JUDGMENT 1. 1. Award passed by the Judge, Labour Court on 3.6.89, ordering reinstatement with back wages to non-petitioner No.2, has been assailed by the petitioner in this Writ Petition. 2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated in order to decide the questions raised on behalf of the petitioner.The non-petitioner No.2 was appointed as a Waterman in the service of Agarwal College on temporary basis with effect from 16.8.78 on fixed salary of Rs. 200/- and for a fixed period of six months. The term of employment of non-petitioner No.2 was terminated with effect from 15.8.80. The workman raised a dispute. The conciliation proceedings failed and then vide notification dated 10.3.81 the State Govt. referred the dispute relating termination of service of the workman for adjudication by the Labour Court. 3. The workman asserted that he had rendered service of more than 240 days in a calendar year. His service was terminated in violation of the provisions contained in Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Termination of his service amounts to retrenchment and, therefore, it was obligatory for the employer to comply with the requirements of the various provisions of 1947 Act. He also stated that after termination of his service, other person had been appointed. The employer admitted the factum of employment of the workman between 16.8.78 to 15.8.80 but asserted that the appointment of the workman was for fixed period of six months and the term was not extended beyond 15.8.80. Therefore, there was no occasion for giving any notice to the workman. It was also not necessary to comply with the provisions contained in Section 25-F of 1947 Act because the termination of the service of the workman does not come within the scope of the definition of the term 'retrenchment' under Section 2(oo) of 1947 Act. The employer further stated that no-one else has been engaged in its service after the termination of the service of the workman. No post was available for accommodating the workman. In respect of the allegation of workman that one Ram Prasad Sharma had been engaged, it was stated that Ram Prasad was engaged for six months to look after the maintenance of the lawns, grounds and buildings of the College. The Govt. had sanctioned only one post of waterman and a permanent employee was already working. 4. In respect of the allegation of workman that one Ram Prasad Sharma had been engaged, it was stated that Ram Prasad was engaged for six months to look after the maintenance of the lawns, grounds and buildings of the College. The Govt. had sanctioned only one post of waterman and a permanent employee was already working. 4. After recording evidence of the parties the Labour Court passed an award. Although the Labour Court declared that the termination of the service of the workman is unlawfull, it declined the given relief of reinstatement and back wages. Instead it ordered payment of wages in lieu of one month's notice and six months' wages by way of compensation. 5. The workman challenged the award of the Labour Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1758/88. This Writ Petition filed by the workman was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by its order dated 4.1.89. The award was quashed and the Labour Court was directed to decide the matter in the light of directions given by the Division Bench. 6. After the decision of the Division Bench the petitioner made an application dated 19.4.89 seeking leave of the Labour Court to amend the written statement. This application was dismissed by the Labour Court held (sic holding) that part of the amendment sought to be made was already covered by the pleadings in the written statement filed and that some addition sought to be made related to a period prior to the filing of the original written statement and that there was no justification to allow such an amendment. The workman filed his affidavit and he was subjected to cross examination. Thereafter the employer made a request for leading evidence in rebuttal and also filed an application with certain documents to show that the workman was gainfully employed. The Labour Court however, rejected the application/request of the petitioner vide order dated 15.5.89. Thereafter it passed the impugned award on 3.6.89 whereby it has directed reinstatement of the workman with consequential benefits. 7. The first contention of Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court has committed a serious error of law treating the termination of the service of the workman as a retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of 1947 Act. 7. The first contention of Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court has committed a serious error of law treating the termination of the service of the workman as a retrenchment as defined under Section 2(oo) of 1947 Act. Shri Sharma argued that the impugned retrenchment was clearly covered by Section 2 (oo) (bb) of 1947 Act. The workman was appointed for a fixed period and his appointment came to an end automatically in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of employment. He further argued that although the termination of the service of the workman took place on 15.8.80, the Court must take note of the amendment made in the 1947 Act by Amending Act of 1982. The definition of the term 