JUDGMENT 1. - We will dispose of the above numbered two habeas corpus petitions by this common order as most of the grounds on which the detention orders have been challenged are common in both these cases. First of all we will give few facts in respect of each of the cases and then we will enumerate the grounds on which the detention orders have been challenged and thereafter we will proceed to deal with each of the grounds.Facts in Respect of D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1194/1992 Gyan Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan and Others . 2. Gyan Chand Jain, the petitioner, is father of detenue Sunil Longiya. The Customs Officers acting on prior information on July 17, 1991, at about 8.30 a.m. intercepted Sunil Longiya, who was then riding on a Priya Scooter No. RNV 7660, at Sabji Ma ndi, Janta Bazar, Kanwar Nagar, Jaipur. When the scooter which the detenue was riding, was caught from its back, the detenue had fallen from it and tried to made an attempt to run away, but he was caught by the Customs Officers. The detenue made an attempt to release himself, grappled with the customs authorities who received injuries in the presence of two witnesses. The detenue who disclosed his name as Sunil Longiya alias Guddu admitted that he had gold biscuits bearing foreign mark. The detenue was taken to the Central Customs Office, Statue Circle, Jaipur, where in the presence of the witnesses, the search of the detenue was conducted and from the right pocket of his pant 12 gold biscuits bearing foreign mark and 13 biscuits from his left pocket of the pant were recovered. On the aforesaid gold biscuits 'JOHNSON HATTHEY LONDON 9990 10 TOLAS' was engraved. The detenue could not furnish any explanation for the possession of the aforesaid gold biscuits. A sum of Rs.8000/- cash was also recovered along with a paper slip from the pocket of his shirt. The aforesaid 25 Foreign Mark gold biscuits had been brought to India and were liable to be confiscated under Section 111 of the Customs Act and therefore, the Customs Officers seized the aforesaid gold biscuits under Section 110 of the Customs Act. The purety of the gold biscuits recovered was found to be 24 carat. The cash recovered from the detenue was returned back to him. The purety of the gold biscuits recovered was found to be 24 carat. The cash recovered from the detenue was returned back to him. Each of the gold biscuits was 10 tolas, in all 250 tolas, of the value of Rs. 11,50,000/, The statement of the detenue was recorded on July 17, and July 18,1991 in which it was given out that the detenue indulged in the smuggling activities and was working as carrier of smuggled articles. In his statement the detenue gave out that the said gold was given to him by one Ram Singh who was agent of Chandra Bhan and further Ram Singh paid Rs. 100/- per biscuits as commission. The detenue has also stated in the aforesaid statement that even on earlier occasion 25 biscuits were given to him by Ram Singh which were given by him under the instructions of Ram Singh, to one Nawal for which Rs. 2500/- were paid to him as commission. As per statement of the detenue, the said recovered gold was delivered to him by Ram Singh who directed him to reach near Jages har Mandir, Bra hampuri with the aforesaid gold-biscuits on July 17, 1991 at 7.45 a.m. but he reached there at 8.00 a.m. and by that time Ram Singh had gone away. After waiting for him he was returning and then he was apprehended by the customs authorities. The following dates are relevant in as far as the present case is concerned: 1. 17.7.91 Search and Seizure and Arrest of the detenue. 2. 18.7.91 Formal arrest, confessional statement, recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, Production before the Magistrate, application filed by detenue before him retracting confessional statement. 3. 19.7.91 Application filed before CJM along with injury report. 4. 18.11.91 Proposal for detention received from Customs Department by Home Secretary regarding 25 gold biscuits worth Rs. 11.50 lacs recovered from the detenue. 5. 20.11.91 Case was examined by the Screening Committee and proposal from the customs authorities approved. 6. 5.12.1991 Examination by the Special Secretary, Home(Law). 7. 6.12.91 Opinion of Special Secretary (Home) Received and matter referred back to the Collector (Customs) regarding delay. 8. 12.12.91 Reply received from the Collector, (Customs) explaining the delay that more information had to be collected before referring the matter. 9. 16.12.91 The matter was again placed before Special Secretary(Home). 10. 16.12.91 Opinion received from Special Secretary(Home). 11. 7. 6.12.91 Opinion of Special Secretary (Home) Received and matter referred back to the Collector (Customs) regarding delay. 8. 12.12.91 Reply received from the Collector, (Customs) explaining the delay that more information had to be collected before referring the matter. 9. 16.12.91 The matter was again placed before Special Secretary(Home). 10. 16.12.91 Opinion received from Special Secretary(Home). 11. 17.12.91 Matter was placed before Home Minister for approval. 12. 18.12.91 Approval by the Home Minister. 13. 19.12.91 File received back from Home Minister. 14. 8.1.92 Formal detention order passed by Shri L.N. Gupta, Home Secretary. 15. 9.1.92 ORDER served on detenue. 16. 15.1.92 The matter referred to the Central Government. 17. 25.1.92 Representation received from the detenue. 18. 4.2.92 Shri Arun Kumar assumed charge as New Home Secretary. 19. 10.2.92 Representation of detenue was rejected by the State Government. Facts In Respect Of D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1472/1992 Dwarka Prasad Soni V.State of Rajasthan and others. 3. This case relates to the detention of one Shri Ghanshyam Soni, brother of petitioner Dwaka Prasad Soni. On some information Hari Narain alias Hari son of Shri Phool Chand Agrawal who was going on Vespa Scooter No. RJ-14-M /4848 was stopped and from his possession 10 gold pieces, each weighing 116.850 grams, in all 1166.500 grams worth Rs.4,32,500/- of foreign mark were recovered. As a follow-up action, search of various business as well as residential premises was taken by the customs authorities. Search of M/s Ram Narain Shri Ram Soni was also conducted by the customs officers in the presence of the independent witnesses and at that time Ghanshyam Soni was also present. During the course of search, the custom authorities recovered one gold biscuit of foreign mark and Indian currency of Rs.1,45,700/-. As per the grounds of detention when the customs officers reached the aforesaid firm the detenue Chan Shyam Soni was trying to remove the foreign mark through roller machine. On a reasonable belief that the aforesaid Indian currency and the gold were smuggled articles and were liable to be confiscated, they were seized under Section 110 of the Customs Act. Thereafter, search of M/s Jamna Lal Laskhari was also conducted and the customs authorities recovered Rs.81,180 /- Indian currency and seized the same believing that it is an income from the sale of smuggled gold. Thereafter, search of M/s Jamna Lal Laskhari was also conducted and the customs authorities recovered Rs.81,180 /- Indian currency and seized the same believing that it is an income from the sale of smuggled gold. Thereafter, the search of the residential premises of Shri Kishore and Shri Devki Nandan was also conducted on July 2, 1991 but nothing incriminating was recovered. Statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act was recorded and the detenue stated that the gold biscuits were given to him by Kishore on July 2, 1991 and under his directions he was removing the foreign marks from the biscuits. He also made other statement as to how he come to be possessed the gold biscuits and Indian currency said to have been recovered from him. The following dates are relevant so far as the present case is concerned : 1. 