JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was delivered by M. B. SHAH, J. - In these three references under section 69 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, the main question which is required to be considered is whether the empty tins cannot be said to have been resold on the ground that they are used as packing material and were used as consumable stores in the manufacture of oil for sale and, therefore, the assessees are required to pay purchase tax under section 15 in respect of the purchase of empty tins from unregistered dealers. For deciding this main question, it would be necessary to refer to sections 2(16), 2(26) and 15 of the Sales Tax Act. Section 15, inter alia, provides that where a dealer who is liable to pay tax under the Act purchases any goods specified in Schedule II or III from a person who is not a registered dealer, then, unless the goods so purchased are resold by the dealer, tax shall be levied as provided therein. In the present case, we are concerned with the phrase "unless the goods so purchased are resold by the dealer" and what meaning can be ascribed to the word "resold". If the goods are purchased by a dealer from a person who is not a registered dealer and the said goods are specified in Schedule II or III and they are resold, then purchase tax is not to be levied. If the goods are purchased by a dealer from a person who is not a registered dealer and the said goods are specified in Schedule II or III and they are resold, then purchase tax is not to be levied. For considering as to what meaning can be ascribed to the word "resold" we have to refer to the meaning of "resale" as specified under section 2(26) of the Sales Tax Act, which reads as under : "2(26) 'resale' for the purposes of sections 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19A and 19B means a sale of purchased goods, - (i) in the same form in which they were purchased, or (ii) without doing anything to them which amounts to, or results in, a manufacture, or (iii) being goods specified in entries 1 to 3 in Part A of Schedule II and in entries 1 to 6 in Part B of Schedule II without doing anything to them which takes them out of the description thereof in those entries, and the word 'resale' shall be construed accordingly;" This definition of the word "resale" is given for the purposes, of sections 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19A and 19B of the Sales Tax Act. In the present case, we are not concerned with clause (iii) of section 2(26). We are mainly concerned with clauses (i) and (ii). Clause (i) of section 2(26), inter alia, provides that "resale" for the purpose of section 15 means sale or purchase of the goods in the same form in which they are purchased. Clause (ii) provides that "resale" of purchased goods should be without doing anything to them which amounts to a manufacture or which results in a manufacture. The first question would be whether the tins which are purchased by the applicants are sold without doing anything to them which amounts to, or results in, a manufacture. Under section 2(26)(ii), it is specifically provided that it would not be a resale of the goods purchased if anything is done to them which amounts to a manufacture. The first question would be whether the tins which are purchased by the applicants are sold without doing anything to them which amounts to, or results in, a manufacture. Under section 2(26)(ii), it is specifically provided that it would not be a resale of the goods purchased if anything is done to them which amounts to a manufacture. The word "manufacture" is also defined in section 2(16) of the Act which reads as under : "2(16) 'manufacture' with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extracting, collecting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods; but does not include such manufactures or manufacturing processes as may be prescribed;" Reading the aforesaid definition, it is clear that a very wide definition of the word "manufacture" is given. Not only that, but the Legislature has provided that even though a particular process may amount to a manufacture as is commonly or normally known, yet it would not be included if it is so prescribed. Rule 3 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970, gives an exhaustive list of the processes which are not included in manufacture. Rule 3 reads as under : "3. For the purposes of clause (16) of section 2, 'manufacture' shall not include the following manufactures and manufacturing processes, namely : (i) the dyeing, bleaching or printing of all kinds of cotton, rayon, artificial silk, pure silk or woollen textile or handloom fabrics; (ii) the decorating, colouring, scenting, boiling, cutting, crushing or roasting of betelnuts; (iii) the colouring of cardamom; (iv) the roasting or grinding of coffee seeds; (v) the blending of different varieties of tea; (vi) conversion of milk into khoa; (vii) the dyeing, bleaching, doubling or twisting of cotton yarn, art silk yarn, pure silk yarn, staple fibre yarn, terylene fibre yarn or any other synthetic yarn, (viii) the dispensing of medicines; (ix) the melting, mixing, refining, alloying or stamping of bullion or the mixing of bullion with gold or silver derived from the melting of article of gold or silver; Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause 'bullion' shall be deemed to include also the goods specified in entry 2 in Schedule III; (x) the cutting of paper from reels into reams and the ruling of papers; (xi) the recovering of jewels and other components from old jewellery and ornaments; (xii) the preparing from betel leaves, of pan, tambul, bida or patti; (xiii) the grinding of chillies, turmeric or other condiments and the grinding of masala and its ingredients and the mixing or blending of condiments and spices; (xiv) the preparing of butter from cream or ghee from butter or cream without use of power; (xv) the rolling of bidies by hand; (xvi) any activity carried out in relation to goods specified in any entry in Schedule I as a result