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1992 DIGILAW 331 (GUJ)

Aratgauri C. Jhaveri (Decd. )(By Accountable Person Krishnalal C. Jhaveri) v. First Assistant Controller of Estate Duty

1992-10-12

G.T.NANAVATI, S.D.DAVE

body1992
JUDGMENT : S.D. Dave, J. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench 'B', while exercising the jurisdiction under section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953, has, at the instance of the accountable person, referred the under mentioned three questions for our answer : "1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that the residuary estate of late Shri C. M. Jhaveri or any part thereof passed on the death of his widow, Aratgauri C. Jhaveri, under section 11 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 ? 2. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that under the will of C. M. Jhaveri, the deceased had life interest in the remainder estate, left after discharge of specific legacies without any discretion in the execution regarding disbursement of the income of the estate ? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the deceased Aratgauri had interest in possession in the residuary estate under the will of Shri C. M. Jhaveri ?" 2. The facts in the background of the present reference do not appear to be much in dispute, as the questions in controversy revolve around the interpretation and construction of the last will and testament of the testator, with a view to gather his correct and real intent behind the testamentary disposition. 3. One Shri C.M. Jhaveri, by his last will and testament dated November 28, 1946, had bequeathed all his properties to his wife, Smt. Aratgauri, for her life, without the power of alienation, except for dire need as per clause 11 of the will. According to clause 12 of the said will, he had appointed his two sons, Vaikunthlal and Krishnalal, as the executors of this estate. The deceased testator had also made provision for his widowed daughter and her son and for the marriage, etc., of his youngest unmarried daughter, Shakuntala, as per clauses Nos. 14 and 15 of the said will. He had also directed under clause No. 17 of the said will that, on his wife's death, his two sons, Vaikunthlal and Krishnalal, would take all his remaining properties in equal shares. The testator, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, had expired on July 14, 1950. The above said will in question was his last will and testament on which there is no dispute before us. The testator, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, had expired on July 14, 1950. The above said will in question was his last will and testament on which there is no dispute before us. It appears that Smt. Aratgauri had by the deed of assignment dated June 8, 1961, assigned her life interest in all the properties given to her under the said will to her two sons, namely, Vaikunthalal and Krishnalal, for an amount of Rs. 10,000. As the deed of assignment had been made within the statutory period of two years of her death which occurred on June 27, 1961, a brief question had arisen for the consideration of the Revenue as to whether the disposal of the life interest would be liable to estate duty under section 11 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. 4. The assessment orders pronounced by the first Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Ahmedabad, dated March 23, 1974, would go to show that, on the death of the late Smt. Aratgauri who had expired on June 27, 1961, the estate duty account was filed by the accountable person on October 16, 1965. According to the accountable person, the deceased was having at best only a life interest as per the will and this life interest was disposed of by her during her lifetime before her death and, therefore, according to the accountable person, no part of the estate left by late Shri C. M. Jhaveri, the husband of the deceased, would pass on her death. It was also contended by the accountable person that even if this life interest of the deceased is accepted as a finding of fact, then also the above said was not an absolute life interest of the deceased alone as discretion was given to the executors of the will to spend the income of the estate for the benefit of the deceased at their discretion. In short, therefore, it was the contention raised on behalf of the accountable person that the deceased, Smt. Aratgauri, was merely a beneficiary under the will of the deceased, and that the executors appointed under the said will were entitled to spend certain amounts for the two daughters as indicated in the will and that, therefore, it could not be said that the deceased was given an absolute life interest in the estate of the deceased. It was also the contention on behalf of the accountable person that no part of the estate left by the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, was liable to estate duty under the relevant provisions of the Act on the death of the deceased, Aratgauri. The above said contentions raised by the accountable person came to be negatived by the First Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Ahmedabad, by the assessment orders dated March 23, 1974. Thus the principal value of the estate which, according to the taxing authority, passed on the death of the deceased, Smt. Aratgauri, was assessed at Rs. 5,11,000. The above said assessment order came to be challenged by the accountable person by filing an appeal before the Appellate Controller, Estate Duty, Gujarat at Ahmedabad. Similar contentions were raised during the hearing of the appeal on behalf of the accountable person. Anyhow the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty had taken the view that, upon a harmonious reading of the will, it clearly emerges that the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, had bequeathed specific and ascertained amount of legacies to several of his relations who have been specifically named in the will, and that, the balance of the properties left after such legacies were to go to the wife, Aratgauri, along with the specific bequest in a sum of Rs. 10,000. Reading the relevant clauses of the will of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, and especially clauses Nos. 17 and 18 also, the appellate authority had come to the conclusion that the contentions raised on behalf of the accountable person could not have been accepted. The appellate authority has noticed as a finding of fact that the deceased, Aratgauri, in fact enjoyed the entire remainder estate and also the income therefrom as confirmed from the income-tax and wealth- tax record. It is in this view of the matter that the appeal filed by the accountable person came to be dismissed by the orders dated May 27, 1976. The accountable person, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the above said appellate orders, had approached