JUDGMENT S. N. Jha, J. - Rajendra Prasad Singh, petitioner in C.W.J.C. No 5584 of 1992, was the Branch Manager in the Kodarma Branch of the Bihar State Co-operative Land Development Bank (hereinafter called 'the Bank'); Ramesh Prasad Singh, Prabodh Narain Singh and Rameshwar Prasad. Petitioners in C.W.J.C. Nos. 4873 of 1992, 5585 of 1992 and 5586 of 1992 were the Field Officer, Assistant and Peon respectively in the said branch. They have challenged the order of Administrator awarding punishment in departmental proceedings. 2. The facts giving rise to the departmental proceedings against the petitioners are thus. There was a general strike in the Bank in 1989. A large section of the employees later called off the strike; in some of the branches including Kodarma, however, the employees did not resume their duties. At the instance of the head office the Regional Manager, Hazaribagh, posted one Sri Sidheshwar Peas ad Singh as its Branch Manager by order dated March 13, 1989. Sri Singh as per direction of the Regional Manager went to Kodarma Branch office. As the office was locked, he contacted Rajendra Prasad Singh, who refused to hand over the keys. Sri Singh reported the matter in the Regional office. Having failed to take over the charge or to get the keys of office again on March 17, 1989, he went to Hazaribagh to make a report to the Regional Manager and contacted him. Since it had already become late, he stayed in the Guest House of the Bank at Hazaribagh in the night. At around 2 O' Clock five persons including the petitioners entered the guest house representing to the night guard that they were also employees of the bank and wanted to stay. Having entered into the room in which Sri Sinha was sleeping, they abused and assaulted him. They forced him to spit and to lick his own spit. Thereafter he was dragged out, forced to write on a piece of paper that he too had gone on strike from March 3, 1989 and also to sign on certain blank papers. Thereafter, he was forcibly taken to the bus stand and asked to go home, threatening him with dire consequences if he would report the matter to the Head office or the police station. Thereafter, he was forcibly taken to the bus stand and asked to go home, threatening him with dire consequences if he would report the matter to the Head office or the police station. Sri Singh at the earliest opportunity, on reaching the Head office at Patna on March 18, 1989, submitted a written report about the occurrence to the Administrator. On May 11, 1989, the petitioners, against whom specific allegation as aforesaid had been made in the written report (the identity of the fifth man not having been ascertained), were placed under suspension. Formal disciplinary proceeding was initiated against them by the order of the Administrator dated August 2, 1989. 3. The petitioners were charged for having misbehaved with and assaulted Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh in the night of March 17, 1989, and disobeyed the order of the Regional Manager, Hazaribagh, dated April 10, 1989 asking the striking employees to report in the district office on return to duty and using un-parliamentary and abusive language against officers in the office. Rajendra Prasad Singh was further charged with having disobeyed the order of the Regional Manager dated March 13, 1989, posting Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh as the Branch Manager by continuing to act as the Branch Manager of the Koderma Branch without any authority. 4. On their request, on October 18, 1989 the petitioner were supplied copies of certain documents in connection with the charge and were also asked to make inspection of certain other documents. Thereafter, as would appear from the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, several dates were fixed in the proceeding, namely, December 19, 1989, January 11, January 23, March 2, March 16, March 26, April 6, April 18, April 30, November 13, November 26, in 1990, and February 5 in 1991. On some of these dates the petitioners except Rameshwar Prasad appeared but did not file show cause. Finally, on March 5, 1991, a date was fixed for examination of the witnesses, namely, Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Sri Md. Naushad, the night guard posted in the guest house of the Regional office. On some of these dates the petitioners except Rameshwar Prasad appeared but did not file show cause. Finally, on March 5, 1991, a date was fixed for examination of the witnesses, namely, Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh and Sri Md. Naushad, the night guard posted in the guest house of the Regional office. It would appear from the copy of the memo dated March 5, 1991, marked Annexure-C to the counter affidavit, that the said two persons were to be examined on March 15, 1991 as witnesses in connection with the disciplinary proceedings arising out of the occurrence dated March 17, 1989 in which the petitioners could not appear and cross-examine the said witnesses either themselves or through their representatives. It would further appear that both the witnesses appeared for their examination on the date fixed i.e. March 15, 1991 and were examined. On account of non-appearance of the petitioners, however, they were not cross examined by them. At this stage, the petitioners filed their show cause on April 9 and April 15, 1991 respectively. The Enquiry officer submitted his reports on different dates, namely, April. 