by a separate suit and for this purpose the Court shall be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide all such questions. This is amply made clear by Rule 101. The inquiry under Rule 101 is, therefore, a detailed investigation into the right, title and interest of the parties. The procedure which the Court acting under Rule 97 (2) has to follow is not a summary procedure. As observed by the learned Editor of Mullas Code of Civil Procedure the nature of the proceeding under Rule 97 of Order 21 and the nature of the order passed by the Court on such application is substantially altered. The order which the Court would pass after adjudication of right, title and interest would be in the nature of a decree. The right of suit which was provided by the earlier Rule 103 is no longer available. But learned Editor of Mulla further finds that the executing Court has to determine all questions including question as to the right, title or interest arising between the parties to the proceedings and the order passed therein has to be given the character of a decree. He further opines that the right of the parties against whom the order is passed is by way of appeal and not by a suit. Similarly, Mr. He further opines that the right of the parties against whom the order is passed is by way of appeal and not by a suit. Similarly, Mr. Sarkar, Editor of Sarkars civil Procedure Code has observed on page 732 of 7th Edition that a proceeding under Rule 97 or Rule 99 is no longer a summary proceeding as it was before the amendment and the executing Court has been clothed with full jurisdiction to determine all questions including question relating to right, title or interest in the property between the parties and the order of such a competent Court passed in such proceeding has been also made appealable. Similar is the view expressed by the learned author of AIR commentaries of C. P. Code wherein it is stated that in view of the present sub-rule (2) added to Rule 97 by Amendment Act, 1976, the procedure is not a summary one. It is a full inquiry and the Court has to adjudicate on the merits of the application. It, therefore, becomes clear that while dealing with the application under Rule 97 (2) of Order 21 the executing Court shall have to adjudicate upon all questions including questions of right, title or interest of third parties and the power of the executing Court while dealing with such application is plenary, as wide as that of Civil Court trying an independent or separate suit filed either by the holder of a decree for possession or by a third party in possession who is obstructing the holder of such a decree. The order which an executing Court will pass on such application is to be treated as a decree so as to provide a right of regular appeal to the party against whom the order is passed. The legislature, therefore, wanted that there should be full and final adjudication of the rival claims by the executing Court itself talcing entire evidence as if it was a substantial trial. The legislature in my opinion therefore never wanted to provide a summary remedy by enacting order 97 (2) of C. P. Code. The legislature, therefore, wanted that there should be full and final adjudication of the rival claims by the executing Court itself talcing entire evidence as if it was a substantial trial. The legislature in my opinion therefore never wanted to provide a summary remedy by enacting order 97 (2) of C. P. Code. The power of the executing Court is not of a summary inquiry and I therefore cannot with utmost respect to the learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court in the case of Dilip Nag v. Smt. Lilabati Garai, reported in AIR 1992 Calcutta 219 agree to the view expressed by him to the effect that the entire procedure of suit is not to be followed and that the scope of inquiry under such rule is limited. I also cannot agree with the view that inquiry is summary and the proceeding must be disposed of expeditiously, bearing in mind its scope and the limited question to be decided. ( 9 ) I am of the opinion that once obstruction is raised or resistance is offered by a third party to the holder of a decree for possession, the holder of the decree has the option of applying for removal of such obstruction under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of C. P. Code. To such application for removal of obstruction, the person in possession has right to file reply or objections arid the Court dealirg with such application under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) is now empowered to adjudicate all questions including the the question of right, title or interest of the person making obstruction or offering resistance. The executing Court is required to hold a detailed enquiry by permitting the parties to lead evidence and it is required to decide all questions including questions of right, title and interest of the parties vis-a-vis properties as well as right to possess the property. The power of the executing Court is of wide amplitude and is co-extensive with the power and jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Court trying a civil suit. In such proceedings, therefore, the claim of the third party in possession of the property is required to be fully gone into. Until his objections are overruled, the execution proceedings insofar as actual recovery of possession is concerned, automatically gets stayed. In such proceedings, therefore, the claim of the third party in possession of the property is required to be fully gone into. Until his objections are overruled, the execution proceedings insofar as actual recovery of possession is concerned, automatically gets stayed. It may be mentioned here that the holder of decree for possession can also resort to remedy of instituting an independent suit to recover possession of the property against such thud party in possession. This remedy is even otherwise available to a holder of a decree for possession under ordinary civil law and the same is not and cannot be barred. This remedy is over and above the remedy provided by Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of C. P. Code. When he resorts to this remedy which under the amended provision is no longer a summary remedy, the warrant for possession as against the third party is not executed. ( 10 ) AT