JUDGMENT Shivraj V. Patil, J.--The short facts leading to this writ petition are : The petitioner was appointed in the service of the respondent initially in 1971, and in 1981 he was designated as Administrative Manager of the respondent at Bangalore. He served the respondent company sincerely. He was a straightforward and upright officer, which naturally created many enemies for him. On March 29, 1976, one Mr. Ramchandra entered the petitioner's house in the I. T.I. Colony, seeking to meet him claiming to have been sent by the President of the Co-operative Society of the I.T.I. The petitioner sent word to him that he should see him only in the office. However, the said Ramchandra insisted to see the petitioner. The petitioner came out and told him that he should not meet in his house and advised him to see in the office, if still desired. But, to the surprise of the petitioner, the said Ramchandra suddenly took out a bundle of currency notes and placed it on the teapoy. This annoyed the petitioner and he shouted at him and asked him to take it and get out. The said Ramchandra tried to put the currency notes in the petitioner's hand when the petitioner pushed them back and went to his drawing room. The said Ramchandra followed the petitioner into his drawing room and put the bundle of currency notes on the radiogram and ran out. The petitioner followed him shouting. In the meanwhile, police officials came into the petitioner's bungalow with Ramchandra. The petitioner explained the facts to them, but they did not pay heed. The petitioner suspected that it was a deliberate and motivated plot at the instance of some people who were misusing and exploiting the general canteen at I.T.I. The petitioner further contends that he contacted on the same day, that is, March 29, 1976, the Chairman and Managing Director of the organisation who was then at Delhi on trunk telephone and apprised him of what had happened. Thereafter, on April 2, 1976, the petitioner restated the whole episode in writing and sought protection from the Chairman and Managing Director from such harassment. The petitioner contends that the whole episode was closed as the Chairman and Managing Director was satisfied that he was being harassed by those interested people. However, it did not stop at that. Thereafter, on April 2, 1976, the petitioner restated the whole episode in writing and sought protection from the Chairman and Managing Director from such harassment. The petitioner contends that the whole episode was closed as the Chairman and Managing Director was satisfied that he was being harassed by those interested people. However, it did not stop at that. He received a memorandum from the Chairman and Managing Director charging the petitioner of misconduct within the meaning of clauses (2) and (16) of rule 5 of the Indian Telephone Industries Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1975 (for short "the rules"). He was further asked to explain in writing as why disciplinary action should not be taken against him under rules 25, 26 and 27 read with clauses (2) and (16) of rule 5 of the rules. The petitioner submitted his explanation on September 30, 1977, pleading innocence and denying the entire charge. He pleaded to drop the proceedings. Thereafter, enquiry was conducted by the Commissioner of Departmental Inquires, Central Vigilance Commissioner. After completing the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on August 20, 1980, holding that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. The Chairman and Managing Director who was the disciplinary authority at that time agreeing with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer by his order dated March 6, 1981, directed the dismissal of the petitioner from service from the afternoon of March 6, 1981. The petitioner being aggrieved preferred an appeal to the Board of Directors on March 17, 1981. The Board dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner by its order dated June 15, 1981. The petitioner challenged the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority dismissing the appeal in this Court in W.P. No. 21294 of 1981. This Court, by the order dated January 27, 1987, set aside the order of dismissal dated March 6, 1981, made against the petitioner as well as the order passed by the appellate authority. Thereafter, the company held de novo enquiry. One Mr. M. K. Dixit, Commissioner for Departmental Inquires, Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi, after conducting the enquiry came to the conclusion that the charges framed against the petitioner were not proved. Thereafter, the company held de novo enquiry. One Mr. M. K. Dixit, Commissioner for Departmental Inquires, Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi, after conducting the enquiry came to the conclusion that the charges framed against the petitioner were not proved. The competent authority disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer by the order dated October 30, 1987, took the view that charges leveled against the petitioner were proved on the basis of the evidence on the record. In that view of the matter, he dismissed the petitioner from the service of the company with the immediate effect. Then again the petitioner preferred an appeal challenging the said order of dismissal dated October 30, 1987. