JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - In this appeal from the District Jail, Phulbani Sikosa alias Sitoda Mallik, hereinafter referred to as the "accused ", calls in question the legality of his convicition for an offence punishable u/s 302 of the India Penal Code, 1860 ('IPC' for short )and sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded by the learned Session Judge, Pulbani. 2. The allegation which led to the trial of accused were that he voluntarily and intentionally caused death of one Tejsa, herein after referred to as the 'deceased' on 3-12-1987 in the evening hours. The background of the case as presented by the prosecution during the trial is on the date of occurrence Mohasa (PW 3) married Tengalu as second wife as per the prevalent tribe custom therefore, he was making arrangement to give feast to his village people. While coming to the village along with bride Tengalu, the groom party arranged for liquor on the way in village Kosabosa for the people who were bringing the girl. At that time one Dandia Mallik (PW 5) appeared there the accused took exception to his presence on the ground that he had not accompanied the marriage party and assaulted him. The deceased intervened and separated the accused and Dandia. As a result, the accused got angry with the deceased and went away. In the evening, when the deceased, PW 3 and his first wife Dagudi were making arrangements for the feast, the accused suddenly appeared there, caught hold of the hair of the deceased with his left hand and dealt blows on his neck by means of a knife with his right hand as a result of which the deceased fell down with blood gushing out and died instantaneously. While some persons who were present at the spot chased the accused, he threatened them also to assault with the said knife and fled away. The matter was reported at the police station on 4-12-1987 and investigation was taken up. The accused took the plea of false implication. 3. Nine witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. Mohan Padra (PW 3), Lasara Mallik(PW 4), Dandia Mallik (PW5) and Sikara Mallik (PW 6) were stated to be the eye-witnesses. However, Sikara Mallik resiled from his earlier statement given before the investigating officer and, therefore, the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine him. 3. Nine witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. Mohan Padra (PW 3), Lasara Mallik(PW 4), Dandia Mallik (PW5) and Sikara Mallik (PW 6) were stated to be the eye-witnesses. However, Sikara Mallik resiled from his earlier statement given before the investigating officer and, therefore, the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine him. Placing reliance on the evidence of PWs 3, 4 and 5 the learned Sessions Judge found the accused guilty and convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid. 4. The learned counsel for the accused, has strenuously urged that the accused was intoxicated. The intoxicant was given to him against his will and, therefore, the consequences of his act or acts were not known to him. Alternatively it was submitted that only one blow was given to the deceased and, therefore, Section 302 IPC is not applicable to the facts of the case. The learned Additional Standing Counsel, on the other hand, supported the findings of the learned Sessions Judge. 5. So far as the intoxication aspect is concerned, the evidence of PW 3 is that the accused did not initially agree to take liquor but on the request of some persons, he took liquor. Except the evidence of PW 6 who had resiled from his earlier statement, there is no other evid ence to show that the accused was so heavily intoxicated that he was not aware of consequences of his act. 6. Section 86 IPC consists of two parts. While the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may possibly be felt by reason of this omisssion. So far as knowledge is concerned, the Court must attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, the Court must gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. The question to be answered is whether the man is beside his mind altogether for the time being ? If so, it will not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about. The question to be answered is whether the man is beside his mind altogether for the time being ? If so, it will not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about. Court has to apply the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts. The distinction must be drawn between motive and intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases, intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is not doubt thin but is no difficult to perceive that they connote different things. These aspects were highlighted by the apex Court in the case of Basdev Vs. The State of Pepsu, . 7. Although one cannot take drunkenness as an excuse for crime, yet when the crime is such that the intention of the party committing it is one of its constituent elements that one has to look at the fact that a man was in drink in considering whether he formed the intention necessary to constitute the crime. A great authority on Criminal Law Stephen. J. postulated the above proposition in Reg v. Doherty, (1887) 16 CCC. 306. 8. The following illuminating words were used by Coleridge, J in Reg v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 CCC 55. "Drunkenness is ordinarily neither a defence nor excuse for a crime, and where it is available as a partial answer to a charge, it rests on the accused to prove it and is not enough that he was excited or rendered more irritable, unless the intoxication was such as to prevent him restraining himself from committing the act in question, or to take away from him the power of forming any specific intention." A person may be so drunk as to be utterly unable to form any intention at all, and yet he may be guilty of very great violence. Such a state of drunkenness may be impossible. Such a state of drunkenness may be impossible. The result of authorities is summarised neatly and compendiously in "Russel on Crimes" Tenth Edition, at page 63 in the following words : "There is a distinction, however, between the defence of insanity in the true sense caused by excessive drunkenness and the defence of drunkenness which produces a condition such that the drunken man's mind becomes incapable of forming a specific intention. If actual insanity in fact supervenes as the result of alcoholic excess it furnishes as complete an answer to a criminal charge as insanity induced by any other cause. But in cases falling short of insanity evidence of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether or not he had this intent, but evidence of drunkenness which falls short of proving such incapacity and merely establishes that the mind of the accused was so affected by drink that he more readily gave way to some violent passion does not rebut the presumption that a man intends the natural consequences of his act." The passage was quoted with approval in Basudev's case (supra), 9. Voluntary intoxication is not a plea which is recognised in law, as an exception to criminal liability. If a man has voluntarily drunk, then, even if he, by reason of his intoxication is, in fact, incapable of knowing the nature of his act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law, he is liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated. His incapacity, which arose by his own act, will not excuse him. 10. The case at hand is one where no evidence has been led to show that the intoxication of the accused was of such magnitude that he did not know the natural and probable consequences of his act or acts. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 86, IPC, is of any assistance to the accused. 11. 10. The case at hand is one where no evidence has been led to show that the intoxication of the accused was of such magnitude that he did not know the natural and probable consequences of his act or acts. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 86, IPC, is of any assistance to the accused. 11. Coming to the alternative plea, we find from the injury as found from the post-mortem examination by the Doctor, PW 2 that one transverse cut throat (stab injury) of the size 2 1/2" x 1/2" with toothy blood stinged discharged situated below the thyroid bone on the front of neck more on the right side cutting through the tricoid cartilage trachea was found. The nature of the injury was such that it is difficult to believe the particular injury was not intended. The force used and the size of the injury does not support the plea of the accused that the death or at least injury of such nature which is likely to cause death was not intended. In our considered opinion, the conviction and sentence are in order. The appeal is dismissed accordingly. D.M. Patnaik, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed