BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE respondent No. 1, Amarsing Pratapsing, aged about 24 (original claimant) filed a claim petition under the provisions of Sec. 110a of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (mv Act" for short), and claimed compensation for an amount of Rs, 1,50,000 for the personal injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident, which occurred, on 24-8-1980, against the respondent No. 2-original opponent No. 1 (driver), respondent No. 3 originalopponent no. 3 (owner) and the appellant-original opponent No. 3 (insurer) in respect of offending truck, G. T. K. 3393. They are hereinafter referred to as the original claimant and original opponents for the sake of convenience and brevity. ( 2 ) THE truck in question was proceeding from Bombay to Dabhoi at the relevant point of time and it was driven by original opponent No. 1- kanchanbhai Chhaganbhai, as driver of the owner, original opponent No. 2, pratapsing Lonasing, who is the father of the claimant. The truck was insured with original opponent No. 3. The said truck turned turtle near Borvad village in Pardi Taluka and it fell in a pit. The claimant who was travelling in hie said truck as relief driver at the relevant time had sustained severe injuries on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the original opponent no. 1. ( 3 ) THE claimant, inter alia, contended that he sustained serious injuries on abdomen region. There was fracture of pelvis and urethra was ruptured. He was admitted in S. S. G. Hospital, Baroda, on 26-8-1980 and came to be discharged on 16-9-1980. Even after discharge from the hospital, there was dripping of urine and the claimant was suffering from acute pain due to rupture of urethra. Complications had also arisen so far as pelvis and urethra were concerned. He was also treated at Dabhoi and as there was no improvement he was shifted to Baroda in a private hospital of Dr. Satish shah where cathedral was inserted in the urethra after the operation was performed. The claimant remained in the clinic of Dr. Shah for a long time thereafter he was also treated in a neurological clinic. A tube was required to be inserted for passing of urine and the claimant had to undergo dilation treatmen in the hospital, at Nadiad. Satish shah where cathedral was inserted in the urethra after the operation was performed. The claimant remained in the clinic of Dr. Shah for a long time thereafter he was also treated in a neurological clinic. A tube was required to be inserted for passing of urine and the claimant had to undergo dilation treatmen in the hospital, at Nadiad. ( 4 ) IT was also the case of the claimant that he was not able to work on account of permanent partial disablement. Therefore, the claimant claimed rs. 1,50,000 by way of compensation for the personal injuries from the opponents. ( 5 ) THE original opponent No. 1 did not file separate written statement. The opponent No. 2, owner of the offending truck, did not appear and resist the claim petition. The original opponent No. 3, insurer, appeared and resisted the claim by filing written statement, at Exh. 22. The allegations made in the claim petition were traversed and controverted by the Insurance Company. It was also pleaded that there was collusion between the claimant and the owner of the offending truck. ( 6 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances and the evidence on record, the Tribunal was pleased to hold that the claimant had sustained injuries on account of rash and negligent driving on the part of the original opponent no. 1, driver of the offending truck G. T. K. 3393. The Tribunal found that the claimant had sustained permanent partial disablement and serious injuries on urethra. Considering the nature and number of injuries, the age and avocation of the claimant and the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 1,00,000 with proportionate costs and interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the application till realisation, against the opponents. ( 7 ) BEING aggrieved by the said judgment and award, the original opponent, insurer, has conic up before this Court, in this Civil Appeal, challenging the legality and validity, by invoking the aids of provisions of Sec. HOD of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939; ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has raised two following contentions : (1) the finding of the Tribunal- that the claimant is entitled to compensation is erroneous, and (2) in the alternative, the amount of compensation awarded to the tune of rs. 1,00,000 is excessive. 1,00,000 is excessive. ( 9 ) IN so far as the first contc-mion is concerned, it is argued that the claimant was neither a cleaner nor a driver in the offending truck at the relevant time and, therefore, the Insurance Company would not be liable for payment of compensation. It is also contented that the claimant is the son of the original opponent No. 2, owner of the offending truck, and therefore, there was a collusion. Such a contention is totally meritless in the facts and circumstances of the present case. No specific issue was raised before the tribunal. Apart Horn that we are of the opinion that the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the insurer in this behalf is without any substance. In this connection following admitted facts may be enumerated : (1) that the claimant was admittedly tiuvellin,; in the drivers cabin on the day of the unfortunate accident, and (2) claimant had sustained serious injuries on account of the accident, in question. ( 10 ) THOUGH no specific , int or issue was in focus before the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the contention of the insurer that there was a collusion is far from truth. There is no reason to disbelieve the version of the claimant, who has sustained serious injuries and whose bodily frame is, substantially, disintegrated, that he WES travelling in the offending truck at the relevant point of time as a reserve driver. Either he was travelling as a driver or as a cleaner or as a labourer in the offending truck. It is nobodys