'retrenchment' has been amended with effect from 18.8.84. With this amendment having been brought into force, the Court cannot ignore the amended definition and termination of service by efflux of time or in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract of the employment cannot be declared as nullity because by virtue of Section 2 (oo) (bb), such termination of service cannot be treated as retrenchment. When the Legislature has specifically excluded some types of termination of service from the definition of the term retrenchment, the Court must give full effect to the Legislative intendment, argued Shri Manoj Sharma. He urged that even though termination of service on 15.8.80 may have been treated as retrenchment under the existing definition, after 18.8.84 it can no more be treated as retrenchment. Shri Sharma placed reliance on the decision of Kerala High Court in J. Samson Jayasingh v. Malayalam Plantations Limited, (1988) 73 FJR 337. 8. Shri P.K. Sharma, learned counsel for non-petitioner No.2, on the other hand argued that termination of the service of the workman clearly fall within the definition of the term retrenchment used in Section 2(oo) of 1947 Act. That provision has been interpretated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, AIR 1976 S.C. 1111 , and it has unequivocally been held by the Supreme Court that termination of service of a workman amounts to retrenchment except termination by way of punishment, voluntary retirement, retirement in terms of contract of service or termination on the ground of continued ill health. Shri P.K. Sharma has further submitted that the amended definition of the term retrenchment, which has become applicable with effect from 18.8.84, cannot be applied retrospectively. This amendment cannot be used for validating an order of termination which was unlawful or void at the time of its passing. He placed reliance on a Division Ben h decision of this Court in Principal Mayo College v. Labour Court and another, 1988 (1) LLN 724 : 1987 (2) RLR 421. 9. The term retrenchment as defined in Section 2 (oo), as it stood upto 17.8.84, has been interpretated by the Supreme Court in several cases. It was for the first time examined in Hari Prasad Shiv Shankar Shukla v. A.D. Divakar, AIR 1957 S.C. 121 . That was a case of closure of industry and in the context of Section 25-FF and 25-FFF, some observations were made by the Supreme Court on the definition of the term retrenchment. Therein it was held that termination of services of the workmen on a bona fide closure of an industry or on change of ownership or management of the industry does not amount to retrenchment. In State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money's case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court took the view that the phrase "termination of service for any reason whatsoever" includes within its scope termination of service by efflux of time or in accordance with the terms contained in the contract of employment, and it is not necessary that there must be an act of termination of the employer. This wider literate interpretation given to the definition of the term retrenchment was accepted in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme-Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee, (1977) 4 SCC 415 Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, AIR 1980 S.C. 1219 and in large number of other cases. 10. In Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation v. Presiding Officer, labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 , the scope and meaning of the term "retrenchment" was again examined by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. The matter was referred to a Constitution Bench in order to consider the questions raised by some of the parties that there was a conflict of views between the decision of Hari Shiv Shankar's case (supra) and Sundara Money's case (supra). The matter was referred to a Constitution Bench in order to consider the questions raised by some of the parties that there was a conflict of views between the decision of Hari Shiv Shankar's case (supra) and Sundara Money's case (supra). After considering the various decisions given by it earlier, the Supreme Court held that although there are apparent incongruities when the definition clause section 2 (oo) is considered in the context of the main provisions viz. Sections 25-F, 25-G, 25-H but there is room for harmonious construction. Their Lordships further observed "As a result of construing retrenchment in its wider sense the rights of the employer under the standing Orders and under the contracts of employment in respect of the workman whose service has been terminated may have been affected by introduction of Sections 2(oo), 25-F and the other relevant sections. Secondly, it may be said, the rights as such are not affected or taken away, but only an additional social obligation has been imposed on the employer as to give the retrenchment benefit to the affected workmen, perhaps for immediate tiding over of the financial difficulty. Looked at from this angle there is implicit a social policy. As the maxim goes-Stat pro ration voluntas populi, the will of the people stands in place of a reason." "The wider literal meaning has since been adopted by the Supreme Court in Sundara Money and subsequent cases rejecting the