of which, the resultant product is not taken out from Schedule I; (xvii) any activity carried out in relation to any of the declared goods in any entry in Schedule Il as a result of which, the resultant product is not taken out of the description thereof in that entry; (xviii) the mixing, sorting, moulding, bleaching, polishing, cutting, reshaping, recutting, grinding, drilling holes in, and stringing of precious stones (including diamonds) and pearls and bunching of pearls; Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, stringing means stringing in plain cotton or silk thread and bunching means tying together the strings of pearls, the ends of which are tied in jari thread, but does not include stringing of pearls or precious stones or bunching of pearls in or with combination of, any precious or ornamental metal; (xix) parching, roasting or salting (with or without adding turmeric) groundnut seeds or groundnut; (xx) the cutting of glass into sizes; (xxi) the charging of electric batteries; (xxii) the threading of iron pipes including galvanised pipes; (xxiii) repolishing of furniture; (xxiv) repolishing of utensils excluding electroplating thereof; (xxv) embroidering or decorating on cotton fabrics; (xxvi) the cutting of glass into khapu (Abhla); (xxvii) the cutting of lenses (blanks) into sizes and fitting them into the spectacle frames." By this inclusive and exclusive statutory definition wider meaning is given to the word "manufacture". The definition of "manufacture" is very wide and includes several activities such as extracting, collecting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing. It also excludes several processing activities as mentioned in rule 3. The definition of "manufacture" is very wide and includes several activities such as extracting, collecting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing. It also excludes several processing activities as mentioned in rule 3. Therefore, the ordinary meaning of the word "manufacture" would be of no relevance and the statutory meaning given to the word "manufacture" under sub-section (16) of section 2 is required to be considered in each case. Under this sub-section, otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods is expressly stated to be "manufacture". This Court in various decisions has observed that the Legislature has defined the term "manufacture" in the widest terms by taking in besides the activities of producing, making, extracting, collecting, altering, ornamenting, or finishing, the activities of processing, treating or adapting any goods so as to make therein suitable for a given purpose, but has observed that merely because the Legislature has defined the term in such widest terms, it would be too spacious to contend that any processing, treating or adapting of goods would amount to, or result in, a manufacture. In the case of State of Gujarat v. Sukhram Jagannath [1982] 50 STC 76 (Guj) this Court considered the definition of the word "manufacture" under the Sales Tax Act and held as under : "It is no doubt true that the Legislature has defined the term 'manufacture' in the widest term by taking in besides the activities of producing, making, extracting, collecting, altering, ornamenting or finishing the activities of processing, treating or adapting any goods so as to make them suitable for a given purpose. But merely because the Legislature has defined the term in such a wide term, it would be too spacious to contend that any processing, treating or adapting of goods would amount to, or result in, a manufacture. Any and every process, treatment or adaptation will not amount to, or result in, a manufacture. It would cease to be a resale, only if something is done to the goods which would amount to, or result in, a manufacture. In other words, where some transformation in a sense of a new and a different article emerging as a result of the processing, treatment or adaptation having different name, characteristic or use so that the end-product does not retain a continuing substantial identity that it can be said that manufacturing has taken place." In the case of Chowgule & Co. In other words, where some transformation in a sense of a new and a different article emerging as a result of the processing, treatment or adaptation having different name, characteristic or use so that the end-product does not retain a continuing substantial identity that it can be said that manufacturing has taken place." In the case of Chowgule & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India [1981] 47 STC 124, AIR 1981 SC 1014 , the Supreme Court dealt with section 8 of the Central Salts Tax Act, 1956 and the phrase "in the manufacture of or processing of goods for sale or in mining". The court was not required to deal with a statutory definition of the word "manufacture" and, therefore, the court held that commonly manufacture is the end result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass and because of the processes where commercially new and distinct article comes into existence, it can be said that article is manufactured. The court observed that the test that is required to be applied is : does the processing of the original commodity bring into existence a commercially different and distinct commodity ? With regard to the meaning of the word "processing" the court relied upon the meaning of the word "process" given in the Webster's Dictionary which is as under : "'process' to subject to some special process or treatment, to subject (especially raw material) to a process of manufacture, development or preparation for the market, etc., to covert into marketable from as livestock by slaughtering, grain milling, cotton by spinning milk by pasteurising, fruits and vegetables by sorting and repacking". The court further held that where any commodity is subject to a process or treatment, with a view to its "development or preparation for the examples, by sorting and repacking fruits and vegetables, it would amount to processing of the commodity within the meaning of