Shyamal Kumar Chakraborty v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL — 1992 DIGILAW 331 (CAL)

Judgment 1. THE petitioner herein is an accused in G. R. Case No. 389 of 1980 under Section 406 I. P. C, of the Court of the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar, Nadia. That case relates to Kotwali P. S. Case No. 3 dated 1-2-1980. The police investigation into the case was not completed even in April, 1990. In the meantime, the Code of Criminal Procedure (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1988 came into force with effect from the 2nd May, 1989. Assent of the President of India to the said act was published in the extra-ordinary Calcutta Gazette dated 14th March, 1989. Sub-section (2) of section 1 of the said Amendment Act provides that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may, by notification in the official gazette, appoint. The Amendment Act, as noted above, was accordingly brought into force with effect from the 2nd May of 1989. Section 4 of the said Amendment Act substitutes sub-section (5) of section 167 cr. P. C. by a new sub-section (5) which runs thus : "(5) if in respect of - (i) any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months, or (ii) any case exclusively triable by court of session or a case under chapter XVIII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the investigation is not concluded within a period of three years, or (iii) any case other than those mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii), the investigation is not concluded within a period of two years. from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence and shall discharge the accused unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the periods mentioned in this sub-section is necessary". Prior to the above substitution sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. Prior to the above substitution sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P. C. stood thus: "(5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months, from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation Of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary". 2. AN offence punishable under section 406 I. P. C. in respect of which the investigation was going on against the petitioner on the date on which the aforesaid substituted provisions of sub-section (5) of section 167 came into force falls within the category mentioned in clause (iii) of the said substituted sub-section (5) and the period of limitation for concluding the investigation in such a case is two years from the date of arrest or appearance of the accused in case the said substituted sub-section (5) becomes applicable to the case. On an application submitted by the petitioner accused the learned Magistrate by his order dated 17-4-90 discharged the petitioner under section 167 (5) Cr. P. C. as the investigation could not be yet completed although two years had already elapsed since the petitioner appeared before the learned Magistrate on 19-3-90 after he was granted anticipatory bail. The learned Sessions Judge, however, set aside the order of the learned Magistrate mainly on the ground that the Amendment Act. 1988 has no retrospective effect and therefore the investigation in this case would not be affected by the substituted provisions of sub-section (5) of section 167. The primary question which awaits decision of his court on this revisional application is whether the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P. C. is attracted to this case. Before the said West Bengal Amendment Act came into force the sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C, was applicable only to cases triable as summons case and the period of limitation for conclusion of the investigation from the date of the arrest of the accused in such a case was six months. Before the said West Bengal Amendment Act came into force the sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C, was applicable only to cases triable as summons case and the period of limitation for conclusion of the investigation from the date of the arrest of the accused in such a case was six months. The magistrate was however empowered to allow the investigation even beyond the period of six months if the Investigating Officer could satisfy him that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months was necessary. There was no period of limitation for other cases, namely, cases which were not triable as summons case. The substituted provisions enacted by the Amendment Act made no change in the period of limitation for conclusion of investigation in respect of cases triable as summons case. The change in respect of the provision relating to summons case was that under the former provision the date from which the period of limitation was to start was marked as the date on which the accused was arrested but under the substituted sub-section this date has been marked as the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance. The other change in respect of the provision concerning summons procedure case is that while under the former provision of sub-section (5) the Magistrate on expiry of the period of six months was required to stop further investigation, in the substituted sub-section besides passing the order stopping further investigation the Magistrate is required further to pass an order discharging the accused. 3. IN the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 provisions, which are altogether new, have been enacted regarding the periods of limitation for conclusion of investigation in respect of other offences which are not triable as summons case in respect of which there was no period of limitation earlier. Therefore, even if the substituted provision relating to the investigation of summons case offences is treated as repealing and re-enacting the earlier provision regarding the investigation of summons case offences with some nominal modification the enactment of the provisions concerning the investigation of. other cases which are not summons procedure cases introduces altogether new provisions which, truly speaking, neither amends any existent provision except by adding something thereto nor repeals any earlier provision or enactment. other cases which are not summons procedure cases introduces altogether new provisions which, truly speaking, neither amends any existent provision except by adding something thereto nor repeals any earlier provision or enactment. In view of the several decisions of this court including some division Bench decisions, such as, Pappa Rao vs. The State 1985 (1) CHN 1 , ramkumar vs. The State (1981 Cr. I. L. J. 1288. Jay Sankar Jha vs. The State (A. I. R. 1982 Cr. I. L. J. 744), Rambriksh vs. The State (1983 Cr. I. L. J. 39), Ali hossain vs. The State 1979 (1) CHN 210 . the position now is that the continuation of the investigation beyond the period prescribed under section 167 (5) is not permissible unless the Investigating Officer satisfies the Magistrate within the said period of limitation that the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of limitation is necessary for special reasons and in the interests of justice and that the Magistrate cannot pass an order after the expiry of the period of limitation extending the time for completion of investigation. 4. THE question that poses now is whether the substituted provisions of sub-section (5) of section 167 have retrospective effect and at any rate whether these provisions shall apply to the proceedings pending on the date on which the said substituted sub-section (5) came into force. In this connection at the very outset it however should be made clear that so far as the investigation of summons cases is concerned the question whether the substituted provision relating to the same will have retrospective effect or not is inconsequential inasmuch as the earlier provision of sub-section (5) also prescribed the period of limitation for conclusion of investigation in summons cases as six months and the said period of limitation has been retained in the substituted provision also for summons cases. Therefore, the investigations in respect of summons cases which were earlier governed by the original sub-section (5) were amenable to the six month period of limitation subject to extension in suitable cases, irrespective of the question whether the new provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) are retrospective or not. Therefore, the investigations in respect of summons cases which were earlier governed by the original sub-section (5) were amenable to the six month period of limitation subject to extension in suitable cases, irrespective of the question whether the new provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) are