this stage, reference is also required to be made to the provisions of Order 21 Rule 98 of C. P. Code which provides that the Court dealing with an application under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) is required to determine the question referred to in Rule 101 and executing Court can pass anyone of the following three orders, namely, (i) allowing the application of the holder of decree by directing that he be put into possession of the property, or (ii) Court may dismiss the application upholding the objections of the obstructionist or the third party or (iii) the Court may pass such other order as it may deem fit. It may be mentioneded that such determination by the executing Court is intended to be a substantive determination of rights, title and interest of the parties to the property. Such order of the executing Court determining the question has the same force as that of a decree which is subject to appeal. It may be stated here that so far as third party in possession of the property is concerned who is not claiming through judgment-debtor or who is not obstructing at the instigation of the judgment-debtor but who is independently claiming the right to retain possession can resist or obstruct the decree-holder and his resistance or obstruction cannot be said to be without just cause. ( 11 ) RULE 99 and Rule 100 of Order 21 of C. P. Code deal with a situation where a third party, ;. e. , any person other than the judgmentdebtor is already dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of the decree for the possession of such property. Such dispossessed person has also the remedy to make an application under Rule 99 and the executing Court is required to adjudicate upon the application and to decide all questions including question of right, title and interest of the parties to possession of such properties. The situation contemplated by Rule 99 and Rule 100 has not arisen in the case before me, and, therefore, it is not necessary to examine the said provisions in greater detail. ( 12 ) AFORESAID amended Rule 101 of Order 21 makes a substantial departure from the old provision. The language of this rule is peremptory and the powers given to the executing Court are of widest amplitude. The power which were hitherto not possessed by the executing Court, namely, power of deciding question of right, title and interest in the property which is subject-matter of execution of a decree, is now conferred upon the executing Court. Under the old Law the power of the executing Court was limited power. It did not possess the power to decide questions relating to right, title or interest in the property. Now such power is conferred on the executing Court under the rule and as observed herein-above the power of adjudication is a substantial power and the procedure to be followed by the executing Court is that of regular trial because its order is to be treated as a decree under Order 21 rule 103 C. P. Code. Against such decree regular appeal can be preferred and, therefore, both the holder of a decree for possession as well as a person who has offered resistance or made obstruction are fully protected and fullfledged trial is contemplated followed by a right of a substantive Civil Appeal. Against such decree regular appeal can be preferred and, therefore, both the holder of a decree for possession as well as a person who has offered resistance or made obstruction are fully protected and fullfledged trial is contemplated followed by a right of a substantive Civil Appeal. ( 13 ) ORDER 21 Rule 104 C. P. Code makes the position still clearer by providing that every order made by the executing Court under Rule 101 or rule 103 shall be subject to the result of any suit that may be pending on the date of the commencement of the proceedings, namely, proceedings under order 21 Rule 97 (2) or Order 21 Rule 99 C. P. Code. Therefore, if a third party is in possession of the property, if it has already moved the Civil Court for its protection and for declaration of his right, title and interest vis-a-vis, property in his possession such suit is not made infructuous and the order passed by the executing Court is made subject to the order that may be passed in such suit. It is thus clear that a third party in possession of the property, if it has already resorted to a remedy of a civil suit for declaration of his right as well as to protect his possession is not in any way prejudiced. ( 14 ) FROM the aforesaid provisions, it becomes clear that a third party in possession of the property can by filing objection to application under order 21 Rule 97 (2) of Civil Procedure Code get his right, title and interest fully adjudicated upon by the Civil Court by leading evidence and till then his possession is protected. If the order is adverse to third party, it has the right to appeal. It may be mentioned that if such third party has already resorted to the remedy of filing a civil suit for declaration of his right, title or interest as well as for protection of its possession, such remedy of the third party is also not prejudiced. If the order is adverse to third party, it has the right to appeal. It may be mentioned that if such third party has already resorted to the remedy of filing a civil suit for declaration of his right, title or interest as well as for protection of its possession, such remedy of the third party is also not prejudiced. In my opinion if third party has not already instituted a suit for protection of its possession or for adjudication of its right, title or interest in the suit property, and if application under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of Civil Procedure Code is made, such third party has the right to file objection and to point out to the Court as to why he should not be removed. There is no necessity for such third party to resort to a separate suit. In fact, legislature wanted to avoid filing of a separate suit by such third party if it has not filed such suit. The legislature in fact wanted to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It wanted to provide efficacious remedy both to the decree-holder as well as to the third party in possession whose rights, title and interest, vis-a-vis, the property in question and visa- vis, a decree-holder are yet not adjudicated upon. Under the old