2.7.1991 Search, seizure, and arrest of Ghanshyam Soni (detenue). One gold biscuit was recovered from Satya Narain, his servant along with cash of Rs.1,45,700/-. 2. 2.7.91 Telegram by the petitioner to Collector (Customs). 3. 3.7.91 Formal arrest, production of detenue before CJM and release of detenue. confessional statement retracted through telegram. 4. 3.7.91 Representation along with affidavit retracting confessional statement under Section 108 of the customs Act, filed. 5. 30.11.91 Proposal for detention initiated by the Customs Department. 6. 6.12.91, 10.12.91 Examination of the case by the Screening Committee. 7. 1.1.1992 Matter referred for examination by Special Secretary, Home(Law). 8. 4.1.1992 Opinion of Special Secretary, Home(Law). 9. 7.1.1992 Matter placed before Home Minister for approval. 10. 9.1.1992 Approval by the Home Minister. 11. 28.1.1992 Formal detention order passed by Shri L.N. Gupta, Home Secretary. 12. 29.1.1992 Detention order served on detenue Ghanshyam Soni. 13. 4.2.1992 Shri Arun Kumar assumed charge as new Home Secretary. 14. 11.2.92 Representation against the detention by detenue. 15. 25.2.92 Representation was rejected by the State Government. 4. Having stated the facts in respect of both the cases, we will now take up the grounds of challenge to the two detention orders issued under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,1974( for short, the COFEPOSA ACT) in each of the cases. 15. 25.2.92 Representation was rejected by the State Government. 4. Having stated the facts in respect of both the cases, we will now take up the grounds of challenge to the two detention orders issued under Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act,1974( for short, the COFEPOSA ACT) in each of the cases. We may state that the grounds of challenge in both the cases are common except that one additional ground has been raised in the case of detenue Ghanshyam Soni (Habeas Corpus Petition No.1472/1992 filed by Dwarka Prasad Soni) and it is that copies of some of the documents furnished with the grounds of detention were illegible and though in the representation filed by the detenue it was specifically said, but still the legible copies of the said documents were not furnished to the detenue thereby reasonable opportunity of filing effective representation shall be deemed to have been denied to the detenue. We will first deal with the common grounds and then we will proceed to deal with the additional ground raised in the aforesaid Habeas Corpus Petition. Learned counsel for the petitioners challenged the detention orders inter alia on the following grounds,- (i) the detention orders are not in conformity with the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India having not been executed, nor having been expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor, (ii) there has been delay in passing the detention orders; (iii) the vital documents were not supplied to the detenue; and (iv) there is total non-application of mind in issuing the detention orders by the detaining authority. 5. In addition to the aforesaid grounds which are common, in relation to the detenue Sunil Longiya, the petitioner, his father, Gyan Chand Jain, in Hebeas Corpus Petition No.1194 /1992, has also raised a ground that whereas the detention order has been made against Sunil Longiya, no such order has been made against Ram Singh, Nawal, Chandrabhan who are similarly situated persons and it amounts to discrimination and further that the detenue had sent a letter on February 22,1992 to detaining authority requesting that a copy of his representation may be sent to the Central Government, but his request was rejected. We have already said about the additional ground taken in the case of detenue Gyanshyam Soni.Re;(i) 6. We have already said about the additional ground taken in the case of detenue Gyanshyam Soni.Re;(i) 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the detention order made under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act will show that they have not been expressed to have been made in the name of Governor. It will appear from a perusal of Annr.1 that in the body of the order the satisfaction of the State Government has been stated and it has been stated that in exercise of the power under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the State Government directed that Sunil Longiya be detained, but it has not been expressed to be taken in the name of Governor. Under clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution all executive action of the Government of State shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution vests powers in the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government of the State and for the allocation among the Ministers of the said business in so far as it is not business with respect to which the Governor is by or under the Constitution required to act in his discretion. Clause (2) of Article 166 provides that orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be made by the Governor. In Abdul Rahim v. The State, 1951 RLW 263 it was held that the detention order should be expressed to be in the name of His Highness Rajpramukh But in the facts of that case because above the signatures of the Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, it was explicitly mentioned that the order had been issued by His Highness the Rajpramukh it was held that the defect was of highly technical character. In State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317 , the Apex Court was dealing with detention order issued under the Public Safety Preventive Detention Act, 1950. In State of Bombay v. Purshottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317 , the Apex Court was dealing with detention order issued under the Public Safety Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The order of detention issued under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of that Act stated in the preamble 'whereas the Government of Bombay was satisfied...'and its operative part read: "Now, therefore...the Government of Bombay is pleased to direct that the said Shri be detained. by order of the Governor of Bombay, Sd/-..." It was held that because the order was issued- By the order of the Governor, it was as per the requirement of Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India. The Court further said that the State could prove by other means that the order has been passed by the proper authority even if it was not expressed to have been made in the name of the Governor. In our opinion, the order of detention should be as per requirement contained in clause(1) of Act. 166 of the Constitution, but if the same is expressed in the name of the Governor as required under clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution and is also duly authenticated under clause (2) of Article 166 according to the rules made by the Governor in this behalf, immunity extend to it and its validity cannot be called in question in any court on the ground that the order has not been expressed to have been made in the name of the Governor, but even if the detention order has not been expressed to have been made in the manner as laid down in Article 166 of the Constitution, it will be open for the State Government to show by independent evidence and by production of the relevant Government record that the order was in fact made as per the requirement of Article 166 of the Constitution. 