retrospective or not. Similarly investigations in respect of summons cases which were pending on the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) came into force would obviously be governed by the law of limitation of six months and the investigation in any such case which was already pending on the date of the coming into force of the substituted sub-section (5) would be subject to the earlier provision as well as the new provision that the investigation will have to be stopped if it could not be completed within six months from the date of arrest of the accused unless the magistrate had before the expiry of the said period of six months permitted the continuation of investigation beyond the said period for any special reasons and in the interests of justice. The problem is regarding the investigation in cases which were not summons cases but which were pending on the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 came into force with altogether new provisions introducing periods of limitation for conclusion of investigation. If the substituted sub-section is held to be retrospective, in that case the newly enacted provisions relating to periods of limitation for conclusion of investigation in respect of non-summons cases will also apply to investigations which were pending on the date on which the substituted provisions came into force. But if this sub-section is not retrospective even then the question may still subsist whether the newly prescribed periods of limitation will be applicable to such pending investigations regarding non-summons cases. 5. WE now embark upon the question as to whether the new provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 167 so far the same relate to non-summons cases are retrospective in operation and if so what will be the manner or extent of application of the same. In a very recent decision of this Court rendered by a single Bench in Mohan Mukherjee vs. The State, 1992 C. Cr. L. R. (Cal) 211, the question that fell for consideration of the court was whether Section 167 (5)Cr. In a very recent decision of this Court rendered by a single Bench in Mohan Mukherjee vs. The State, 1992 C. Cr. L. R. (Cal) 211, the question that fell for consideration of the court was whether Section 167 (5)Cr. P. C, was applicable to the cases where charge-sheets had been submitted as far back as in December, 1984. In that decision the learned Judge while referring to the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 cr. P. C. observed thus: the amending Act which introduced Section 167 (5) in the Code of criminal Procedure contains nothing to suggest even remotely that retrospective operation should be given to this provision. This section embodies substantially a rule of limitation and it should be generally regarded as prospective in its operation, as otherwise the space of time which is essential for its operation would consist in part, of time passed -before the act. This will clearly lead to an absurd situation as it would prejudicially affect the investigating agency regarding the time available to it to conclude an investigation and may even affect the legality of past investigations. No authority in this regard has also been produced on behalf of the petitioners. In such circumstances there is no question of holding that Section 167 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has retrospective effect". With respect I agree with the observation of the learned Judge that Section 167 (5) embodies substantially a rule of limitation. I also agree that it will lead to an absurd situation if the enactment is given retrospective operation so as to affect a concluded investigation where the investigation had been concluded before the substituted sub-section (5) frame into force. The reason is plain. The substituted sub-section (5) refers or relates to investigation in its pendency. It obviously does not refer or relate to cases where the investigation had already been concluded and charge-sheet submitted before the advent of the new sub-section (5. If the investigation were at all pending on the date on which the new6ub-section (5) came into force there was no question of applying the said sub-section to any investigation in its pendency. It obviously does not refer or relate to cases where the investigation had already been concluded and charge-sheet submitted before the advent of the new sub-section (5. If the investigation were at all pending on the date on which the new6ub-section (5) came into force there was no question of applying the said sub-section to any investigation in its pendency. It is therefore evident that both the ratio of the decision of the learned Single Judge and the decision itself apply only to such cases where the investigation had already been completed before the new sub-section (5) came into force. The said decision of the learned Judge neither covers nor purports to cover any case where the investigation was pending on the date when the new sub-section came into force and any casual observation which the learned Judge might have made in the judgment must not be taken to be an enunciation of law on the question whether the substituted sub-section (5) will be applicable to cases where the investigation was pending on the date of the advent of the said sub-section. 6. NOW let us consider whether the newly incorporated provisions, embodying substantially a rule of limitation can be retrospective so as to apply to the pending investigations. Generally speaking substantive law is prospective in operation whereas the procedural law is retrospective unless it is made to operate otherwise by express provision or by necessary implication. Again, statutes of limitation are regarded as procedural law. That the law of limitation is primarily a law relating to procedure has been very succinctly discussed after a review of a large number of judicial decisions by a Full Bench of the rajasthan High Court "presided over by Wanchoo C. J. (as his Lordship then was) in JETMAL VS. AMBSINGH. A. I. R. 1955 Rajasthan, 97. Also in N. I. Insurance Co. vs. Shantimisra, A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 237, it has been observed by the Supreme Court at page-241 : "(2) Even though by and large the law of limitation has been held to be a procedural law, there are exceptions to this principle. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action governs it. But there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Generally the law of limitation which is in vogue on the date of commencement of the action governs it. But there are certain exceptions to this principle. The new law of limitation providing a longer period cannot revive a dead remedy. Nor can it suddenly extinguish vested right of action by providing for a shorted period of limitation". In Jose Das Costa vs. Dascora, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1843 the following proposition of law was reiterated by the Supreme Court in paragraph 28 "while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment". In Gurbachan Singh vs. Salpal Singh, A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 209, the Supreme Court in connection with Section 113a of the Indian Evidence Act made the following observation in paragraph-36 which deserves attention : "(36) The provisions of the said section do not create any new offence and as such it does not create any substantive right but it is merely a matter of procedure of evidence and as such it is retrospective and will be applicable to this case. It is profitable to refer in this connection to Halsbury's Laws of England, (fourth edition. Volume 44 page-570 wherein it has been stated thus- The general rule is that all statutes, other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure of evidence, are prima facie prospective, and retrospective effect is not to be given to them unless, by express words or necessary implication, it appears that this was the intention of the legislature'. . . . . . . . . " Paragraph-37 of the said decision which runs thus is also relevant in this connection : "(37) It has also been stated in the said volume of Halsbury's Laws of england at page-574 that the presumption against retrospection does not apply to legislation concerned merely with matters of procedure or of evidence on the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be construed as retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was not the intention of Parliament". In P. Mahendran vs. State of Karnataka, A. I. R. 1990 S. C. 405 it has been observed by the Supreme Court that in the absence of any provision of necessary intendment a rule cannot he given retrospective effect except in matter of procedure. From the discussions hitherto made it may be safely recorded as the accepted proposition of law that ordinarily or generally speaking procedural law is retrospective in operation unless there is express provision or necessary intendment to the contrary. It is also the general proposition that law of limitation is a part of the procedural law and is therefore ordinarily retrospective in operation. There are, of course, certain exceptions to the aforesaid general proposition, such as where a subsequent law curtails the period of limitation and such law conies into force at once, it should not be allowed to have retrospective effect so as to destroy pre-existing vested rights because the giving of such retrospective effect amounts to not merely a change in procedure but a forfeiture of the very right to which the procedure relates (vide A. I. R. 1955 rajasthan 97, supra. Again, where a new law of limitation provides a longer period of limitation the remedy that had already been barred under the previous law of limitation would not be revived thereby. Nor can the new law suddenly extinguish vested right of action by providing for a shorter period of limitation (vide A. I. R. 1976 S. C. 237, supra. 