JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - This is tenant's writ petition arising front suit for ejectment from an accommodation and recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation. The petitioner won in the trial court but has lost in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. 2. The plaintiffopposite party no. 2 Rais Ahmad filed the aforesaid suit on the following facts: Petitioner was tenant of the house in question at the monthly rent of Rs 20.00, The opposite party No. 2 purchased the house from the previous landlord and became entitled to receive rent from the petitioner. Rent due from him with effect from 111984 had not been paid and, accordingly, notice was issued on 11101984 demanding payment of arrears of rent and terminating tenancy, which was served on 16101984 but despite service of notice neither rent was paid nor the accommodation was vacated. 3. The suit was filed on 25111984. Undisputably the property is governed by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act XIII of 1972), for short, Act. The relief for ejectment was claimed on the basis of default in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. 4. The petitioner contested the aforesaid suit alleging that the plaintiff/opposite party did not inform him of the transfer of house in his favour by the previous landlord and, accordingly, he paid rent upto 3111984 to the previous landlord. On this basis it was pleaded that the opposite party could not claim rent for the month of January, 1984. It was further asserted that on acquiring knowledge of the transfer of the house in favour of the plaintiffopposite party he tendered rent to the oppositeparty but he refused to accept the same, whereupon he sent 'five months' rent amounting to Rs 100.00 by money order on 2371984 but the money order was refused and there upon he deposited rent in court under Section 30 of the Act. 5. During pendency of the suit the petitioner did not deposit rent under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for short, Code, and, therefore, his defence was struck off. 6. The plaintiff in support of his case examined himself as P.W. 1 and Bandey as P.W. 2. 7. 5. During pendency of the suit the petitioner did not deposit rent under Order XV Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for short, Code, and, therefore, his defence was struck off. 6. The plaintiff in support of his case examined himself as P.W. 1 and Bandey as P.W. 2. 7. The trial court dismissed the suit on the following findings: As soon as the petitioner acquire I knowledge of transfer of ownership he tendered rent to opposite party No. 2 who did not accept the same whereupon he remitted rent by Money Order and that too was refused. Thereafter the petitioner deposited rent in court under Section 30 of the Act. On these findings the petitioner could not be said to be defaulter in payment of rent within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act and he was not liable to eviction from the accommodation. 8. The revisional court has allowed the landlord's revision and decreed the suit on the following findings: The plaintiffopposite party did not serve any notice upon the petitioner prior to 16101984 informing him of the transfer of ownership. With effect from 16101984 the petitioner became liable to pay rent to the oppositeparty. After 3111984 the petitioner had not paid any rent either to the plaintiffopposite party or to his previous landlord. He was, therefore, liable to pay rent to the plaintiffopposite party from 121684. In his deposition the plaintiffopposite party had stated that no rent was tendered to him personally or through Money Order and he did not refuse to accept rent. This evidence stood unrebutted. The best evidence of refusal to accept rent was the money order coupon which was not filed by the petitioner. Therefore, the finding of refusal to accept rent to justify deposit under Section 30 is based on no evidence. The deposit under Section 30 of the Act not being based on refusal was not in accordance with law and such a deposit could not save the default which occurred under Section 20(2)(a). Accordingly the petitioner was liable to be evicted from the accommodation in question. 9. Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed that in the suit which has given rise to the present proceedings, validity of Section 30 was not required to be considered and the petitioner was entitled to relief against ejectment on mere proof of deposit under Section 30. 9. Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner pressed that in the suit which has given rise to the present proceedings, validity of Section 30 was not required to be considered and the petitioner was entitled to relief against ejectment on mere proof of deposit under Section 30. According to the learned counsel if the deposit was made without refusal it cannot be ignored while considering the question of default. The learned counsel submits that even an invalid deposit qualifies for relief against ejectment. In support of the submission the learned counsel has relied upon (1) 1985(2) ARC 188 Ram Das (deceased) through his legal representatives v. Vth Addl. District Judge, Azamgarh and others, (2) 1985(2) ARC 331 Shanker Lal Sharma v. Ram Adhar and another, (3) 1964 ALJ 148 Jareef Khan and others v. Mukhtar Ahmad and (4)1979 (5) Allahabad Law Reports 101 (SC) Lakhan Rai v. Ram Kumar Agarwal. 10. Sri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the landlordopposite party points out that the view taken in Ram Das and Shanker Lal Sharma (supra) cannot be treated as correct in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in 1986(2) Allahabad Rent Cases 132 Smt. Mridula Dayal v. VIth Addl. District Judge, Allahabad and others. According to the learned counsel in view of this judgment the petitioner can claim relief against eviction only on establishing that the rent was deposited on existence of the conditions prescribed in Section 30 and also in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the said section It is submitted that there was no evidence from the side of the petitioner to establish that the plaintiffopposite party had refused to accept the rent and, therefore, the deposit made by the petitioner under Section 30 of the Act was of no avail to him. For making the submission he has tried to draw support from the observations contained in paragraph7 of the judgment by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1987(1) Allahabad Rent Cases: Kameshwa Singh Srivastava v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and others. 