7. In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution of India the Government has made The Rajasthan Rules of Business (for short, Business Rules). As per rule 4 of the Business Rules, the business of the Government shall be transacted in the Secretariat Departments specified in the First Schedule and shall be classified and distributed between those departments as laid down therein. As per rule 4 of the Business Rules, the business of the Government shall be transacted in the Secretariat Departments specified in the First Schedule and shall be classified and distributed between those departments as laid down therein. Rule 5 empowers the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister to allot among the Minister or Ministers of State, the business of Government by assigning one or more department to the charge of a Minister. The Secretary of the department concerned, ordinarily is official head of the department and it is the Minister-in-charge who is primarily responsible for the disposal of the business of the department as per rule 9. A look at the first schedule to the Business Rules will show that it is the Home Affairs and Justice department who has to deal with the preventive detention and therefore, as per rules 4,5,9 read with first Schedule of the Business Rules, it is the Minister-in- charge of the Home Affairs and Justice Department, who has to deal with the matters of preventive detention. As said earlier, under rule 9 of the Business Rules, it is the Minister in charge who shall be primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department. Rule 21 of the Business Rules provides that for the disposal of business relating to its department, the Minister in charge has power by means of standing order, to give such direction as he thinks fit and in exercise of those powers standing orders have been issued and it appears from a perusal of the standing orders that the matter is to be disposed of by the Home Secretary, and the file is to be submitted to the Home Minister. In the present case a reference to sub-section(1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act has already been made in the earlier part of this order and it will be seen that the order of detention can be made by (i) Central Government,(ii) State Government,(iii) any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of that Section by that Government, or (iv) any officer of State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of that Section by that Government. In the instant case, it will be seen presently that the State Government has specially empowered the Home Secretary as an officer for the purposes of sub-section(1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. The COFEPOSA Act came into force in the year 1974. The Government of Rajasthan vide notification dated December 18, 1974,GSR 159, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub,section(1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, empowered the Secretary to the Government in the Home Department to issue order for the purpose of the said Act vide Order No. F.8(363) Home/Gr.V/74. The said notification is in force and there is nothing to the contrary. It can therefore be said that the State Government specially empowered the Secretary to the Government in the Home Department by virtue of his office as an officer to take the order directing that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or segmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from smuggling goods, or abetting the smuggling of goods or engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods etc., such person be detained. But even if an order is made by the specially empowered officer for the purposes of sub- section(1) of Section 3,it has to be expressed in the name of the Governor. But the law is settled that if the order is not expressed to be in the name of the Governor, it is still open for the detaining authority to show by independent evidence such as production of the relevant Government record and /or by affidavit of the responsible officer that the order was in fact made in accordance with the requirement of Article 166 (1) of the Constitution and the only thing is that the immunity which is available if the order is authenticated as required under clause (2) of Article 166 and is expressed to be in the name of Governor, will not be available. In Dattatraya v. State of Bombay, (1952) SCR 613 , it was held that the provision of Article 166 of the Constitution is only directory and what the court is to see is whether the substantive requirement has been complied with or not. In Dattatraya v. State of Bombay, (1952) SCR 613 , it was held that the provision of Article 166 of the Constitution is only directory and what the court is to see is whether the substantive requirement has been complied with or not. Again in the case of Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1823 , the court was considering the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution and said that if the conditions laid down in Article 166 are complied with, the order cannot be called in question on the ground that the order is not made by the Governor.The court referred to the aforesaid case of Dattatraya(supra) wherein it was held that all that the procedure established by law requires is that the appropriate Government must take a decision as to whether the detention order should be confirmed or not, the Court said that the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution are only directory and not mandatory in character and if they are not complied with, it can be established as a question of fact that the impugned order was issued in fact by the State Government or the Governor. We have already said that the Business Rules have been framed by the Governor in exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (2) and (3) of Article 166 of the Constitution. Under rule 11 of the Business Rules all orders or instruments made or executed by or on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan, shall be expressed to be in the name or executed in the name of the Governor. Rule 12(1) of the Business Rules provides that every order or instrument of the Government shall be signed by a Secretary, a Special Secretary, an Addl. Secretary, a Joint Secretary, Dy.Secretary, Legal Remembrancer, Joint Legal Remembrancer and other officers mentioned therein and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument. Therefore, there can be no doubt that even the detention order under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act should have been expressed to be in the name of the Governor even if it was made by the Secretary in the Home Department who was specially empowered for the purposes of sub- section(1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. A perusal of the two detention orders in the two cases will show that though they have not been expressed to have been made in the name of the Governor, but as said earlier, the State Government can still satisfy this court by producing the relevant Government record that there has been compliance with the provisions contained in Article 166(1) of the Constitution. We have already said that the Business Rules have been framed by the Governor and we have also made a reference to the standing orders framed by the Minister in charge of the Home Department in exercise of the powers conferred on him under rule 21 of the Business Rules, and at the cost of repetition it can be said that under the Business Rules it is the Secretary who has to authenticate the order. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Sushila Mafatlal Shah, 1988 (4) SCC 490 , the detention order was made by Shri D.N.Capoor, an officer specially empowered by the Government for the purpose of sub-section(1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and it does not appear whether or not the said detention order was expressed to have been made in the name of the Governor. The court was examining the scheme of the COFEPOSA Act. The Court said that even if an officer is not empowered under the Rules of Business to Act, it will not make any difference if he has been specially empowered for the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. The Court in para 22 of the judgment said " It is also relevant to clarify at this juncture the position as regards an order of detention passed by an officer specially empowered under Section 3(1) vis-a-vis an order of detention passed by another officer who besides being empowered to act under Section 3(1) is also conferred authority under the Rules of Business of the Government to act on behalf of the government. This difference in the conferment of powers upon the officers falling under the two categories cannot have any impact on the nature of the detention orders respectively passed by them because the common factor entitling the officers falling in the two classes is their empowerment under Section 3(1) of the Act. This difference in the conferment of powers upon the officers falling under the two categories cannot have any impact on the nature of the detention orders respectively passed by them because the common factor entitling the officers falling in the two classes is their empowerment under Section 3(1) of the Act. Without such empowerment an officer even if he be empowered to act on behalf of the Government under the Rules of Business, cannot pass an order of detention against anyone." We have already said that we have looked to the two orders and a perusal of the said orders will reveal that the detention orders have been made by the Home Secretary to the Government, who, as said earlier, is an officer specially empowered for the purposes of sub-section(1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act by the State Government. By reference to Business Rules and more so, to rule 12, we have also said that the order had to be signed by the Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan. The matter of detention was not one which was to go to the Governor and it was to be disposed of under the Business Rules by the Home Secretary and the Minister was only to see the file which he did see. It was not necessary that the file should have gone to the Governor and all that was required that the order should have been expressed to be in the name of Governor. We have already said that it is directory and not mandatory and after perusal of the file, we are of the opinion that there has been substantive compliance with the provisions of Article 166(1) of the Constitution in making the detention orders by the Secretary to the Government in the Home Department. We find no substance in this ground of challenge to the detention orders.Re; (ii). 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners contained that the detention orders were passed after a few months of the alleged incident and reasonable explanation has been furnished by the respondents for the delay in passing the detention orders. According to the learned counsel the aforesaid delay in making the detention orders will show that either the detaining authority was not vigilant or was satisfied at the detenue will not indulge in the smuggling activities therefore, it was not necessary to make detention order. According to the learned counsel the aforesaid delay in making the detention orders will show that either the detaining authority was not vigilant or was satisfied at the detenue will not indulge in the smuggling activities therefore, it was not necessary to make detention order. In the earlier part of this order, we have already given the necessary facts in respect of this submission. In the case of Sunil Longiya the search and seizure of the detenue took place on July 17,1991, and proposal for the detention from the customs department was received by the detaining authority i.e. Home Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan on November 18,1991 and the detention order was made on January 18,1992. In the other case relating to Ghanshyam Soni, the search and seizure and arrest of the detenue took place on July 2, 1991 and the proposal of detention from the customs department was received by the detaining authority on November 30,1991 and the detention order was made on January 28,1992. It can therefore be said that whereas in the first case there has been delay of 5 months and 21 days, in making the detention order from the date of incident, in the other case, there has been delay of 6 months and 22 days in making the detention order from the date of incident. In the affidavit filed by the detaining authority an attempt has been made to explain the delay on the ground that the Collector (Customs) had sought some more information and some more information had to be collected before referring the matter. It will appear from the sequence of events that after the proposal has been received on November 18,1991, by the detaining authority from the Customs authorities, the matter was examined by the Screening Committee on November 20, 1991. The proposal to make detention order was approved, the matter was then again examined by the Special Secretary, Home(Law) on December 4,1991 and his opinion was received on December 6, 1991. Reply was received from the Collector (Customs) on December 12,1991 in which an explanation for the delay was furnished that more information was to be collected. The matter was again placed before the Special Secretary, Homes on December 16,1991 who gave his opinion on the same day. Reply was received from the Collector (Customs) on December 12,1991 in which an explanation for the delay was furnished that more information was to be collected. The matter was again placed before the Special Secretary, Homes on December 16,1991 who gave his opinion on the same day. The matter was then placed before the Home Minister on December 17,1991, who approved it on December 18,1991 and the file was received back from Home Minister on December 19, 1991. The formal detention order was passed on January 8,1992 by Shri L.N.Gupta Home Secretary, who was the person specially empowered for the purposes of sub- section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and it was served on the detenue on January 9, 1992. 9. So far as other case of Ghanshyam Soni (Habeas Corpus Petition No.1472/92) is concerned, the proposal from the Customs Department was received by the detaining authority on November 30,1991 and it was examined by the Screening Committee on December 6/10, 1991. It was placed for examination by the Special Secretary Home(Law) on January 1,1992 and opinion of the Special Secretary (Law) was received on January 4,1992. The matter was placed before the Home Minister for approval on January 7,1992 and approval of the Home Minister was made on January 9,1992 and the file was received by the detaining authority who issued the formal detention order on January 29,1992 and the same was served on the detenue on January 29,1992. Thus, it will be clear that an attempt has been made to explain the delay which has occasioned in making the detention order. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners in support of his contention that the non-explanation of the delay in making the detention order throws considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and makes the detention order illegal, has referred to the case of T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, AIR 1990 SC 225 ; Virdhi Chand Shankerlal Oswal v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 (1) Crimes 394 and Issac Baby v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 135 . It is not necessary for us to deal with each and every case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Addl. Advocate General as each of the cases was decided on its own fact. It is not necessary for us to deal with each and every case referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Addl. Advocate General as each of the cases was decided on its own fact. In our opinion the delay by itself in making the detention order after the incident cannot be held to be fatal to the making of the detention order. In certain cases the delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. By the every nature of smuggling activities, the investigation and collection of material to find out as to who are the persons connected with such activities, may he and is necessary. What the law requires is that there should not be inordinate delay and if the delay is there, it must be satisfactorily explained. There can be no hard and fast rule as to what is the length of time which should be regarded sufficient to snap the nexus between the incident and the order of detention, and it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala, JT 1989 (3) SC 444 , after considering the earlier decisions, the Court summarised thus - "The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case ". To our mind it is common knowledge that as and when the question arises in respect of a person and proposal is made to make an order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, the customs authority is bound to enter into the investigation which is, as is well known, process of collection of evidence in order to find out as to whether in respect of a person an order of detention should or should not be made with a view to prevent him in any manner, from smuggling activities. It is also to be examined as to whether in a given case the normal procedure is or is not enough and any preventive procedure is to be taken. The collection of the material is bound to take time. We have to see in the present cases whether there has been delay or whether the delay has or has not been explained ? In the first of the two cases, i.e. the case of Sunil Longiya, the proposal for detention was received by the detaining authority on November 18,1991 and it was examined by the Screening Committee immediately thereafter on November 20,1991. The matter was examined by the Special Secretary, Home(Law) on December 4,1991 and the matter was referred back to the Collector(Customs) to explain the delay. Reply from the Collector (Customs) was received on December 12,1991. The matter was again examined at various levels and the detention order was made on January 8,1992. Similarly, in the other case of Ghanshyam Soni also the proposal was received by the detaining authority on November 30,1991 and the matter was examined by the Screening Committee on December 6/10,1991. The matter was referred for examination by the Special Secretary on January 1,1992 and after examining the matter at various levels, the detention order was made on January 28,1992. We have scrutinise the details in respect of whatever delay has occasioned and we can say on the basis of material that the detaining authority was alive on this issue and that is why in the case of Sunil Longiya the matter was referred back to the Collector (Customs) to explain the delay and after the receipt of the reply and only after being satisfied that the delay has been explained, the detention order was made. In our opinion, the connection in between the prejudicial activities and the detention orders had not been broken when the detention orders had been made. Thus, we find no substance in this ground of challenge also to the two detention orders.Re; (iii) 11. It is the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution as well as sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act that the grounds of detention must be furnished to the detenue within the period prescribed therein. Obviously, by the grounds of detention under the aforesaid provisions is meant not only the grounds but the documents, statements or other material re lied upon in the grounds of detention and they must also be communicated to the detenue because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, they form part thereof and the grounds furnished to the detenue cannot be said to be complete without the aforesaid material. It is only on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority under sub-section (3) of Section 3 that the order under sub-section(1) of that Section can be made, and for such subjective satisfaction there must exist some facts, some events and the documents on which such events are based or state of toings to reach the subjective satisfaction for a valid order of detention. Therefore, if any document on which the aforesaid subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based and if any document has been referred to in the grounds of detention, it is necessary that a copy of those documents should be made available to the detenue so that he may be in a position to make an effective representation which right has been conferred on him, as said earlier, under clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution as well as under sub-section(3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. If either any relevant document has not been considered in making the detention order or in formulating the grounds of detention, then the order of detention is likely to be vitiated on the ground of non-consideration of relevant material and thereby not being in a position to arrive at the subjective satisfaction as required under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. Similarly, if any document has been considered in formulating the ground of detention and a copy of which is not supplied to the detenue, then it will be a transgression of the right of the detenue to make effective representation as conferred on him as per clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution and sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act and such an order of detention is likely to be struck down on that ground alone. But at the same time, if any document has not been relied upon either in the detention order or in the accompanying grounds for the detention order and there is only a casual reference of that document, then in such a case non-supply of that document will be of no effect and neither it can be said that there could not be subjective satisfaction as required under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act or that the detenue has been denied the right of making the effective representation which right has been conferred on him under the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution as well as provisions of COFEPOSA Act. In our view, it is the position of law which emerges from a perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution as well as relevant provisions of the COFEPOSA Act and on the basis of decided cases of the Apex Court as well as this Court. 