JUDGMENT - H.W. DHABE, J.:---Parties by Counsel. Rule heard forthwith. 2. The petitioner has challenged in this writ petition the acquisition of land made by the respondents for the extension of Gaothan. Two contentions are raised before us. The first contention is that the notification issued under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short, "the Act") is beyond the period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. The other contention raised before us is that no hearing was accorded to the petitioner in the respect of the objection raised under section 5-A of the Act. 3. The facts are that the notification dated 22-8-1990 under section 4 of the Act was published in the Government Gazette on 14-2-1991. It is not in dispute that the last date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act is the date of the Government Gazette. Section 6 notification was thereafter issued on 20-1-1992 and the same was published in the Government Gazette and the newspaper on 30-1-1992 and its public notice was given on 25-3-1992. 4. The submission on the basis of the above facts is that the notification under section 6 of the Act is last published by the public notice on 25-3-1992 which is the date beyond one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act i.e. 14-2-1991. The question to be considered is as to the interpretation of the second proviso to section 6(1) of the Act. The said provides to section 6(1) reads as follows : "Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by notification under section 4 sub-section (1).....(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the notification." 5. The question which arises for consideration is that the meaning of the expression "made" is in Clause (ii) of the aforesaid proviso. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it means the publication of the notification under section 6(1) of the Act, which according to sub-section (2) is the last of the dates of such publications required to be made under the said section. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it means the publication of the notification under section 6(1) of the Act, which according to sub-section (2) is the last of the dates of such publications required to be made under the said section. In support, he has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh and others)1, reported in (1991)4 Supreme Court Cases 368 to show that after holding that the Land Acquisition Act as amended from time to time, would be applicable in the case of acquisition of land under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922, the Supreme Court has relied upon the date of publication of the notification under section 6 of the Act to hold that the notification issued under the said Act was beyond the period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act. 6. Perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court cited supra would show that the Supreme Court has not construed Clause (ii) of the Proviso to section 6(1) and in particular the meaning of the expression "made" thereunder which question does not appear to have been raised in the said case in which the principal question raised and considered by the Supreme Court is whether the Land Acquisition Act, as amended from time to time, is applicable to the acquisitions made under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922. It is however, pertinent to see that in the case of (Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P and others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1976 Supreme Court 417, the Supreme Court has directly considered as to what the expression "declaration made" used in section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act means. It is held in para 26 of the said judgment that the declaration and publication are two different things and what is relevant for the purpose of Clause (ii) of the proviso to section 6(1) is the making of declaration. Similar view is also taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Shivgonda Bulgonda Patil others v. The Director of Resettlement and others)3, reported in 1992(1) Bombay Cases Reporter 177 para 15. 7. Similar view is also taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Shivgonda Bulgonda Patil others v. The Director of Resettlement and others)3, reported in 1992(1) Bombay Cases Reporter 177 para 15. 7. In the instant case, it is clear that the date of declaration of the notification under section 6 is 20-1-1992 which is within one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act i.e. 14-2-1991. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the notification under section 6(1) of the Act is beyond the period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4 of the Act cannot than be accepted. 8. The other contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that no opportunity was given to her in respect of her objections under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. 9. We have perused the relevant order sheets of the learned Land Acquisition Officer. The petitioner had filed the objections under section 5-A of the Act on 22-8-1991. Thereafter, the case was fixed by the learned Land Acquisition Officer for spot inspection. It appears from the order of the learned Land Acquisition Officer dated 31-8-1991 that he had directed that notice should be given to the landholder and the Talathi, but no notice was given to the landholder about the spot inspection. Further, the order sheets would show that the learned Land Acquisition Officer, on many occasions, was busy in other matter. Persual of the order sheets would also show that the next date was not the same which was given on the previous date. Ultimately, the matter was adjourned to 6-7-1981 on 11-1-1981, on which date, the learned Land Acquisition Officer inspected the spot and immediately sent his report to the Commissioner for issuance of notification under section 6 of the Act. It is therefore clear that no hearing was granted to the petitioner in respect of her objections under section 5-A of the Act. 10. The learned Counsel for the State has urged before us that the objections under section 5-A were not raised in time. However, it is clear from the order sheets that the said objections were entertained by the learned Land Acquisition Officer. No effect can therefore be given to the above objection raised as behalf of the State. 11. 10. The learned Counsel for the State has urged before us that the objections under section 5-A were not raised in time. However, it is clear from the order sheets that the said objections were entertained by the learned Land Acquisition Officer. No effect can therefore be given to the above objection raised as behalf of the State. 11. Is the result, the ground raised, about the opportunity not being granted to the petitioner in respect of her objections under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act is well founded and has to be upheld. The instant writ petition is thus allowed and the impugned notification under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is set aside. Rule made absolute in the above terms. No costs. Writ petition allowed.