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner on May 20, 1988, confirming the order of dismissal dated October 30, 1987. Hence, this writ petition challenging the impugned order on the grounds that there has been no application of mind in passing the impugned order, Annexure G, dated May 20, 1988, and that the competent authority, while passing the impugned order of dismissal dated October 30, 1987, Annexure B, though he had the right to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, the said order is bad in law as the competent authority without considering every one of the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer has passed the said order. It is also contended that the competent authority did not give its reasons as to why the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer are not tenable either in law or on facts as disclosed by evidence, even the appellate authority has not considered this aspect of the matter, as such, the order of the appellate authority also suffers from infirmity. Besides these grounds, certain other grounds are also raised in the writ petition and reference is made to various decisions in support of the case of the petitioner. 2. The respondent has filed the statement of objections contending that the writ petition filed by the petitioner is frivolous, vexatious and not maintainable in law or on facts and as such it is liable to be dismissed. The respondent denied that the petitioner served the company honestly and sincerely. The respondent has also denied all the material allegations made in the writ petition. The respondent denied that the petitioner served the company honestly and sincerely. The respondent has also denied all the material allegations made in the writ petition. It is stated that in W.P. No. 21294 of 1981 the order of dismissal passed on the earlier occasion was set aside subject to de novo enquiry being held under several conditions set out in the said order. With regard to the grounds raised in the writ petition, the respondent has stated thus in paras 23 and 24 of the statement of objections : "The allegation in para 22 that Annexure G is bad in law and that the perusal of the same would establish that there has been no application of mind and further that it is nothing but a rubber stamp of the order of the competent authority is not true. The allegation in para 23 that Annexure B, the order of the competent authority is bad in law on the ground that though the competent authority has the right to disagree with the findings, the same does not give him a carte blanche to differ from the Enquiry Officer without considering every one reason given by the Enquiry Officer is not true. The allegation that the competent authority must give his own reasons as to why reasons given by the Enquiry Officer is not tenable is not fully correct. At any rate in the instant case, the competent authority has considered in detail the evidence on record and also the order of the Enquiry Officer and has differed from the Enquiry Officer on valid reasons. The allegation that the competent authority has not given reasons and that the order of the appellate authority under Annexure C suffers from the vice of non-application of mind and want of reasons is wholly false." The respondent has also explained the position even with the regard to the various decisions referred to by the petitioner in the writ petition. Thus, having filed the detailed statement of objections the respondent has prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 3. Thus, having filed the detailed statement of objections the respondent has prayed for the dismissal of the writ petition. 3. Although several grounds and contentions are raised in the writ petition, Shri B. R. G. K. Achar, learned counsel for the petitioner, at the hearing confined his arguments only to the following two grounds : (1) Although the disciplinary authority has power to disagree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer it could not have passed the order of dismissal without considering every one of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and without dislodging the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer based on the evidence. (2) No opportunity was given to the petitioner in regard to the proposed punishment particularly so when the competent authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. 4. Shri Udaya Holla, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner did not make any statement before the Enquiry Officer and he did not give any explanation when opportunity was given and even he did not enter the witness box. His further submission was that the procedure contemplated in Rule 26 of the Rules was followed and action was taken under rule 27 of the Rules by the competent authority. Thus, the competent authority has passed the impugned order, Annex. B. Learned counsel contended that under rule 27(2), the competent authority disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Authority recording its own reasons on the evidence on record. Thereafter, an order imposing penalty of dismissal was passed under rule 27(3). 5. I have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. The charge against the petitioner reads thus : "That Shri J. P. Sinha, while functioning as Administrative Manager, Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., Dooravaninagar, Bangalore, committed gross misconduct inasmuch as he at about 7.30 p. m. on March 29, 1976, in his quarters No. B-7, Central Avenue, I.T.I. Colony, Bangalore, demanded and accepted an illegal gratification of Rs. 1,000 from Shri M. Ramchandra s/o Shri K. V. Muniyappa, No. 52, K. R. Puram, Bangalore, as a motive or reward for forbearing from taking action against the said Shri .... 