section 8(3)(b) and rule 13. The nature and extent of processing may vary from case to case; in one case the processing may be slight and in another it may be extensive; but with each process suffered, the commodity would experience a change. Wherever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing of the commodity. Wherever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some operation performed on it or in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing of the commodity. The nature and extent of the change is not material. The court finally observed that what is necessary in order to characterise an operation as "processing" is that the commodity must, as result of the operation, experience some change. The aforesaid decision in Chowgule's case [1981] 47 STC 124 (SC); AIR 1981 SC 1014 has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Rajasthan State Chemical Works AIR 1991 SC 2222 . The court dealt with the word "manufacture" as defined in section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The court observed that in determining what constitutes "manufacture" no hard and fast rule can be applied and each case must be determined on its own facts having regard to the context in which the term is used in the provision under consideration. The court pertinently observed that, whenever a commodity undergoes a change as a result of some pertinently observed performed on it and in regard to it, such operation would amount to processing to of the commodity; each step towards production would be a process in relation to the "manufacture"; that the natural meaning of the word "process" is a mode of treatment of certain materials in order to produce a good result, a species of activity performed on the subject-matter in order to transform or reduce it to a certain stage. The court relied upon the following observations in the case of J. K. cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer [1965] 16 STC 563 (SC); AIR 1965 SC 1310 : "In J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer [1965] 16 STC 563 (SC); [1965] 1 SCR 900; AIR 1965 SC 1310 , this Court in construing the expression 'in the manufacture of goods' held thus (at page 569 of STC; 1313 of AIR) : 'But there is no warrant for limiting the meaning of the expression "in the manufactured of goods" to the production of goods only. The expression "in the manufacture" takes in within its compass, all processes which are directly related to the actual production.' The court further held thus (at page 568 of STC; 1313 of AIR) : 'The expression "in the manufacture of goods" should normally encompass the entire process carried on by the dealer of converting raw materials into finished goods. Where any particular process is so integrally connected with the ultimate production of goods that but for that process, manufacture or processing of goods would be commercially inexpedient, goods required in that process would, in our judgment, fall within the expression 'in the manufacture of goods'." The court further relied upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 791 : "To say this is to equate 'processing' to 'manufacture' and for this we can find no warrant in law. The word 'manufacture' used as a verb is generally understood to mean as 'bringing into existence a new substance' and does not mean merely 'to produce some change in a substance', however minor in consequence the change may be." Relying on the aforesaid observations the court held that "processing" may he an intermediate stage in manufacture and until some change has taken place and the commodity retains a continuing substantial identity through the processing stage, it cannot be said that it has been manufactured. The court held that does not, however, mean that any operation in the course of such process is not in relation to the manufacture. Lastly, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Shiv Datt & Sons [1992] 84 STC 497, it is not necessary to refer to other decisions. In that case the court interpreted the identical definition of word "manufacture" and word "resale" as defined under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. The court was required to consider the question whether the dealers who purchased the batteries from manufacturers were selling the said batteries in the same form or not so that they are entitled to get deduction from their turnover of such part thereof as related to resale of the batteries on the ground that the goods sold by them were the same goods as purchased from the manufacturers. The court considered the definition of the word "manufacture" along with the word "resale" and observed that the words used in the definition of "manufacture" are very wide, yet they should not be interpreted so widely as to render the provision practically meaningless and so as to treat the goods sold as different merely because some slight additions or changes are made in the goods which are purchased before they are sold. The court held as under : ..... If such a wide interpretation is given there may be very absurd results flowing as a consequence thereof. For instance, the definition includes the word 'ornamenting'. If a dealer purchases certain foods and merely adds some decorative material thereto, according to the State's interpretation, there will be a 'manufacture'. For instance, if a car is purchased and some lights or some special gadgets are added thereto, the interpretation will result in rendering the resale of the same car the resale of a different commodity. Again, if a piece of furniture is sold in a dismantled condition and the distributor puts the parts together and sells it, the definition, if construed as widely as interpreted by the State, can be said to amount to manufacture and render the furniture sold a different item of goods from the furniture purchased. This clearly is not the intention of the Legislature. The purpose of section 8 is that, where substantially the goods purchased are resold, there should be a deduction of the turnover on which purchase