ORDER This application arises out of general court martial proceeding held at Amritsar in the State of Punjab. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents as to the maintainability of the writ application in this Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 2. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution provides that the power conferred upon the High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs, to any Government, authority or persons, may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territory within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority, or the residence of such person is not within those territories. The question for consideration is whether part of cause of action has arisen within the territories comprising the State of Bihar so as to confer the jurisdiction upon this Court. Counsel for the petitioner has contended that since the revisional order was sent and served upon the petitioner at Muzaffarpur, part of cause of action will be deemed to have arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. 3. The point in issue is no longer res integra so far as this Court is concerned, In Nand Kisore Singh v. Union of India (1983 PLJR, 54) a Division Bench of this Court held, following certain authorities as mentioned in the judgment, held that the service of notice or order at a place might also constitute the accrual of part of cause of action if the effect of the order or the consequences of the order are to fall there. On facts, however, it was held that the consequences of the order of dismissal and removal from service having already taken place at a place beyond the territories of the State, merely because the petitioner preferred appeal against the order of dismissal from his village home, service or communication of the appellate order on his home address would not constitute accrual of part of the cause of action. It was observed:- "It is clear that consequence of the order of dismissal of the petitioner and his removal from the service took place at Naya Nangal itself and the petitioner when returned to his village home, came as dismissed employee, having no claim whatsoever in the service, except a right to prefer an appeal. Simply therefore, the filling of an appeal from his village home where the petitioner might have chosen to proceed after his dismissal in our opinion did not or should not furnish any part of the cause of action to clothe the High Court of that place the territorial jurisdiction to exercise any of the powers under Clause (1) of Article 226. Such a view in our considered opinion appears quite reasonable and proper. As otherwise it would expose the authority or a Government to the vagaries of a disgruntled employee to compel them to defend the action that he may choose to bring at a place far away from its seat or place of residence. Such an interpretation and spirit of Clause (2) of Article 226 may lead to great injustice and hardship to them." We may further add that an order of dismissal, removal from service or the like, constitutes a complete cause of action by itself for filing a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The departmental remedies by way of appeal or revision etc. are alternative and existence of any such remedy per se does not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining the writ petition. It was not in dispute that the impugned order had taken its full effect within the State of Punjab and provided cause of action for filing a writ petition. An appeal or revision against such orders is in the nature of post decisional adjudication. It merely enables the persons aggrieved to challenge the impugned orders. Rejection of any such appeal or revision does not give rise to any further consequence and, therefore, even if the revisional order of the Central Government (Annexure-9) was communicated to the petitioners at Muzaffarpur, it will not amount to accrual of part of the cause of action. 4. It merely enables the persons aggrieved to challenge the impugned orders. Rejection of any such appeal or revision does not give rise to any further consequence and, therefore, even if the revisional order of the Central Government (Annexure-9) was communicated to the petitioners at Muzaffarpur, it will not amount to accrual of part of the cause of action. 4. Learned counsel, however referred to S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1990 Supreme Court, 10) and submitted that in a case of service dispute, the cause of action must be taken to arise not from the date of original adverse order but from the date of the order of the higher authorities where statutory remedy is provided by way of appeal or revision. In our opinion, the law laid down in the case cited is of no avail to the petitioner for the simple reason that the question for consideration in that case was as to when for the purpose of limitation cause of action would be deemed to accrue. No such question of limitation arises in this case. 5. In our view, decision in Nand Kishore Singh (supra) squarely covers the instant case. We accordingly accept the preliminary objection and hold that this application is not maintainable in this Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. It is accordingly dismissed.