K. A. SWAMI, ACTG. CJ. ( 1 ) THOUGH this writ appeal is posted for consideration of I. A. No. II filed by the appellant, we are of the view that as the appeal lies in a narrow compass it can be finally disposed of. Accordingly, we have heard both sides on the merits of the appeal. ( 2 ) THE contention urged on behalf of the 3rd respondent in the writ petition as well as in this appeal is that as against the award dated 3-2-1992 passed by the assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Chikkaballapur Sub-Division, chikkaballapur in Miscellaneous Dispute Petition No. 15 of 1991-92, the appellant has a right of appeal under Section 105 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), and as such, jurisdiction under Article 226 need not be exercised. The learned single Judge has accepted the contention and dismissed the writ petition. ( 3 ) HOWEVER, we are of the view that this is a case in which the appellant need not be driven to the necessity of filing an appeal. Because, in our view, the ground on which the election is challenged itself is unsustainable having regard to the provisions contained in Section 30 of the Act. ( 4 ) THE only point that arises for consideration is as to whether the appellant is entitled to the relief sought in the writ petition having regard to the provisions contained in Section 105 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the aforesaid point are no more in dispute. There is a society known as The Milk Producers' Co-operative Society, chikkaballapur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Co-operative Society ). The managing committee of the co-operative society consisted of nine members. Third respondent was the President of the Society. Appellant was one of the members of the managing committee to the co-operative society. Eight members of the managing committee did not co-operate with the third respondent who was the President of the co-operative Society, therefore, they resigned. Thus, the appellant also along with the other members of the managing committee resigned from the membership of the managing committee. Appellant was one of the members of the managing committee to the co-operative society. Eight members of the managing committee did not co-operate with the third respondent who was the President of the co-operative Society, therefore, they resigned. Thus, the appellant also along with the other members of the managing committee resigned from the membership of the managing committee. On coming to know that eight members of the managing committee had resigned, and only the President of the Society who was the 3rd respondent had remained as a member of the managing committee, and as such the society could not function, the State Government in exercise of its powers under section 30 of the Act, appointed the Administrator on 3rd August, 1990. The order passed by the Assistant Registrar, dated 3rd August, 1990 reads thus: ( 6 ) THUS, it is clear from the aforesaid order that the administrator came to be appointed not on the ground that the committee persistently made default or was negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on the committee by the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws, or committed an act which was prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members or otherwise not functioning properly. It was also not on the ground that the co-operative society did not function in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws or any order or direction issued by the State Government or the Registrar. It was mainly on the ground that eight members of the managing committee had resigned therefore the President alone could not discharge the functions of the committee. There is a provision for tendering resignation by the members of the managing committee of a co-operative societies. Section 29-B of the Act specifically enables a member of a committee other than the nominated member to resign his membership in writing under his hand addressed to the co-operative society and his seat shall become vacant on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of such resignation unless within the said period of fifteen days he withdraws such resignation in writing under his band addressed to such co-operative society. In the instant case, resignations were tendered by eight members of the managing committee on 15-3-1990; whereas, the order under Section 30 of the Act appointing the Administrator on the basis of the resignations tendered by eight members of the managing committee was passed by the Deputy Registrar of co-operative Societies, Kolar on 3rd August, 1990. The order has been extracted in the earlier portion of this Judgment. It is clear from the said order that it has been passed on the basis of the resignations tendered by eight members of the managing committee and not on the basis of any of the grounds stated in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act. After the Administrator was appointed, an election was held to the managing committee. Appellant was one of the members who was elected to the managing committee in that election. Thereafter he was also elected as the President of the Co-operative Society. In the meanwhile, the third respondent raised a dispute under Section 70 of the Act challenging the validity of the election of the appellant on the ground that he was disqualified under sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act because he was removed from the membership of the managing committee under Section 30 (1) of the Act, hence he was disqualified to be elected. The assistant Registrar has accepted that ground on the basis that the entire managing committee had not resigned; that one of the members of the managing committee namely 3rd respondent was functioning when the order of supersession was passed; that the members of the managing committee were advised to withdraw their resignations by issuing show-cause notice, dated 30th May, 1990, produced as annexureb. Therefore, he has held that the appellant was disqualified for being elected as a member of the managing committee. ( 7 ) IT is true that the award in question is appealable-appeal lies both on facts and in law. But in a case where the whole cause of action is based fully on the misconception of law or on the basis of law which does not apply to the facts of the case, whether it is necessary to drive the parlies to prefer an appeal. But in a case where the whole cause of action is based fully on the misconception of law or on the basis of law which does not apply to the facts of the case, whether it is necessary to drive the parlies to prefer an appeal. If the facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the question are disputed, normally this court does not exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution because those facts are to be established and, as the appellate authority is entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and record its own findings, it would be just and appropriate to allow the appellate authority to decide. But in a case where on the face of it the ground of disqualification