tax has already been paid. This provision should be interpreted in a practical and workable manner. The mere fact that the words used in the definition of 'manufacture' are very wide should not lead us to so widely interpret them as to render the provision practically meaningless and so as to treat the goods sold as different merely because some slight additions or changes are made in the foods which are purchased before they are sold. It is true that under the section it is not necessary that there should be 'manufacture' in sense that a new commodity has been brought into existence as would have been required if that work is interpreted in its sense. It is true that under the section it is not necessary that there should be 'manufacture' in sense that a new commodity has been brought into existence as would have been required if that work is interpreted in its sense. But, at the same time, the section should be so interpreted to mean only such of the various processes referred to in the definition and applied to the goods as are if such a character as to have an impact on the nature of goods. This is indeed made clear by the closing word of the definition which refer to 'manufacture or manufacturing processes. The last category of the processes referred to in rule 3 extracted also in relation to gods in Schedule B also emphasises this basic idea." It should be noted that the last category of the processes referred to in rule 3 as extracted by the Supreme Court in this case is "subjecting the foods specified In any entry in Schedule B to any process or doing anything to them which does not take them out of the description thereof in that entry". In the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, in rule 3 there are similar clauses. Clause (xvi) provides that any activity carried out in relation to goods specified in any entry in Schedule I as a result of which the resultant product is not taken out from Schedule I would not be included in manufacturing process. Clause (xvii) provides that any activity carried out in relation to any of the declared goods in any entry in Schedule II as result of which, the resultant product is not taken out of the description thereof in that entry would not be included in manufacturing process. From these clauses it is clear that the Legislature has specifically provided that the process, which is carried out in relation to goods and which is such that the resultant product is not taken out of the description of the goods mentioned in various entries of Schedule I or II, would not be manufacturing process for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act. The court further referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Nilgiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Co. The court further referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Nilgiri Ceylon Tea Supplying Co. v. State of Bombay [1959] 10 STC 500, and the observation that the words used by the statute, namely "processed or altered in any manner after such purchase" were very wide. The court read down the scope of this expression and considered that, for the purposes of the definition, there should be some alteration in the nature or character of the goods, and observed as under : "In our opinion, the interpretation of section 2(17) calls for a like limitation on the words used by the statute. As we have already pointed out if a very wide interpretation is given, it may lead to impractical consequences." If the nature of the goods is changed by the processes which are covered by the definition given in section 2(16), then it would amount to a manufacturing process. From the discussion of the various judgments, it is clear that - (1) in determining what constitute "manufacture", each case must be decided on its own facts having regard to the context in which the term is used and defined under the provisions of the Act, (2) the general meaning of the word "manufacture" implies that it is the end-result of one or more processes through which the original commodity is made to pass and because of process or processes commercially new and distinct article comes into existence; (3) however, when the Legislature has given inclusive definition so as to include certain processes, then those processes also would amount to manufacture; the nature and extent of processing may vary from case to case; in one case the processing may be slight and in another it may be extensive, but with each process suffered, the commodity would experience a change; (4) the definition of the word "manufacture" under the Sales Tax Act even though wide, is required to be read down to mean and is to be interpreted to mean only such of the various processes referred to in the definition and applied to the goods as are of such character to have an impact on the nature of goods. If the nature of goods is changed by the processes which are covered by the definition given in section 2(16), then it would amount to manufacturing process. If the nature of goods is changed by the processes which are covered by the definition given in section 2(16), then it would amount to manufacturing process. Take for illustration "ornamenting of (gold, silver or any metal) articles" - gold, silver or metal may remain as it is, still however, once ornaments are prepared by a process, it would amount to manufacture. At the same time, mere adding some decorative material in certain goods will not amount to manufacture. It is not necessary that entirely a new commodity should come into existence. It would suffice if by processes mentioned in the section there is some change in character or nature of the goods. Various other illustrations can be given after taking into consideration the words "making, extracting, collecting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating or adapting any goods". However, in each case it would depend upon the fact whether there is some change in the character or nature of the goods. Further, as provided under section 2(16), the prescribed manufacturing processes