case that the claimant was travelling in the offending truck as a gratuitous passanger. Needless to reiterate that the claimant is the son of the owner of the truck. However, that fact by itself would not be sufficient to jump to the conclusion that there was a collusion and that the claimant was not travelling as a reserved driver in the offending truck at the relevant point of time, as contended by the insurer. In our opinion, such a contention is, totally, meritless and deserves to be rejected. Therefore, the first contention raised on behalf of the insurer that the claimant is not entitled to compensation is devoid of any force. Hence it is rejected. In our opinion, such a contention is, totally, meritless and deserves to be rejected. Therefore, the first contention raised on behalf of the insurer that the claimant is not entitled to compensation is devoid of any force. Hence it is rejected. ( 11 ) NEXT it will bring into the focus the question of the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. Ordinarily, we would not have permitted the insurer, the appellant herein, to agitate this point but for the allegation of collusion we have gone into the merits of the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal and we have found that the approach of the Tribunal in determining the amount of compensation at Rs. 1,00,000 is not only moderate but is conservative. The claimant claimed an amount of Rs. 1,50,000 and the Tribunal awarded only Rs. 1,00. 000. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the Tribunal has taken very conservative view. Therefore, it cannot be contended even for a moment that the amount of compensation of Rs. 1,00,000 awarded by the Tribunal is in any way excessive or harsh. ( 12 ) WE cannot resist the temptation of mentioning that the claimant has sustained serious injuries and permanent partial disablement on account of rupture on urethra. Initially the claimant was examined in S. S. G. Hospital, at Baroda, after the accident, on 27-8-1980. and the following injuries were noticed : (1) Complain of pain in the lumber region, (2) Pain and tenderness in hypogestrium and left illiac fossa, (3) History of hematuria contusion of bladder and urethra. X-ray was taken and X-ray plate revealed the fractures of both pubic rammi with fracture of right ischium. ( 13 ) THE claimant was discharged on 16-9-1980 from the hospital. He was again admitted in the hospital on 13-10-1980 as complaint persisted. The case papers are produced, at Ex. 59. It is very clear from the medical evidence on record that the claimant has difficulty in passing the urine. In fact, it is clear from the evidence on record that he was required to pass urine frequently. Blood was also coming alongwith urine after the accident. On radiological examination it was found there were fractures on both pubic rammi and right ischium. The claimant had also to take treatment at Nadiad for urethra injury. The claimant had undergone optical urethrotomy treatment and he needs regular follow up in future. Blood was also coming alongwith urine after the accident. On radiological examination it was found there were fractures on both pubic rammi and right ischium. The claimant had also to take treatment at Nadiad for urethra injury. The claimant had undergone optical urethrotomy treatment and he needs regular follow up in future. The claimant was also treated in Sarvajanik hospital, Surat. It is found from the medical papers of Surat Hospital that the claimant had serious complaint in passing urine and there was considerable frequency of urination. The claimant also finds difficulty in sexual intercourse. There was dramatic stricture of membrane of urethra for which he was required to go for periodical dilatation. It is found from the evidence that such treatment is required for the whole life. The radiological reports are produced, at Exs. 61 and 62. There is clear medical evidence to show that there is substantial rupture of urethra and until operation was carried out the claimant was passing urine with blood. There is also clear medical evidence on record that the claimant will have difficulty in passing urine and will have difficulty in enjoyment of sex. Thus, the claimant who is a youngman of 24 years will have to undergo substantial physical pain, shock and suffering for a longer period. In fact he is a living victim of a violent accident. ( 14 ) IN view of the evidence on record, the award of Rs. 40,000 under the head of pain, shock and sufferings and loss of enjoyment of life and the amount of Rs. 60,000 under the head of pecuniary loss, cannot be said to be excessive at all. Therefore, the second contention raised on behalf of the appellant is also required to be rejected. ( 15 ) UNFORTUNATELY, in a case where the claimant is awarded an amount of Rs. 1,00,000 interest only at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the application till realisation was awarded from the opponents. Crossobjections are not filed. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the powers of this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code ("code" for short) should be exercised in absence of cross-objections so as to enhance the rate of interest. Crossobjections are not filed. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the powers of this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code ("code" for short) should be exercised in absence of cross-objections so as to enhance the rate of interest. The learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that this is not a fit case wherein this Court should exercise its discretion to enhance the rate of interest from 6% per annum on the amount of compensation. Thus, it is submitted that this is not a fit case where the Tribunal has failed to exercise, the discretion for award of interest. In otherwords, it is contended that mere award of lesser rate of interest cannot be said to be a sufficient ground so as to call for the exercise of powers of this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code. This submission is, seriously, controverted by the learned Counsel for the claimant. ( 16 ) AT this stage, we would like to refer to the provisions of Order 41 rule 33 of the Code which read as under : 33. The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees : provided that the Appellate Court shall not make any order under Sec. 35a, in pursuance of any objection on which the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has omitted or refused to make such order. " ( 17 ) IT becomes very clear from the aforesaid provisions that the appellate Court is empowered to grant adequate relief so as to do substantial justice between the parties even in absence of cross-objections or appeal. " ( 17 ) IT becomes very clear from the aforesaid provisions that the appellate Court is empowered to grant adequate relief so as to do substantial justice between the parties even in absence of cross-objections or appeal. Considering the scope of this Rule and the factual scenario emerging from the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the rate of interest is required to be upwardly revised even in absence of cross-objections or appeal at the instance of the original claimant, while exercising the powers of this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code. Rule 33 is, primarily, intended to confer power upon the appellate Court to do justice by granting relief to a party who has not appealed. We are reminded of the observations made by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Municipal Board, Mount abu v. Hari Lal, reported in 1988 0 ACJ 281 :"should the Courts be silent spectators and feel helpless and impotent by not redressing injustice and by tolerating such grave injustice, simply because due to the human values for compensation which could be valied and imagined by the advocate drafting the petition were too low or the appellants inability to pay the court-fees which may be a more tangible ground for putting the reduced claim. Inadequate claim has been made at both levels of the original Court and the appeal. I have repeatedly observed in various decisions, e g , Pista Aggsarwals fast and Kao Dheer Singhs case that in adjudicating compensation cases, the claim case should not be considered like those of easement or mortgage or property dispute. For Social Welfare legislation of a State wedded to socialism and the constitutioat focus is on social injustice not only in the preamble, but in directive principles which are to be enforced by passing legislation like Fatal Accidents act or Motor Vehicles Act or other alike social welfare statutes the approach should be humanistic, liberal, non-technical and equitable. "the underlying purport and design of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 would clearly go to show that the Parliament has enacted such a provision with a view that the Court could rise to the occasion and render substantial justice between the parties even in absence of cross-objections or appeal. "the underlying purport and design of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 would clearly go to show that the Parliament has enacted such a provision with a view that the Court could rise to the occasion and render substantial justice between the parties even in absence of cross-objections or appeal. Thus, the framers of the Code, who had hardly any concept of social justice then in that period of 1908 had enacted under Order 41 Rule 33 that even if the appellant may not have made a perfect claim the Court should not become silent spectator and remain impotent to give appropriate relief to one who rightly deserves the potentiality. All the Courts should deliver justice according to the needs of the litigants and the circumstances emerging from the evidence on record, has been thus recognised by the provisions incorporated in Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code. Therefore, in absence of the cross-objections by the claimant, this Court can invoke the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 even if required, suo motu, and enhance the compensation or rate of interest. In the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Tuisi Devi, reported in 1988 0 ACJ 962, it was held by the Rajasthan High Court that under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code, the appellate Court can saddle the insurer with enhanced liability. ( 18 ) IN the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Kamalabai, reported in 1989 0 ACJ 750, where the claimants neither filed an appeal nor preferred cross-objection but urged the appellate Court to grant higher rate of interest taking aids of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code. It would be appropriates to reproduce the relevant observations of the Bombay high Court :"it is well settled that provisions of Order 41, Rule 33 of the Code can be resorted to "ex debits justifies", i. e. , to do justice between the parties in exceptional cases by varying the decree in favour of the respondents although they might not have preferred any appeal against the decree. " ( 19 ) IN the case of Soneram v. Jayaprakash, reported in AIR 1986 MP 21 , the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Order 41 Rule 33 of the code enhanced the compensation granted by the Tribunal even though no appeal was preferred by the claimant. " ( 19 ) IN the case of Soneram v. Jayaprakash, reported in AIR 1986 MP 21 , the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Order 41 Rule 33 of the code enhanced the compensation granted by the Tribunal even though no appeal was preferred by the claimant. Similarly, in the case of Sewaram alias sewan v. Nanhe Khan all Asgar Beg, reported in 1987 0 ACJ 354, the high Court of Madhya Pradesh awarded 10% interest on the compensation amount in absence of appeal or cross-objection by the claimants. Likewise, rajasthan High Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Manumaii Mahamia, reported in 1987 0 ACJ 1045, enhanced the. rate of interest to 12% instead of 6% granted by the Tribunal from the date of the application till realisation. ( 20 ) IN our opinion, the powers granted under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code are widest in amplitude