7. WE would now refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ruslon and hornaby (I) Ltd. vs. T. B. Kadam, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 2025 which deals with the question of application of certain type of legislation which, for its application, refers to a situation or stale of affairs. That was a case in connection with the industrial Disputes Act. 1947. There the incident took place in December 1963 and following a domestic enquiry over that incident an employee was dismissed from service on the 7th January. 1964. Section 2a of the Industrial disputes Act came into force on 1st December, 1965 and on 23rd June, 1967 a reference was made by the Government of Maharashtra regarding the dismissal of the said employee to the labour court. Section 2a reads thus :- "2a. 1964. Section 2a of the Industrial disputes Act came into force on 1st December, 1965 and on 23rd June, 1967 a reference was made by the Government of Maharashtra regarding the dismissal of the said employee to the labour court. Section 2a reads thus :- "2a. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of am individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute" It was argued before the Supreme Court that since the order of dismissal was made on the 7th January, 1964 and since; Section 2a of the Industrial disputes Act came into force on 1st December, 1965 the reference of the dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act read with Section 2a was bad and it was further argued that would amount to giving retrospective effect to the provisions of Section 2a. It may be mentioned here that Section 2a would permit reference of an Industrial Dispute under Section 10 even if the dispute was between an individual workman and his employer in respect of certain matters enumerated in the said Section 2a. The Supreme Court, however, repelled the said argument and observed that Section 2a was in effect a definition section and it provides in effect that what would not be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2 (K) would be deemed to be an industrial dispute in certain circumstances. It was further observed that there was, therefore, no question of giving retrospective effect to Section 2a in making the reference which resulted in the award under consideration. In that connection, the Supreme Court made the following observation : "when the section uses the words 'where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman it does not deal with the question as to when that was done, it refers to a situation or a state of affairs. In other words where there is a discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service otherwise the dispute relating to such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination becomes an industrial dispute. . . . . . . . . . . . In other words where there is a discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of service otherwise the dispute relating to such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination becomes an industrial dispute. . . . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied) "any reference under section 10 would be made only sometime after the dispute itself has arisen. The only relevant factor for consideration in making a reference under section 10 is whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. There cannot be any doubt that on the day the reference was made in the present case an industrial dispute as defined under section 2a did exist". 8. ON the basis of the said decision of the Supreme Court it has been argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that irrespective of the question whether the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 have retrospective effect the same will apply to proceedings pending on the date on which the said provisions came into force inasmuch as the substituted sub-section, for its application, refers to a situation or stale of affairs, namely, the pendency of investigations for certain specified periods. It has been argued that since the sub-section refers to a situation or state of affairs namely, the pendency of investigations for certain specified periods as a pre-condition for its application, if it appears that on the date on which the said provisions came into force the investigation was yet pending for the specified period applicable to the case or more the provisions of the said sub-section shall apply with reference to the said situation or stale of affairs and in that case the investigation will have to be stopped and this is the position of law as enuncited by the said decision of the Supreme Court irrespective of the question whether the said provisions are retrospective or not. There is no doubt that the above argument is not wholly without substance but then the application of the said principle of law in such cases will not be free from certain practical difficulties. There is no doubt that the above argument is not wholly without substance but then the application of the said principle of law in such cases will not be free from certain practical difficulties. It is true that the sub-section (5) of section 167 requires the Magistrate to stop the investigation where the same could not be concluded within the prescribed period, but at the same time the sub-section gives an opportunity to the Investigating Officer to satisfy the Magistrate that the continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period is necessary for special reasons and in the interests of justice in which case the Magistrate will have the power to permit the continuation of the investigation even beyond the prescribed period. It has been already held in several decisions of this Court including certain decisions of Division Bench which I have already mentioned that the prayer for extension of time for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period must be made before the expiry of the prescribed period and the power of the Magistrate to permit continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period has to be exercised before the expiry of the said period (vide Ali Hossain vs. The State, 1979 (1) CHN 210 , Rambriksh vs. The State, 1983 Cr. I. L. J. 39. Jay Sankar Jha vs. The State, 1982 Cr. I. L. J. 744, Ramkumar vs. The State, 1981 Cr. I. L. J. 1288, pappo Rao vs. The State, 1985 (1) CHN 1 and Dilip Kumar Das vs. The State, 1992 (11) CHN 25. Therefore, the position in law so far as the decisions of the court are concerned is that any prayer or order for extension of time for continuation of investigation beyond the prescribed period will have to be made before the expiry of the prescribed period. This will create a hurdle in the matter of applying the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) in a good number of cases where the investigation had already continued for more than the prescribed period but was not yet concluded on the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) came into force. This will create a hurdle in the matter of applying the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) in a good number of cases where the investigation had already continued for more than the prescribed period but was not yet concluded on the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) came into force. It may be noted here that in none of the aforesaid decisions any such question was under consideration as to what would be the consequence if the investigating officer had no opportunity to apply within the prescribed period for continuation of investigation beyond such period by reason of the simple fact that the substituted sub-section came into force only after the prescribed period, or better I should say, only after a period equivalent to the period subsequently prescribed as the period of limitation for conclusion of investigation in such types of cases had already elapsed thereby rendering it physically and practically impossible to apply for extension of time before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation. Rather that is precisely the question that has fallen for consideration in the present case. The application of the ratio of the decisions of the aforesaid cases regarding the requirement of making the prayer for permission to continue the investigation beyond the prescribed period before the expiry of such period is rather confined only to such cases where the investigating officer had or has obligation and opportunity under any existent provision of law to complete the investigation within any specified period for permission to continue the investigation even after the expiry of such period. 