1,000 from Shri M. Ramchandra s/o Shri K. V. Muniyappa, No. 52, K. R. Puram, Bangalore, as a motive or reward for forbearing from taking action against the said Shri .... on the complaints received regarding the supply of vegetables made by him to the I.T.I. canteen and to permit him to continue the supply of vegetables to the I.T.I. canteen as detailed in the statement of imputations of misconduct and thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and contravened rule 4 of the India Telephone Industries Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1975." The case of the respondent was based on the allegation that the question of continuance of the arrangement of the supply of vegetables by Shri K. V. Muniyappa, father of the complainant Shri M. Ramchandra through the I.T.I. Co-operative Society to the I.T.I. canteen was under consideration of the petitioner, Shri J. P. Sinha, and there was certain complaints against this supply of vegetables and, therefore, the complainant, Shri Ramchandra as directed by the President of the I.T.I. Co-operative society, saw the petitioner in his office on March 25, 1976. On that day, he was told by the petitioner that the concerned file had not yet reached him; Sri Ramchandra saw the petitioner again in the morning in his house on March 27, 1976, even on that day the same thing was told; on March 28, 1976, when Sri Ramchandra saw the petitioner in his house the petitioner is alleged to have demanded Rs. 5,000 in token of showing favour to him and not taking any action on the complaints and that after long persuasion the petitioner agreed to take Rs. 1,000. Since Ramchandra was reluctant to pay the amount he made a complaint to the CBI on March 29, 1978, when a trap was laid. 6. On appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record the Enquiry Officer held that the charge as framed against the petitioner was not proved as can be seen from Annexure A, the report dated September 18, 1987. The disciplinary authority after going through the findings of the Enquiry Officer, connected records and having considered them, disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer for the reasons recorded and held that the charges leveled against the petitioner were proved on the basis of the evidence on record. The disciplinary authority after going through the findings of the Enquiry Officer, connected records and having considered them, disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer for the reasons recorded and held that the charges leveled against the petitioner were proved on the basis of the evidence on record. In that view of the matter, order of dismissal of the petitioner from the service was passed as per Annexure B. 7. In order to appreciate the first contention of Sri B. R. G. K. Achar, learned counsel for the petitioner, that although the disciplinary authority was competent to disagree with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer it was not open to it to pass an order of dismissal without considering the evidence on record and without dislodging the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer for his conclusion, in my opinion, it is useful to refer to Annexure B itself and the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority in the annexure to the impugned order Annexure B. The disciplinary authority states as to what are the main points on the basis of which the Enquiry Officer has recorded the findings and it has recorded the reasons as to why the conclusions of the Enquiry Officer are not accepted. A perusal of the reasons recorded with the findings of the Enquiry Officer clearly goes to show that the disciplinary authority did consider the evidence brought on record and has dislodged every one of the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer. It is useful to extract the relevant portion from the report (part of Annexure B) which reads thus : "The conclusion of the Inquiry Officer is not acceptable for the following reasons : (1) By branding the complainant as an interested witness, the Inquiry Officer has not given any credence to his evidence and tilted the balance completely in favour of the charged officer. This is not fair. The complainant's evidence cannot be discarded in toto. It should be assessed in the background of the supporting evidence on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case. I find that there is abundant evidence to corroborate his statement. It is a fact that the complainant's father was a supplier of canteen items and complainant was attending to the supplies. Shri Sinha had recorded a note in this connection instructing the President of I.T.I. Co-operative Society to come for discussion. I find that there is abundant evidence to corroborate his statement. It is a fact that the complainant's father was a supplier of canteen items and complainant was attending to the supplies. Shri Sinha had recorded a note in this connection instructing the President of I.T.I. Co-operative Society to come for discussion. This note is also supported by his own letter dated March 12, 1976, addressed to the President of the Society. Apart from these circumstances, there are many other circumstances which are closely connected to link the chain of events. Therefore, it may not be proper to discard the evidence of the complainant when they are corroborated by other circumstances connected to the issue. The fact that on March 29. 1976, at the residence of Shri Sinha the tainted currency notes were recovered from his house and that he was walking with his dog and wife immediately after the complainant came out of the house, cannot be discarded branding the complainant as an interested witness. The independent witness, SW-1, Sri K. J. Issac, has also confirmed the behavior of Sri Sinha at this given point of time. (2) The Inquiry Officer has pointed out that since the General Manager was the final authority in deciding the purchase of canteen items, there is no motive for Sri J. P. Sinha for demanding and accepting the bribe from the complainant. This position is, however, not correct, because Shri Sinha, Administrative Manager, was occupying a pivotal position and he had an important role to play in the matter of grant of contracts or their cancellation. He was, therefore, in a position to influence the course of events. Thus, the inference of the Inquiry Officer that there is no motive on the part of the charges officer is incorrect. (3) Pointing out that gate pass was issued to the complainant, Sri Ramchandra, the Inquiry Officer has felt that the complainant could not have met the charged