and could be exercised in favour of the respondents notwithstanding that the respondents or claimants have not filed any cross-objection or appeal. The power of the Tribunal to award interest is provided in Sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (corresponding Sec. 110cc of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939), where any Court or Claims Tribunal allows claim for compensation made under this Act, such court or Tribunal, may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation, simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date but not earlier than making such application in this behalf. Thus, a wide discretion is given to the Tribunal for awarding rate of interest while granting the amount of compensation. Motor Vehicles Act is, undoubtedly, a welfare legislation. Needless to reiterate that whenever unfortunate victims of road accident or the dependants of the deceased victims, enter the thresholds of the Court for justice, they should not be over-burdened with the technicalities or strict pleadings of the law applicable in other Civil cases. In fact, most of the accident victims in our country are pedestrians or cyclists, and most of them are illiterate and come from poor strata of the society and suffering from poverty and ignorance. In fact, most of the accident victims in our country are pedestrians or cyclists, and most of them are illiterate and come from poor strata of the society and suffering from poverty and ignorance. Considering the benevolence in the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the cases on hand, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal has, seriously, erred in awarding rate of interest of 6% only in a serious case of disintegration of the bodily frame of the claimant. . ( 21 ) IN view of the facts and circumstances and aforesaid proposition of law, we are convinced that this is a fit case, wherein, the rate of interest should be revised upwardly and enhanced even in absence of appeal or cross-objection by the original claimant, who is a living victim of the violent accident. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Diwan-chandra gupta, reported in 1989 0 ACJ 320, the Madhya Pradesh High Court was pleased to enhance the rate of interest from 6% to 12% from the date of the application till payment even without cross-objection. Without any cross-objection, in an appeal at the instance of the insurer, like one on hand, interest was directed to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the application by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Limited v. Shakuntia Bai, reported in 1987 0 ACJ 224. Similar view was taken by the Gauhati High Court in the case of United India Fire and General Insurance Company Limited v. Malati bala, reported in 1985 (1) Gau. LR 443. In that case the award of the tribunal was faulted by the High Court for not giving reasons for awarding only 6% interest and not higher interest, taking the view that the Tribunal had committed jurisdiction al error in doing so and that could be corrected by the High Court without cross-objection of the claimant-respondent. ( 22 ) THE Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, in to the case of prakramchand v. Chuttan alias Alim and Ors. ( 22 ) THE Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court, in to the case of prakramchand v. Chuttan alias Alim and Ors. , reported in 1991 0 ACJ 1051 , held in an appeal under Sec. HOD of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that high Court can act without cross-objection and enhance the interest to 12% per annum from the date of the application till realisation on the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. In this decision, the Full Bench has considered relevant provisions of law including the special provisions under the Motor vehicles Act, 1939, for filing appeal under Sec. HOD (corresponding Sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ). We arc in complete agreement with this decision that the appellate Court even in an appeal under Sec. HOD of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (Sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), is empowered under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code for enhancement of compensation or rate of interest even in absence of any crossobjection or appeal Section 110cc of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and corresponding Sec. 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provide for the award of interest on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. It would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Sec. 171 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988, which read as under :"171. Award a/interest where any claim is allowed : where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this act, such Tribunal may direct that in additicn to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. " ( 23 ) THE view which "we are inclined to take is also very much reinforced by the decision of the Apex Court, rendered in the case of narcinva V. Kamat v. Alfredo Antonio Deo Martins, reported in 1985 ACJ 397. In that case the Supreme Court awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum despite there being no cross-objection of the claimants. In that case the Supreme Court awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum despite there being no cross-objection of the claimants. In short, when the appellate Court finds that the Tribunal has failed to exercise discretion or has erred in exercise of the discretion, then in that case, the appellate Court is empowered to grant appropriate relief in respect of compensation or in respect of rate of interest. It would be interesting to refer to the observations made by the Full Bench of the Madhya pradesh High Court in the case of "prakramchand" (supra) as under : "11. Obviously, the view which has ronsislently prevailed with the Summit Court on the interpretation of Sec. 110-CC is that Claims Tribunal, and in appeal the High court also, in determining the compensation payable to the claimant preferred