ORDER K.S. Paripoornan, J. 1. The decree holder in O. S. No. 173 of 1972, Munsiff Court, Mavelikkara, is the revision petitioner. In this revision, the order passed by the court below in E. P No. 47 of 1986 dated 16-9-1991 is in challenge. The respondent is the judgment debtor. A decree was passed in favour of the revision petitioner to realise a sum of Rs. 1,410/- with 6% interest on the principal amount and costs on 31-7-1972. The decree holder filed an execution petition on 11-1-1974. Since no steps were taken, it was dismissed. During that time, the respondent (judgment debtor) filed O. P. No.5 of 1972 under the Debt Relief Act. The revision petitioner decree holder was also a party there in. Due to the absence of the respondent, O. P. No. 5 of 1972 was dismissed on 17-11-1980. The judgment debtor filed restoration application, which was dismissed on 13-4-1984. The respondent judgment debtor had surrendered the property to the Sub Court in O. P. No. 5 of 1972. After the dismissal of O. P. No. 5 of 1972, he got the property released and wanted to alienate the property. It was then, the present execution, petition E P. No, 47 of 1986, was filed, on 24 2-1986. The execution petition was initially allowed on 19-7-1989. In C.R P. No. 2129 of 1989, at the instance of the judgment debtor, this Court set aside the said order and ordered a remit. This Court directed the court below to consider whether the decree holder is entitled to exclusion of time either under S.14 or under S.15 of the Limitation Act. After the remit, the court below, by order dated 16-9-1991, held that the decree holder is not entitled to claim exclusion of time under S.14 or 15 of the Limitation Act. The execution petition was held to be barred by limitation. The decree holder has come up in revision. 2. I heard counsel. 3. Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the court below has totally misconstrued S.14 and 15 of the Limitation Act. It was submitted that the court below declined to apply S.14 of the Act on the ground that the respondent was not prosecuting O. P. No. 5 of 1972, since he was only a defendant or respondent therein. So, S.14 will not apply. It was submitted that the court below declined to apply S.14 of the Act on the ground that the respondent was not prosecuting O. P. No. 5 of 1972, since he was only a defendant or respondent therein. So, S.14 will not apply. Counsel also submitted that the court below was in error in holding that S.15 of the Limitation Act will not apply since there was no stay or injunction against the execution of decree in O. P. No.5 of 1972. It was submitted that apart from S.15 of the Limitation Act, once there is a statutory bar from executing the decree that is sufficient to postpone the period of limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the respondent judgment debtor contended that the revision petitioner was not eo nomine a plaintiff in O. P. No. 5 of 1972. He was only a respondent therein and so, it cannot be said that S.14 of the Act will apply. It was also submitted that in order to invoke S.15 of the Act, execution of the decree should have been stayed in O. P. No. 5 of 1972, which was not done. The fact that there is statutory bar in view of S.3 and 4 of the Kerala Act 11 of 19701s irrelevant. 5. On hearing the rival pleas, I am of the view that the court below totally misconstrued and misunderstood S.14 of the Limitation Act. It is true that the revision petitioner was not the plaintiff in O. P. No. 5 of 1972. He was only a respondent therein. But, in the said proceedings, he had claimed that right which is sought in this execution petition. In O. P. No. 5 of 1972, he was not resisting or defending the proceedings. He was claiming the rights to get the amount in the said original petition. He may not be eo nomine a plaintiff. But that is not decisive of the question. In the commentaries of the Limitation Act, Chitaley Vol. 1 6th edition, at page 330, the law is stated thus: "Where the plaintiff in the second suit was a plaintiff in the prior proceeding and the other circumstances specified in the section exist, the section clearly applies. But where the present plaintiff was only a defendant in the prior proceeding, does the section apply? 1 6th edition, at page 330, the law is stated thus: "Where the plaintiff in the second suit was a plaintiff in the prior proceeding and the other circumstances specified in the section exist, the section clearly applies. But where the present plaintiff was only a defendant in the prior proceeding, does the section apply? It has been held that it will apply, provided he had claimed therein the rights sought for in the present suit. In other words, he must have in the prior suit interests in the nature of those of a plaintiff". The above statement is supported by the decisions in Acha Kunju Vasu v. Krishna Kurup and another AIR 1954 TC 237 and Parameswaran Kartha v. Edappally Valia Raja AIR 1959 Ker. 7 . In the light of the above legal position, the court below was in error in holding that the decree holder herein was not prosecuting the proceedings in O. P. No. 5 of 1972. 6. Counsel for the respondent - judgment debtor contended that in order to apply S.14, the proceedings should have been prosecuted (pursued) in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain it. It was argued that this is not a case where the court could not entertain O. P. No. 5 of 1972, The petition was entertained, but dismissed for default of the petitioner. In such a case, it cannot be said that the, court could not entertain the proceedings due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature. There is no merit in this plea. 7. The words 'other cause of a like nature', occurring in S.14 of the Limitation Act, has been construed to denote that the defect must be of such a character as to make it impossible for the court to entertain the suit or application either in its inception or at all events as to prevent it from deciding on merits (See Rustomji on Law of Limitation, 7th Edition, at page 254). Rustomji had stated the law based on the decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Bhai Jai Kishen Singh v. Peoples Bank of Northern India AIR 1944 Lah. 136. Rustomji had stated the law based on the decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Bhai Jai Kishen Singh v. Peoples Bank of Northern India AIR 1944 Lah. 136. The said decision was approved by the Supreme Court in the decision in Gurdit Singh and others v. Munsha Singh and others AIR 1977 SC 640 . See also AIR 1951 Patna 486 So, the fact that O. P No. 5 of 1972 was dismissed due to the non appearance of the petitioner therein is sufficient to attract S.14 of the Act, since the court could not dispose of the matter on the merits. 8. From the above, it is evident that the period from 17-1-1972 (when O P No. 5 of 1972 was filed) to 13-4-1984 (when O. P. No. 5 of 1972 was finally dismissed), a period of twelve years will be excluded from being counted for the purpose of limitation. The decree is dated 31-7-1972. The present execution petition was filed on 24-2-1986 will be well within time. There can be no doubt on that score. It is agreed that the judgment debtor filed O.P. No. 5 of 1972 for relief under the Debt Relief Act. He prayed for relief under S.3 read with S.4, for instalment payment. Under the said Act, the payment is irrecoverable for certain period. In view of the decision in Kunhimutty v. Moideen kutty 1968 KLT 580 , the running of time under the Limitation Act is suspended while the payment is irrecoverable. That period also should be excluded, because it is a statutory/repose. If that is also excluded, there will be further advantage to the decree holder to exclude that time also. 9. I have held that S.14 of the Act will apply to the instant case. On that ground, the period from 17-1-1972 to 13-4-1984 will be excluded while calculating the period of limitation. If that period of twelve years is excluded, it cannot be denied that the execution petition is well within time. The court below was in error in dismissing the execution petition. The order of the court below dated 16-9-1991 is reversed. I hold that the execution petition is not barred by the law of limitation. The revision petition is allowed. The matter is remitted to the court below for proceeding with E. P. No. 45 of 1986 in accordance with law. The order of the court below dated 16-9-1991 is reversed. I hold that the execution petition is not barred by the law of limitation. The revision petition is allowed. The matter is remitted to the court below for proceeding with E. P. No. 45 of 1986 in accordance with law. The matter is posted in the court below, for appearance of the parties, on 22-9-92.