JUDGMENT S. P. Rajkhowa J: These two appeals arise out of judgment and orders passed by the Learned Trial Judge on 19th April 1989 disposing of the Special Suit No. 62 of 1981 and Special Suit No. 63 of 1981 thereby setting aside Award dated 3rd November 1987 passed in these two Special Suits. We propose to dispose of both the appeals by a common judgment. 2. During the pendency of the appeals, respondent Prasanna Kr. Dutta had died and his legal heirs were substituted vide order dated 2.3.90 of the Appeal Court. 3. After the appeals were heard and the judgment was kept reserved, the appellant died on 31st of March, 1992 and his legal heirs were substituted by this Appeal Court's order dated 16th July 1992. 4. One Purna Ch. Dutta during his life time carried on business under the name and style of P. C. Dutta and Co. Petitioner No.1 Tara Sundari Dutta is the widow of said Purna Ch. Dutta, and the other petitioners namely Prasanna Kr. Dutta, Paritosh Dutta, Peary Mohan Dutta and respondent No. 1 Panchanan Dutta (since dead) are the sons of the said Purna Ch. Dutta. After the death of Purna Chandra on 3rd October 1961 the parties to this litigation carried on business of P. C. Dutta & Co. in co-partnership. 5. In 1981 disputes and differences arose between the parties and the respondent No. 1 Panchanan Dutta made an application under s. 20 of the Arbitration Act in this Court being Special Suit No. 63 of 1981 on 24th July 1981 for filing the Arbitration Agreement as contained in the Deed of Partnership dated 11th August 1971. The said firm was also dissolved. 6. The disputes and differences which had arisen between the parties and which were sought to be referred to Arbitrator were set out in para 27 of the said Agreement as under: (a) Whether the respondents are bound to disclose to the petitioner actual state of affairs of partnership and if, so, to disclose. The said firm was also dissolved. 6. The disputes and differences which had arisen between the parties and which were sought to be referred to Arbitrator were set out in para 27 of the said Agreement as under: (a) Whether the respondents are bound to disclose to the petitioner actual state of affairs of partnership and if, so, to disclose. (b) Whether the petitioner is entitled to inspect all books of accounts of the partnership business; (c) Whether the respondents are liable to furnish a true and faithful accounts of the partnership business to the petitioner; (d) Whether after taking proper accounts of the partnership business the respondents are liable to make payment to the petitioner all sums of money due and payable to the petitioner. 7. The said application filed under s. 20 of the Arbitration Act was disposed of by this Court by order dated, 7th September 1981 and by consent of all parties. Srikrishna Gupta, Barrister-at-Law was appointed Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes and differences between the parties. 8. The learned Arbitrator held several sittings and eventually passed his Award on 3rd day of November 1987 directing the respondents to pay to the claimant/petitioner a sum of Rs. 5,86,000/- in full and final settlement of all his claims and demands against the respondents in relation to the partnership firm of P. C. Dutta and Co. and further directing the respondents to pay interest on the said sum at the rate of 6% per annum from 1st December 1981 till the date of the Award and further directing the respondents to pay the claimant/petitioner the costs of all incidental to that reference which were assessed at Rs. 70,000/-. 9. The respondents challenged the aforesaid Award by filing an application under s. 33 read with S. 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in each of the aforesaid Special Suit Nos. 62-63 of 1981 mainly on the ground that the learned Arbitrator mis-conducted himself in not calling for the books of accounts of the firm M/s. P. C. Dutta & Co. for the period 1961 to 1978 and by admitting inadmissible evidence, exhibits M & N allegedly being the summary of the balance sheets for the period 1961 to 1981. 10. 62-63 of 1981 mainly on the ground that the learned Arbitrator mis-conducted himself in not calling for the books of accounts of the firm M/s. P. C. Dutta & Co. for the period 1961 to 1978 and by admitting inadmissible evidence, exhibits M & N allegedly being the summary of the balance sheets for the period 1961 to 1981. 10. The learned Trial Judge accepted the submissions of the petitioners and held that the documents produced on behalf of respondent No. 1 before the learned Arbitrator were not reliable and the learned Arbitrator should not have accepted those documents in absence of the primary documents particularly books of accounts and the balance sheet. The Learned Trial Judge has held that the learned Arbitrator has mis-conducted the proceedings as he chose not to call for the books of accounts in spite of the fact that the petitioners were ready and willing to produce the same. Accordingly by the impugned judgment and order the Learned Trial Judge has set aside the Award. 11. Being aggrieved thereby, the respondent No. 1 has come up in Appeal challenging the findings of the learned Trial Judge resulting in the setting aside of the Award. 12. At the outset the learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary point that the appeal is time barred. 