JUDGMENT 1. - Brief facts giving to the present special appeal are that the petitioner-appellant claimed himself to be an agriculturist and filed a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 4(e) of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957 as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner-appellant has taken a loan from Bank of Baroda for purchase of tractor trolly and other implements and also for digging of well. The D.P. Note, letter of hypothecation and letter of personal guarantee of Shri Sohan Lal were furnished. The loan was sanctioned by the Bank at the rate of 12.5%, which is 2% above the minimum bank interest rate of 10.5% as per directive of the Reserve Bank of India. There was default in making payment of loan and a suit was filed by the Bank against the petitioner-appellant and the land of Khasra No. 3016/56 having area of 15 bighas situated at village Nainwa, which was mortgaged by Bhanwarlal in favour of the Bank was prayed to be auctioned. The appellant-petitioner made an application under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1957 (hereinafter to be referred to as "the Act") in the Debt Relief Court (Civil Judge) Bundi praying that applicant Bhanwarlal is an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act and the Bank should be asked to render the entire statement of account and thereafter the Debt Relief Court should determine the actual amount payable. A further prayer was made that the amount may be allowed to be paid In the instalments of Rs. 500/- per month. The Debt Relief Court vide its order dated 7.4.1984 held that the provisions of Clause (e) of Section 4 of the Act are not applicable to the Scheduled Bank. 3. In the writ petition, the learned single judge observed that the provisions of Clause (e) of Section 4 of the Act is a valid piece of legislation and it stands the test of permissible classification and fulfils the two essential conditions, namely, (i) the classification must be founded on a intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from other left out of the group and (ii) the differential must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The provisions were held as not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition was dismissed. 4. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, the provisions of Section 4 are reproduced below: "4. Inapplicability of the Act in certain cases-The provisions of this Act shall not effect claims due in respect of: (a) rent as defined in Clause (22) of Section 5 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955); (b) any liability in respect of any sum due to any society registered or deemed to be registered under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1953 (Rajasthan Act IV of 1953); (c) any liability arising out of a breach of trust; (d) any liability in respect of maintenance whether under a decree of a court or otherwise; (e) any liability due to a bank; (f) arrears of wages or salary; (g) any liability in respect of village profits or of land revenue arising between co-sharers and the lambardars or between a proprietor and a thekedar or a farmer of proprietary rights or between co-sharers in ijara and Jagir villages; (h) a mortgage claim against property in the hands of subsequent transferee who has taken the transfer in order to satisfy the mortgage; (i) any liability arising between mortgagor and mortgagee in respect of land revenue of the mortgaged property which has been paid by the mortgagee on behalf of the mortgagor; (j) any revenue or tax payable to Government or any other sum of money due to Government by way of or towards repayment of loan or otherwise; (k) any tax payable to a local authority and any other sum of money due to it by way of or towards repayment of a loan or otherwise." 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the provisions of Section 4(j) of the Act were examined by this Court in the case of Nathudan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 Raj. 274 , wherein the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State conceded that the provisions of the said section are hit by the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. 274 , wherein the learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State conceded that the provisions of the said section are hit by the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. The provisions of Section 4(j) are applicable to "any other sum of money due to Government by way of or towards payment of a loan." This concession was made by the then Advocate General on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Mukari Charid v. Inder Singh ILR 1959(9) Raj. 547 wherein the provisions of Section 2(e) of the Rajasthan Jaglrdars' Debt Reduction Act was held to be hit by the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and the said judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajastluan v. Mukan Chand, AIR 1964 SC 1633 . On that analogy the provisions of Section 40 of the Act were held by the learned Single Judge as unconstitutional and hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 6. It was further submitted that the provisions of Section 4(k) of the Act were also examined by this Court In the case of Fateh Singh v. Gram Panchayat Ransi Goon and Ors. WLN 1971-Part-I, page 439 wherein the claims due in respect of any tax payable to a local authority and any other sum of money due to it by way of or towards repayment of loan or otherwise was held to be not a valid piece of legislation and was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. 7. The judgment of this Court in Ram Rakh v. Creditors 1970 R.L.W. 309 was also referred to with regard to the provisions of Section 4(b), wherein the Division Bench considered the scheme of the Act and the provisions with regard to the Rajasthan Jagirdar Debt Reduction Act and the objects and reasons of that Act vis-a-vis the Rajasthan Relief of Agricultural Indebtness Act, 1957 and observed that the reasons for enactment of both the Acts are different. The object of Rajasthan Jagirdar Debt Reduction Act was to reduce the debt secured on Jagir lands which have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act and that on that account the Jagirdar's capacity to pay debts has been reduced and the object of that Act was to ameliorate their condition. The object of Rajasthan Jagirdar Debt Reduction Act was to reduce the debt secured on Jagir lands which have been resumed under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act and that on that account the Jagirdar's capacity to pay debts has been reduced and the object of that Act was to ameliorate their condition. The main consideration in enacting that Act was that there was reduction in the assets of the Jagirdars by force of law and their debts must be reduced and it would make no distinction whether the debt is of the State or of any other person. The object for the enactment of the Act was with regard to the problem of agricultural indebtedness in the State which has assumed considerable magnitude. Because of sheer necessity agriculturists are compelled to pay exhorbitant rates of interests. Not only this but the interest which accuses on loan in from time to time added to the principal amount and the burden on the debtor goes on increasing, resulting in his inability to pay his debts in full. 8. Our attention has also been drawn towards the provisions of the Banking Regulations Act, 1946, wherein in respect of the rate of interest charged by the banking companies the courts were debarred from examining the excessiveness in the rate of interest charged by this amendment. The Reserve Bank of India has fixed the interest to be charged by the scheduled banks for the different categories of debtors including advances and loans to the agriculturists and they have been treated in a preferential manner by charging the interest at the rates which were lower than other categories. 