by application under Sec. 110-A of the Act, ought to awaid, in addition to the compensation, simple interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application. By holding so, their Lordships have expressed the view that non-exercise or improper exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal or High Court under Sec. 110-CC taints the award made in regard to the compensation. Reason for that is not far to seek as Sec. 11occ vests jurisdiction in Tribunal to make direction in regard to interest payable to the claimant "in addition to 1he amount of compensation" determined. They also purport to hold that it is the duty of the Claims Tribunal and the High Court to specify the rate of interest and the date from which that becomes payable and that is discharged by specifying the interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum and the date of, payment as from the date of application, that mandate, in our view, in regard to interpretation of Sec. 110-CC has become the law of the land, as contemplated under Art. 141 of the constitution and that is binding on all Courts in India. We are buttressed in this conclusion noticing the emerging trend at the summit level. We are buttressed in this conclusion noticing the emerging trend at the summit level. In a recent decision rendered on 3-5-1990 in the case of Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Sitifh, 1990 ACJ 777 (SC), the view taken is that for award of interest, no pleading is necessary, while in the decision rendered on 15-11-89, in the case of R. L. Gupta v. Jupiter General Insurance company, 1990 ACJ 280 (SC), in categorical terms, the Apex Court observed that"there have been several orders of this Court in recent cases in compensation disputes where the Court has awarded 12 per cent interesi" and on that ground, their Lordships raised interest also from 6 per cent to 12 per cent while enhancing the compensation. " ( 24 ) IN view of the aforesaid circumstances and the settled proposition of law, we are of the clear opinion that this is a fit and appropriate case wherein the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal at 6% per annum is required to be upwardly revised and enhanced so as to make the award of compensation just and reasonable. ( 25 ) NOW the question would arise as to what rate of interest should be awarded to the claimant in absence of cross-objection while dismissing the appeal. This Division Bench recently in the case of Mohanbhal Gemabhai v. Balubhai savjibhai (Civil Appeal No. 1316 of 1981) 28-9-1992 (reported in 1993 (1) GLR 249 ), has taken a view that the rate of interest should be 15% instead of 12%. In the said Division Bench decision of this Court has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of "rukmani Devi v. Om Prakasli" reported in 1991 0 ACJ 3. In that case the Supreme Court was pleased to award interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the application till realisation. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case while exercising the powers of appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code and considering the provisions of Sec. 110cc of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (corresponding sec. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case while exercising the powers of appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code and considering the provisions of Sec. 110cc of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (corresponding sec. 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), we are of the opinion that the rate of interest at 6% awarded by the Tribunal on the amount of compensation is required to be enhanced at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the application till realisation although the claimant has not filed cross-objection or appeal against the rate of interest awarded by the Tribunal. ( 26 ) IN the result, while dismissing this appeal, it is directed that the rate of interest of 6% per annum awarded by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the extent of 15% per annum from the date of the application till realisation, on the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. ( 27 ) BEFORE parting, we may clarify that the rate of interest at 15% per annum substituted in place of 6% as awarded by the Tribunal shall apply from the date of application till the amount is realised or paid and obviously the amount of interest paid earlier, if any, at the rate of 6% per annum shall be deducted from the amount of interest on the said amount of compensation. ( 28 ) THE amount of enhanced rate of interest awarded on the amount of compensation from the date of the application till payment is directed to be deposited in Fixed Deposit Receipt in a Nationalised Bank or in any security of the choice of the claimant for a period of not less than 72 months and the claimant shall not be entitled to create any charge or encumbrance thereon without prior approval of the Tribunal. Of course, the claimant shall be entitled to the interest which shall accrue due thereon periodically. It was contended that the claimant is not paid interest on the amount of the Fixed Deposit Receipts already invested in the bank and, therefore, some directions should be given at this stage. We do not propose to give any direction at this stage except observing that it will be open for the claimant to move the Tribunal concerned for appropriate direction by way of an application with reasons which will be examined by the Tribunal on merits. We do not propose to give any direction at this stage except observing that it will be open for the claimant to move the Tribunal concerned for appropriate direction by way of an application with reasons which will be examined by the Tribunal on merits. It will be open for the Tribunal to pass appropriate orders on merits on such an application as and when preferred. ( 29 ) IN the net result, the impugned judgment and award except to the aforesaid extent of substitution of rate of interest shall stand confirmed, with no order as to costs. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. .