17, 1991, in the case of Prabodh Narain Singh and Rameshwar Prasad, on May 9, 1991, in the case of Ramesh Prasad Singh and on September 16, 1991 in the case of Rajendra Prasad Singh. They were served with copies of the enquiry reports as well as the statements of the said two witnesses and asked to show cause why final decision be not taken on the basis of the available materials. By different memos dated December 16, and December 20, 1991. The petitioners submitted their show cause on December 28, 1991 on which the Administrator as the Disciplinary Authority has passed the impugned order, inter alia, reducing the petitioners in rank and directing that they will not be entitled to any emoluments except the subsistence allowance payable in accordance with rules during the suspension period. 5. Dr. Sada Nand Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners were denied the opportunity of cross-examination of the witnesses in the departmental proceedings. Since the basis of the initiation of the proceeding and the punishment awarded therein is the complaint of Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh supported by Sri Md. Naushad, denial of opportunity to cross-examine them has caused serious prejudice to the defence and, thus, there has been violation of the rules of natural-justice. Since the basis of the initiation of the proceeding and the punishment awarded therein is the complaint of Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh supported by Sri Md. Naushad, denial of opportunity to cross-examine them has caused serious prejudice to the defence and, thus, there has been violation of the rules of natural-justice. It was submitted that it is true that the petitioners failed to appear on the date fixed for the examination of the witnesses i.e. March 15, 1991, but their show cause although filed belatedly on April 9, and April 15, 1991, had been entertained and considered. In that view, the request contained in the show cause for making available the names of the witnesses for the cross-examination should have been allowed. In this connection learned counsel also drew our attention to the enquiry report stating that the report was being submitted as the petitioners did not pray for time for examination of witnesses in the show cause filed by them. For the proposition that the witnesses should be examined in presence of the delinquent, reliance was placed on M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Limited v. Gangadhar & ors. (AIR 1964 Supreme Court, 708) and Town Area Committee, Jalalabad v. Jagdish Prasad and others (AIR 1978 Supreme Court, 1407). Reference also was made to Khem Chand v. Union of India (AIR. 1958 Supreme Court, 300). Learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank, on the other hand, submitted that the proceeding lingered on for about two years but no show cause was filed until the witnesses were examined. It was also submitted that on the facts of the case, particularly, in view of Annexure-C, it is evident that opportunity was given to the petitioners for cross-examination of the witnesses which they did not avail of. He also pointed out that the petitioners were furnished copies of the statements of the witnesses and, they also filed their second show cause in which they really did not deny the occurrence but only high-lighted certain alleged contradictions between the two statements, one, the written report submitted by Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh on March 18, 1989 and the other, his statement before the Enquiry officer. 6. I have already mentioned above that in spite of several dates having been fixed in the proceeding between December, 1989 and March 1991 the petitioners did not even file their show cause. 6. I have already mentioned above that in spite of several dates having been fixed in the proceeding between December, 1989 and March 1991 the petitioners did not even file their show cause. As regards the opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses, the petitioners had been informed well in advance by memos dated March 5, 1991 that the witnesses were to be examined on March 15, with liberty to them to appear and to cross-examine them either themselves or through their representatives. Mr. Jha, no doubt although half-heartedly tried to suggest that the memo dated March 5, 1991 had been interpolated by inserting few lines at the bottom which mention about the opportunity to the petitioners for cross-examination. As learned Advocate General rightly submitted, there is presumption of correctness in official business and anybody who asserts to the contrary has to prove the same. The petitioners have not at all discharged the onus that the last few lines had been subsequently inserted. Even if they were, it is obvious from bare glance at the memos in question (Annexures C series) that the copies of the communication addressed to the witnesses had been duly forwarded to all the four petitioners, about which there is no allegation of interpolation. In other words, even if it be assumed in favour of the petitioners that the last three lines asking them to appear on the date for cross-examination were later inserted, the fact remains that they know that the witnesses were going to be examined on that date. It is true that the last few lines pointedly referred to on behalf of the petitioners, have been rather closely typed. That, however, does not necessarily give rise to any conclusion or even suspicion that they were inserted later. The communication consists of only one page and, therefore, probably the person who typed it wanted to adjust the entire matter in one page and in that process he closely typed the last few lines. Once the communication is relied upon it would follow that the petitioners had knowledge about the proposed examination of the witnesses on the date. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioners cannot contend that they were denied the 'opportunity' to cross-examine the witnesses. 