officer earlier on March 25, 1976. It is true there was a system of gate pass. The complainant was a supplier to the I.T.I. and Security Supervisor (SW-2) Sri G. H. Aswathaiah, has stated that the pass system did not generally apply in the case of suppliers and further that suppliers of essential commodities were allowed into the factory premises without pass. It is true there was a system of gate pass. The complainant was a supplier to the I.T.I. and Security Supervisor (SW-2) Sri G. H. Aswathaiah, has stated that the pass system did not generally apply in the case of suppliers and further that suppliers of essential commodities were allowed into the factory premises without pass. This was so even on Thursday though it is treated as non-visitors days : Thus, though the circular the exhibit D-3 indicates that there will be no visitor on Thursdays and Sundays, it would not apply to suppliers of essential commodities like vegetables. According to exhibit S-6, the witness, SW-2, Ashwathaiah, the Security Supervisor, was on duty at the main gate on March, 25, 1976. As per his statement the complainant, Sri Ramchandra, had approached asking him to allow him to go to administrative office and since he was a supplier, he permitted him to go. The date appearing in his statement, i.e., May 23, 1976, is of no significance since the event was over on March 29, 1976, itself. Reference to fifth month may be only an error. Both documentary and oral evidence confirm the date as March 25, 1976, and not May 23, 1976. It is also in evidence that SW-3, Shri D. S. Ananthamurthy, that he had advised Shri Ramchandra to meet Shri Sinha. In the given circumstances, there is sufficient corroboration both by oral and documentary evidence to confirm the meeting of Shri Ramchandra with Shri Sinha on March 25, 1976. The Inquiry Officer does not seem to have appreciated this evidence. (4) Regarding Shri Ramachandra's meeting with Sri Sinha before March 29, 1976, that is on March 27 & 28, the Inquiry Officer has given more credence to the defence documents, D-6 and D-7 and witness DW-1 and DW-2 and has pointed out that there is no proof of the complainant, Sri Ramachandra's meeting Sri Sinha before March 29, 1976. A careful examination of documents and statements reveals that Exhibit D-6 is the minutes of a meeting of a private body recorded in the loose sheet of paper on March 27, 1976, containing the signature of Shri Sinha with reference to date March 28, 1976, also in the same sheet of paper. D-7 is a photograph in which Sri J. P. Sinha is also present. D-7 is a photograph in which Sri J. P. Sinha is also present. It will be too much to conclude that Sri Ramchandra would not have met Sri Sinha earlier to March 29, 1976, i.e. .. on 27th and 28th, on the basis of these documents and statements of DW-1 and DW-2. The chain of events that followed, i.e. the complainant, Sri Ramchandra, visited Sri Sinha's house on March 29, 1976, and the bribe money was recovered from there as corroborated by witnesses give much credence to his statement. However, his meeting Sri Sinha earlier to March 29, 1976, is only an additional circumstance. It does not alter the conclusion in the light of the events that took place at the residence of Shri Sinha on March 29, 1976. (5) It is not true that the charged office, Shri Sinha called SW-5, Shri V. Narayanan, to witness the trap proceedings as observed by the Inquiry Officer in his report. It is at the instance of CBI officer, Shri V. Narayanan, Financial Controller, who was the neighbor of Shri Sinha, came to the residence of Shri Sinha to witness the proceedings relating to trap. The fact that the money was produced by the daughter of Shri Sinha is recorded in the mahazar attested by the witnesses as per Exhibit S-3. It is also recorded in the mahazar (Exhibit S-3) that the daughter of Shri Sinha kept the money on the radiogram from where the money was seized by the CBI. Therefore, what Shri Sinha has recorded in the back of the seizure memo that the money was recovered from the hall on the radiogram is only a part of the transaction. It is recorded in the mahazar and confirmed by SW-1 that at the first instance when they saw, money was not found on the radiogram and it is only subsequently money was kept there by the daughter of Shri Sinha and it was recovered from there. Since the witness, SE-1 (eye witness), has confirmed that money was kept by the daughter of Shri Sinha, there was no need for the CBI officer to wash the fingers of the daughter of Shri Sinha. An endorsement contradicting the remarks of Sri Sinha may not be necessary since the mahazar, Exhibit S-3, contained the relevant details. Since the witness, SE-1 (eye witness), has confirmed that money was kept by the daughter of Shri Sinha, there was no need for the CBI officer to wash the fingers of the daughter of Shri Sinha. An endorsement contradicting the remarks of Sri Sinha may not be necessary since the mahazar, Exhibit S-3, contained the relevant details. The observation of the Inquiry Officer that the currency notes were not washed in solution will not alter the position for the reason that serial Nos. of the notes already recorded in the mahazar (exhibit S-2) were compared with the currency notes when recovered from Shri Sinha's residence and they tallied. This confirms that the same notes which were entrusted were recovered. To make it more clear it should be stated that : (a) To confirm whether Sri Sinha had accepted the tainted currency notes or not his finger was has been taken by CBI Officers and the results are positive confirming Sri Sinha's handling of notes. (b) There was no need for obtaining the finger wash of the daughter of Sri Sinha since the eye witness (SW-1) confirms that it is the daughter of Shri Sinha who kept the notes on the radiogram. (c) Regarding the washing of currency notes, there was no need to wash the notes since their serial numbers are already