provisions executing Court could not have undertaken this exercise. Now under the amended provision this power to adjudicate upon all questions including question of right, title and interest in the property is given to the executing Court and, therefore, in my opinion, there is no need for such third party to file a separate suit if it has already not filed the suit and Rule 104 of Order 21 protects the pending suit and makes the order of the executing Court subject to the result of the pending suit. ( 15 ) FROM the aforesaid scheme of the rules, in my opinion, it becomes abundantly clear that application under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of Civil Procedure code filed by the holder of decree for possession must proceed expeditiously according to law by providing full opportunity to the decree-holder as wells obstructionist to lead whatever evidence they want to lead so that there can be final adjudication of all questions including question of their right, title and interest, vis-a-vis the property in execution. Till such application is decided question of recovering possession from such third party does not arise because the executing Court shall have to decide as to whether obstruction made by the third party is to be removed or not. The third party is, therefore, fully protected. Therefore, even if the third party has filed an independent separate suit for establishment of his right, title or interest, there is no justification in law for any Court to stay the proceedings under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) till such suit filed by the third party is decided. In fact, order passed under rule 97 (2) or 99 which is to be treated as decree under Rule 101 is always subject to the result of such pending suit filed by the third party and, therefore, there can be no justification for stay of the proceedings under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of Civil Procedure Code. ( 16 ) IN the case of R. Janab Majibulla, Justice G. N. Ray (as His lordship then was) of Calcutta High Court reported in AIR 1984 Cal 249 was called upon to decide as to whether application under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of the decree-holder against third party was competent if the third party had already filed a suit against the decree-holder which was dismissed though an appeal was pending against it. The learned single Judge took the view that since there was already adjudication of the right, title and interest vis-a-vis the property between decree-holder and the third party, executing Court cannot sit on appeal over the issue of independent title. However, following observations made by the learned single Judge are pertinent and relevant for the purpose of deciding the controversy before me :"in my view, the petitioner having failed to obtain any declaration of his title to the premises in question which is the basis of his claim of independent title to the party, he cannot claim, as a matter of right, before the executing Court that the execution proceeding should be stayed because be had raised a dispute as a third party. A person not being party to a decree is not bound by the decree unless he claims any interest through any of the parties to the decree. A person not being party to a decree is not bound by the decree unless he claims any interest through any of the parties to the decree. Such third party con maintain an application under Order 21 Rule 97, Civil Procedure Code for resisting the execution of the decree affecting his independent title 10 the properly in question. When such claim of independent title to the property unaffectedly the decree Is made, the executing Court has jurisdiction and also a duty to determine the validity of the claim of the objector. But if the objector had already chosen to institute a suit against the decree-holder for declaring his title to the property in question unaffected by the decree and had failed to obtain such declaration after a contested hearing the executing Court cannot ignore the judgment and decree suffered by the objector in his own suit. The effect of such judgment and decree can only be undone by the competent Court of appeal. It may be noted that simply because an appeal has been preferred by the objector against the decree suffered by him in the suit in which he is a party, the judgment and decree of the trial Court do not lose their force. "from the aforesaid observations it becomes clear that a third party in possession of the property has right to file objection raising all questions including question of right, title and interest and executing Court is required to adjudicate upon all such questions. It is true that Rule 99 Order 21 deals with the situation when a third party is already dispossessed by the holder of the decree and such a third party is empowered to apply to the executing Court to restore him possession. If the executing Court refuses to adjudicate upon the claim of the third party, such party can institute an independent civil suit for a declaration of his right, title and interest. But when the executing Court is already inquiring into the objections filed by the third party, in my opinion, there is no need of instituting a separate suit and even if such civil suit is instituted there is no need for executing court to stay its hand till the civil suit filed by the third party is decided. But when the executing Court is already inquiring into the objections filed by the third party, in my opinion, there is no need of instituting a separate suit and even if such civil suit is instituted there is no need for executing court to stay its hand till the civil suit filed by the third party is decided. The very object of introducing Order 21 Rule 97 (2) and of introducing rule 101 would be frustrated if executing Court are required to stay their hands despite the fact that it is undertaking the same inquiry which can be undertaken by a Civil Court in independent civil suit. In my opinion, therefore, Mr. . M. C. Bhatt, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner is right in contending that executing Court which has already embarked upon adjudication of right, title and interest of the holder of a decree for possession and the third party resisting such decree-holder in the application