Judgment :- Petitioner in O.P.No. 7186 of 1991 is the appellant. appellant-petitioner is the Board of Directors of the Trivandrum District Co-operative Bank which is a Cooperative Society. For appointment of officers in the Bank, a notification was issued, evidenced by Ext. P2, inviting applications from eligible candidates. The selection was to be made by a written test which is followed by an interview. While the date for the test and interview was fixed, by Ext. P3 order dated 3-7-1991, the Joint Registrar stayed all further proceedings in respect of the appointment, pending an enquiry into a complaint regarding the process of selection. Later, by Ext. P5 order dated 6-7-91, Government also stayed further proceedings in the matter. The writ petition under Art.226 was filed by the appellant to quash Exts. P3 and P5. Petitioner contended that the order Ext. P3 by the Joint Registrar is beyond his power under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (for short, 'the act). Itis the further contention of the petitioner that the appointment of officers in the Bank is an internal matter and the Registrar has no jurisdiction to intefere in that matter under any of the provisions of the Act. 2. The contention on behalf of the respondents was to the effect that under S.66 of the Act, the Registrar has supervisory power over the working and the affairs of every society and it was in exercise of that power that Ext. P3 order was passed. The learned Single Judge accepted the contention of the respondents and held that in such circumstances the Registrar has power to pass an order like Ext. P3, and accordingly dismissed the writ petition. The appeal is against the above judgment. 3. Thus the only question to be decided is as to whether the Registrar has power of jurisdiction to interfere and pass orders like Ext. P3 in the circumstances of the case. S.66 of the Co-operative Societies Act deals with supervision and inspection of the working of every society by the Registrar. S.66(l) (a) is the relevant section and it reads as follows: "66. P3 in the circumstances of the case. S.66 of the Co-operative Societies Act deals with supervision and inspection of the working of every society by the Registrar. S.66(l) (a) is the relevant section and it reads as follows: "66. Supervision and Inspection:--(1)(a) The Registrar shall supervise or cause to be supervised by a person authorised by him by general or special order in writing in this behalf, the working of every society as frequently as he may consider necessary." The above section gives power or authority to the Registrar to supervise the working of every society as frequently as he may consider necessary. The working of the society will definitely include the appointment of necessary officers in the Bank and other ancillary matters and on a plain reading of the Section, we have no hesitation to agree with the learned Single Judge that the appointment of officers in a Co-operative Society is a matter which comes within the purview of S.66 of the Act and the Registrar has the necessary power to supervise the same. In exercise of that power, for effectively supervising the working of the society, certainly he will be entitled to pass appropriate orders which are necessary in the circumstances of the case. 4.. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Kurian v. Joint Registrar (1990 (1) KLT 618) has taken the same view and has held as follows: "It is true that a co-operative society must have freedom of activities. Officers of the Department and the Government are not to take action interfering with the autonomy of the societies. This does not mean that the society can act in any manner ignoring the provisions of the Act and the directions given by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Only when a co-operative society acts within its jurisdiction, in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the general directions by the Registrar, can they claim freedom from interference. When they violate the provisions of the bye-laws and the Act in an arbitrary manner, their actions will be subject to the supervisory control of the authorities under the Act. The committee cannot act against the interest of the society with immunity. If they resort to activities prejudicial to the interest of the society, the Registrar must have the power to curb and curtail their freedom. In the instant case the applications of eligible candidates were rejected. The committee cannot act against the interest of the society with immunity. If they resort to activities prejudicial to the interest of the society, the Registrar must have the power to curb and curtail their freedom. In the instant case the applications of eligible candidates were rejected. Persons who were summoned for written test were not informed of the interview that was to follow the test on the same day. These actions of the board were in violation of the specific directions given by the Registrar. Such actions have gone to materially affect the selection. So, the selection has to be cancelled." On a reading of S.66 and the setting of the other provisions contained in the Act, we are in complete agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid decision and we also accordingly hold that the Registrar has power to pass appropriate orders in the matter of appointment of officers, in exercise of his power under S.66 of the Act. 5. Counsel for the appellant-petitioner relied on two decisions of this Court reported in Shertallai Ubran Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1984 KLT 971) and Kottayam Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1988 (1) KLT 827). In the former case, the Joint Registrar passed orders upgrading the society as a Class II credit society and sanctioned additional posts. But he imposed a condition that appointments to the newly created posts can be made only with his prior approval. It was the validity of this condition that was challenged in that decision and in that context this Court observed that the direction requiring the society to obtain prior approval of the Joint Registrar for appointment of officers and servants of the