narrow, natural and contextual meaning. The question of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court being per incuriam on ground of failure to apply the law earlier laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Court in Hariprasad Shukla case could arise only if the ratio in Sundara Money and subsequent decisions in the line was in conflict with the ratio in Hariprasad and Anakapalle. Analysing the cofnplex syllogism of Hariprasad case it appears that its major premise was that retrenchment meant termination of surplus labour of an existing industry and the minor premise was, that the termination in that case was of all the workmen on closure of business on change of ownership. The decision was that there was no retrenchment. However, Hariprasad case is not an authority for the proposition that section 2 (oo) only covers cases of discharge of surplus labour and staff. The decision was that there was no retrenchment. However, Hariprasad case is not an authority for the proposition that section 2 (oo) only covers cases of discharge of surplus labour and staff. The judgments in Sundara Money and the subsequent decisions in the line could not be held to be per incuriam inasmuch as in Hindustan Steel and Santosh Gupta cases, the Division Benches of the Supreme Court had referred to Hariprasad case, and rightly held that its ratio did not extend beyond a case of termination on the ground of closure and as such it would not be correct to say that the subsequent decisions ignored a binding precedent. In a fast developing branch of Industrial and Labour Law it may not always be of particular importance to rigidly adhere to a precedent, and a precedent may need be departed from if the basis of legislation changes." 11. In the light of this decision of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that the termination of the service of the workman with effect from 15.8.80 clearly falls within the scope of the term retrenchment as used in Sec-2 (oo), as it stood in the year 1980. 12. The effect of violation of the provisions of Section 25-F or other provisions of the 1947 Act in case of a retrenchment has been examined time and again. The consequence of breach of the these provisions in effecting retrenchment have been described differently. Sometimes it has been said that the order is voidable, sometimes it has been described as void. At other times it has been treated as nullity. These different shades of expression employed in the various decisions of the Supreme Court or other High Courts, however, do not detracts from the fact that termination of service brought about in violation of a condition precedent contained in Section 25-F is no termination in the eye of law. If breach of this mandatory provision has been committed, the action of the employer has to be treated as viod ab initio and inoperative. It has to be treated that the relationship of master and servant has not lawfully been brought to an end and the workman can claim a declaration of nullity and even otherwise claim other benefit to which he is entitled under the provisions of 1947 Act. 13. It has to be treated that the relationship of master and servant has not lawfully been brought to an end and the workman can claim a declaration of nullity and even otherwise claim other benefit to which he is entitled under the provisions of 1947 Act. 13. Admittedly, the amended definition of the term retrenchment has been made effective from 18.8.84. It is thus clear that the Legislature has not thought it proper to give express retrospectivity to the amended clause. The question, however, is as to whether the amended definition can be treated as retrospective by implication and can it be said that the amended definition has the effect of validating an order of termination of service which was otherwise unlawful. The question of retrospectivity of the amended definition was directly in issue before the Division Bench in Principal Mayo College v. Labour Court and another (supra). That was a case in which termination of the service of a Chowkidar was brought about without compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F. The Labour Court held that the termination was illegal on account of non-compliance of the requirements of Section 25-F. The Labour Court, therefore, directed reinstatement of the workman with consequential benefits. Shri Manoj Sharma, counsel for the petitioner, in that case raised an argument of implied retrospectivity. The Division Bench formulated a question as to whether clause (bb) added to Section 2 (oo) by the Amending Act No. 49 of 1984 has retrospective effect or not. After making reference to some decisions of the Supreme Court, the Division Bench stated the principles for deciding the question as to whether the amendment should be given prospective or retrospective effect and then concluded as under:- "13. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above referred cases if we consider the new Cl. (bb) as added to section 2 (oo) by the Amending Act, 49 of 1984, we will discover that no retrospective effect car be given to new Cl. (bb) as it is the part of the definition clause. 14. Further, it is not with respect to procedural law, but it is a provision whereby some powers are conferred on the employer which is destructive of the protection so far available to the employee prior to 18 August, 1984, the date when the new Cl. (bb) as it is the part of the definition clause. 14. Further, it is not with respect to procedural law, but it is a provision whereby some powers are conferred on the employer which is destructive of the protection so far available to the employee prior to 18 August, 1984, the date when the new Cl. (bb) was inserted in the matter of terminating the contract of employment. Prior to the amendment made in the definition of retrenchment by the Amending Act, 49 of 1984, retrenchment has been understood to mean termination of services for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, unless it falls within the exception provided in the definition of section 2 (oo). As a result of this amendment contractual termination will not constitute retrenchment, because now by virtue of new Cl. (bb) one more exception has been provided in the definition of retrenchment. The new clause provides as follows : "(bb) Termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being termination under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or" Thus, in our opinion, no retrospective effect can be given to the new Cl. (bb) which was added to section 2 (oo) by the Amending Act, 49 of 1984." 14. In the view of clear pronouncement of a Division Bench, the argument of Shri Manoj Sharma about retrospectivity of the amended definition cannot be accepted. In the decision of the Kerala High Court, to which Shri Manoj Sharma has made a reference, the termination of the service of the workman had been brought about on 31.1.76. The learned Judge of the Kerala High Court took notice of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sundara Money's case and observed that amendment was made in 1984 in order to overcome the principle laid down by the Supreme Court by Sundara Money's case and other cases and then proceeded to say that termination of service by efflux of time or in accordance with the conditions of contract has been negatived though prospectively by the statutory amendment. He further held that although the order of termination was an invalid order and the employee was entitled to be treated as if he was notionally in service, that position could validly continue only until the Legislature finally clarified the law so as to negative the principle laid down by the Supreme Court. On that logic the learned judge held that the order of termination remained ineffective till 18.8.84 i.e. the date when the amendment was made effective. With great respect, I am unable to accept the reason given by the learned Judge for holding that the termination of service of the workman which was invalid, remained ineffective till 18.8.84 only. Once the termination of service of a workman, brought about in violation of Section 25-F, has the effect of rendering the order as void, a subsequent Legislation cannot validate the order of termination by implication. The reason given by the learned Judge of the Kerala High Court, if accepted, would lead to serious anamolies. The fate of the orders of retrenchment would then have to depend on purely fortuitous factors. In a given case, if the termination was declared void by the competent court, the workman would become entitled to all benefits. In an identical case if the Court failed to decide the matter in time, workman in the later case would be deprived of the relief of reinstatement. In my considered opinion, the learned Judge did not correctly appreciate the consequences of a retrenchment order passed in violation of the mandatory requirements contained in Section 25-F and after holding that the amendment was prospective, there was no justification for holding that the order became effective and acquired validity from the date of amendment. I am clearly of the opinion that the law laid down by the Division Bench in Mayo College's case is correct and there is no warrant or justification for taking a different view. I, therefore, hold that the finding recorded by the learned Judge, Labour Court that termination of the service of the workman amounts to retrenchment as defined in Section 2 (oo) of 1947 Act, is correct and does not call for any interference by this Court. 15. I, therefore, hold that the finding recorded by the learned Judge, Labour Court that termination of the service of the workman amounts to retrenchment as defined in Section 2 (oo) of 1947 Act, is correct and does not call for any interference by this Court. 15. The second contention advanced by Shri Manoj Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Labour Court has committed a serious error of law in refusing to accept the amendment application filed on behalf of the petitioner on 19.4.89 and also in refusing to allow it to lead evidence in rebuttal. He urged that once the Division Bench had remanded the matter back to the Labour Court for fresh decision, it was obligatory for the learned Judge, Labour Court to have allowed equal opportunity to both the parties to put forward their cases. Shri Manoj Sharma submitted that the technical rules of civil procedure are not applicable to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and other industrial adjudications. Therefore, the learned Judge, Labour Court should have adopted a liberal approach in allowing the amendment application and in giving opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence in rebuttal. He further argued that the documents which have been filed by the petitioner along with the application could not have caused any prejudice to the workman. Instead cause of justice would have been advanced. Shri P.K. Sharma on the other hand argued that the Division Bench had not remanded the case for fresh decision but had directed that the workman should be given opportunity to show that he was in gainful employment. 