12. So far as the case of Sunil Longiya (detenue in Habeas Corpus Petition No.1194/1992) is concerned, it was contended by the learned counsel that the Customs Department did not place before the detaining authority the application dated July 19,1991 which was filed by the detenue before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, wherein it was prayed that the injury report may be taken on record. He had also filed an application on July 18, 1991 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate(Economic Offences) wherein he had stated that the statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act which was recorded by the Customs Authorities, was retracted and that statement was obtained by the customs authorities by way of coercion and compulsion and he was tortured and he received injuries. But neither the two applications nor the injury report were placed by the Customs Officers before the detaining authority. But neither the two applications nor the injury report were placed by the Customs Officers before the detaining authority. Copies of the aforesaid applications as well as that of the injury report were not made available to the detenue along with the detention order and the grounds of detention. It was also contended that when the detenue was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate(Economic Offences) on July 19,1991, he was released on bail and copy of the bail order had not been furnished to him. 13. So far as other case in relation to detenue Ghanshyam Soni( Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1472/1992) is concerned it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a Telegram was sent on July 2,1991 by his brother Dwarka Prasad, the petitioner, to the effect that the customs authorities had taken his brother Ghanshyam Soni forcibly and after his statement by using, third grade methods. There is no reference of this telegram in the grounds of detention and therefore, not only the same was not considered, but also a copy of the same was not furnished to the detenue along with the grounds of detention. Similarly, a telegram retracting the confessional statement was also sent but a copy of the same was not made available. A copy of bail order was not made available because he was released on bail by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. 14. So far as copies of the bail orders in both the cases are concerned, it may be stated that the moment Sunil Longiya and Ghanshyam Soni were produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on July 18 and July 19,1991 respectively, no bail order was made and all that was ordered by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was that in view of decision of this Court in the case of Swamop Singh alias Saroop Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 1308 of 1991, decided on June 4, 1991 by a learned Single Judge of this Court (Hon'ble N.C. Sharma J.), the remand under Section 167 Cr.P.C. was not applicable and therefore, the detention was illegal. Both of them were released by the Customs Authorities and there was no bail order as such and it was only on the technical grounds an aforesaid that they were released. Both of them were released by the Customs Authorities and there was no bail order as such and it was only on the technical grounds an aforesaid that they were released. Under these circumstances, therebeing no bail order, it was not necessary to have supplied any copy of the bail order by the customs authorities to the detenue, nor the detaining authority was required to supply a copy of the same to any of the detenue. It will be seen from a perusal of the grounds of detention in each of the two cases that the detaining authority was alive of the fact that the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate has released each of the detenue when each of them was produced before that court. So far as the alleged retracted confessional statements of the detenue are concerned, it may be stated that telegram had been given retracting the confession and copy of the telegram has been made available alongwith the ground of detention to the two detenue. Not only the copy of the telegram but even the copy of the reply to the telegram has been supplied to the detenue. So far as the alleged injury report said to have been produced by the detenue before the Chief Judicial Magistrate is concerned, there is material on record that it was in the knowledge of either the sponsoring authority or detaining authority. It will appear that there is no document that the injury report was relied upon by the detaining authority either in making the detention order or in formulating the grounds of detention in the case of Sunil Longiya. We have already said in the earlier part of this order that there is casual reference of any document in the grounds of detention and the document has not been relied upon in arriving at the subjective satisfaction it is not necessary that a copy of that document should be supplied to the detenue or and non-supply of it will not render the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority bad. This Court in the case of Hanuman Prasad Agrawal and another v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 (II) Crimes 761 , to which one of us(M.B. Sharma J.) was a party, has held that if a person retracts his confession either by way of an affidavit or before the Magistrate, such piece of evidence stands on higher pedestal and being a relevant piece of evidence must be placed before the detaining authority who should consider it and then frame an opinion as required under sub- section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. In the aforesaid case the entire case law was reviewed and the court in para 10 of the judgment said "...it can be said that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as required under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is a condition precedent for forming the opinion that the detention of a person is necessary and it is necessary that all the relevant material must be considered." In that case the fact that the detenue had retracted his confessional statement was considered, but the affidavit under which the confessional statement was retracted was not considered. The court observed that the affidavit under which any confessional statement is retracted stands on higher pedestal than any other document. This Court dealing with the argument of the Addl. Advocate General for the State that the affidavits of the two persons retracting confessional statements had not been received at all by the detaining authority and therefore not considered, and what was required under law was that the fact of retraction of confession should have been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, said that " We are of the opinion that if a person retracts his confession either by way of an affidavit or before the Magistrate, such piece of evidence stands on higher pedestal and being a relevant piece of evidence must be placed before the detaining authority who should consider it and then frame and opinion as required under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of COFEPOSA Act." The court taking into consideration the fact that the relevant material i.e the affidavits under which the confessional statements had been retracted, had not been placed before the detaining authority and therefore were not considered by the detaining authority, held that it will vitiate