13. It was submitted on behalf of the respondents that as the judgment and order dated April 19, 1989 from which the appeal herein arises, was signed by the Learned Trial Judge on April 19, 1989 and the same was filed in the department on July 21, 1989, the appeal was barred by limitation. The appeal came up for hearing on November 22, 1990. This question of limitation was raised on that date also by the learned counsel for the respondents. Upon this preliminary point being raised the Appellate Court directed the appellant to file an affidavit stating the steps taken regarding filing of the said order and pursuant to the said order the appellant has filed the affidavit on November 27, 1990 stating the steps taken by him. From this affidavit we find that after the impugned judgment and order was delivered and signed on April 10, 1989, the appellant on the following day had put in the requisition for drawing up the order and the requisition for certified copy of the judgment and order. From this affidavit we find that after the impugned judgment and order was delivered and signed on April 10, 1989, the appellant on the following day had put in the requisition for drawing up the order and the requisition for certified copy of the judgment and order. On May 10, 1989 the judgment was filed (vide paper-book page-177). On June 23, 1989 the appeal was preferred and the Memorandum of Appeal was filed in Court. On July 4, 1989 notice was issued by the department for settling the draft on July 7, 1989 and accordingly the draft was settled on that day. On July 20, 1989 the order was drawn up, completed and signed and the same was filed on July 21, 1989. Thereafter the folios were assessed on July 24, 1989 and on the same date stamps were furnished. On August 2, 1989 the certified copy of the order was made ready for the delivery and the delivery was taken on August 4, 1989. The following day was a Saturday and the next day was a Sunday. So the certified copy of the order was filed in the Appeal Section on August 7, 1989. From the above facts we are satisfied that the appellant cannot be said to• be guilty of any laches or negligence in the matter of obtaining the certified copy of the decree and in filing the same in Court and accordingly we hold that the appeal is not barred by limitation. While coming to this conclusion, we have placed our reliance on the judgment of this Court in Smt. Annanda Sundari Saha vs. Monohoran Saha, reported in AIR 1980 Cal. 365, cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, in which Chapter XXXI of the Original Side Rules of this Court prescribing the procedure for filing of appeals and Section 12 of the Limitation Act have been exhaustively discussed. 14. 365, cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, in which Chapter XXXI of the Original Side Rules of this Court prescribing the procedure for filing of appeals and Section 12 of the Limitation Act have been exhaustively discussed. 14. The main thrust of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the books of accounts which are the primary documents were not produced before the learned Arbitrator and the balance sheet which is prepared on the basis of the books of accounts being secondary evidence cannot be relied upon in absence of the primary documents and that the other document dated 4.4.79 which is purportedly a mutual agreement among the partners of the firm in suit cannot be relied upon as it was not signed by all the partners. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel had relied upon AIR 1972 S.C. 330 , Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen. In paragraph 14 of this reported judgment, Supreme Court quoted the observations of Venkatarama Aiyar J. In Union of India vs. Varma, AIR 1957 S.C. 882 . The observations, inter alia, are that when a document is produced in a Court or in a Tribunal the question that naturally arises is, is it a genuine document, what are its contents and are the statements contained therein true. When the appellant produced the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the Company it does not by its mere production amount to a proof of it or of the truth of entries therein. If these entries are challenged the appellant must prove each of such entries by producing the books and speaking from the entries therein. Learned counsel submitted that the 2 charts prepared by the petitioner marked as Exts. M & N cannot be relied upon as the petitioner did not produce the books of accounts wherefrom he prepared these charts. We have seen that Exts. M & N are not balance sheets in the real sense but these are charts prepared by the petitioner similar to balance sheet in which he has shown his share of money in the partnership business. We have seen that Exts. M & N are not balance sheets in the real sense but these are charts prepared by the petitioner similar to balance sheet in which he has shown his share of money in the partnership business. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that this ruling referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent does not apply in the case before us and has submitted that the learned Arbitrator has not mis-conducted himself even if he had relied upon Exts. M & N. and has further submitted that it was the duty of the respondents being the accounting parties, to produce the books of accounts. In absence of the books of accounts the learned Arbitrator had to rely upon the Exhibits M & N which were prepared on the basis of the books of accounts. While dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon Lindley's Treatise on Partnership. 15. The facts of the case mentioned in paragraph 14 of AIR 1972 S.C. 330 can be distinguished from the facts of the instant case. In that case the appellant produced the balance sheet and profit and loss account of the Company but the accounts shown in this statements were contested. As such a duty was cast upon the appellant to produce the books of accounts which are primary documents and on his failure to do so, it was observed under the circumstances that those documents could not be relied upon. In the case in hand the books of accounts were not in the possession of the petitioner. These were in the hands of the respondents. On their failure to produce the same, the learned Arbitrator had to rely upon the Exhibits M & N to pass the Award. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that it was the duty of the learned Arbitrator to call for the books of accounts and as he failed to do so, he mis-conducted himself. On their failure to produce the same, the learned Arbitrator had to rely upon the Exhibits M & N to pass the Award. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that it was the duty of the learned Arbitrator to call for the books of accounts and as he failed to do so, he mis-conducted himself. The learned counsel has drawn our attention to the minutes of the 49th sitting of the meeting of the Arbitration held on 19th January 1987 of Special Suit No. 63 of 1981 wherein the following were stated on behalf of the petitioners (respondents in this appeal): "The learned Arbitrator is most welcome to go through the accounts and on the basis of such accounts whatever money would be due and payable, if at all, to the claimant after adjusted dues, if any, to the partnership by the claimant and Award in favour of the claimant can certainly be made." So it was the duty of the respondents to produce the books of accounts before him. That it was not the duty of the learned Arbitrator to direct the respondents to produce the books of accounts, will be clear from the minutes of the 56th sitting of the Arbitration held on November 30, 1984 (Special Suit No. 62 of 1981). Relevant questions and answers from the Cross-examination of respondent Paritosh Dutta have been quoted by the respondents in their application filed on 9.12.87 under sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act vide at page 11-12 of the paper book. The said respondent was asked whether he had produced the books of accounts before the learned Arbitrator. His reply was that these were under the Receiver so he could not produce them. So he was asked what steps he took for their production. His reply was that 'he would take steps of produce them if' he was directed to do so. Then he was asked, if he had the desire to produce them he could have taken steps and his reply was that certain documents regarding accounts like balance sheet, challans, bills etc. had already been produced. Then he was asked whether these were all he wished to produce. His reply was, if any other books of accounts are required he was ready to produce. He was again asked as to the documents on which he wished to rely. had already been produced. Then he was asked whether these were all he wished to produce. His reply was, if any other books of accounts are required he was ready to produce. He was again asked as to the documents on which he wished to rely. His reply was that whatever were in their custody they had produced and whatever were in the custody of the Receiver they could not produce. The learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to a passage of the Treatise on Partnership by Lindley, 5th Edition at page 651 dealing with the consequence of non-production of the books of accounts. It is said that "if a partner has books or accounts in his possession, and he will not produce them, an account may, nevertheless, be arrived at by presuming everything against him". 16. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the learned Arbitrator had mis-conducted the proceedings as he did not call for the books of accounts and has relied upon the decision of the 9upreme Court in K. P. Poulose vs. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1975 S.C. 1259 , But the learned counsel for the appellant has shown the distinction between this reported case and the case in hand. He has pointed out that in this reported case the Arbitrator himself wanted the documents to be produced. Whereas in the case in hand, the Arbitrator did not give any direction for such production. In other words it was the duty of the respondents to produce the books of accounts before the Arbitrator. The learned counsel for the respondent cited AIR 1987 Delhi 148, M/s. Bombay Ammonia Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India. In this case the Arbitrator had directed the respondent to produce the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner but he did not pursue the matter further. The document sought to be produced by the petitioner before the Arbitrator