11. For making the submission he has tried to draw support from the observations contained in paragraph7 of the judgment by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in 1987(1) Allahabad Rent Cases: Kameshwa Singh Srivastava v. IVth Addl. District Judge, Lucknow and others. 11. Section 20(2)(a ) of the Act provides as follows: (2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely; (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months, and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand. In view of the above provision a landlord c in claim eviction from a building governed by the Act if the tenant who is in arrears of rent for more than four months fails to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of notice of demand. In the present case there is no dispute that notice of demand was issued by the landlord on 11101984 and was served upon the tenant on 16101984. If on 11101984 rent for not less than four months was not due the landlord will not be entitled to evict the petitionertenant. It has, therefore, to be seen whether this rent was due when the notice dated 11101984 was issued. 12. The claim of the petitionertenant was, as already noticed, that he deposited rent under Section 30 of the Act after 2371984. The courts below have not disputed the deposit of rent by the petitioner under S. 30 of the Act. The question for consideration is whether this deposit can amount to payment of rent to the landlord within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act. 13. Section 30 entitles a tenant to deposit rent in court on existence of the conditions mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) thereof, Since subsection (2) has not been relied upon by the petitioner I omit it from consideration. 13. Section 30 entitles a tenant to deposit rent in court on existence of the conditions mentioned in subsections (1) and (2) thereof, Since subsection (2) has not been relied upon by the petitioner I omit it from consideration. Subsection (1) which is relied upon reads as follows: (1) If any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it. (Emphasis supplied). 14. From the emphasized word in this clause it would appear that right to deposit is acquired only when there is refusal on the part of the landlord to accept the rent. There is no general right available to the tenant to deposit rent in Court. Subsection (4) requires notice to be issued to the landlord when rent is deposited under subsection (1). Subsection (6) reads as follows: In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case referred to in subsection (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in subsection (2). (Emphasis supplied.) This is a deeming clause. This clause applies when deposit has been made in accordance with the preceding clauses of Section 30. This is apparent from the use of the words deposit made as aforesaid. Although when deposit is made in court the money does not come in the hands of the landlord. This clause creates the fiction of payment to the landlord, but this fiction will be attracted only when the deposit has been made as aforesaid. This is apparent from the use of the words deposit made as aforesaid. Although when deposit is made in court the money does not come in the hands of the landlord. This clause creates the fiction of payment to the landlord, but this fiction will be attracted only when the deposit has been made as aforesaid. Thus for the fiction available under this clause, a deposit referable to subsection (1) must be made when rent has been tendered to the landlord and he has refused to accept the same, If there has been no tender of rent and no refusal the deposit will not be referable to subsection (1) and the fiction created by subsection (6) will not be available to the tenant. When deposit is made on fulfilment of the conditions prescribed in subsection (1) two fictions arise (1) payment has been made to the person in whose favour the deposit has been made, and (2) the payment has been made on the date the amount has been deposited in court. In view of this position it has to be seen whether the deposit asserted by the petitioner was made on existence of the conditions prescribed in subsection (1) so as to attract the fiction created under subsection (6). 15. According to the finding of fact recorded by the revisional court there was no tender of rent by the petitioner to the landlord and there was no refusal of rent by the latter. Accordingly the conditions for deposit prescribed in subsection (1)were not satisfied. Therefore, the fiction created under subsection (6) will also not be attracted. 16. In taking the view that only a deposit made on fulfilment of conditions prescribed in subsection (1) qualifies for the deeming clause under subsection (6) I am fortified by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Mridula Dayal's case (supra). Ram Das and Shanker Lal Sharma (supra) were decided by a learned Single Judge and Ram Das's case has been specifically considered by the Division Bench and not approved. Accordingly the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from these two decisions. Of Course, in these two decisions it was held that even an invalid deposit of rent under Section 30 qualifies for relief against ejectment. 17. Accordingly the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot derive any benefit from these two decisions. Of Course, in these two decisions it was held that even an invalid deposit of rent under Section 30 qualifies for relief against ejectment. 