JUDGMENT - G.D. KAMAT, J.:---Petitioner is a Shipchandler by occupation and according to him he used to obtain a licence for the business of Shipchandling at the Mormugao Harbour during the erstwhile Portuguese regime. Petitioner says that he last obtained a licence dated 27th March, 1968, issued by the Director of Civil Administration and Collector after liberation. According to him, by virtue of this licence dated 27th March, 1968 he is entitled to do Shipchandling Business at the Mormugao Harbour. He complains that on 15th November, 1977, the Security Staff of the Mormugao Port Trust stopped his entry and access to a vessel known as "MUGUNGARA" on the ground that the petitioner has no valid licence as a Shipchandler. According to the petitioner, he brought to the notice of the Port Trust Authorities that the licence dated 27th March, 1968, granted to him by the Director of Civil Administration and Collector, was a valid licence by virtue of which he was entitled to carry on the business of Shipchandling at Mormugao Harbour and therefore, there is no question of the Port Authorities preventing him from carrying on his business. Certain more correspondence was entered into by the petitioner with the Port Authorities and it may be mentioned at this stage itself, that not much reference need be made to that correspondence and suffice at this stage to record some facts and events which have taken place. With the advent of the Liberation of the Territory of Goa, the Mormugao Port was brought within the fold of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 which was made applicable as from 1st July, 1964. Under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, the Port Administration is entitled to frame regulations in respect of various matters which broadly relate to activities in connection with the port, loading and unloading of goods, merchandise, stevedoring, shipchandling, repairs, etc., etc. Section 123 of the Act by way of general power, enables the Board to make regulations consistent with the Act for all or several of the matters enumerated under that section. Section 124 of the Act stipulates that no regulation made by the Board under the Act other than sub-section (2) of section 17 shall have effect until it has been approved by the Central Government and until such approval has been published in the official gazette. Section 124 of the Act stipulates that no regulation made by the Board under the Act other than sub-section (2) of section 17 shall have effect until it has been approved by the Central Government and until such approval has been published in the official gazette. According to the Mormugao Port Trust schedule of Harbour and Railways Rates which were already in force were amended by virtue of Notification No. M.P.T./3-G.A. (8)/76 dated 30th September, 1976, under Chapter VI of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. Alongwith such amendments the Mormugao Port Regulations were also amended by virtue of Notification No. M.P.T./10-G.A.-7/75 and after approval from the Central Government and duly published in the Official Gazette. A look at the revised rates will suggest under Item 4 that any trader who wishes to carry on Shipchandling business at the Mormugao Port is required to pay licence fee of Rs. 500/- per year and which is non refundable. An amendment has also been equally brought about to Clause 60 of the Regulation known as Mormugao Port Regulations by which under Clause 60 A licence is required to be issued by the Board to Shipchandlers, ship repairers, chippers, fitters and other miscellaneous traders. Such a licence is mentioned to be granted on year-to-year basis to firms and individuals subject to clearance by Customs Authorities. Under Clause (c) thereof an intending Shipchandler is required to apply in the prescribed proforma annexed as Appendix 'A' in the Port Regulation, to the Chairman of the Mormugao Port Trust for obtaining the necessary licence. It further provides that every such application shall be accompanied by a 'No Objection Certificate' from Customs Authorities by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Collector and a solvency certificate from the Mamlatdar for an amount not below Rs. 25,000/-. The further requirement is that as the Shipchandler and his agents and servants are required to enter the customs barrier and thereafter board the vessels within the Port Area, every applicant is required to obtain a 'No Objection Certificate' from the steamer agents. There are some more conditions in the matter of security deposit of Rs. 50/- in case of Shipchandlers. 2. There are some more conditions in the matter of security deposit of Rs. 50/- in case of Shipchandlers. 2. It appears that the petitioner could not obtain a 'No Objection Certificate' from the steamer agents and went on insisting that by virtue of the licence granted to him by the Director of Civil Administration-cum-Collector dated 27th March, 1968, he is an all-time licensed Shipchandler and therefore there is no question of the first respondent insisting upon the petitioner to have a fresh licence under the Mormugao Port Regulations for the purposes of carrying on Shipchandling Business and having found that he is not allowed to carry on the Business of Shipchandling at the Mormugao Port, he instituted a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on India vide Writ Petition No. 50 of 86 challenging the requirements of the Port Regulations in the matter of grant of licence and, at the same time insisting that he has an irrevocable licence dated 27th March, 1968 and therefore the action of the Port Administration in preventing him is illegal. This Writ Petition came up for admission before a Bench of this Court to which one of us (Kamat, J.) was a party. The Writ Petition was rejected and we must confess, by a non-speaking order, on the same day. The matter however did not rest there and the petitioner took up the matter before the Supreme Court by instituting Special Leave to Appeal Petition No. 11019 of 1986. The Apex Court on 29th October, 1986 upon hearing the learned Counsel made the order as follows: "Special Leave Petition is dismissed. The petitioner can apply for a licence under the now prevailing rules. Under the circumstances we do not see any reason to interfere with the order passed by the High Court. Special Leave Petition is dismissed." 