the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench "B", by filing the necessary appeal. The above said appeal filed by the accountable person came to be decided and disposed of by the orders dated January 31, 1978. The accountable person, being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the above said appellate orders, had approached the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench "B", by filing the necessary appeal. The above said appeal filed by the accountable person came to be decided and disposed of by the orders dated January 31, 1978. The Tribunal had also taken the view that reading the relevant clauses of the will and the testament of the deceased, it could not have been accepted that the deceased, Aratgauri, had not got an absolute life interest because discretion was given to the executors of the will to spend the income for the benefit of the deceased by the testator and also because of the further fact that certain provisions were made for the benefit of the two daughters of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri. Later on, the necessary application was moved before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for referring the aforementioned two questions to this court under section 64(1) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. Accordingly, the above said two questions have been referred to us for our answer. 5. Mr. J.P. Shah, the learned advocate who appears on behalf of the assessee has urged that the authorities below have committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the deceased, Aratgauri, was given an absolute life interest in the estate of the deceased. In the submissions of the learned advocate, Mr. Shah, the deceased, Aratgauri, was not given an absolute life interest in the estate of the deceased but, as it becomes clear from the relevant clauses of the will of the deceased, certain provisions were made for the two daughters of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, and that the executors and administrators were also entitled to spend the corpus for the benefit of the above said two daughters. It is in view of this position that Mr. Shah has further contended that the taxing authorities had committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the deceased was given an absolute interest in the estate of the deceased and that the same passed to the accountable person on the death of the deceased, Smt. Aratgauri. But Mr. It is in view of this position that Mr. Shah has further contended that the taxing authorities had committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the deceased was given an absolute interest in the estate of the deceased and that the same passed to the accountable person on the death of the deceased, Smt. Aratgauri. But Mr. Thakore, learned counsel who appears on behalf of the Revenue, has urged that, as pointed out by the Tribunal and the taxing authorities below, the will of the deceased requires to be read harmoniously and when it is so read, it becomes clear that the deceased, Aratgauri, was given an absolute life interest in the estate of her husband, and that, merely because some provisions were made for the two daughters of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, it cannot be said that the life interest was not absolute. Mr. Thakore has also, arguing in the same line, contended that, because of the above said factual position, it could not be successfully urged on behalf of the accountable person that the deceased, Aratgauri, was merely a beneficiary under the will. 6. As indicated by us above, the contention of the accountable person before the taxing authority was that the life interest given to the deceased, Aratgauri, was not an absolute one. It requires to be appreciated that no contention has been raised on behalf of the assessee before us regarding the application of section 11 of the Estate Duty Act of 1953. The sole contention which is being canvassed before us on behalf of the assessee through the learned advocate, Mr. Shah, is that the life interest given to the deceased, Aratgauri, was not an absolute life interest because provisions were made for the two daughters of the deceased, late Shri C. M. Jhaveri, and that, therefore, the position of the deceased, Aratgauri, was reduced to a position of a mere beneficiary. It is indeed true that the will of the deceased, like any other document, requires to be scrutinised as a whole and a harmonious construction would be necessary to cull out the exact intention of the deceased testator. It is indeed true that the will of the deceased, like any other document, requires to be scrutinised as a whole and a harmonious construction would be necessary to cull out the exact intention of the deceased testator. In our opinion, when the will is read in the above said manner and is construed harmoniously with a view to find out and gather the correct and real intention of the testator, the view taken by the Tribunal and the taxing authorities below appears to be a perfectly justifiable one. 7. When reference is made to the last will and testament of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, at annexure-A, it becomes clear that, under clause No. 9 a specific bequest in a sum of Rs. 10,000 was made in favour of the deceased, Aratgauri, and she was authorised to use the above said amount in any manner which she may like with full and absolute ownership and disposal over the same. Clause No. 9 of the will makes it clear that the deceased had made a bequest of all his remaining properties to his wife, Aratgauri, for her life, without power of alienation, except for dire need. A joint reading of clauses Nos. 9 and 11 of the will would go to show that, over and above a specific bequest in a sum of Rs. 10,000, all the remaining properties of the deceased were given to Aratgauri for her lifetime but it was bequeathed without the power of alienation, except for dire need. The last four words appearing in clause No. 11, namely, "except for dire need" would go to show that, though life interest was given to the deceased, Aratgauri, she was also entitled to alienate the property in case of dire need. Anyhow, the above phrase is not a material aspect for our consideration while answering the questions referred to us. The learned advocate, Mr. Shah, appearing on behalf of the assessee, has placed heavy reliance upon clauses Nos. 12, 15 and 16 of the will with a view to canvass the contention that the deceased was a mere beneficiary under the will and that she was not given absolute life interest in the estate of the deceased. Clause No. 12 of the will speaks of the appointment of the two sons, Vaikunthlal and Krishnalal, as the executors of the estate. Clause No. 12 of the will speaks of the appointment of the two sons, Vaikunthlal and Krishnalal, as the executors of the estate. It is made clear in clause 12 that the above said two executors shall first pay up the liabilities of the deceased and thereafter shall manage the estate during the lifetime of the deceased, Aratgauri, in the same way as the deceased testator used to do during his lifetime. This clause No. 12, therefore, would only go to show that the two sons, namely, Vaikunthlal and Krishnalal, were to act as the executors of the estate and that they were required to discharge the liabilities of the deceased first and thereafter they were required to manage the estate during the lifetime of the deceased, Aratgauri. This clause, therefore, on the contrary, would go to show that the deceased, Aratgauri, was given a life interest in the estate of the deceased which she was to enjoy during her lifetime. 