17. The view taken in Smt. Mridula Dayal's case has the support of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kameshwar Singh Srivastava's case (supra). In paragraph7 of the Report their Lordships have observed primarily a tenant is under a legal obligation to pay rent to the landlord as and when due and if he fails to pay the same on demand from the landlord and if he is in arrears for a period of more than four months he would be liable to ejectment. Where there is a bona fide dispute regarding the landlord's right to receive rent on account of there being several claimants or if the landlord refuses to accept the rent without there being any justification for the same, the tenant would be entitled to take proceedings under Section 30 of the Act and deposit the rent in Court thereupon he would be deemed to have paid the rent to the landlord, consequently he would be relieved of his liability of eviction. It does not, however, follow that the tenant is entitled to disregard the landlord or ignore his demand for payment of rent to him. The provisions of the Act safeguard tenant's interest but it must be kept in mind that the landlord's right to receive rent and in the event of the tenant's being in arrears of rent for a period of more than four months, his right to evict the tenant is preserved. If the tenant makes the deposit in Court without their being any justification for the same or if he refuses to pay the rent even on the service of notice of demand by the landlord, he would be liable to eviction ................ (Emphasis supplied). 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, invites my attention to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the above report and submits that even according to their Lordships a too technical view should not be taken in disputes of the present nature. In that case their Lordships did set aside the decree for ejectment upheld by this Court but that was done on the special facts and circumstances available on the record of that case. In that case their Lordships did set aside the decree for ejectment upheld by this Court but that was done on the special facts and circumstances available on the record of that case. The special facts were that on the death of the landlord name or names of the person or persons entitled to receive rent was/were not communicated to the tenant, and the tenant was in doubt as to the person who was actually entitled to receive the rent. He had tendered rent to one of the legal representatives who had refused to accept the same. Thereafter all the landlords issued notice to the tenant demanding arrears of rent. Earlier the tenant had already deposited rent in Court. On receipt of notice the tenant sent reply stating therein that he was ready and willing to pay the rent and if the person to whom he had sent rent earlier was willing to accept the same he may inform him within a reasonable time failing which he would deposit the rent in miscellaneous case in which he had earlier deposited. The landlords did not respond to this letter and thereafter the tenant deposited the rent in the case in which rent had already been deposited earlier on its refusal by one of the landlords. The subsequent deposit was treated as valid because the miscellaneous case under Section 30 had been filed on the basis of earlier refusal. In the present case no such situation arises. Accordingly Kameshwar Singh Srivastava's case (supra) gives no benefit to the petitioner although it gives benefit to the landlordoppositeparty. 19. In Zareef Khan's case (supra) learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the observations made in paragraph18 of the Report. In this paragraph it has been observed that the landlord cannot be permitted to manufacture a case of default by circumventing the restrictions on ejectment. It has further been observed that a landlord is entitled to send a notice of demand if the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and eject him if he fails to pay within one month. Thereafter it is observed. It has further been observed that a landlord is entitled to send a notice of demand if the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and eject him if he fails to pay within one month. Thereafter it is observed. But if the tenant proves that on two previous occasions the landlord refused to accept rent and he had to deposit it in Court under Section 7C, and he also refused without lawful excuse a third remittance which reached him after he had posted his notice of demand, and he wrote to the landlords' lawyer within the month of the service of demand that he was ready and willing to pay the rent provided the landlord was willing to accept it, and suggested that in view of his previous refusal the landlord should collect the rent from him or specify the manner in which it should be remitted, and also inquired of the lawyer if he was willing to accept rent on the landlord's behalf but received no reply, the Court will not hold in these circumstances that the tenant had failed to pay the rent on demand. These observations are made on the facts obtaining on the record of that case. From the observation itself it is apparent that in that case the tenant had succeeded in establishing that the landlord had refused to accept the rent. In the present case the finding of fact recorded by the court below is that the rent was neither tendered nor refused. Accordingly this authority is of no assistance to the petitioner. This case was under the old Act. Section 30 of the present Act is almost identical to Section 7C of the old Act. 20. In Lakhan Rai's case their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the decree of eviction on the ground that the notice issued by the landlady did not indicate any willingness on her part to accept the rent. This case is, therefore, based on the language of the notice issued by the landlady. It has not been held in this case that a deposit under Sec. 7C could be made even though the conditions prescribed for deposit in Section 7C were not satisfied. Accordingly this authority is also of no assistance to the petitioner. 21. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. It has not been held in this case that a deposit under Sec. 7C could be made even though the conditions prescribed for deposit in Section 7C were not satisfied. Accordingly this authority is also of no assistance to the petitioner. 21. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. The petitioner shall vacate the accommodation in question within two months from today failing which it will be open to the landlordopposite party to execute the decree. (Petition dismissed.)