were not available on the record of the proceedings of the Arbitrator. Under the facts and circumstances, a Learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that the Arbitrator failed to do his duty and his failure or negligence had resulted in substantial miscarriage of justice to the petitioner and on that ground alone the Award was liable to be set aside. Under the facts and circumstances, a Learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that the Arbitrator failed to do his duty and his failure or negligence had resulted in substantial miscarriage of justice to the petitioner and on that ground alone the Award was liable to be set aside. However, in the case before us we find that even without the books of accounts being produced before the Arbitrator by the respondents, he could come to a definite finding without causing any miscarriage of justice to the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to AIR 1983 Delhi 297, Union of India vs. Mehta Teja Singh. In this case the claim of the Government before the Arbitrator for recovery of the amount from the contractor was based on the report of the technical examiner and the Arbitrator did not order production by the Government though specifically requested by the contractor to do so. Under the circumstances it was held by the Delhi High Court that the action of the Arbitrator in making the Award allowing the claim without himself looking into the report on which the claim was based and without allowing the contractor inspection thereof amounts to misconduct of the Arbitration proceeding resulting in denial of natural justice to the contractor and rendering the Award liable to be set aside. But the facts of this case can be distinguished from the facts of the case in hand. Here in the case before us none of the parties applied before the Arbitrator to direct the accounting party to produce the books of accounts. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied heavily upon a Single Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in AIR 1975 Karnataka 7, Smt. Jubedabi Kon vs. Smt. Jainbi Kon. It has been held therein that in a suit for partnership accounts if the Court finds that the defendant, the accounting party, is withholding the books of accounts relating to the transaction or produces only a part to them it can draw such inferences as it thinks proper. On failure of the defendant to produce the relevant accounts books etc. the plaintiff will be at liberty to prove by secondary evidence or other evidence the liability of the defendant. We agree with the views expressed by the Learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court. On failure of the defendant to produce the relevant accounts books etc. the plaintiff will be at liberty to prove by secondary evidence or other evidence the liability of the defendant. We agree with the views expressed by the Learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court. The learned counsel for the respondent referred to AIR 1914 P.C. 33, Rai Dwarka Nath Sarkar vs. Haji Mohammed Akbar. It was held therein that in a suit for accounts between the partners, each party is bound to account to the best of his ability and give full discoveries of all documents in his possession as to matters in dispute relating to the partnership. The learned counsel for the appellant had submitted that he had no dispute with the learned counsel on the opposite side as regards this ruling and has submitted that the appellant produced the secondary documents relating to the accounts of the partnership business to the best of his ability but that the respondents had failed in their duty inasmuch as they being the accounting parties did not produce the books. The balance sheet produced by the appellant although secondary evidence, will carry much probative value in absence 'of the primary documents. Under the facts and circumstances of the case and the propositions of law discussed above it cannot be said that the learned Arbitrator had mis-conducted the proceeding. 17. Lastly the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the learned Arbitrator had acted beyond his jurisdiction and mis-conducted himself. As an instance of this jurisdictional error, the learned counsel has submitted that the Arbitrator had gone beyond the terms of reference and has drawn our attention to the Court's order dated April 19, 1984 in Special Suit No. 62 of 1981. This order relates to an application for amendment of Section 20 application and it says that "If the proposed amendments were already pleaded in Section 20 application but due to inadvertence omitted from the statement of claims, then such amendments should be allowed. No amendment should be allowed which will introduce new dispute or new facts not pleaded in Section 20 application. Scope of the reference cannot be enlarged by way of amendment". However, it transpired that the learned Arbitrator allowed the amendment whereby a new dispute "regarding diversion of partnership money and keeping the same in the benami names" were introduced and evidence was tendered thereto. Scope of the reference cannot be enlarged by way of amendment". However, it transpired that the learned Arbitrator allowed the amendment whereby a new dispute "regarding diversion of partnership money and keeping the same