the detention order. It will appear from the reply filed in the Habeas Corpus Petition 1\10.1194/1992 and more so, to para 7 that there is nothing to show that application Annr.9 was at all produced before the learned Magistrate and the learned Magistrate had passed any order on this application. A perusal of para 7 of the Habeas Corpus Petition will show that it is clearly stated that on July 18,1991 the detenue submitted an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) Jaipur wherein it was submitted that he was tortured by the Customs Officers and the Customs Department is trying to falsely implicate him in the case of alleged recovery of 25 gold biscuits, though no such statement was given voluntarily by the detenue and a request was made for medical examination in the said application. A look at Annr. 9 which is a photostat copy of the certified copy will show that there is no endorsement of the Magistrate about production of its by Sunil Longiya before him, rather there is no order of the Magistrate on this application. It cannot, therefore, be positively said that such an application was made before the Chief Judicial Magistrate( Economic Offences) on the day the detenue Sunil Longiya was produced before him and as said earlier, the Chief Judicial Magistrate held that the provisions of Section 167 Cr.P.C. were not applicable in view of the above referred to decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court. On July 19, 1991, another application appears to have been presented on behalf of the detenue and a copy of that application in Annr. 11 and there is an endorsement on it. Along with it a copy of the injury report was also produced. While giving the facts in the earlier part of this order, we have already said that as per the grounds of detention, it is the case of the customs authorities that the petitioner was made to stop the scooter and after falling he made an attempt to run away. and he was caught. He again made an attempt to release himself and the customs authorities and the detenue grappled with each other and the customs authorities also received injury. But in the arrest memo there is no mention of any injury received by Sunil Longiya. We may not be misunderstood to mean that there was torture of Sunil Longiya. and he was caught. He again made an attempt to release himself and the customs authorities and the detenue grappled with each other and the customs authorities also received injury. But in the arrest memo there is no mention of any injury received by Sunil Longiya. We may not be misunderstood to mean that there was torture of Sunil Longiya. On March, 30, 1992, both of us had discussed the proposed order and we were of the opinion that perusal of the file from the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) which may contain the said applications is necessary and further arguments are required. We had listed the case for further hearing on March 31, 1992. The file from the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate was received and has been perused and has also been shown to the learned counsel for the petitioner. There is no material that application was presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate on July 18,1991 as is alleged, though the application is on the file. There is further no averment in the petition or affidavit that the said application was filed in the presence of an officer of the customs department when application seeking remand was filed by him. On that file also there is no material that any customs officer or the sponsoring authority had or could have had knowledge about the existence of that application. Even in the representation of the detenue there is no mention that the sponsoring authority had any knowledge of the same. Under these circumstances in our opinion, it was not necessary for the Customs Authorities to have obtained copy of the application of Sunil Longiya filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate retracting his confession and making the request that he should be medically examined. The sponsoring authority having no knowledge could not have forwarded this document to the detaining authority for its consideration. Though, in his representation he raised a specific plea that the aforesaid documents were not supplied to him and even thereafter they were not supplied, but as said earlier he did not say that they were presented before the Chief Judicial Magistrate in the presence of the customs officer car the sponsoring authority had or could have any knowledge of the same. We will deal with the effect of it when we will deal with the ground of non-application of mind, but so far as the present ground that documents were not supplied to the detenue is concerned, we are of the opinion that they detenue had right to receive copies of such of the documents which were referred to in the detention order or in the grounds formulated and it will appear that so far as the two applications dated July 18, 1991 and July 19,1991 alongwith the injury report are concerned they were not relied upon by the detaining authority and therefore under law it was not necessary to supply to the detenue those documents. Copies of the telegrams under which the confessional statements were retracted were made available to the detenue and so far as bail order/orders are concerned, we have already said that no bail orders were actually made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and he ordered that the bail applications were not maintainable and thereafter both the detenue were released by the customs authorities. There is a casual reference about their release by the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) and therefore there is no question for making available any bail order to the detenue. Thus, in both the cases we are of the opinion that the detenue had no right to copies of the documents which had not been relied upon by the detaining authority in making the detention order or in the grounds formulated. On this ground, the detention orders cannot be held to be invalid.Re;(iv). 15. We have already said that the subjective satisfaction as required under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act of the detaining authority has to be only based on the relevant material and the material will also be retracted confession, if any, of the detenue made before the Chief Judicial Magistrate or before the Customs Authorities. 15. We have already said that the subjective satisfaction as required under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act of the detaining authority has to be only based on the relevant material and the material will also be retracted confession, if any, of the detenue made before the Chief Judicial Magistrate or before the Customs Authorities. So far as the case of Sunil Longiya is 4 - berried, while dealing with the ground of non-supply of copies of vital document we have already said that so far as Annr.91 application dated July 18,1991, allegedly filed by Sunil Longiya before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences) is concerned, there is no material that it was presented at all before the learned Magistrate and that there is no material and no averment that the custom officer who had filed an application for seeking remand before the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic (Offences) has any knowledge or could have had any knowledge about that application having been filed by the detenue. The same can be said of the application dated July 19,1991, which though presented