3. After this order was rendered by the Supreme Court, the petitioner once again renewed his request for grant of a licence for Shipchandling. Once again the petitioner was not in a position to obtain "No Objection Certificate" from the steamer agents, with the result the petitioner has not been able to secure any Shipchandling licence. After this order was rendered by the Supreme Court, the petitioner once again renewed his request for grant of a licence for Shipchandling. Once again the petitioner was not in a position to obtain "No Objection Certificate" from the steamer agents, with the result the petitioner has not been able to secure any Shipchandling licence. The petitioner equally went on insisting with the Port Administration that by virtue of the order of the Supreme Court he was entitled to obtain a licence from the Port Authorities, but the case of the Port Authorities is that despite the Supreme Court directions, whereby the petitioner was directed to comply with the prevailing rules, viz. Mormugao Port Regulations, the petitioner's application is incomplete and that though the petitioner was called upon several times to complete his application, he does not do so. That is how on or about 12th November, 1987, the petitioner instituted the present Writ Petition once again challenging the action of the Port Authorities on same grounds which were earlier taken in the Writ Petition No. 50 of 86 which was rejected by the order dated 15th April, 1986 and what is more, affirmed by the order of the Supreme Court dated 29th October, 1986. It may be also mentioned that in the earlier Writ Petition the petitioner had put into attack the licence that he had obtained dated 27th March, 1968, from the Director of Civil Administration and Collector of Goa, which is also taken in the present petition. 4. Before we come to the question of some preliminary hurdles, at the threshold we would make it clear that under the erstwhile regime, the Port Administration was coming within the Directorate of Civil Administration unlike the present position. It may be stated that in so far as the Ports and Harbours are concerned, they directly come under the Central Government and are not within the purview and ambit of the State Government. It may be stated that in so far as the Ports and Harbours are concerned, they directly come under the Central Government and are not within the purview and ambit of the State Government. What is therefore necessary to be seen is that although under the erstwhile regime the Director of Civil Administration might have been empowered to grant licence for a prospective trader in Shipchandling, there can be no doubt that under the present administration such a power cannot be exercised by any of the officers of the State Government and what is more by virtue of the provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, such power has been expressly given and vested in the Port Administration, namely the Board of Trustees. It is therefore difficult to envisage how the petitioner still insists that he is entitled to carry on Shipchandling business at the Mormugao Port by virtue of the so called licence granted to him by the Director of Civil Administration, who is only a functionary of the State Government. It is therefore clear on any count that any licence that an intending trader wants to have in connection with any of the activities required to be done within the Port areas, has to be obtained from the Port Administration. 5. Apart from this, we will presently point out that the petitioner's claim that what is granted to him by the Director of Civil Administration and Collector is not a licence for the purposes of enabling him to directly carry on the Shipchandling Business at Mormugao Harbour is clear. This letter is available at page 53 of the compilation and it is addressed to the Mamlatdar of Mormugao Taluka and copy forwarded to the petitioner. It reads : "It is hereby informed that the Collector and D.C.A. has no objection to permit Shri Francisco Almeida resident of Vasco-da-Gama to carry on the business of delivering provisions and stores to foreign vessels calling at the Mormugao Port." By no stretch of imagination it can be stated that this can amount to a grant of licence for Shipchandling. A reading of the letter itself makes it clear that it is merely a "No Objection" granted to the petitioner and by no stretch of imagination it could mean that the petitioner can carry on the Shipchandling Business without obtaining due and proper licence from the Port Authorities. 6. A reading of the letter itself makes it clear that it is merely a "No Objection" granted to the petitioner and by no stretch of imagination it could mean that the petitioner can carry on the Shipchandling Business without obtaining due and proper licence from the Port Authorities. 