A. PASAYAT, J. ( 1 ) THE legality of conviction for an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (in short, the I. P. C.) and the sentence of imprisonment for life as awarded by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Rourkela, is assailed by Ramachandra Mohanta (hereinafter referred to as the accused ). He along the two others (since acquitted) stood charged for the offence punishable under section 302/34 I. P. C. ( 2 ) IN a nut shell, the prosecution case is that on 30th April, 1988 at about 1. 15 p. m. Harish Chandra Acharya (hereinafter referred to as the Tdeceased) who was the Assistant Manager, Hot Strip Mill, Rourkela Steel Plant. Rourkela went inside the underground cellar of the above Hot Strip Mill in order to make water. There the accused persons attacked him the a knife the common intention to kill him. The deceased was severely injured and shouted for help. Hearing his shout, several other employees rushed inside the cellar and found him lying in a pool of blood. He was removed to the Plant Medical Unit inside the Rourkela Steel Plant, but the doctor in charge of that Medical unit referred the case to Ispat General Hospital (I. G. H.) where the doctor declared him dead. Since it was a case of homicide - the authorities of the Rourkela Steel Plant informed the police and investigation was undertaken. During investigation, it came to light that the accused was annoyed with the deceased because the letter made indecent overtures at his lady love Salmi Cramin, the other accused who has been acquitted. It was also noticed that the accused had taken the help of accused Fulsingh Badaiak to kill the deceased. The accused persons denied the entire allegations levelled against them. ( 3 ) THIRTY-TWO witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. Though the other two accused persons were acquitted for absence of sufficient evidence, the present appellant was convicted on the basis of the evidence relating to recovery of a knife and a torch allegedly pursuant to the information given by him while in custody. For coming to conclusion of accuseds culpability, reliance was placed on the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 and that of the investigating officer (P. W. 31 ). For coming to conclusion of accuseds culpability, reliance was placed on the evidence of P. Ws. 2 and 3 and that of the investigating officer (P. W. 31 ). Accordingly the accused was found guilty for an offence punishable under section 302 I. P. C. and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal has strenuously urged that in view of the meagre evidence of recovery allegedly pursuant to the information given, the learned trial Judge should not have found the accused guilty. The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported the judgment of conviction and sentence as passed by the learned trial Judge. ( 5 ) SINCE the fate of the case dependent on the acceptability of evidence relating to recovery of knife and the torch, it is relevant to refer to the evidence of P. Ws. 2, 3 and 31. Tapan Kumar Mishra (P. W. 2) has stated that the accused was brought under hand cuff and he pointed out the place from where the police recovered one knife in his presence and a seizure listwas prepared. In cross-examination he has admitted that the knife was lying on the walk a way between R. N. ventilation fan rooms the torch light was lying in a drum kept under a stair case. He has also accepted that the accused did not make any statement before the seizure witness, but in response to the queries of the investigating officer, he pointed out the places of concealment. The seizure lists were written in their office but column No. 5 of the seizure lists were not written in his presence. According to S. Ram Das (P. W. 3), the accused took the investigating officer, P. Ws. 2 and 3 to the cellar and there he produced one knife. Thereafter he took them to another cellar, where he produced a torch. According to P. W. 31. after the accused was arrested he categorically stated that he had concealed one knife inside the cellar, which was recorded as a statement. P. W. 31 further stated that the accused led them to another cellar and produced one torch light which was also seized. The so-called statement which was stated to have been recorded has not brought on record. after the accused was arrested he categorically stated that he had concealed one knife inside the cellar, which was recorded as a statement. P. W. 31 further stated that the accused led them to another cellar and produced one torch light which was also seized. The so-called statement which was stated to have been recorded has not brought on record. ( 6 ) THE question is whether the evidence relating to recovery is sufficient to fasten guilt of the accused. Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 is by way of proviso to sections 25, and 26 and a statement even by way of confession made in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is admissible in evidence against the accused. This position was succinctly death the by the Apex Court. in Delhi Administration v. Balkrishna and Md. Inauatullah v. State. The words 5o much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered arc very important and the whole force of the section concentrated on them clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. The ban as imposed by the preceding sections was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. If all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an objecting, subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. The object of the proviso in section 27 was to provide for the admission of evidence which but for the existence of the section could not, in consequence of the preceding sections, be admitted in evidence. It would appear that under section 27. as it stands, in order to render the evidence leading to discovery of any fact admissible, the information must come from any accused in custody of the police. The requirement of police custody is productive of extremely anomalous results and may lead to the exclusion of much valuable evidence in cases where a person, who is subsequently taken into custody and becomes an. The requirement of police custody is productive of extremely anomalous results and may lead to the exclusion of much valuable evidence in cases where a person, who is subsequently taken into custody and becomes an. accused, after committing a crime meets a police officer or voluntarily goes to him or to the police station and States the circumstances of the crime which lead to the discovery of the dead body, weapon or any other material fact, in consequence of the information thus received from him. This information which is otherwiseadmissible becomes inadmissible under section 27 if the information did not come from a person in the custody of a police officer or did come from a person not in the custody of police officer. ( 7 ) AS indicated above, the statement which was said to have been recorded has not been brought on record though P. W. 31 has Stated that a Statement was recorded by him. The effect of the non- production of the document has been discussed by this Court in Brahmananda Nanda v. State. The accepted position is that the places from where the alleged recoveries were made were easily accessible. Significantly, it has been accepted that investigation officer during his earlier visits had not noticed these articles at the places from where they were subsequently recovered. The recovery of the knife at the most may constitute a link in the chain of Circumstances in a given case. That by itself would not be sufficient to fasten the guilt on the accused, unless there are other materials leading to the conclusion that the accused was the author of the crime. In the case at hand, as indicated above, except the so-called recovery, there is no other material to link the accused to the crime. The evidence relating to recovery is seamy and not of conclusive nature. In view of insufficiency of the evidence, it would be unsafe to sustain the conviction of the accused. Consequently the conviction and sentence are accordingly set aside. The accused be set at liberty forth the unless he is required to be in custody in connection with any other case. The appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.