set up on the basis of the order superseding the committee of management of the co-operative society is not tenable inasmuch the ground on which the committee is superseded does not fall under Section 30 (1) of the Act, sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act is not attracted. Consequently, it cannot be held that the appellant was disqualified to be elected as a member of the Co-operative Society. Therefore, we are of the view that it is not necessary to drive the appellant to go through the appeal proceeding. In Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v Karnataka State Transport authority, 1984 (1) Kar. L. J. 552 (DB): AIR 1984 Kant. 4 (DB), this question came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court of which, one of us (KASJ as he then was) was a member. In that case, while dealing with the contention that in view of the existence of an equally efficacious alternative remedy of appeal under section 64 (1) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, a transport operator should not be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it was held as follows in paragraph 9:"it is, no doubt, true, that some averments in the memorandum of writ petition are characteristic of and peculiar to a prayer for a writ of mandamus and lend some support to Sri Rangaswamy's contention. It is also true that in the matter of a petition for mandamus the position in regard to the existence of an alternative remedy as a ground for declining relief is stricter and more exacting than in the case of certiorari. It is also true that in the matter of a petition for mandamus the position in regard to the existence of an alternative remedy as a ground for declining relief is stricter and more exacting than in the case of certiorari. The frame of the petition and the pleadings therein might not be very elegant and appropriately worded. But the petition read as a whole would indicate that petitioner was aggrieved by what, according to him, was a quasijudicial decision rejecting petitioner's application in a manner and on grounds which, according to petitioner, vitiated it. The prayer, in effect, was to have that quasi-judicial decision declared 'illegal and improper'. In our opinion, the refusal of the STA to consider the application of the petitioner dehors the inter-State agreement on the grounds set out in the order would show that there is a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested on it besides constituting an error of law apparent on the face of the record. Even when an equally efficacious alternative remedy exists, where, however, fundamental rights are affected where rules of natural justice are violated, or where there is a failure on the part of the authority concerned to confine itself within the bounds of its legitimate jurisdiction or where there is a failure to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it or where there is an error of law apparent on the face of the record, a person aggrieved can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 without reference to any remedy however equally efficacious it be. The existence of an alleniative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the High court under Article 226. The rule that the court does not entertain a petition under Article 226 when there is an equally efficacious alternative remedy is not a rule of law, but is a principle the courts have evolved for the guidance of their own discretion. In regard to the effect of the existence of an alternative remedy in the context of certiorari, Halsbury (IV Edn.) Vol. 11, para 1528 states: 'there is no rule in regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy; and, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right appeal has been conferred by statute,'. . . . . . . . . 11, para 1528 states: 'there is no rule in regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy; and, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right appeal has been conferred by statute,'. . . . . . . . . "this is also a case in which there is error of law apparent on the face of the record because the ground taken in the dispute in support of the plea that the appellant was disqualified, is not available in law. This is a case in which a dispute was raised under section 70 of the Act on the ground that the appellant was disqualified under sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act as the managing committee of which he was a member was superseded under sub-section (1) of Section 30. We have already pointed out in the earlier portion of this Judgment that superseding of the managing committee of the Co-operative Society in question was not on any of the grounds mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act, but it was on the ground that out of nine members of the managing committee (including the president) eight had tendered resignation and their resignations had become final and conclusive because they did not withdraw the resignations within 15 days from the date of submission of the resignations. Resignations were tendered on 15-3-1990, whereas the notice to show cause for passing an order under Section 30 of the act was issued as per Annexure-B on 31st May, 1990 long after the resignations had become final and the members had ceased to be the members of the managing committee, as such there was no question of removing them from the committee. Therefore, the ground on which the committee was superseded did not fall under Section 30 of the Act. A member of the managing committee will be disqualified under section 30 (3) of the Act only if the committee is superseded on any of the grounds stated in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 and not on the ground that the members of the managing committee had resigned. A member of the managing committee will be disqualified under section 30 (3) of the Act only if the committee is superseded on any of the grounds stated in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 and not on the ground that the members of the managing committee had resigned. If resignation to the managing committee is made a ground to disqualify a member under Section 30 (3) of the Act, the right of a member of the managing committee to resign as per Section 29-B of the act will be affected. Therefore, we are of the view that the very ground on the basis of which the election petition has been framed is not available in law. That being so, the award passed by the Assistant Registrar on the face of it is unsustainable as the appellant was not disqualified on the ground stated in the dispute. ( 8 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal has to be followed. It is accordingly allowed. The order of the learned single Judge is set aside, and the writ petition is allowed. The award dated 3-2-1992 passed in Miscellaneous Dispute No. 15 of 1991-92 by the assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Chikkaballapur Sub-Division, Kolar district, is hereby quashed, and the dispute is dismissed. ( 9 ) SRI N. K. Gupta, learned Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 in six weeks. --- *** --- .