16. I have given my thoughtful consideration to this argument. While disposing of the writ petition No. 1758/88, the Division Bench had observed:- "We are therefore, of the view that the award should be set aside and the petitioner should be allowed to lead evidence on this point that he was not in employment and he remained in employment for very short time and not for a long time. The Court will also consider the point whether it is a case for reinstatement or not. So far as the scope of Section 2(oo) is concerned, Mr. Sharma can raise this objection before the Labour Court. Taking note of the fact that the petitioner is not in employment, we hereby direct that the interim maintenance amount of Rs. The Court will also consider the point whether it is a case for reinstatement or not. So far as the scope of Section 2(oo) is concerned, Mr. Sharma can raise this objection before the Labour Court. Taking note of the fact that the petitioner is not in employment, we hereby direct that the interim maintenance amount of Rs. 1,200/- by way of compensation be paid to the petitioner. We further direct that the Labour Court will decide the matter within three months and the parties are directed to appear before the Labour Court on 3.2.89. The petitioner will also be entitled for Rs. 500/- as cost of litigation." The judgment passed by the Division Bench no doubt results in setting aside of the award but the Division Bench had deliberately given opportunity to the workman only to lead evidence on the point that he was not in employment or if he was in employment such employment was for a very short period. The employer was directed to raise objection with respect to Section 2 (oo) of 1947 Act. No review petition was filed against this order of the Division Bench nor any appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court. Therefore the order of the Division Bench became final. In the light of the specific directions given by the Division Bench, the learned judge, Labour Court has allowed the workman to lead evidence on the specific question to which reference has been made in the order of Division Bench. If the Judge, Labour Court has followed the directions given by the Division Bench, it cannot be said that he has acted arbitrarily. Thus there is no warrant for holding that the learned Judge, Labour Court has misconstrued the order passed by the Division Bench. 17. That apart a perusal of the order dated 26.4.89 shows that the Judge, Labour Court applied his mind to the relevant considerations while deciding the amendment application filed on behalf of the petitioner. He has rightly held that so far as the facts relating to a period prior to the filing of the first written statement is concerned, they were fully within the knowledge of the management and therefore, there was no justification for permitting it to now amend the pleadings. He has rightly held that so far as the facts relating to a period prior to the filing of the first written statement is concerned, they were fully within the knowledge of the management and therefore, there was no justification for permitting it to now amend the pleadings. Regarding other two grounds of amendment, he rightly observed that the pleadings contained in the written statement were sufficient to cover the additional point sought to be raised on behalf of the petitioner. The workman filed his affidavit stating that he was not gainfully employed. He specifically stated that he had not worked in any office of Indian Airlines and had not worked at any other place. He was not gainfully employed. In cross examination, certain suggestions were given to him regarding his employment in the Dharamshala as a Chowkidar but he categorically denied these suggestions. The learned Judge also rejected the prayer for recross examination of the workman and rejected the application of the management for production of additional documents. The Judge, Labour Court was fully entitled to exercise his discretion to permit or not to permit the management to lead the evidence and in my opinion, it cannot be said that in exercising its discretion refusing to allow the management to lead its evidence, the leaned Judge committed a grave error of law which has resulted in injustice to the petitioner. 