9. IF the substituted sub-section (5) is applied to pending investigations where a period longer than the prescribed period had already elapsed but the investigation was yet continuing on the date on which the said provisions came into force the literal application of the law to such cases will require slopping of investigation but the investigating agency in such cases will be deprived of the opportunity of making prayer for extension of time inasmuch as there would be no opportunity to apply for such extension within the prescribed period because the prescribed period had already expired before the substituted provisions came into force. Therefore the substituted sub-section in such a case will have to be applied only in a partial manner without leaving any scope for application of that part of the provisions which gives opportunity to the investigating agency to pray for extension of time for concluding the investigation beyond the prescribed period. 10. OF course, there will be no difficulty in applying the substituted sub-section in its entirety to those cases of pending investigation where the prescribed period according to the substituted sub-section had not yet run out on the date on which the said sub-section came into force thereby leaving some margin of time for the investigating agency to avail of the opportunity given by the substituted sub-section to pray for extension of time within the prescribed period. But there will be a real difficulty in the matter of application of the substituted sub-section in all its dimensions to those cases where the investigation was yet pending on the date on which the substituted sub-section came into force but the prescribed period of limitation had already expired on or before the said date. Since the amended provisions came into force on a particular date during the pendency of investigation it was obviously not possible for the investigating agency to apply to the Magistrate within the prescribed period for extension of time because such an application for satisfying the requirements of the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5)could not have been filed both in fact and in law before the said provisions came into force. Even if it is assumed that by reason of the time gap between the date of publication of the Presidential assent and the date of coming into force of the substituted provisions the investigating agency was aware that such an enactment was ready for being put into operation on a future date, the knowledge of such impending enforcement of the enactment from a future date could not have helped the investigating agency to make prayer for extension of time within the prescribed period in compliance with the requirements of the provisions which were yet to come into force. It also cannot be expected that in every case of pending investigation in would have been possible for the investigating agency to complete the investigation within such period as would be enacted as the period of limitation because there might have been complexities in many cases rendering it impossible to complete the investigation by any particular time and that is precisely why the legislature thought it prudent and necessary to give a discretion to the Magistrate to permit continuation of investigation beyond the prescribed period of limitation where the facts and circumstances would necessitate such extension for special reasons and in the interests of justice. Therefore the question of applying the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 so far it relates to investigations in respect of non-summons case offences pending for more than the prescribed periods on the date on which the said sub-section came into force is not free from difficulties and there cannot be any question of partial application of only some aspect of the said sub-section excluding some other aspect which is also equally important. The sub-section must apply in all its dimensions if it is to apply at all and any truncated application of the same is unacceptable. We will however examine later whether it is possible to avoid such truncated application. In Mithilesh Kumar vs. Prem Behari Khare, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1247 it has been held by the Supreme Court that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards matter of procedure unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. It was further observed in that case that the presumpti against retrospective operation is strong in cases in which the statute, if operated retrospectively, would prejudicially affect vested rights or the illegality of the past transactions, or impair contracts or impose new duty or attach new disability in respect of past transactions or consideration already passed. That was a case where the question arose whether Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 would apply to pending suits including appeals. That was a case where the question arose whether Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 would apply to pending suits including appeals. In that case the Supreme Court appears to have made a fine distinction between retrospective application of a statute in respect of substantive law and the application of a new enactment to cases where a part of the requisites for its action has been drawn from time antecedent to its passing. In this connection the Supreme Court made the following observation: "however a statute is not properly called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. We must look at the general scope and purview of the statute and at the remedy sought to be applied, and consider what was the former State of Law and what the legislation contemplated. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective and is generally unjust and may be oppressive. But laws made justly and for the benefit of individuals and the community as a whole, as in this case, may relate to a time antecedent to their commencement. The presumption against retrospectively may in such cases be rebutted by necessary implications from the language employed in the statute. It cannot be said to be an invariable rule that a statute could not be retrospective unless so expressed in the very terms of the section which had to be construed. The question is whether on a proper construction the legislature may be said to have so expressed its intention". Then again the following observation of the Supreme Court in paragraph-2 (ibid) also is relevant in this connection: "22. As defined in section 2 (a) of the Act 'benami transaction' means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by any other person. A transaction must, therefore, be benami, irrespective of its date or duration. Section 3, subject to the exceptions, states that no person shall enter into any benami transaction. This section obviously cannot have retrospective operation. A transaction must, therefore, be benami, irrespective of its date or duration. Section 3, subject to the exceptions, states that no person shall enter into any benami transaction. This section obviously cannot have retrospective operation. However section 4 clearly provides that no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie, by or on behalf of a person claiming to be real owner of such property. This naturally relates to past transactions as well. The expression 'any property held benami' is not limited to any particular time, date or duration. Once the property is found to have been held benami, no. suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect thereof shall lie. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 4 nullifies the defiance based on any right in respect of any property held benami whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. It means that once a property is found to have been held benami, the real owner is bereft of any defiance against the person in whose name the property is held or any other person. In other words, in its sweep section 4 envisages past benami transactions also within its retroactivity. In this sense the Act is both a penal and a disqualifying statute. In case of a qualifying or disqualifying statute it may be necessarily retroactive. For example, when a law of representation declares that all who have attained 18 years shall be eligible to vote, those who attained 18 years in the past would be as much eligible as those who attained that age at the moment of the law coming into force". (Emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court in that case applied me provisions of the Benami transaction (Prohibition) Act (45 of 1988) to suits and appeals pending on the date on which the said Act came into force. Apart from substantially being a law of limitation, the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. (Emphasis supplied) The Supreme Court in that case applied me provisions of the Benami transaction (Prohibition) Act (45 of 1988) to suits and appeals pending on the date on which the said Act came into force. Apart from substantially being a law of limitation, the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P.C. also may be termed as an enactment of disqualifying provisions in the sense that the said sub-section disqualifies the investigating agency to continue the investigation of cognizable cases, as a matter of right, after the expiry of the prescribed period applicable to the case unless the investigating agency satisfies the Magistrate in terms of the said sub-section about the necessity of the continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period. Therefore, even as a disqualifying enactment the substituted sub-section may, if viewed in the light of the above noted observations of the Supreme Court, be retroactive in the sense that it shall apply to investigations pending on the date on which it came into force. 11. BUT then here also we will have to revert to the same question again as to how the said sub-section (5) can be applied in all its dimensions to pending investigations where the prescribed period had already elapsed before the said substituted sub-section came into force in this connection, it may be noted here that the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari (Supra) applied the provisions of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act to pending suits and appeals although seemingly such provisions were part of substantive law in our present case, however, the substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 is substantially a law of limitation and the proceeding of investigation is indeed primarily a part of the procedural law. The next case which calls for our attention is the decision of the Supreme Court in B. Banerjee vs. Anita Pan, a. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1146 where the question of the constitutional validity of the retrospective operation expressly given by the legislature to the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act (34 of 1969) fell for consideration. In that connection the Supreme Court made the following observation which may be noted here : "22. Moreover what is the evil corrected by the Amendment Act? The influx of a transferee class of evicters of tenants and institution of litigation to eject and rack-rent or re-build to make larger profits. In that connection the Supreme Court made the following observation which may be noted here : "22. Moreover what is the evil corrected by the Amendment Act? The influx of a transferee class of evicters of tenants and institution of litigation to eject and rack-rent or re-build to make larger profits. Apparently the inflow of such suits must have been swelling slowly ever the years and when the stream became a flood the legislature rushed with an amending bill. Had it made the law merely prospective, those who had, in numbers, already gone to court and induced legislative attention would have escaped the inhibition. This would defeat the object and so the application of the additional ban to pending actions could not be called unreasonable". On the basis of the above observation of the Supreme Court the learned advocate for the petitioner argued that here also the legislature was prompted to bring the new legislation putting a limitation on the endless longivity of criminal investigations in the background of the innumerable pending investigations where the unfortunate accused persons were facing the ordeal of prolonged and endless continuation of investigation and it will be a great injustice to them who virtually actuated the legislature to enact the new law in the field if they are deprived of the benefit by holding that the substituted sub-section (5) does not apply to pending investigations. There is indeed force and pathos in this submission. 12. THE substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C., as we have seen, prima facie relates to the procedure of investigation of cognizable offences by police and is therefore inherently a procedural law. It prescribes certain periods as the periods of limitation for conclusion of investigation in respect of different types of cognizable offences. Viewed from the angle also where it takes colour as a law of limitation the provisions of the said substituted sub-section (5) form part of the procedural law. Ordinarily a procedural law is presumed to be retrospective unless there is express provision or necessary intendment to the contrary. However, true substituted sub-section cannot have retrospectivity to the extent of bringing within its ambit the cases in which the investigation had already been concluded and charge-sheet submitted before the substituted sub-section (5) came into force as has been held by a bench of this Court in Mohan Mukherjee vs. The State, 1992 C. Cr. However, true substituted sub-section cannot have retrospectivity to the extent of bringing within its ambit the cases in which the investigation had already been concluded and charge-sheet submitted before the substituted sub-section (5) came into force as has been held by a bench of this Court in Mohan Mukherjee vs. The State, 1992 C. Cr. L. R. (Cal)211 (supra. Apart from the question of retrospectivity the substituted sub-section is otherwise applicable to investigations which were pending on the date on which it came into force on the ground of retroactivity in as much as this being a remedial and disqualifying piece of legislation as discussed earlier its application to investigations pending on the date on which it came into force should not be excluded as that will not only deprive innumerable number of accused persons from the whole some benefit of that section whose harassment or ordeals in facing prolonged investigations rather prompted the legislature to enact the provisions but will also lead to an undesirable and inequitable discrimination between the two sets of accused persons, one set being those who were arrested earlier Ho the advent of the substituted sub-section but the investigation was yet continuing there after and the other being those who were arrested subsequent to such date irrespective of the question as to when the concerned offences were committed. Therefore, it is only just and proper as well as equitable and non-discriminatory to apply the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) retrospectively to pending investigations on the ground that the said substituted sub-section refers to a particular situation or state of affairs for its application, and pending investigations afford such situation or state of affairs thereby attracting the application of the said provisions. Such application is warranted and sustained by the decision of the Supreme Court in Rusten and Hornsby (I) Ltd. vs. T. B. Kadam, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 2025 (supra. The mere fact that a part of the requisites for the action of the substituted sub-section is drawn from time antecedent to its passing namely, the pendency of the substituted sub-section will not be a bar to its application to the pending investigations in view of the principle enunciated in the decision of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari vs. Prem Behari, A. I. R. 1989 SC 1247 (supra) as discussed earlier. The substituted sub-section (5) being an enactment of a remedial nature must also be so interpreted as to suppress the mischief and augment the remedy which will be defeated to a large extent if the numerous cases of investigation pending on the date of the advent of the