are required to be excluded. Rule 3 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Rules, 1970, which provides an exhaustive list of processes which are not to be included in the manufacturing process, is quoted hereinabove. Clause (xvi) of rule 3 provides that any activity carried out in relation to goods specified in any entry in Schedule I as a result of which the resultant product is not taken out from Schedule I would not be included in the manufacturing process. Clause (xvii) of rule 3 provides that any activity carried out in relation to any of the declared goods in any entry in Schedule II as a result of which the resultant product is not taken out of the description thereof in that entry would not be included in manufacturing process. From these clauses, it is clear that the Legislature has specifically provided that the process, which is carried out in relation to goods and which is such that resultant product is not taken out of the description of the funds mentioned in various entries of Schedule I or II, would not be manufacturing process for the purposes of the Sales Tax Act. Section 5 provides that subject to the conditions or exceptions (if any) set out against each of the goods specified in column 3 of Schedule I, no tax shall be payable on the sales or purchases of any goods specified in that Schedule. Sections 7 and 8 provide levy of sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Part A or Part B of Schedule II at the rate set out against each of them in column 3. Similarly section 10 provides that sales tax on the turnover of sales of goods specified in Schedule III shall be levied at the rate set out against each of such goods in column 3 thereof, but after deducting from such turnover resales of goods as provided in sub-sections (1) and (2). Schedule I, Schedule II and Schedule III are to be read together along with the aforesaid clauses (xvi) and (xvii), for arriving at the conclusion that there is a manufacturing process. It has to be found out in each case whether by carrying out the manufacturing processes, the resultant product is not taken out of the description mentioned in the various entries of Schedule I or Schedule II. Entry 12 of Part A of Schedule II provides for packing material including empty tins and empty barrels. Therefore, the Tribunal has to find out whether empty tins and oil are separately sold and whether by storing the oil in a tin, it is taken out of the description of the goods under entry 12 of Schedule II. Applying the aforesaid tests in each case, the competent authority under the Sales Tax Act is required to find out as to whether the dealer has resold the tins (i) in the same form in which they were purchased or (ii) without doing anything to then which amounts to, or results in, a manufacture. However, the Tribunal in these references arrived at the conclusion that empty tins purchased from the unregistered dealers cannot be said to have been resold on the ground that they were purchased as consumable stores. However, the Tribunal in these references arrived at the conclusion that empty tins purchased from the unregistered dealers cannot be said to have been resold on the ground that they were purchased as consumable stores. In our view, the entire approach of the Tribunal is erroneous because in each case the Tribunal has to decide whether the empty tins purchased from unregistered dealers are resold in the same form in which they were purchased or whether they are sold without doing anything to them which amounts to, or results in, a manufacture. The Tribunal was required to decide the question whether the process applied by the assessee on the tins resulted in manufacturing of a new article or it amounts to manufacture in the sense that there is alteration in the nature or character of the goods. The Tribunal decided the case solely on the ground that the tins are purchased as consumable stores, therefore, they can never be resold. For this purpose, the Tribunal has relied upon the decision in the case of Vasuki Carborundum Works v. State of Gujarat [1979] 43 STC 294 (Guj). In our view, the aforesaid approach is erroneous. In Vasuki's case [1979] 43 STC 294 (Guj) the court had not dealt with the provisions of section 15 read with section 2(16) and 2(26). The court considered section 13(1)(B) which prescribes that there shall not be deducted from the turnover of sales, sales of goods to a recognised dealer as provided in sections 7, 8 and 10 unless the recognised dealer certifies in the prescribed form, that the goods other than prohibited goods sold to him are goods purchased by him for use by him as raw or processing materials or as consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale by him. The court interpreted the phrase "consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale" and held as under : "The crux of the problem in the present reference is that are the articles in question such that they can be said to be consumable stores required in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale, since admittedly it is neither raw material nor a processing material. The Supreme Court has pointed out in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. The Supreme Court has pointed out in J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd.'s case [1965] 16 STC 563 that a process or an activity may not be necessary theoretically for production of finished goods, but if it is such an integral part of the ultimate manufacture of goods that in its absence the manufacture may not be commercially expedient, that activity or process must he considered to be manufacturing activity itself and the goods intended for use in that process or activity should be considered to be goods required in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale. It is no doubt true that the articles which can be purchased tax-free on furnishing a prescribed certificate by a manufacturer must be either raw materials or processing materials or consumable stores. But it is not possible to say much less