8. Clause No. 14 of the will says that the son-in-law of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, namely, Ravivadan Mangaldas Marfatia, has expired leaving behind the widow, Subhadra, and a minor son, Sudhir. Clause No. 15 says that the testator, therefore, set apart an amount of Rs. 15,000 only out of his estate, with a direction to the executors saying that instead of setting apart a sum of Rs. 15,000 and to invest the same in safe securities, the executors may set apart proper and safe securities which the deceased was possessed of at the time of his death. It is further directed in clause No. 15 that the executors are required to utilise the income from the above said corpus, namely, Rs. 15,000, for the welfare of the widowed daughter and her minor son, Sudhir. It is also further clarified that, in case of necessity, the executors and trustees are empowered to utilise the whole or part of the corpus also towards the achievement of the object. Mr. Shah has urged before us with great vehemence that the word "corpus" occurring in clause 15 relates to the entire estate left by the deceased and not only a trust in a sum of Rs. 15,000. By raising this contention, Mr. Mr. Shah has urged before us with great vehemence that the word "corpus" occurring in clause 15 relates to the entire estate left by the deceased and not only a trust in a sum of Rs. 15,000. By raising this contention, Mr. Shah wanted to urge that the entire estate left behind by the deceased in which the deceased, Aratgauri, was given a life interest was open to the executors and trustees for the use and application for the benefit of the widowed daughter and the minor son. Mr. Shah also wanted to urge that a person like the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, would never think of setting apart a meagre sum of Rs. 15,000 only for the maintenance, education and welfare of the widowed daughter and her minor son. But the later portion of this clause No. 15 goes to show very clearly that both daughter, Subhadra, and minor son, Sudhir, were likely to get all the properties from the father of the deceased, Ravivadan, and that he was a reasonably well off man. Anyhow, an amount of Rs. 15,000 was being set apart for the above said purposes by the deceased out of extra caution as stated by the testator himself in the concluding portion of clause No. 15 of the will. 9. Clause No. 16 says that an amount of Rs. 20,000 is being set apart for the unmarried daughter, Shakuntala, for her maintenance. This clause also while making provision for unmarried daughter, Shakuntala, says that, in case of necessity, the corpus of the amount also can be utilised for the benefit of the unmarried daughter, Shakuntala. But once again it has been made specific and clear, as has been done in the previous clause also, that if the income of the corpus of an amount of Rs. 20,000 is not being utilised for the said purpose, the same shall revert to the wife's life interest in the property left behind by the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri. Therefore, both the above said clauses, namely, clauses Nos. 15 and 16 on which Mr. Shah has placed heavy reliance, would go to show that two "trusts" were created by the said clauses for an amount of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000 for the widowed daughter and her son and for the unmarried daughter, respectively. Therefore, both the above said clauses, namely, clauses Nos. 15 and 16 on which Mr. Shah has placed heavy reliance, would go to show that two "trusts" were created by the said clauses for an amount of Rs. 15,000 and Rs. 20,000 for the widowed daughter and her son and for the unmarried daughter, respectively. The reference to the word" corpus" cannot be understood as connoting the entire corpus or the life interest which was being bequeathed to the deceased, Aratgauri, by her husband. Upon a close reading of the entire will and especially all the aforementioned relevant clauses and upon a proper construction thereof it becomes clear that the deceased was given life interest in the property and that, it was an absolute life interest. Ordinarily, she was to enjoy the outcome or the income of the life interest, but in case of dire need, she was also entitled to alienate the life interest which was bequeathed in her favour by her deceased husband. In the case of the two small amounts or their income not being utilised for the purposes stated as above, even the corpus and the income there from were also desired to be added to the life interest which was being granted to the deceased, Aratgauri. In view of this position, reading the will as a whole and trying to gather the correct and real intention of the deceased, the contention raised by Mr. Shah, the learned advocate for the assessee, cannot be accepted. In our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal and the taxing authorities were perfectly justified in expressing the view that the residuary estate of the deceased testator passed on the death of the deceased, Aratgauri. We shall, therefore, have to say that the Tribunal was right in holding that the residuary estate of Shri C. M. Jhaveri passed on the death of his widow, Aratgauri, under section 11 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953. It is also clear that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that, under the will of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, the deceased, Aratgauri had a life interest in the entire estate. It is also clear that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in holding that, under the will of the deceased, Shri C. M. Jhaveri, the deceased, Aratgauri had a life interest in the entire estate. In the same way, we shall have to say that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the deceased, Aratgauri, had interest in possession in the residuary estate under the will of her deceased husband, Shri C. M. Jhaveri. 10. In view of these findings and conclusions of ours, all the above said three questions shall have to be replied in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We accordingly do hereby answer the above said questions with no order as to costs.