18. Shri Manoj Sharma then argued that the Labour Court was not entitled to grant relief of reinstatement to the employee. He strenuously urged that no post is available against which the workman can be reinstated in service. In the alternative he argued that in any case there was no justification for awarding the relief of full back wages. Shri Manoj Sharma placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Coimbatore Pioneer "B" Mills Ltd. v. The Labour Court and ors., 1980 (1) LLJ 503. Shri P.K. Sharma on the other hand argued that once the retrenchment has been found to be in violation of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act, there is no justification for denial of relief of reinstatement to the workman. Shri P.K. Sharma argued that only in exceptional cases relief of reinstatement can be denied to the workman. Shri P.K. Sharma on the other hand argued that once the retrenchment has been found to be in violation of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act, there is no justification for denial of relief of reinstatement to the workman. Shri P.K. Sharma argued that only in exceptional cases relief of reinstatement can be denied to the workman. The normal rule is that once the order of termination is found to be void, the employer is under an obligation to put the employee back in service. He invited the Court's attention to the decision of Supreme Court in Surendra Kumar Verma v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and another, AIR 1981 S.C. 422 , and urged that there is no justification for denial of reinstatement with back wages to the employee. On the question of back wages Shri P.K. Sharma further argued that the employer is under an obligation to raise and substantiate the plea of gainful employment of the workman between the period of termination of service and the date of award. Only if the employer establishes that the workman was in employment for the entire period, then the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal can refuse the relief of reinstatement. In support of this submission he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 1979 S.C. 75 . There is no manner of doubt that an order of retrenchment passed in violation of Section 25-F of the 1947 Act is nullity. In Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. Subong Tea Estate, 1964 (1) LLJ 333 , the Apex Court laid down the law regarding consequence of termination of service having brought about in violation of Section 25-F. The Apex Court observed: "that being so, we must hold that the retrenchment of the eight workmen, being invalid in law, cannot be said to have terminated the relationship of the employer and employee between the vendee, respondent 2 and the eight workmen concerned. They are accordingly entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service; they would also be entitled to recover their full wages for the period between the date of the retrenchment and the date of their reinstatement." 19. They are accordingly entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service; they would also be entitled to recover their full wages for the period between the date of the retrenchment and the date of their reinstatement." 19. In Udaipur Mineral Development Syndicate Pvt. Ltd. v. M.P. Dave, 1975 RLW 131 a Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider this very question. In that case to Labour Court had found that the termination of service of the workman was in violation of Section 25-F of 1947 Act. It, however, ordered payment of compensation of Rs. 3,000/- instead of reinstatement. On an writ petition filed by the workman a learned Single Judge declared that the workman was entitled to reinstatement. While dismissing the special appeal of the management, the Division Bench observed as under: "We have accordingly looked at the controversy before us in the light of the aforesaid two conditions, and we find that as it was the mandate of Section 12-F of the Act that a workman like the respondent shall not be retrenched by his employer until he had been paid, at the time of his retrenchment, the compensation prescribed by clause (b) of section 25-F and as it is not in dispute that that requirement of the law was not fulfilled by the appellant while retrenching the respondent, it would follow that the Labour Court's decision to grant the appropriate relief had to be conditioned by a consideration of the fact that the appellant had committed a breach of a mandatory requirement of the law governing the respondent's retrenchment. The effect of a breach of the provisions of section 25-F of the Act came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. Subong Tea Estate (9) and, while holding the retrenchment to be invalid for breach of the provisions of section 25-F, they laid down the law as follows: That being so, we must hold that the retrenchment of the eight workmen, being invalid in law, cannot be said to have terminated the relationship of employer and employee between the vendee, respondent 2 and the eight workmen concerned. They are accordingly entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service; they would also be entitled to recover their full wages for the period between the date of the retrenchment and the date of their reinstatement." It appears, however, that the Labour Court did not examine the controversy in the light of the two conditions laid down in the New Manak Chowk Spinning and Weaving Co's case (7), and it therefore wrongly laboured under the impression that it was permissible for it to refuse the relief of reinstatement even though the respondent's service could not be said to have been terminated by the notice of retrenchment because of the failure to comply with the requirement of section 25-F of the Act so that the relationship of employer and employee continued between the parties. In other words, the Court fell into the error of ignoring the fact that the legal effect of the invalid order of retrenchment was to continue the relationship of employer and employee between the parties, and it was not permissible for it to terminate that relationship by a fist of its own in breach of the mandate of section 25-F of the Act and its interpretation by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Subong Tea Estate's case (8), simply because it thought that it would not be proper to order the reinstatement for the reasons mentioned by it. There is therefore, nothing wrong if the learned single Judge has corrected the mistake and directed the Labour Court to amend its award." 