society is illegal and accordingly the condition or the restriction imposed by that order was quashed. In the latter case, while the process of selection was in progress, a representation was sent to the Government alleging irregularities in the conduct of the test. Thereupon, the Minister for Co-operation ordered that pending disposal of the Petition, the Joint Registrar may be directed to instruct the society not to conduct the interview for making new appointments in the Bank. It was on the basis of this directive that the Joint Registrar issued orders prohibiting the Bank from conducting interview for appointment of certain officers. Thereupon, the Minister for Co-operation ordered that pending disposal of the Petition, the Joint Registrar may be directed to instruct the society not to conduct the interview for making new appointments in the Bank. It was on the basis of this directive that the Joint Registrar issued orders prohibiting the Bank from conducting interview for appointment of certain officers. The propriety of the orders issued by the Government and the Joint Registrar was challenged before this Court and it is in that context that the observations made in that judgment have to be viewed. On a reading of that judgment it is clear that the Joint Registrar did not apply his mind to the facts of the case which necessitated action by him but he merely followed the order of the Minister and passed consequential orders. Under the provisions of the Act, it is for the joint Registrar to exercise the power conferred on him and he is not expected to act under the dictates of the Government. This court quashed his order which cannot be an authority for saying that the Registrar has no power under S.66 of the Act to pass necessary orders in the matter. In that view of the matter, the aforesaid decisions can have no application to the facts of this case. In this case, Ext. P3 order was passed on the basis of a complaint pending enquiry into the allegation made in the petition and it is not based on any direction from the Government. Though Government also passed Ext. P5 order, that was subsequent to the order passed by the Joint Registrar on 3-7-1991 and it cannot be said that the Joint Registrar was influenced by the direction given by the Government. 6. It was further contended by counsel for the appellant that even assuming that the Registrar has power to supervise the working of the society, there is no provision in the Act enabling him to pass interim orders like Ext. P3. We are not inclined to agree with this contention. It is well-settled that any authority on whom a jurisdiction is conferred has got all the power of doing all such acts which are essential and necessary to its proper execution. In other words, every authority which has certain powers has the jurisdiction to pass ancillary orders to effectively exercise the power vested in him. It is well-settled that any authority on whom a jurisdiction is conferred has got all the power of doing all such acts which are essential and necessary to its proper execution. In other words, every authority which has certain powers has the jurisdiction to pass ancillary orders to effectively exercise the power vested in him. The aforesaid position is settled by a long catena of decisions reported in Dharmadas v. S.T.A. Tribunal (1962 KLT 505), MohammedKunhiv. Income Tax Officer (1965 KLT 1055), I.T. Officer v. Mohd. Kunhi (AIR 1969 S.C. 430) and George v. Thressia (1992 (1) KLT 65:1992 (1) KLJ 79). Even an administrative authority can exercise such ancillary powers to give effect to the power conferred on him by a statute. The following principle stated by Craies on Statute Law is apposite in this context: "If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail to be carried out. Thus, in Cookson v. Lee (1854) 23 L.J.Ch. 473,475, Lord Cran Worth L.C, a private Act vested certain lands in trustees for the purpose of enabling them to sell the lands for building purposes, but the Act contained no express power to expend any portion of the purchase moneys in setting out the lands or in making roads. In these circumstances the court held that, having regard to the object of the Act, namely such power ought to be implied". In Sutherland on Statutory Construction, III Edition, Volume 3, the learned author said as follows: - "Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implications/fed States v. Sircho, 262 U.S.165, 67 L.Ed. 92.43 Sup. Cl. 511 (1923) That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed, State v. Nestos (48 N.D. 894,187 N.W. 233, 235 (1922)". 7. 92.43 Sup. Cl. 511 (1923) That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed, State v. Nestos (48 N.D. 894,187 N.W. 233, 235 (1922)". 7. In view of the above principles, we have no hesitation to hold that to effectively exercise the power conferred under S.66 of the Co-operative Societies Act, the Registrar has got the necessary power to pass such ancillary or interlocutory orders. In this case, a complaint has been made on the method of appointment chosen by the appellant-society and by Ext. P3 order the Joint Registrar has only stayed further proceedings pending enquiry. That is well within his jurisdiction and we do not find any reason to interfere with that discretion exercised by the Joint Registrar and accordingly we do not find any reason to quash Ext. P3. 8. But so far as Ext. P5 is concerned, it is an order passed by Government. We were not shown any authority or jurisdiction for the Government to pass such an order under any of the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act. In that view of the matter it has to be held that Ext. P5 order passed by Government is without jurisdiction. But that will not be of any assistance to the petitioner as Ext. P3 order was validly passed by the Joint Registrar. 9. The process of selection of officers in the Bank has already started and by Ext. P3 order dated 3-7-1991, it is stayed by the 3rd respondent. In these circumstances, we direct the 3rd respondent to make an enquiry into the matter and pass appropriate order as expeditiously as possible. 10. Subject to the above direction, the Writ Appeal is dismissed.