substituted sub-section (5) are excluded from the benefit of the same. As regards the practical difficulty of applying the provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) so far it relates to the opportunity of the investigating agency to pray for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period in non-summons procedure cases the same may be obviated by allowing the investigating agency to exercise such opportunity before the investigation is stopped under the substituted sub-section (5) in respect of those cases where the prescribed period of investigation in non-summons procedure cases had already expired before the substituted sub-section (5)came into force but the investigation was yet continuing on that date. It will be unfair to a large number of accused persons to deny them the benefit of the substituted sub-section (5) in such of the non-summons procedure cases where on the date on which the said sub-section came into force the investigation was pending for a period longer than the equivalent period of limitation prescribed by the said sub-section on the ground that the substituted sub-section can not apply in all its dimensions to such cases of pending investigation. At the same time it will be equally unfair to the investigating agency to take them by surprise or to deny them the opportunity to apply in fit cases for continuation of investigation on the ground that the period equivalent to the prescribed period of limitation had already expired before the substituted sub-section came into force in this connection, I would like to quote the following passage of V. R. Krishna Iyer, J. from the decision of the supreme Court in B. Banerjee vs. Anita Pan, A. I. R. 1975 S. C. 1146 (at page-1157): "31. This consideration is itself germane to the larger concept of justice which it is the duty of the Courts to promote. Law finds its finest hour when it speaks to justice in an fair terms. In the present case our interpretative endeavour has been imbued with this spirit. This consideration is itself germane to the larger concept of justice which it is the duty of the Courts to promote. Law finds its finest hour when it speaks to justice in an fair terms. In the present case our interpretative endeavour has been imbued with this spirit. In the process of interpretation where alternatives are possible, the man in the law influences the law in the man may be and the construction on Ss. 4 and 13 of the Amendment Act herein adopted, we admit, appeals to us as more humane. The calculus of statutory construction relating to complex problems of the community cannot be hide-bound by orthodox text book canons. In the said decision in view of the coming into force of the West Bengal Premises tenancy (Second Amendment) Act (34 of 1969) the Supreme Court allowed opportunity to the landlords to establish their cases by satisfying the requirements of the amended provisions of law in pending suits and appeals by process of interpretation which was considered fit and proper to solve the complex problem and by taking recourse to an interpretative process which perhaps did not wholly conform to the orthodox text book canons, and rather added an innovative dimension to the art of interpretation. The necessity of a search for a just resolution of a complex situation bearing in mind the policy of the legislation and the conditions in the Amendment Act was emphasised by the Supreme Court in the said decision in the following language at page 1157: "we are satisfied that as far as possible courts must avoid multiplicity of litigation. Any interpretation of a statute which will obviate purposeless proliferation of litigation, without whittling down the effectiveness of the protection for the parties sought to be helped by the legislation, should be preferred to any literal, pedantic, legalistic or technically correct alternative". 13. Any interpretation of a statute which will obviate purposeless proliferation of litigation, without whittling down the effectiveness of the protection for the parties sought to be helped by the legislation, should be preferred to any literal, pedantic, legalistic or technically correct alternative". 13. IT is true that if it is held that the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 will not apply to investigations pending on the date on which the said sub-section came into force, even then the persons figuring as accused in those proceedings will be entitled to approach the High Court, in fit cases, for quashing the investigation proceedings on the ground of inordinate delay in as much as it has now been acknowledged judicially that the right speedy trial is a right of an accused emanating from Article 21 of the Constitution. But then it will not be an easy task for many accused to approach the High Court from the distant and remote corners of the state for such relief in case the more easily available relief which the legislature has thought fit to provide by enacting the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 is denied to those innumerable number of accused entangled in the investigations pending on the date on which the said sub-section came into force. Moreover, that will also contribute to multiplicity of litigations. These aspects of the matter are also required to be borne in mind in consonance with the above noted observations of the Supreme Court, while considering the question whether or not the substituted sub-section (5) should be applied to investigations pending on the date on which it came into force. 14. IN this connection, I would also like to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in N. I. Insurance Co. vs. Shanti Misra, A.I.R. 1976 S. C. 237. There certain questions arose with reference to certain provisions of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. The Act was amended by a Central Act of 1956 with effect from the 16th February, 1956. The original Section 110 was deleted and new sections 110 to 110f were introduced. Under Section 110a an application for compensation in connection with an accident of the specified nature is required to be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred within 60 days of such occurrence. The original Section 110 was deleted and new sections 110 to 110f were introduced. Under Section 110a an application for compensation in connection with an accident of the specified nature is required to be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred within 60 days of such occurrence. Section 110f inter alia provides that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the claims Tribunal for that area. Until and unless the Claims Tribunal was constituted for any particular area a suit for compensation could be brought before the appropriate Civil Court under the Indian Fatal Accidents Act, 1885 within a period of two years from the occurrence of the accident as provided in Article 82 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The position, therefore, was this that after the Claims Tribunal was constituted for any particular area no suit for compensation could be filed in the Civil Court and the claim for compensation in such a case was required to be made before the Claims Tribunal within 60 days from date of the accident. This gave rise to certain practical difficulty in the matter of interpretation regarding the application of law. It was quite possible that an accident occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the claims Tribunal in a case where on the date of the constitution of the tribunal the claimant had a right to file a suit before the Civil Court for compensation within two years from the date of the accident. But as soon as the Claims Tribunal was constituted the claimant's right to approach the Civil court by a filing a suit was barred because of change of forum but at the same time because of the new law of limitation of 60 days, if made applicable to such a case, the claimant would be debarred from approaching the Claims Tribunal inasmuch as the accident had occurred more than 60 days before the constitution of the Claims Tribunal which was the new period of limitation. The question that posed before the Supreme Court in N. I. Insurance Co. The question that posed before the Supreme Court in N. I. Insurance Co. (supra) was whether in such a case the claimant would have to approach the civil Court for compensation within two years from the date of the accident or he would have to approach the Claims Tribunal which had in the meantime been constituted although the prescribed period of 60 days had already expired on the date of constitution of the Claims Tribunal. It may be mentioned here that in the said case the Claims Tribunal had been constituted by notification published in the Gazette