7. Once the communication is relied upon it would follow that the petitioners had knowledge about the proposed examination of the witnesses on the date. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioners cannot contend that they were denied the 'opportunity' to cross-examine the witnesses. 7. Another aspect which, in my opinion, is equally important is that the petitioners had been furnished copies of the statement of the witnesses and pursuant to the second notice, they filed their show cause as well. In Kesoram Cotton Mills (supra) relied upon by learned counsel itself their Lordships while dwelling upon the need for examination of witnesses in the presence of the workman at the domestic enquiry held that the generally speaking the witnesses should be examined in his presence from the 'beginning to the end'. But since principles of natural justice are not like strait jacket rigid formulae, it was also said that it may be possible to have another method of conducting a domestic enquiry. In that connection it was observed:- "The minimum that we shall expect where witnesses are not examined from very beginning at the enquiry in the presence of the person charged is that the person charged should be given a copy of the statement made by the witnesses... ..." In K. L. Tripatbi v. State Bank of India & ors. (AIR 1984 Supreme Court, 273) dealing with a similar question it was held that neither cross-examination nor the opportunity to lead evidence by the delinquent is an integral part of all quasi-judicial adjudications. In this connection the following observations may also be usefully noticed:- "It is true that all actions against a party which involve penal or adverse consequences must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice but whether any particular principle of natural justice would be applicable to a particular situation or the question whether there has been any infraction of the application of that principle has to be judged, in the light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. We must reiterate again that the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. We must reiterate again that the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula. In order to sustain a complaint of violation of principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity of cross-examination, it bas to be established that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedure followed." In fact, as was held in Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa [ (1969) 3 SCC 492 ], if the rules of natural justice are violated, the Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal but what has to be seen is whether 'actual prejudice' has been caused to the person by the supposed denial to him with a particular right. 8. To concluse on this question it would appear that the petitioners were given full opportunity, not only to file their show-cause but also to cross-examine the witnesses on the date fixed, and to produce their defence witnesses, thereafter, on March 23 and April 19, 1991, but the petitioners did not co-operate nor availed of the opportunities. Besides their conduct, the fact that they, after receipt of the statement of the witnesses, submitted their detailed show-cause dealing with the said statements trying to find fault with them is sufficient to hold that they did not suffer any real prejudice. In my opinion, therefore, in the background of facts and circumstances of this case, the procedure followed in holding the enquiry must be held to be just and fair and consequently there bas been no infraction of rules of natural justice. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners next contended that the enquiry by Sri Shailendra Kumar Sinha, Regional Manager, Hazaribagh, cannot be said to be fair since the charges basically emanates from violation of his orders. In this connection it was pointed out that both the orders dated March, 13, 1989 posting Sidheshwar Prasad Singh as the new Branch Manager and the order dated April 10, 1989 directing the striking employees to report in the district office on return to duty had been issued by him and, therefore be should have examined himself as a witness rather than act as Enquiry Officer. Since his own orders had been allegedly violated, he had some kind of bias from the every inception and, therefore, it cannot be said that the enquiry conducted by him was fair. Reliance was placed on Virendra Prasad Singh 'Gautam' v. The State of Bihar & ors. [ 1992 (1) PLJR 304 ]. 10. It has to be kept in mind that the petitioners had not alleged any personal malice against the Enquiry officer. There is no allegation of bias against the Disciplinary Authority either. The basis of initiation of the proceeding was complaint of Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh dated March 18, 1989. The Disciplinary Authority on receipt of that complaint took action against the petitioners against whom specific allegations were made. One can say that he took 'cognizance' of the occurrence and proceeded in the matter. I fail to see how in this background the question of any malice or bias against the Enquiry Officer has any consequence. It is true that in the memo of charges the orders dated March 13 and April 10, 1989 issued by the Regional Manager i.e. the Enquiry Officer have been mentioned. However, admittedly those orders had been issued on the direction of the head office. They were not the own independent orders of the Regional Manager. Even if it be assumed in favour of the petitioners that the Enquiry officer had some kind of bias, it is the Disciplinary Authority against whom there is no such allegation; who finally considered the report, directed second show cause notice to be issued and then on consideration of their show cause and the materials on