urged successfully that the consumable stores must necessarily partake the nature of raw materials or processing materials or must more or less stand on the same footing. We do not think that the learned Assistant Government Pleader was right in his contention that consumable stores must be given a very restricted meaning since they are used along with the words 'raw or processing materials' in section 13(1)(B). In the ultimate analysis, the relevant question is : are the articles in question the prescribed articles required in the manufacture of taxable goods for sale ? In other words, are they consumable stores or materials required in a process or activity which is integrally connected with the manufacturing activity and without which the activity of manufacture may be commercially inexpedient ? The answer, in our opinion, is that the article in question in this reference, namely, kathi (twine), is part of such consumable stores which would be necessarily required in the activity of marketing the goods which is essentially connected with the larger activity of manufacture. The answer, in our opinion, is that the article in question in this reference, namely, kathi (twine), is part of such consumable stores which would be necessarily required in the activity of marketing the goods which is essentially connected with the larger activity of manufacture. We do not want to say that all the articles or materials which may facilitate the business of manufacture would be such consumable goods as entitled to be purchased tax-free." Thereafter, the court has held that it is not possible in the very nature of things to lay down exhaustively or to suggest a straight jacket formula as to what would be the articles or goods required in a process or activity which though not strictly a manufacturing activity itself but is such an integral part thereof that in its absence the manufacturing activity may not be commercially expedient. Further, in the case of Collector of Central Excise v. Eastend Paper Industries Ltd. [1990] 77 STC 203 (SC); AIR 1990 SC 1893 the court considered the question with regard to wrapping paper which was used as packing material. The court has dealt with the question whether wrapping of finished product by wrapping paper is a process incidental and ancillary to the completion of manufactured product under section 2(f) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and whether wrapping is used as a component part of finished excisable goods attracting the benefit of the Notification No. 18A/83-CE, dated July 9, 1983. The Supreme Court has considered the aspect that in order to take benefit of nonlevy of excise duty on wrapping paper it had to be established that the wrapping papers were consumed or utilised as component parts or raw materials for the finished products. The court dealt with the contention that whether wrapping paper was a raw material or component part of the wrapped paper. The court observed that "manufacture" in the sense it is used in the excise law, was not complete unless and until wrapping was done. After considering the relevant decision, the court held that anything required to make the goods marketable must form part of the manufacture and any raw material or any materials used for the same would be component part for the end-product. After considering the relevant decision, the court held that anything required to make the goods marketable must form part of the manufacture and any raw material or any materials used for the same would be component part for the end-product. The relevant observations in paragraph 7 (at page 208 of STC) are as under : "To be able to be marketed or to be marketable, it appears to us, in the light of facts in the appeals, that it was an essential requirement to be goods, to be wrapped in paper. Anything required to make the goods marketable, must form part of the manufacture and any raw material or any materials used for the same would be component part for the end-product. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in the view it took. There is no ground to interfere in these appeals." From the aforesaid decisions, it can be held that if tins (packing materials or containers) are required to make the goods marketable then they would form part of the product which is manufactured, that is, in the present case, oil. Such tins would be component part of the end-product. However, this would depend upon the nature of the business and transactions carried out by the assessee. In all cases invariably it cannot be said that tins and oil are not sold separately. For this purpose, the learned advocates for the assessees relied upon the concession made by the learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the Revenue in Sales Tax Reference No. 3 of 1982 decided on June 11, 1992, in the case of Khambhatwala v. State of Gujarat(Reported in [1992] 87 STC 170 (Guj)). The relevant portion reads as under : "Learned Advocate-General appearing for the Revenue fairly conceded that the question referred to the High Court was required to be decided by taking into consideration the provisions of section 15 of the Act and the conditions laid down in rule 42 of the Sales Tax Rules, 1970. Under section 15 of the Act if a dealer purchases any goods specified in Schedule II or III of the Act from a person who is not a registered dealer, the turnover of such purchases is exigible to tax, 'unless the goods so purchased are resold by the dealer'. Moreover, such resale should be in conformity with the provisions of rule 42. Moreover, such resale should be in conformity with the provisions of rule 42. He further submitted that the provisions of section 13(1)(B) which provides for deduction from turnover of sales in certain circumstances are not applicable and therefore not relevant for deciding the question. Learned Advocate-General conceded that the question is required to be answered by having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and that the answer that may be given by the court would be operative