in the benami names" were introduced and evidence was tendered thereto. On this point the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon 52 CWN 826, Khusiram vs. Mathura Dass, AIR 1948 Bom. 292, Sherbanubai vs. Hooseinbhoy, and (1991) 4 S.C.C. 93 . Associated Engineering Co. vs. Govt. of A.P. In Khusiram's case it was held that the Court must retain sufficient control over the Arbitrators to prevent and redress any justice on their part. If the Arbitrators do not appreciate the points involved in the case and do not apply their minds to them or if they decide in any way in which no reasonable man occupying a judicial or quasi-judicial position would decide, it is open to the Court to interfere with the Award in the interest of justice. In Sherbanubai's case it was held that the parties cannot by agreement confer upon Arbitrator wider powers than those given by order of reference. Parties wishing to give such powers to the Arbitrator must get fresh order of reference or get the original order amended or altered. In the case of Associated Engineering Co., the Supreme Court has held that the Arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. If the Award deliberately departs from the contract, apart from constituting misconduct, it will also constitute malafide action and if the Arbitrator commits an error in the construction of the contract, that is an error within his jurisdiction. But if he wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits a jurisdictional error. An umpire or Arbitrator cannot widen his jurisdiction by deciding a question otherwise than in accordance with the contrat. As against these decisions the learned counsel for the appellant has cited AIR 1989 S.C. 268 , U.P. Hotels vs. U.P. State Electricity Board. It was observed therein that "even assuming that there was an error of construction of the agreement or even that there was an error of law in arriving at a conclusion, such an error is not an error which is amenable to correction even in a reasoned Award under the law. It was observed therein that "even assuming that there was an error of construction of the agreement or even that there was an error of law in arriving at a conclusion, such an error is not an error which is amenable to correction even in a reasoned Award under the law. In order to set aside an Award, there must be a strong proposition of law laid down in the Award as the basis of the Award". The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the learned Arbitrator ought not to have relied upon a document dated 4th April 1979 inasmuch as it was not signed by all the partners. We have perused this document marked 'C' (page 170 of the paper book). It mentions about mutual agreement between the partners as proposed in the meeting dated 6.3.79 a/c P.C. Dutta and Co. and Dutta Bros. This was signed by 2 partners namely Prasanna Kr. Dutta and Paritosh Dutta but the space for signature of the remaining prater was kept blank. As such it is contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that this document is inadmissible in evidence and the learned Arbitrator mis-conducted himself by relying on such inadmissible documentary evidence. Obviously the remaining partner is Smt. Tara Sundari Dutta. This omission does not lead to the conclusion that this document was fabricated and was not a genuine one. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of this Court in Hemchandra Gupta vs. Om Prakash Gupta, AIR 1987 Calcutta 69. In this reported case, a draft Deed of Partition prepared according to the instructions of the defendant and approved and signed by him was produced. It was held that the draft Deed might not amount to contract as it was not signed by both the parties but the recital in the Deed would amount to admission by the defendant. This ruling has a bearing on the case in hand. In our opinion the learned Arbitrator did not commit any misconduct in relying on this document. Tara Sundari Dutta had not filed any affidavit to the effect that no mutual agreement took place in the meeting dated 6-3-79 among the partners including herself. Technically speaking, the learned Arbitrator travelled beyond the scope of reference by admitting evidence of the Bank Account of M/s. P. C. Dutta and Co. Tara Sundari Dutta had not filed any affidavit to the effect that no mutual agreement took place in the meeting dated 6-3-79 among the partners including herself. Technically speaking, the learned Arbitrator travelled beyond the scope of reference by admitting evidence of the Bank Account of M/s. P. C. Dutta and Co. maintained in the Entally Branch of the Allahabad Bank. It was perhaps necessary as these partnership accounts were inextricably connected. But it is not the duty of the Court to try to gauge the mind of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator is the sole Judge of the quality and quantity of the evidence and the Court would not sit in appeal over the views of the Arbitrator by re-examining and reassessing the materials placed before him. 18. In the result, both the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments and orders are set aside and the impugned Award is restored. We pass no order as to cost of the these Appeals. S. Ahmed, J: I agree. Appeal allowed, Impugned order restored; Judgments and orders set aside.