record passed the impugned orders. It has to be borne in mind that immediately after the occurrence took place in the night of March 17, Sri Sidheshwar Prasad Singh with marks of violence on his body lodged the complaint on the very next day at Patna in which he expressing danger to his life if he were forced to join at Koderma Branch, he even made a request for transfer to some other place. Having gone through the complaint (Annexure-A) the statements of the witnesses (Annexures D and D/1), I find myself in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority. Having gone through the complaint (Annexure-A) the statements of the witnesses (Annexures D and D/1), I find myself in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Disciplinary Authority. To me it appears that on the facts of the case no two views are possible and even if it were so, it would not be possible for the writ court to substitute its own view in place of that of the Disciplinary Authority. 11. On the question of bias, learned Advocate General submitted that the assertion of the petitioners at best creates a suspicion of a lurking bias. But mere suspicion in the absence of proof is not enough to strike down any order. He in this connection referred to a passage from the Full Bench decision of this Court in N. P. Mathur v. State of Bihar & ors. (AIR 1972 Patna, 93), which is as follows:- "On mere suspicion that the order has been made mala fide, it cannot be struck down. To interfere with it on the ground of such an attack, very cogent reasons and crystal grounds are necessary. The facts must be proved by a person who wants to attack an executive order on the ground of mala fides to show that the irresistible conclusion is that the sole motive or purpose or in any event the dominant one was such as was neither legal nor honest. It is only then that an order can be held to have been made mala fide and can be struck down as such. It is to be noticed that of late a practice has grown to attack all sorts of executive orders on vague grounds of mala fides. But it is to be pointed out that such attacks are made without appreciation of the true, legal position in this regard." In my opinion, the petitioners have failed to prove the allegation of bias and, accordingly, this contention is rejected. 12. Learned counsel submitted that so far as the writ petition of Ramesh Prasad Singh (C.W.J.C. No. 4873 of 1992) is concerned, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on an additional point, namely, that the Enquiry officer had accepted his defence as to his absence from the place of occurrence on the basis of medical certificate. 12. Learned counsel submitted that so far as the writ petition of Ramesh Prasad Singh (C.W.J.C. No. 4873 of 1992) is concerned, the petitioner is entitled to succeed on an additional point, namely, that the Enquiry officer had accepted his defence as to his absence from the place of occurrence on the basis of medical certificate. Since the Disciplinary Authority did not agree with the finding of the Enquiry Officer it was incumbent upon him to give a further opportunity to the petitioner to explain the matter. Learned counsel placed reliance on Narayan Misra v. State of Orissa (1969 SLR 657). This submission too, in my opinion is devoid of any substance. The well known legal position that the report of the Enquiry Officer is not binding on the Disciplinary Authority, who can differ and reach a different conclusion for reasons to be recorded in that regard has not been, and indeed cannot be, disputed. It is not necessary to cite authorities in support of the proposition. Reference may only be made to the decision of a Constitution Bench in Union of India v. H. C. Goel (AIR 1964 S. C. 364) where it was held that if the Enquiry officer had made report in favour of Government servant but the Government taking a contrary view issued a second notice which subsequently resulted in the dismissal of the Government servant, the action of the Government cannot be said to be in contravention of the Constitutional safeguard afforded by Article 311 of the Constitution (in that case). We have seen above that after receipt of the enquiry report dated May 9, 1991 (in the case of Ramesh Prasad Singh) he was asked to show cause again in the light of the said report after making its copy available to him. I fail to understand how the petitioner can make a grievance on these facts that he was entitled to further opportunity. 13. Learned counsel finally submitted that the impugned orders, in the cases of Rajendra Prasad Singh and Ramesh Prasad Singh reverting them to a post which is lower than the post of their initial appointment are fit to be struck down on this very ground alone. Reliance was placed on Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1937 Supreme Court. 1627). Reliance was placed on Hussain Sasansaheb Kaladgi v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1937 Supreme Court. 1627). It was pointed out that Rajendra Prasad Singh was initially appointed on the post of Land Valuation Officer in 1973. By office order dated September 9, 1960 the pay scales of the posts of Land Valuation Officer and Supervisor (earlier carrying a lower scale) were merged and the posts were re-designated as Senior Field Officer and Field Officer respectively. However, their duties and functions were to continue as before. It was submitted that the post of Land Valuation Officer being equivalent to the Senior Field Officer, Rajendra Prasad Singh could not be reverted to the post of Field Officer, equivalent to Supervisor, which he never held. Similarly, it was pointed out in the case of Ramesh Prasad Singh that he was initially appointed on the post of Supervisor, equivalent to Field officer but is sought to be reverted to the post of Assistant. The contention of the learned Advocate General, on the other hand, is that it is a case of reduction in rank and not reversion. According to him, while an employee cannot be reverted to a post lower than the one on which he was initially appointed, he can be reduced in rank and placed on a post even lower than the post of initial appointment. Reliance has been placed on R. Gopal Rao v. Commissioner of Income Tax [1976 (2) SLJ 508], Mahendra Kumar v. Union of India and anr. [1984 (1) SLJ 34] and C. S. Balakumar v. The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Madras [1987 (1) SLR 418]. 