of the 18th March, 1967. The claimant thereafter filed claim before the Claims Tribunal on 8th July, 1967 claiming compensation in respect of the accident which had occurred on the 11th September, 1966. Obviously therefore the 60 days period of limitation which is applicable in the matter of preferring a claim before the Claims Tribunal had already expired both from the date of the accident as well as from the date of constitution of the Claims Tribunal when the claim was filed before such tribunal. In these circumstances, the Supreme Court however held that the filing of the claim before the Claims Tribunal was in accordance with the law in view of the constitution of the Claims Tribunal but for overcoming the bar of limitation the Supreme Court adopted a course on the basis of a reasonable view warranted by the facts and circumstances. In that connection, the Supreme Court made the following observation in para 10 (ibid): "but since in such a case there is a change of forum, unlike the fact of the said cases, the reasonable view to take would be that such an application can be filed within a reasonable time of the constitution of the Tribunal, which ordinarily and generally, would be the time of limitation mentioned in sub-section (3). If the application could not be made within that time from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal, in a given case, the further time taken in the making of the application may be held to be the reasonable time on the facts of that case for the making of the application or the delay made after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in sub-section (3) from the date of the constitution of the Tribunal can be condoned under the proviso to that sub-section. " "on the facts of this case, we held that the remedy available to the respondents was to go before the Claims Tribunal and since the law was not very clear on the point, the time of about four months taken in approaching the Tribunal after its constitution can be held to be either a reasonable time or the delay of less than two months could well be condoned under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110a." The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court thus clearly indicates that where a literal application of any particular provision of law becomes impossible due to exceptional situations for which the parties concerned are not responsible but the dominant purpose of the provision has to be applied, it may be necessary, by taking a reasonable view warranted by the facts and circumstances, to make workable adjustments which will not only serve the dominant purpose but will also sub-serve the clause of the ancillary purpose ingrained in the matrix of the dominant purpose. 15. NOW let us see now tar the above principle emerging from the said decision of the Supreme Court can be applied to our present case and in what manner. Here the dominant purpose of the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P. C. is to put a defined limitation on the duration or longivity of criminal investigation and therefore that has to be implemented in a reasonable way rather than withdrawing its application on the ground that the literal application of the connected ancillary provision is impossible of implementation for certain peculiarity of circumstances. In such a situation the provision relating to the dominant purpose of the enactment will have to be applied in such a manner that the concerned enactment in all its dimensions can be applied in a harmonious way by taking recourse to a reasonable manner of application of the same. 16. IN our present case, however, even any departure or deviation from the express provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C. will not be necessary for applying the same in all its dimensions to different situations. 16. IN our present case, however, even any departure or deviation from the express provisions of the substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C. will not be necessary for applying the same in all its dimensions to different situations. These situations may arise (1) where the accused has been arrested in connection with the investigation off any offence after the advent of the said sub-section, and also in two other types of cases (2) where the accused was arrested in connection with an investigation before the advent of the said sub-action and the investigation was yet continuing on the date on which the said sub-section came into force but a period equivalent to the subsequently prescribed period of limitation for such investigation had already expired before the said date as well as cases (3) where the accused had been arrested before the said sub-section came into force but the statutory period had not yet elapsed on the date on which it came into force but the investigation was yet continuing on that date. The provisions of the substituted sub-section, I would like to note, can very well be applied to all the above situations to serve the object of the enactment with reasonable adjustment of operational application if and where necessary as was done by the Supreme Court in some cases consistently with the object of the enactment and the suitability or demand of circumstances such as, in B. Banerjee vs. Anita Pan (supra) and N. I. Insurance Co. vs. Shanti Misra (supra. The making of law falls within the domain of legislature and this is indeed a subject of social engineering but it is also an acknowledged fact that law as framed by the legislature quite often requires the finishing touch of judicial technology for facilitating the achievement of the object of the particular enactment to the intended extent. The above mentioned two decisions of the Supreme Court are indeed a few of the instances in the field. In order to make any particular piece of enactment effective to the intended extent it may be necessary to modulate its application in a manner best suited to the circumstances to meet the avowed objective of the same. The above mentioned two decisions of the Supreme Court are indeed a few of the instances in the field. In order to make any particular piece of enactment effective to the intended extent it may be necessary to modulate its application in a manner best suited to the circumstances to meet the avowed objective of the same. A question may be raised as to whether the application of the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 to investigations pending on the date on which the same came into force will take away or affect any vested right. Without entering into the question whether the right of investigation can be termed as a vested right of the police we will find that the substituted sub-section (5) does not take away or affect the right of the police to investigate a cognizable offence and it rather merely regulates that right. It may be noted very emphatically that although the police have a right to investigate a cognizable offence they have definitely no right to misuse that right of investigation and that is why the legislature has intervened by sub-section (5) to prevent any possible misuse of that right of investigation by providing specified periods of limitation for conclusion of investigation in respect of different types of offences. If the substituted sub-section takes away any right it does not do so in respect of any legally recognized right. Rather it takes away an 'illegal right' or I should say, an unwholesome opportunity to misuse the right of investigation. It rather only regulates the right of investigation. At the same time the legislature being fully aware that there may be complexities in certain cases where in the interests of justice continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period may be necessary, has made provision empowering the Magistrate to allow the continuation of investigation beyond the prescribed period in certain circumstances. 17. THE position, therefore, boils down to this, (i) The application of the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. 