recorded in the mahazar (exhibit S-2) relating to the entrustment of tainted currency notes when recovered from the residence of Shri Sinha, on comparing the numbers of the notes recorded earlier with the one recovered, they tallied. (d) The observations of the Inquiry Officer that Shri Sinha had submitted confidential report against the President of the I.T.I. Co-operative Society and other officers about their work and the possibility of these persons to somehow humiliate him cannot be accepted for the reason that the circumstances of Shri Sinha's involvement in this crime are so strong that it leads to only one conclusion that he had demanded and accepted that bribe. A situation as claimed by him, if an attempt was made to thrust the currency notes to his hands and he was shouting at that time following altercations were true, it does not seem consistent with the human behavior that immediately after this event a person would develop such a cool and relaxed temperament as if nothing had happened. A situation as claimed by him, if an attempt was made to thrust the currency notes to his hands and he was shouting at that time following altercations were true, it does not seem consistent with the human behavior that immediately after this event a person would develop such a cool and relaxed temperament as if nothing had happened. As soon as the DSP, CBI, revealed his identity Sri Sinha became nervous and he did not make any attempt to explain to the DSP that the money was thrust on him by Shri Ramchandra. He has only stated that the gentleman had left the currency notes on the radiogram of the drawing room. When Sri Narayan, Financial Controller, went to his house at the request of the CBI Officer to witness the proceedings, Shri Sinha should have told him immediately that he has been framed up in a false case, if it were true. Instead, in the end of the proceedings he has stated that Sri Ramchandra threw the notes on the radiogram. At the first instance in the presence of SW-1 and at the second instance in presence of SW-5, he has never stated that money was thrust on him. It is only in his letter dated April 2, 1976, addressed to CMD giving reference to his talk on March 29, 1976, he had pointed out that the complainant tried to put the money in his hands and he pushed it back and went to the drawing room and the complainant came behind him and put the bundle of notes on the radiogram and ran out and he followed him shouting and in the meantime a party of police officials came with him. He explained the fact to them and they did not heed to it. Thus, there has been no consistency in the statement of Shri Sinha. Further, as per exhibit S-3 and confirmed by SW-1 immediately after the incident he and his wife were coming out of his house with a dog belies the story about the shouting made by him, thus his claim that the money was thrust and he shouted is thus not believable. (e) The trap laying officer was not examined by the prosecution since he was not available at the time of inquiry. (e) The trap laying officer was not examined by the prosecution since he was not available at the time of inquiry. His non-examination does not alter the conclusion because independent witness SW-1 and SW-5 have been examined in this case during inquiry and that they have confirmed their statements." In view of what is stated above it cannot be said that the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer either without considering the evidence on record or without recording reasons as to why it disagreed with the reasons given by the Enquiry Officer. In the matter of disciplinary proceedings and the conclusions arrived at by the competent authorities bases on the evidence on record, that too on the findings of fact recorded, this Court sitting under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot and should not reappreciate the evidence as a Court of appeal. It is not possible to disturb the findings of fact even assuming that on reappreciation of evidence on record some other view is possible unless it is shown that the findings recorded are perverse or not bases on the evidence on record or it is a case of non-consideration of any material evidence. In the instinct case, no complaint is made with regard to the procedure followed in holding the enquiry. Under these circumstances I am unable to agree with the first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. Hence, I reject the same. 8. Sri Udaya Holla, learned counsel for the respondent, in support of his submissions has cited several decision as to when a writ of certiorari can be issued. He emphasised that the jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. Hence, the findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. In my opinion it is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited, in the view I have taken on the first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and in view of the fact that the decisions cited refer to the well-settled principles of law. 9. In my opinion it is not necessary to refer to the decisions cited, in the view I have taken on the first contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and in view of the fact that the decisions cited refer to the well-settled principles of law. 9. Sri B. R. G. K. Achar, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the impugned orders cannot be sustained as no opportunity was given by the competent authority in regard to the proposed punishment, particularly so when it disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. In support of his submission learned counsel relied on the following decisions : Lokenath Tolaram, etc. Vs. B.N. Rangwani and Others, AIR 1974 SC 150 . S.L. Kapoor Vs. Jagmohan and Others, AIR 1981 SC 136 . Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1416 . Olga Tellis and Others Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, AIR 1986 SC 180 and I.J. Rao, Asstt. Collector of Customs and Another Vs. Bibhuti Bhushan Bagh and Another, AIR 1989 SC 1884 . 