20. In Surendra Kumar Verma's case (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that : "Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the Court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions. The plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. It is as if the order has never been and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-a-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the Court to make appropriate consequential orders." 21. In the light of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court and that of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that order of reinstatement must ordinarily follow as a consequence or as a corollary of the finding that the termination of the workman is in violation of the mandatory provisions contained in Section 25-F of 1947 Act. Only in very exceptional circumstances, the relief of reinstatement can be denied to the employee. Sonic of the exceptional circumstances have been pointed out by the Apex Court in Surendra Kumar Verma's case. There might be cases where the industry is closed down or it might be in severe financial doldrums or there might be a case where the employer has lost confidence. The burden of proving existence of exceptional circumstances lies on the employer. It is for the employer to plead and prove that the order of reinstatement should not be passed. In the present case, the Labour Court has considered the plea advanced on behalf of the petitioner against the order of reinstatement and it has found this plea to be without merit. Neither before the Labour Court nor before this Court the petitioner has been able to place any material to justify deviation from the general rules of reinstatement. No material has been placed before this Court by to petitioner to show the strength of the posts in different cadres, the availability of work as on the date of award passed by the Labour Court or even today. In the absence of such material it is not possible for me to accept the plea of Shri Manoj Sharma that this Court should interfere with the award of reinstatement passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court. In the absence of such material it is not possible for me to accept the plea of Shri Manoj Sharma that this Court should interfere with the award of reinstatement passed by the learned Judge, Labour Court. I am very much conscious of the fact that the challenge has been made in this writ of certiorary to the award passed by the Labour Court and jurisdiction of this Court is not in the nature of an appellate jurisdiction. The Court can interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court only when it is found that a serious error of law apparent on the face of the record has been committed by the Labour Court, and such error has resulted in manifest injustice. Merely because this Court may on re-appreciation of the evidence placed before the Labour Court or Tribunal came to a different conclusion, it is not open to this Court to interfere with the award, passed by the Labour Court. 22. The last question which requires consideration is as to whether the workman has rightly been awarded full back wages. It is true that the Division Bench of this Court had not permitted the Respondent to lead evidence on the question of gainful employment and the Labour Court has not acted with any grave illegality in not permitting the petitioner to lead evidence in rebuttal but nevertheless it cannot be ignored that the petitioner is an educational institution. The petitioner had produced some documents which indicate that the Respondent workman had made earning during the period of his employment. The award of full back wages will put serious burden on the educational institution like the petitioner and it will affect the working of the institution. It will be, therefore, proper to modify the making of full back wages. Instead of full back wages, the workman shall be entitled to only 75% of the back wages till the date of award. 23. As a result of the above discussion, the Writ Petition is dismissed in so far as challenge to the award of reinstatement of the Respondent workman is concerned. It is partly allowed in respect of the back wages. It is ordered that the workman shall be entitled to 75% of the back wages till the date of award. Regarding future wages the workman will be entitled to proceed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It is partly allowed in respect of the back wages. It is ordered that the workman shall be entitled to 75% of the back wages till the date of award. Regarding future wages the workman will be entitled to proceed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workman shall be paid cost of Rs. 500/-.Petition partly allowed. *******