6. It is indeed true that Mr. Lakhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, tried to contend that under some Portaria (law) which is still in force in the State issued by the erstwhile regime, the Director of Civil Administration had power to grant licence for Shipchandling at the Port of Mormugao. We made several attempts with Mr. Lakhakar to tell us the number of that Portaria and to identify the same and we must mention that Mr. Lakhakar was not able to cite that Portaria. Even on the assumption that such a Portaria had been enacted by the Portuguese Government and directed the Director of Civil Administration to grant such licences, it is futile now to contend that such power in relation to Port affairs can still be vested in the Director of Civil Administration or the Collector, for obvious reason that such a Director is a functionary of the State Government, whereas the Port and Harbours are matters which directly come under the Central Government. In any event, the Mormugao Port Trust is now totally brought within the purview of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 and it does not take time to iterate that all matters relating to Port and its affairs, must come within the ambit of that Act and the licences shall be governed in the matter by Regulations made thereunder and to be issued by the functionaries also mentioned there at. 7. The first question now that comes is the bar to the maintainability of the present petition. Mr. Lakhakar does not dispute that the challenges contained in the present petition are the same which were made in Writ Petition No. 50 of 1986 and which was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court on 15th April, 1986. What is more, this order of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in turn dismissed the Special Leave to appeal petition of the petitioner. In our view therefore, this petition must attract the doctrine of res judicata. It may be indeed mentioned that Mr. What is more, this order of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in turn dismissed the Special Leave to appeal petition of the petitioner. In our view therefore, this petition must attract the doctrine of res judicata. It may be indeed mentioned that Mr. Lakhakar relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. The Board of Trustees and another)1, reported in A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1283 and contended that inasmuch as neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court has gone into the merits of the matter, the doctrine of res judicata is not attracted and therefore, it is open to the petitioner to challenge the action of the respondents in the present petition. In our view the argument is itself misconceived and we will presently point out that the ratio laid down in the Cochin Port Trust Authority (supra) is not available to the petitioner. What is necessary to be seen is that on identical challenges the petitioner had come in the earlier petition which was rejected by this Court and what is more the rejection was upheld in the Special Leave to appeal petition, by the Supreme Court. Insofar as the Cochin Port Trust case is concerned, the facts were entirely different. Upon an Industrial Tribunal having made an award the Cochin Port Trust has challenged the same directly before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court refused to grant Special Leave and rejected the same summarily without going into any of the contentions on merits. Subsequently, the Port Authorities instituted a petition in the Kerala High Court. A question was raised on behalf of the workmen of the Cochin Port Trust that the Board's earlier Special Leave petition having been rejected by the Supreme Court in limine the doctrine of res judicata was applicable and therefore, the writ petition before the Kerala High Court was not maintainable, and such a challenge was negatived by the Supreme Court in that decision. We do not think that we are required to elaborate on the principle as nowhere we have found that a decision of (Daryo others v. State of U.P. others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457 has either been diluted or desented from. 8. We do not think that we are required to elaborate on the principle as nowhere we have found that a decision of (Daryo others v. State of U.P. others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1457 has either been diluted or desented from. 8. We now assume for the sake of argument, that the petitioner is right and the doctrine of res judicata is not attracted insofar as the present petition is concerned. We therefore, now come to the merits of the matter insofar as the petition is concerned. We may succinctly mention that four challenges have been made in this petition which are as follows : 1. That the action of respondent No. 1 in the matter of cancellation of the petitioner's licence for Shipchandling dated 27th March, 1968, is illegal; 2. Power under Mormugao Port Regulation derived from section 124 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, is ultra vires and no such power can be read in the Act in the matter of grant of licences for Shipchandling; 3. Alternately, if Mormugao Port Regulation is held to be valid, it is unreasonable being contrary to the Constitution of India; 4. The licence fee of Rs. 500/- per annum is excessive and inasmuch as it betrays the character of fees the same amounts to a tax, the same is illegal. 