only as regards the facts and circumstances of this case. In short it was conceded that as a general proposition it could not be laid down that the goods which might have been used as consumable stores in the manufacture of taxable goods, can never be subject-matter of resale in all cases." It is their contention that in all cases it cannot be held that empty tins and oil cannot be sold separately. It would depend upon the nature of the business carried out by the assessee. The assessee may be selling oil in loose; in bulk; it can be transported by a tanker; it can be sold in small packing or in a packing material of insignificant value. They have further relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raj Sheel v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1989] 74 STC 379; AIR 1989 SC 1696 , and submitted that in every case the assessing authority is obliged to ascertain the true nature and character of the transaction upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances pertaining to the transaction. In the case of Raj Sheel [1989] 74 STC 379; AIR 1989 SC 1696 , the Supreme Court dealt with the question of packing material and its sale in the context of section 6C of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. Section 6C is in pari material with section 21 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act. In that case there was sale of beer in bottles packed in cartons and sale of cement in gunnies. Section 6C is in pari material with section 21 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act. In that case there was sale of beer in bottles packed in cartons and sale of cement in gunnies. The court held as under : "It is commonly accepted that a transaction of sale may consist of a sale of the product and a separate sale of the container housing the product with respective sale consideration for the product and the container separately; or it may consist of a sale of the product and a sale of the container but both sales being conceived of as integrated components of a single sale transaction; or, what may yet be a third case, it may consist of a sale of the product with the transfer of the container without any sale consideration therefor. The question in every case will be a question of fact as to what are the nature and ingredients of the sale. It is not right in law to pick on one ingredient only to the exclusion of the others and deduce from it the character of the transaction." From the aforesaid judgment, it can be stated that - (i) sale of oil can be with the transfer of the container (tin) without any sale consideration for tin; (ii) there can be a sale of oil and a sale of the container (tin) and both the sales are integrated components of a single sale transaction; (iii) there can be a sale of oil and a separate sale of the container (tin) with respective sale consideration for oil and the tin separately. With regard to first and second transactions, there may not be any difficulty in deciding that there is one transaction of sale of oil and tin. But, with regard to the last transaction, it would depend upon the investigation of the facts in each case. With regard to first and second transactions, there may not be any difficulty in deciding that there is one transaction of sale of oil and tin. But, with regard to the last transaction, it would depend upon the investigation of the facts in each case. Even with regard to the last type of transaction, the Supreme Court has observed that the price of the produce and the price of the container are shown separately may evidence that two separate transactions are envisaged, but that circumstance alone cannot be conclusive of the true character of the transaction; that it is not unknown that traders may, for the advantage of their trade, show what is essentially a single sale transaction of product and container, or a transaction of a sale of the product only with no consideration for the transfer of the container, as divisible into two separate transactions, one of sale of the product, and the other a sale of the container, with a distinct price shown against each. The Supreme Court further observed that the issue as to whether the packing material has been sold or merely transferred without consideration depends on the contract between the parties. The fact that the packing is of insignificant value in relation to the value of the contents may imply that there was no intention to sell the packing, but where any packing material is of significant value it may imply an intention to sell the packing material. Thereafter, the court laid down following criteria to find out as to whether a transaction for sale of packing material is an independent transaction : "1. The packing material is a commodity having its own identity and is separately classified in the Schedule; 2. There is no change, chemical or physical, in the packing either at the time of packing or at the time of using the content; 3. The packing is capable of being refused after the contents have been consumed; 4. The packing is used for convenience of transport and the quantity of the goods as such is not dependent on packing; 5. The packing is capable of being refused after the contents have been consumed; 4. The packing is used for convenience of transport and the quantity of the goods as such is not dependent on packing; 5. The mere fact that the consideration for the packing is merged with the consideration for the product would not make the sale of packing an integrated part of the sale of the product." In the present case, applying the aforesaid criteria with regard to oil tins, it can be stated as under : (1) Tin is a commodity having its own identity. (2) By packing oil in the tin there is no change, chemical or physical, in the tin either at the time of packing or at the time of using the content. (3) The tin is capable of being refused after oil has been consumed. (4) The tin (packing material) is used for convenience of transport and storage. In most of the cases the quantity of goods is dependent upon