Judgment 1. THE opposite party filed Title Suit No. 206 of 1980 in the Second Court of the Learned Munsif at Howrah, subsequently renumbered as Title Suit No. 28 of 1985 of the court of the learned First additional Munsif, Howrah on transfer, for eviction of the petitioners from the suit premises inter alia, on the grounds of default and reasonable requirement. The said suit was decreed in part only on the ground of default, by the learned munsif on 29th September, 1986. Against the said decree the petitioners preferred an appeal being Title Appeal No. 257 of 186, and the opposite party also filed a cross objection in the said appeal as no decree was passed in the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement. The learned Third Assistant district Judge, Howrah who heard the said appeal, remanded the matter back to the trial court for rehearing, by his judgment and order dated 30th June, 1990. Against the said order of remand, the opposite party preferred a First miscellaneous Appeal being F. M. A. No. 1062 of 1990 in this Hon'ble Court, which was ultimately allowed by Haridas Das, J. on 2nd August, 1991 by setting aside the said order of remand and remanding the matter back to the lower appellate court for rehearing of the appeal inter alia, with the following directions:- "in the result, this appeal is allowed on contest, but without any order as to costs. The impugned order of remand passed by the learned Lower appellate Court of Remand passed by the learned lower appellate court is hereby set aside and the appeal is remanded to the learned lower appellate court for a decision of the issue whether the plaintiff reasonably required the suit premises for his own use and occupation and whether the plaintiff will be entitled to get a decree on that ground. I make it clear that the defendants shall not be entitled to reagitate the ground of default. If any application is made before the learned lower appellate court either by the plaintiff or by the defendants praying for taking into consideration subsequent facts having a bearing on the question of reasonable requirement, the learned lower appellate court will consider the same and will pass appropriate order thereon. If any application is made before the learned lower appellate court either by the plaintiff or by the defendants praying for taking into consideration subsequent facts having a bearing on the question of reasonable requirement, the learned lower appellate court will consider the same and will pass appropriate order thereon. In the event such prayer is allowed, the parties shall be entitled to adduce further evidence before the learned lower appellate in that behalf. The learned lower appellate court shall, after giving opportunities of hearing to both the parties as indicated above pronounce judgment on the evidence already on record and on the basis of further evidence if any. " 2. AFTER the matter was sent back to the lower appellate court as above, the petitioners' appeal however, was dismissed for default on 20th December, 1991 by the learned Third Assistant District Judge, How rah as no one appeared on behalf of the appellants at the time of hearing of the appeal. The lower appellate court however, went on proceeding with the cross-objection and passed certain orders namely, the Order Nos. 69, 70 and 71 dated 2nd January, 1992, 3rd January, 1992 and 16th January, 1992 respectively, which are the subject matters of challenge in the present civil order. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners contends inter alia, that since the title appeal was dismissed, whether on merits or not, after such dismissal, the cross objection that was filed in the said appeal, cannot be proceeded with any further, in view of the fact that the cross-objection arose out of Title Appeal No. 257 of 1986 itself, which was dismissed for default as aforesaid and the cross objection was not an independent proceeding nor it could be treated as a separate appeal. 3. MR. Banerjee, learned Advocate for the opposite party, however, contends inter alia, that the impugned orders do not suffer from any material irregularity or any lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower appellate court, inasmuch as, even if the title appeal was dismissed for default, the cross objection was not to be automatically dismissed and had to be heard separately as it had got a distinctly separate entity, 4. THE right to make a cross objection in an appeal, is nothing but the exercise of the same right of appeal which is given to an aggrieved party, and is not a new right conferred by Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure as has been held by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Haridas vs. India Cable company. A.I.R. 1965 Calcutta, 369; UP S.R.T. Corpn. vs. Janki Devi A.I.R. 1982 Allahabad, 296 (FB) and also by the Supreme court in the case of rambhaivs. Dabhiajikumar, A. I. R. 1965, Supreme Court, 669. Moreover, on a plain reading of the provision of Order XLI Rule 22 (1) and Rule 22 (4) of the code it would clearly appear, that withdrawal of an appeal is no bar to the hearing of cross objection filed by the respondent, whether the appeal is withdrawn before or after the hearing, and similarly, the dismissal of an appeal for default, also will not be a bar to the hearing of the cross objection, but if the appeal has abated, the respondent will not be entitled to have his cross-objection heard even though, the legal representatives of the deceased have been brought on record in the cross objection, as was held in the case of Govind Prasad vs. Rajanikanl A. I. R. 1960 Calcutta, 512 corresponding to 63c. W. N. 981 Accordingly. I hold that the impugned orders do not suffer from any material irregularity or any lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower appellate court and the revisional application also does not merit any interference. The civil order accordingly is dismissed without any order as to costs or interim or if there by any, stand vacated. 5. I. however, direct the lower appellate court to hear out the cross-objection as early as possible, but in any case by November, 1992. Let this order be communicated to the lower appellate court forthwith. Civil order dismissed.