under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) is not required to stay such proceedings till independently instituted suit by the third party is decided. A decree-holder cannot be indefinitely denied the fruits of its decree and, therefore, with a view to avoiding multiplicity on: litigation and delay in execution for decree for possession of immovable property the legislature has by amending the law now provided a remedy of adjudication of all questions including question of right, title and interest by the executing court itself and order passed by the executing Court is treated as a decree so that substantive right of appeal is also provided. Therefore, there is no scope of any independent or separate suit to be filed by the third party and even if such suit is filed, the executing Court is under no obligation to stay adjudication under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) {if Civil Procedure Code. To such a situation Sec. 10 of Civil Procedure Code cannot have any application because by very nature of scheme enacted by Order 21 Rule 97 to Rule 104 speedy remedy is provided by the legislature to adjudicate upon all questions including question of right, title and interest and therefore, by necessary implication application of Sec. 10 to such proceeding is excluded. That apart. Sec. 10 of Civil Procedure Code cannot proprio vigour apply to an application for execution. That apart. Sec. 10 of Civil Procedure Code cannot proprio vigour apply to an application for execution. In my opinion, therefore, the learned City Civil Judge was not right in staying the inquiry under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of Civil Procedure Code till final decision of the suit and the order passed by him, therefore, cannot be sustained. ANSWER TO QUESTIONS (a) to (d) : ( 17 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion of the scheme and the Rules of Order 21 it becomes clear that when the holder of decree for possession or the purchaser of any such properly sold in execution of a decree comes with a warrant for possession, the appropriate remedy of a person other than the judgment-Debtor is to resist or obstruct the bolder of decree for possession, and when the holder of a, decree for possession who applies to the executing court under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of C. P. Code to remove such obstruction, to file objection challenging the application setting out his right, title and interest, vis-a-vis, property. Once such objections are filed the executing Court is required to fully adjudicate upon the right, title and interest of the said third party, vis-a-vis, the holder of decree for possession and vis-a-vis the property. Till such adjudication is undertaken by the executing Court after permitting the parties to lead evidence, the possession of such parson is protected. If the order in such proceedings is against the third party in possession of the property, it has right to appeal against such order as such order passed by the executing court is to be treated as decree. Secondly, the third party can also resort to remedy of filing Civil Suit for declaration of the right, title and interest as well as for protecting its possession though such remedy is not advisable to be resorted to. In fact, the legislature wanted to avoid filing of separate suit by such third party if it has not already filed the suit. The object of the legislature in enacting Order 21 Rule 97 (2) was to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, though remedy by way of filing a Civil Suit is not specifically barred or excluded, resort to such remedy is meaningless. The object of the legislature in enacting Order 21 Rule 97 (2) was to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Therefore, though remedy by way of filing a Civil Suit is not specifically barred or excluded, resort to such remedy is meaningless. The remedies of the holder of decree for possession when he is obstructed by the third party are : (i) to proceed under Rule 97 of Order 21 C. P. Code. (ii) to apply again in execution of the decree under Rule 85 and 36; and (iii) to institute regular suit for recovery of possession against the third party. ( 18 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion, it also becomes abundantly clear that though the remedy of instituting a separate suit challenging the legality and validity of decree is available to a third party over and above the remedy of filing obstruction application under Order 21, Rule 97 C. P. Code the executing Court is not expected, and in fact, not required to stay the proceedings under Order 21 Rule 97 (2) till such independent suit filed by the third party is decided. Section 10 of C. P. Code has no application to such execution proceedings. In fact to stay the proceedings under Order 21, Rule 97 of C. P. Cede would amount to rendering the amendment in the aforesaid provisions absolutely meaningless and ineffective. The legislature has provided effective remedy to third party of complete adjudication of right, title and interest of the parties in the execution proceedings itself and it is expected that the executing Court itself shall expeditiously decide such right, title and interest of the parties. Therefore, in my opinion, the executing Court has no jurisdiction, whatsoever, to stay such proceedings and any attempt to import the provisions of Sec. 10 C. P. Code to such proceedings would frustrate the legislative intent. 22. In the result, Civil Revision Appli. succeeds. The judgment and order passed by the City Civil Court below Exh. 75 in Misc. Civil Appli. No. 799 of 1986, dated 1/11/1991 staying the hearing of Execution Application no. 715 of 1986 and Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986 is hereby quashed and set aside and the City Civil Court is directed to proceed peremptorily with the hearing of Misc. Civil Appli. No. 799 of 1986 and to decide the same in accordance with the observations made "in this judgment. 715 of 1986 and Obstruction Removal Application No. 799 of 1986 is hereby quashed and set aside and the City Civil Court is directed to proceed peremptorily with the hearing of Misc. Civil Appli. No. 799 of 1986 and to decide the same in accordance with the observations made "in this judgment. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. .