the capacity of tin (packing material); on the basis of the tin used in packing oil, its quantity would be determined, i.e., roughly 15 kilograms or 16 kilograms. May be, in some cases, the tin may contain 1 kilogram, 5 kilograms or 10 kilograms, of oil depending upon the size of tin. (5) The mere fact that the consideration for tin and oil is separately mentioned would not mean that there is separate sale of tin and oil. It would depend upon the factual investigation into the nature and ingredients of sale. The authority is required to consider and to determine the fact as to whether there was intention of the assessee to sell separately oil and tin and it may also depend upon the consideration of the fact as to whether the value of tin in comparison to the value of oil is insignificant. All these questions are required to be decided by the fact-finding authority before arriving at the conclusions to whether tins are resold or not. The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the opponent submitted that after purchase of the empty oil tins, the applicants are not selling the tins in the same form in which they were purchased. He submitted that the attention of the Tribunal was not focused on this aspect at all. The learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the opponent submitted that after purchase of the empty oil tins, the applicants are not selling the tins in the same form in which they were purchased. He submitted that the attention of the Tribunal was not focused on this aspect at all. However, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the applicant pointed out that even with regard to this aspect the phrase "in the same form" has been considered by this Court in the case of Line Traders, Sales Tax Reference No. 3 of 1981 decided on April 2, 1991, (Reported as State of Gujarat v. Lina Traders [1991] 82 STC 313 (Guj).) wherein the court has observed that the word "form" connotes visible aspect in which the thing exists or manifests itself. It is in this sense that the words "same form" are used in clause (i) of section 2(26). If the visible appearance of the goods purchased does not change and the same are sold, it can be said to be "resale" of purchased goods. The court has further observed that from clause (ii) of section 2(26) the legislative intent becomes clear. That is, if nothing is done to goods purchased and they are sold in the same form of their purchase, clause (i) is attached so as to describe that transaction of sale of purchased goods as "resale". In our view, as this aspect is not considered by the Tribunal it is not necessary to deal with it in these references, that is to say, whether the tins purchased by the applicants are sold in the same form. This also would be required to be decided by the Tribunal. Keeping the aforesaid discussion in mind, we now deal with the aforesaid sales tax references and answer the questions referred therein. Re : Sales Tax Reference No. 3 of 1988. In this reference, the following three questions are referred for our decision : (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the empty tins were consumable stores used in the manufacture of oil for sale ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, resale of empty tins cannot take place as they were consumed or used in packing of oil ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, resale of empty tins cannot take place as they were consumed or used in packing of oil ? (3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, purchase tax under section 15 was payable by the applicants ? For the purposes of our answer, the aforesaid three questions are reframed as one question as under "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the empty tins cannot be said to have been resold on the ground that they were consumable stores used in the manufacture of oil for sale and that therefore purchase tax under section 15 was payable in respect of purchase of empty tins from the unregistered dealers ?" It cannot be stated that merely because empty tins were consumable',e stores used in the manufacture of oil for sale, they cannot be resold. The Tribunal has to decide it on merits keeping in view the aforesaid discussion with regard to the words "manufacture" and "resale". We therefore answer the question in the negative. Re : Sales Tax Reference No. 19 of 1988 : In this reference the following question is referred for our decision : Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the empty tins cannot be said to have been resold on the ground that they were consumable stores used in the manufacture of oil for sale and that therefore purchase tax under section 15 was payable in respect of purchase of empty tins from unregistered dealers ?" We answer this question in the negative. The Tribunal has to decide this question afresh keeping in view the aforesaid discussion with regard to the words "manufacture" and "resale" Re : Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1988 : In this reference the following two questions are referred for our decision : (1) Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax was justified ? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that in the eye of law after the empty tins are used in the packing of oil, their resale either express or implied cannot be possible and that, therefore, purchase tax under section 15 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969, on the purchases of such empty tins from unregistered dealers was required to be levied ? Question No. (1) is not pressed and, therefore, it is not necessary to answer it. We answer question No. (2) in the negative. It cannot be stated that merely because empty tins were consumable stores used in the manufacture of oil for sale, they cannot be resold. The Tribunal has to decide it on merits keeping in view the aforesaid discussion with regard to the words "manufacture" and "resale". In the result, all these references are decided accordingly with no order as to costs. References answered accordingly.