10. Sri Udaya Holla, learned counsel for the respondent, per contra, relies on the following two decisions to contend that the second show cause notice regarding proposed punishment was not at all necessary : Management Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. Vs. S.S. Railway Workers' Union, AIR 1969 SC 513 and Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. T.C. Shrivastava and Others, AIR 1984 SC 1227 . Learned counsel pointed out that under the relevant rules giving of second show-cause notice is not at all required, in particular he drew my attention to rules 26 and 27 of the Rules. This being the position, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner may be rejected. 11. The decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner deal with providing an opportunity to aggrieved person based either on the principles of natural justice or on the basis of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India Lokenath Tolaram v. B. N. Rangawani, (supra) deals with the seizure of goods by the authorities and interpretation of Sections 110 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962. S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (supra), deals with principles of natural justice; audi alteram partem. That case pertains to supersession of municipal committee under Section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act. S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (supra), deals with principles of natural justice; audi alteram partem. That case pertains to supersession of municipal committee under Section 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act. It was held that the minimum requirement of natural justice must be observed even in a crisis under Section 238 of the Act. In the same decision it is also held that exclusion of application of principles of natural justice would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and the terms of the relevant statute. Union of India and Another Vs. Tulsiram Patel and Others, AIR 1985 SC 1416 deals with providing an opportunity under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. In the same volume at page 545 in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (supra), Articles 19(1)(e) and 21 of the Constitution of India came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. I. J. Rao, Assistant Collector of Customs v. Bibhuti Bhushan Bagh, (Supra), again deals with the effect of Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, in the matter of extension of period beyond six months for giving notice in respect of seizure of goods. In that case, the Supreme Court also considered as to when post-decisional hearing could be permitted. Thus, the decisions cited by learned counsel for the petitioner in my considered opinion do not help the petitioner to support the contention that in a case like this second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment should be given. Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India dies not apply to the case of the petitioner for the simple reasons that he was not a civil servant. The other decisions under the Customs Act and the Punjab Municipal Act, in my opinion, do not help the petitioner inasmuch as in the case on hand opportunity was given as contemplated under rule 26 of the Rules and after following the necessary procedure the impugned order is passed under rule 27. 12. In the case of Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. S. S. Railway Workers' Union, (supra), it is held thus in the said decision (at pate 744) : "As regards the modification requiring a second show-cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. 12. In the case of Management, Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. S. S. Railway Workers' Union, (supra), it is held thus in the said decision (at pate 744) : "As regards the modification requiring a second show-cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions given by Courts or the Tribunals such a second show-cause notice in case of removal has ever been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Article 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that Article. To import such a requirement from Article 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification on any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should, therefore, be set aside." 13. In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. T. C. Shrivastava, (supra), the Supreme Court has referred to, in para 8 of the said decision, to the case of the Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. S. S. Railway Workers' Union, (supra), and it is held that neither under the ordinary law of land nor under the industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary unless the standing order provides expressly or by necessary implication giving of such second notice. In the case on hand, rule 27 does not provide expressly or by necessary implication giving of second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment. 14. In view of this legal position directly on the point, I find considerable force in the submission of Sri Udaya Holla, learned counsel for the respondent. Hence, I have no hesitation to reject the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. No other point arises for consideration. Under the circumstances the writ petition is devoid of merit. Consequently, it deserves to be dismissed. 16. Hence, I have no hesitation to reject the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. 15. No other point arises for consideration. Under the circumstances the writ petition is devoid of merit. Consequently, it deserves to be dismissed. 16. In the result and for the reasons stated above, this writ petition stands dismissed. No costs.