9. Insofar as the first proposition is concerned in the matter of the validity of the cancellation of the licence of the petitioner, we have abundantly made clear as to how the Director of Civil Administration being a functionary of the State Government is unable to grant any licence in the matter of affairs relating to the Port once Goa became a part of the Union of India and the Harbours and Ports are now vested under the Central Government. We have also equally and abundantly made clear that the Mormugao Port and Harbour is brought under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 and therefore any licences must come by under the provisions of that Act and from the functionaries mentioned therein. It is therefore clear that if any regulations are made under that Act, such regulations will guide the course of grant of licences when persons are seeking to operate within the port area. It is therefore clear that if any regulations are made under that Act, such regulations will guide the course of grant of licences when persons are seeking to operate within the port area. It is therefore, clear that the petitioner cannot by any stretch of imagination harp that the licence granted to him by the Director of Civil Administration dated 27th March, 1968, entitles him to carry on Shipchandling Business within the port area. We have also otherwise sufficiently seen as to how that document dated 27th March, 1968 is in fact not a licence, but merely a 'No objection Certificate'. 10. Coming to the second proposition that the Port Regulations made under section 124 of the Major Port Trusts Act are ultra vires and further that no such power can be read in the Act, we may presently mention that sections 52 and 123 confers all general powers on the Board of Trustees. We have also made reference to section 124 of the Act that every regulation made by the Board of Trustees is required to be approved by the Central Government and it became operative only upon publication in the Official Gazette. Mr. Arvind Gadgil, Deputy Secretary of the Mormugao Port Trust in his affidavit dated 30th March, 1988, has iterated that Mormugao Port Regulations were not only framed by the Board of Trustees, but they were duly approved by the Central Government vide Ministry's Letter No. PGL-56/76 dated 14th September, 1976. The averment further states that these regulations were published in the Government Gazette bearing series No. III No. 28 dated 27th October, 1976. A further Notification dated 27th October, 1978, was issued by the Deputy Secretary of the Mormugao, Port Trust whereby the additional amendment to the Mormugao Port Trust and amendment to the Schedule of Harbour and Railway Rates were also published. Mr. Lakhakar now says that it was clearly incumbent upon the first respondent. Port administration, to have quoted the Ministry's letters in the Official Gazette and mere incorporation of the number of the letter alongwith the date is not sufficient compliance for the factum of approval. We must point out that all that section 124 of the Act requires is the approval by the Central Government and the subsequent event of publication in the official gazette. It is not understood as to how Mr. We must point out that all that section 124 of the Act requires is the approval by the Central Government and the subsequent event of publication in the official gazette. It is not understood as to how Mr. Lakhakar can contend that the approval made by the Central Government must also be published and that must necessarily prove the factum of approval. After all, we are dealing with a central agency. The affidavit clearly mentions not only the Code number of the communications, but even the date of the communications under which the Central Government has approved the regulation framed and what is more, they are published thereafter in the Government Gazette. We do not think that any further elaboration is required on this point or the matter requires any further consideration. It must not be forgotten that even under the provisions of 7th Evidence Act, any act done by a Government department is always presumed to be true and correct in all respect and there is no scope for presumption otherwise. Section 124 of the Act also makes it clear that the publication in the official gazette is to bring the regulation into operation and otherwise with the intention to make the same to the knowledge of the people publicly. Inasmuch as this has been adhered to, we fail to see as to how the petitioner can insist that section 124 has not been complied with. 11. The alternative argument is that if the regulation is valid the same is unreasonable being contrary to the Constitution of India. In fact, we fail to comprehend this challenge. It must be seen that the administration of the Port is vested in what is known as the Board of Trustees who are appointed by the Central Government from time-to-time under the very Act, Major Port Trusts Act, 1963. The Port has to be administered in accordance with the provisions of this Act and needless to say therefore, that in matters connected therewith several regulations are required to be made. If from the point of view of security of the Port itself, as also the Foreign and Indian vessels which touch the Port or Harbour, it must be held that Port administration can make all reasonable regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. If from the point of view of security of the Port itself, as also the Foreign and Indian vessels which touch the Port or Harbour, it must be held that Port administration can make all reasonable regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. Shipchandling is a business which involves supply of food items to the vessels which are berthed at the Port. This requirement also involves security including certain measures from the angles of the fulfilment of the Customs Act, 1960. If, having regard to all these factors the Regulation requires that a Shipchandler ought to bring 'No objection' from ship's agent, who are otherwise responsible to the Port Administration, we fail to see how such a provision can be held to be unreasonable. It is therefore, not possible for us to hold that the Regulation can be faulted with so as to be dubbed as unreasonable and contrary to the Constitution. Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India also recognizes reasonable restriction in the matter of trade, commerce, etc. Taking therefore, any sense of the matter an intending Shipchandler being made to get 'No Objection' letters from the steamer agents, must be held to be a reasonable restriction for grant of Shipchandling licence. 12. Coming to the last of the challenge, namely that the rate of licence fee of Rs. 500/- per annum for Shipchandling, betrays the character of fees and is otherwise excessive, in our view having regard to the present inflation this challenge need only be mentioned to be rejected. It is impossible to accept that a person who wants to carry on Shipchandling Business at a comparatively busy Port like Mormugao, where large number of ships come for carrying iron ore from this State to places like Japan, Korea and some East European countries like Romania, etc. should complain that the licence fee of Rs. 500/- per annum is excessive. In our view, otherwise nothing has been brought to show that this amount betrays the character of fees or it is in fact a tax which is not authorised insofar as the Port administration is concerned, to be levied. It must be pointed out that a Shipchandler is required to enter the Port area. He makes use of the area for the purpose of carrying on his business when supplies are made to the ships berthed at the Port. It must be pointed out that a Shipchandler is required to enter the Port area. He makes use of the area for the purpose of carrying on his business when supplies are made to the ships berthed at the Port. This being so, we fail to understand as to how a paltry sum of Rs. 500/- can be termed as a tax or such a smaller amount cannot be charged as fees. In fact, it comes to less than Rs. 2 per day. Mr. Lakhakar indeed relied upon several decisions to focus the proposition that fees must be commensurate with services and that there should be an element of quid pro quo. He also relied upon authorities to suggest as to how in the absence of power no tax can be levied. Nobody disputes the proposition advanced by Mr. Lakhakar. We merely record the authorities relied upon by him. They are : (Mohammad Yasin v. The Town Area Committee, Jalalabad another)3, reported in (1952)3 S.C.R. 572, (M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. others)4, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302, (Abdul Majeed Qureshi v. Corporation of Calcutta and others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1967 Cal. 174, (The State of Maharashtra others v. The Salvation Army, Western India Territory)6, reported in A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 846, (K.C. Varadachari, Partner, Madras Oil Mills and Products v. The State of Madras by the Secretary to the Government of Madras, Food and Agriculture Department)7, reported in A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 764. 13. We may now mention that the Supreme Court while disposing of the Special Leave petition of the petitioner clearly directed the petitioner to apply for a licence under the prevailing rules. In other words, the Supreme Court clearly directed the petitioner to apply under the Mormugao Port Regulations. Inasmuch as the petitioner has not supplied 'No Objection Certificate' from steamer agents, it is clear to us that the petitioner has not so far complied with the Regulation. We therefore, fail to see as to how the petitioner can insist upon not doing something which the Supreme Court directed him to do, or not fulfiling the conditions laid down by the Regulations and yet come before this Court and complain about the same. We therefore, fail to see as to how the petitioner can insist upon not doing something which the Supreme Court directed him to do, or not fulfiling the conditions laid down by the Regulations and yet come before this Court and complain about the same. Taking any view of the matter therefore, it is clear that the petitioner in fact has no cause of action and his application for licence has not been rejected and on the contrary, the Port Trust has been insisting with him to complete his application. 14. Mr. Tamba, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, made a statement before this Court that even if the petitioner now filed 'No Objection Certificate' from the steamer agents the Port Administration will consider grant of the necessary licence to the petitioner. 15. The petitioner today has filed his affidavit with some annexures such as judgments delivered by the Supreme Court, in (Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of Bihar others)8, reported in A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1780 and (Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India and others)9, reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 344, a letter of Mormugao Port Trust dated 10th January, 1986 alongwith the tender notice. We have gone through the affidavit and other documents. In our view no special mention need be made. 16. For all these reasons mentioned above, the petition fails and is dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs. 17. Petitioner present in Court, at this stage orally applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave rejected as there is no substantial question much less of public importance, besides we have dealt with the matter on its merits and merely applied regulations to the facts of the case. Petition dismissed. *****