14. In R. Gopal Ran (supra) a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held:- "In my view, the expression "reduction in rank" covers a wider field than reversion to a lower post. It is true, the word "reversion", always connotes "a return to the original post or place". But, the word "reduction" has no such limitation and, therefore, reduction in rank extends even to a rank which the officer concerned never held. The word "reduction" normally connotes, the "state of being reduced, and diminution, subjugation." In Mahendra Kumar (supra) the person concerned was directly recruited to the category of office-surveyor. He was reduced to the lower post of surveyor. The word "reduction" normally connotes, the "state of being reduced, and diminution, subjugation." In Mahendra Kumar (supra) the person concerned was directly recruited to the category of office-surveyor. He was reduced to the lower post of surveyor. A learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court held:- "The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules provide for several penalties which can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons one of the major penalties contemplated by rule 2 "reduction to a lower... grade, post of service...", and I see no reason why this penalty cannot be imposed upon a person who, on the date of imposition of penalty, is continuing in the same post to which he was appointed by direct recruitment. This is not a case of reversion of a government servant to his substantive post for want of vacancy or otherwise but this is a case of reduction by way of punishment." The aforesaid two decisions were followed by the Madras Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal in C. S. Bala Kumar (supra). However, it would appear that in the very next case reported in that journal namely, Shivalinga Swamy v. State of Karnataka [1987 (1) SLR 422], a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court held on interpretation of the rule that an order imposing the penalty of reducing the delinquent to the post which was lower than the post of his initial appointment was incompetent. The order of penalty accordingly was quashed and the matter was remitted to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order. 15. The decision in the cases cited by the reamed Advocate General has been rendered on interpretation of the relevant rules. Rule 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and Rule 2 of the Bihar and Orissa Subordinate Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1935 prescribe "reduction to a lower post or time scale or to a lower scale in a time scale" as one of the penalties which can be awarded against member of the service. We have not been informed about the rules relating to the service conditions applicable to the employees of the Bank. The word used while passing the order of punishment is 'Awakramit' as against 'Padavanati' or 'Prativartit', the officially recognised Hindi equivalent of the terms 'reduced in rank' and 'reverted' respectively. We have not been informed about the rules relating to the service conditions applicable to the employees of the Bank. The word used while passing the order of punishment is 'Awakramit' as against 'Padavanati' or 'Prativartit', the officially recognised Hindi equivalent of the terms 'reduced in rank' and 'reverted' respectively. 'Awakramit' literally means 'down graded' which is more akin to 'reduced in rank,' but is usually used in the context of down-gradation of posts, not by way of punishment. On general principle, however, it is difficult to conceive that a person could be reduced to a post which he never held. In Kaladgi's case (supra) the Supreme Court stated the law in the following words:- "A direct recruit to a post, it cannot be gainsaid, cannot be reverted to a lower post. It is only a promotee who can be reverted from the promotion post to the lower post from which he was promoted. These propositions are so elementary that the same are incapable of being disputed and have not been disputed." In my respectful view, in view of the clear and emphatic pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court the judgment in Gopal Rao and Mahendra Kumar (supra) cannot be said to be correct. It would, accordingly, follow that the punishment awarded to these two petitioners, namely, Rajendra Prasad Singh and Ramesh Prasad Singh to this extent cannot be said to be legal. The cases of Prabodh Narain Singh and Rameshwar Prasad obviously stand on different footing and no such argument has been advanced regarding them. Since the enquiry and the findings of the Administrator cannot be otherwise faulted, it is a fit case in which the question of punishment should be considered afresh. 16 In the result, C.W.J.C. No. 5585 of 1992 and C.W.J.C. No. 5586 of 1992 are dismissed. C.W.J.C. No. 5584 of 1992 and C.W.J.C. No. 4873 of 1992 are allowed in part. The Administrator shall consider afresh the nature and quantum of punishment in accordance with law as regards the petitioners of these two cases. There will be no order as to cost. Shamim Ahsan; J.—I agree.