9. In the case of Indian Bank, Tiruvannamalai v. V.A. Balasubramania Gurukal, AIR 1982 Mad. 296 the Nationalised Bank was charging compound rate of interest to agriculturist as per directions of the Reserve Bank of India. It was held that it cannot be said that the charging of such rates by such banks is per'se excessive so as to render such transaction 'substantially unfair' so that the transactions can be ripped open by applying the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act and the rate of interest cut down accordingly. The non-application of the Usurious Loans Act was found as not amounting to infraction of guarantee of equality. 10. The non-application of the Usurious Loans Act was found as not amounting to infraction of guarantee of equality. 10. The decision in Bank of India v. Kamam Ranga Rao AIR 1986 Kamataka 242 was also referred to, wherein the directives of the Reserve Bank to treat the agricultural advances at par with the commercial loan and to charge interest at the monthly, quarterly or half yearly rests was found not justified and it was observed that it may not be illegal to charge interest with yearly rest. 11. In Indian Bank, Alamuru v. M. Krishna Mutiny AIR 1983 A.P. 347 the decision of the Madras High Court referred to above was dissented from and it was held that the direction of the Reserve Bank to charge interest above 31/2% per annum over and above the official rate of interest with quarterly rest is inherently vicious and is hit by the Usurious Loans Act (10 of 1918). 12. In Bank of Baroda v. Rednam Nagachaya Devi, (1989) 4 SCC 470 , the Supreme Court has observed that the burden of showing that a classification is arbitrary is basically on the person who impeaches the law. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived as sustaining the constitutionality, the existence of that state of facts, as at the time of the enactment of the law, must also be assumed. The allegations on which violations of Article 14 are based must be specific, clear and unambiguous and must contain sufficient particulars. In this case, the judgment of the High Court was set-aside without pronouncement on the merit of controversy regarding the effect of Section 21A of the Banking Regulations Act on the applicability of Usurious Loans Act. 13. In Fatehchand v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 1825 , the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1976 was challenged. It was held by the Supreme Court that the exemption granted by the statute to the credit institutions and banks was reasonable because liabilities due to Government, local authorities and other credit institutions were not lended lead by vice of the debtors' exploitation. 14. In State Bank of Travencore v. Mohd. Khan, (1981)4 SCC 82 , the State Bank of Travencore, which is a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as not a company/banking company. 14. In State Bank of Travencore v. Mohd. Khan, (1981)4 SCC 82 , the State Bank of Travencore, which is a subsidiary bank of the State Bank of India was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as not a company/banking company. It was observed by the Apex Court that the statement of objects and reasons of the Act shows that the agricultural indebtedness amongst the poorer sections of the society showed an upward trend after July 14, 1958 owing to various economic factors. In the said Act, from the definition of "Debt* under Section 2(4), a sum payable to the Reserve Bank of India or the State Bank of India or any subsidiary bank within the meaning of Clause (k) of Section 2 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 were excluded from the definition. It was found by their Lordships that the reason for this exception is obvious. It is notorious that money lenders exploit needy agriculturists and impose upon them harsh and onerous terms while granting loans to them. But that charge does not hold true in the case of representative institutions, like banks and banking companies. They are governed by their rules and regulations which do not change from debtor to debtor and which, if anything, are intended to benefit the weaker sections of the society. It is for this reason that debts owing to such creditors are excepted from the operation of the Act. The view taken by the High Court that the exclusion provided for in Clause (1) of Section 2(4) of the Act can be availed of if debt is due to the banking company at the time of commencement of the Act. The dispute therein was with regard to application of Clause (1), whether it applies if a debt has been incurred from the banking company before commencement of the Act. The provisions of Clause (1) were held not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 15. After going through the various authorities cited by both the parties, we are of the view that there is a reasonable classification and the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution are not infringed. According to the said Article of the Constitution of India the State shall not deny to any person equality before law or equal protection before law within the territory. According to the said Article of the Constitution of India the State shall not deny to any person equality before law or equal protection before law within the territory. The present Act was promulgated for relief to the agriculturist in respect of debts where arbitrary and/or exorbitant rate of interest was charged. The Scheduled Banks are charging interest in accordance with the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India and uniformly from all agriculturists in the State without any discrimination so far as agricultural debt is concerned. The rate of interest is uniform and is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary or exorbitant so as to fall within the vice of discrimination. The reasons given by the learned Single Judge with regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 1964 SC 1633 that, the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which distinguishes persons or things that are to be put together from others left out of the group and that the differential must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question, have been found in the context of the provisions of Section 4(e) of the Act as permissible classification. 16. Another important factor has to be seen that the provisions of Section 21A of the Banking Regulations Act referred to above is an act of Parliament, whereas the provisions of Section 4(e) of the Act is an act of the State Legislature and, therefore, it cannot over ride the provisions of Section 21A of the act of Parliament. 17. In these circumstances, we agree with the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge and hold that the provisions of Clause (e) of Section 4 of the Act is a valid piece of legislation. 18. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.Appeal dismissed. *******