17. THE position, therefore, boils down to this, (i) The application of the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P. C. to investigations pending on the date on which the said sub-section came into force is covered by the retroactivity of the provisions of the said sub-section in view of the several decisions of the Supreme Court discussed above, (ii) Non-application of the substituted sub-section (5) to the large number of cases of investigation which were pending on the date on which the said sub-section came into force will deprive a large number of accused persons of the benefit of the said sub-section although quite possibly their ordeals in facing prolonged investigation prompted the legislature to make that piece of enactment in conformity with the import of Article 21 of the Constitution, (iii) Non-application of the substituted sub-section to pending investigations will be discriminatory between the two sets of accused persons in a most unreasonable and inequitable way, such as, between accused arrested before the sub-section came into force and the accused who managed to escape arrest till after it came into force, although in both the cases the concerned offences were committed before the advent of the substituted sub-section. It will be highly inequitable and discriminatory to disallow the benefit of the sub-section to the former category of accused but to allow the benefit to the latter category by granting a premium in favour of their dexerterity to avoid arrest till the said sub-section came into force. (iv)Non-application of the sub-section to pending investigations will also lead to multiplicity of litigations inasmuch as for getting appropriate relief the accused deprived of the benefit of the sub-section will have to approach the high Court in fit cases for quashing the investigation for violation of Article 21 or for securing the ends of justice which will become definitely more difficult and more onerous for a large number of poor litigants. (v) The sub-section (5)however will have to be applied, wherever it has to apply, in all its dimensions and not in a turncated way. (vi) For securing the applicability of the substituted sub-section (5) in all its dimensions to pending investigations the manner of application of the same may be reasonably modulated so as to ensure the investigation beyond the prescribed period in deserving cases. Such modulated application can be permitted in a reasonable manner best suited to the circumstances. (vi) For securing the applicability of the substituted sub-section (5) in all its dimensions to pending investigations the manner of application of the same may be reasonably modulated so as to ensure the investigation beyond the prescribed period in deserving cases. Such modulated application can be permitted in a reasonable manner best suited to the circumstances. This can be done by allowing the investigating agency an opportunity to pray, if necessary, for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period before the order stopping investigation is passed by the magistrate in cases where a period equivalent to the prescribed period had already expired before the substituted sub-section came into force but the investigation has yet been continuing even after that date. This seems to be the only reasonable solution of the complex problem as to whether the substituted sub-section is to apply or not to apply to investigations pending on the date on which the said sub-section came into force. 18. THE position of law in regard to the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P. C. is therefore summarised below: 1. In respect of investigation in a summons procedure case for which the earlier provision of sub-section (5) of Section 167 Cr. P. C. also contained the same period of limitation of six months, the investigation will have to be stopped after the expiry of the period of six months irrespective of the question whether the investigation was continuing on the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) came into force, unless the Magistrate had or has granted permission within the prescribed period of limitation to continue the investigation beyond the prescribed period after the investigating officer had satisfied him that it was necessary to do so for special reasons and in the interests of justice. 2. The substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 shall not apply to any case where the investigation had already been concluded and charge-sheet submitted before the substituted sub-section came into force 1992 C. Cr. L. R. (Cal) 211 (supra. 3. 2. The substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 shall not apply to any case where the investigation had already been concluded and charge-sheet submitted before the substituted sub-section came into force 1992 C. Cr. L. R. (Cal) 211 (supra. 3. Where the accused was arrested before the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) of Section 167 came into force in connection with any investigation of cognizable offence but the statutory period had not yet expired on the date on which the substituted sub-section came into force and the investigation was yet continuing the Magistrate will stop the investigation after the expiry of the statutory period unless the investigating officer satisfies him before the expiry of such period about the necessity of continuation of the investigation beyond such period. This proposition emerges from the several decisions of this Court where it has been held that the extension for continuation of investigation beyond the prescribed period will have to be prayed for and granted before the expiry of the prescribed period 1979 (1)CHN 210 , 1983 CR. I. L. J. 39, 1982 Cr. I. L. J. 744 and 1981 Cr. I. L. J 1288 (supra. 4. Where however the investigation was pending on the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) came into force but the statutory period of limitation had already expired before the advent of the substituted sub-section (5) thereby giving no opportunity to the investigating officer to apply beforehand for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period, the Magistrate shall, to the knowledge of the accused and the investigating officer, take up the matter without delay either suo motu or on prayer for consideration of passing of an appropriate order either stopping the investigation and discharging the accused or allowing the investigation to continue if the investigating officer even at this stage satisfies him that it is necessary so to do for special reasons and in the interests of justice. 5. 5. Where, in any case, by reason of extremely narrow margin of time left after the advent of the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 it was not practicable for the investigating officer to apply within the prescribed period for continuation of the investigation beyond the prescribed period for special reasons and in the interests of justice and the Magistrate has passed an order stopping the investigation on the ground that no prayer for continuation of investigation was made before the expiry of the prescribed period although only a very narrow margin of time was left giving no practical opportunity to the investigating officer to make the prayer within that narrow margin of time left after the advent of the substituted sub-section, the aggrieved party may approach the High Court for appropriate relief under section 482. It may be noted here that the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in A.I.R. 1991 M. P. 302 (New India Assurance Co. vs. Nafis Begam) as cited by the learned Advocate for the opposite party is not applicable here because there the provisions held prospective formed part of substantive law which is generally prospective but here we are not concerned with substantive law. 19. SINCE in the present case a period much longer than the period prescribed for conclusion of investigation in such types of cases had already elapsed long before the date on which the substituted sub-section (5) came into force and since the investigating officer, as is manifest from the order of the learned Magistrate, was taking virtually no interest in the investigation of the case and was not even making any routine prayer for extension of time inspite of repeated opportunities and directions given by the learned Magistrate and the investigation is pending since 1980 and we are now in the second half of 1992, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where on the ground of violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial and for securing the ends of justice the investigation should now be formally stopped and the proceeding should be quashed. Accordingly, the impugned order of the learned Sessions judge is hereby set aside and the investigation against the accused is quashed. The accused thus stands discharged. The application stands disposed of accordingly. 20. Accordingly, the impugned order of the learned Sessions judge is hereby set aside and the investigation against the accused is quashed. The accused thus stands discharged. The application stands disposed of accordingly. 20. THE Registrar, Appellate Side is directed to make an extract of this judgment relating to the position of law in regard to the substituted sub-section (5) of section 167 Cr. P. C. as summarised in the concluding phase of the judgment and communicate the same to all judicial Magistrates of the state expeditiously. Application allowed.