before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Economic Offences) admittedly was not presented before the customs authorities or in their presence and the customs authorities could have no knowledge of the same. The sponsoring authority also could not have had any knowledge of those documents, and one who has no knowledge of any document, cannot be charged with the offence of suppressing of the same from the detaining authority. Therefore, though there can be no dispute so far as the position of law is concerned that if any vital document is suppressed from the detaining authority, the detention order is likely to be set aside and rendered invalid on the ground of suppressing of the vital document, but as stated earlier, the sponsoring authority had no knowledge and could have no knowledge of the aforesaid two documents and therefore there was no question of sponsoring authority suppressing any material document from the detaining authority and it cannot be said that the order that the detenue Sunil Longiya may be detained under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act is invalid on the ground of non-application of mind. We may state that it will depend on the nature of the document as to what is the effect of non-supply of the same. We may state that it will depend on the nature of the document as to what is the effect of non-supply of the same. For example, take a case of a bail order granted by a court. If a bail is granted without any condition, the detaining authority is alive of the fact that the bail was granted by a Magistrate or by a court to the detenue and he considered this fact of the bail being granted to the detenue, then non-supply of the bail order or copy of the bail order will not have any consequence, but if the bail has been granted with certain pre-conditions, then the supply of the copy of the bail order will be necessary as it will be relevant piece of evidence and the detaining authority must be informed about it so that it may consider whether still it is necessary to make the order of detention under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act or the conditions in the bail order itself will meet the situation and the detention order is not necessary. While dealing with the reported case of this court of Hanuman Prasad (Supra) we have already said by reference to para 10 that if a person retracts his confession before a Magistrate by way of an affidavit or before the Magistrate, such piece of evidence stands on higher pedestal and is relevant piece of evidence and therefore it must be placed before the detaining authority who should consider it and then form opinion as required under sub- section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. In the case of M. Ahmedkutty v. Union of India and another, (1990) 2 SCC 1 , it was held in the facts of that case that non-consideration of bail application and the order of release would amount non-application of mind and that would affect the detention order. In that case no doubt certain observations of the Apex Court will lead to the inference that if a bail order had been made with certain condition such as the detenue reporting to the customs authorities and the same is not considered, it will affect the detention order. In that case no doubt certain observations of the Apex Court will lead to the inference that if a bail order had been made with certain condition such as the detenue reporting to the customs authorities and the same is not considered, it will affect the detention order. In the aforesaid case, the Court considered its earlier decision in the case of S. Gurdip Singh v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 419 , which had followed Ichhu Devi Chorasia v. Union of India (1980) 4 SCC 531 , and Shalini Soni v. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 544 and said that "Considering the facts in the instant case the bail application and the bail order were vital materials for consideration. If those were not considered the satisfaction of the detaining authority itself would have been impaired, and if those had been considered, they would be documents relied on by the detaining authority though not specifically mentioned in the annexure to the order of detention and those ought to have formed part of the documents supplied to the detenue with the grounds of detention and without them the grounds themselves could not be said to have been completed." It can therefore be said in the instant case that the charge of the suppression of the two applications dated July 18, and July 19,1991 of the detenue from the detaining authority not been proved and it cannot be said that this could have led the detaining authority to non-consideration of any vital document. Therefore, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could not be said to be vitiated in the instant case in so far as detention order of Sunil Longiya is concerned. 16. Corning to the case of detenue Ghanshyam Soni (Habeas Corpus Petition No.1472/1992), it is said that the petitioner who is brother of detenue Ghanshyam Soni had sent a telegram on July 2,1991 to the Customs Collector mentioning therein that his brother Ghanshyam Soni had been taken forcibly by the Customs Officers and his statement was forcibly obtained by them by using third degree methods. It will appear from para 10 of the reply that such telegram was produced before the detaining authority and the same was considered by it and we have already said in so far as bail order is concerned that no bail order was made even in the case of this detenue. It will appear from para 10 of the reply that such telegram was produced before the detaining authority and the same was considered by it and we have already said in so far as bail order is concerned that no bail order was made even in the case of this detenue. Thus so far as this case is concerned, it cannot be said that any material document, fact or information was suppressed from the detaining authority and therefore, the satisfaction of the detaining authority is vitiated on the ground of suppression of relevant material. 17. In so far as this petition in relation to Ghanshyam Soni is concerned, an additional ground has been raised and it is that some of the copies which were made available to the detenue were illegible and therefore the detenue was denied reasonable opportunity of making effective representation. It will appear from para 13 of the petition that para 4 of page 2 of grounds of detention is not legible and therefore he could not make effective representation. The detenue also submitted that pages Nos. 18,60, and 61 of the paper-book are also not legible and the detaining authority was requested to supply the legible documents. It was further submitted that pages 98,99 and 111 of the paper-book, the documents supplied to him more in English and he does not know English and therefore these documents should be deemed not to have been supplied to him. A look at para 13 of the reply will show that it has been denied and it has been stated that all the documents which were supplied to the detenue were legible. It is also stated therein that the fact regarding documents being in English is not relevant because these documents are only prescription slips of medicine prescribed by a physician to Shri Kishori Sharan and therefore, there was no purpose to supply Hindi version of these documents to the detenue. It has also been stated that the representation dated February 7,1992 made by the detenue is in English language which bears the signatures of the detenue. On behalf of the detenue a representation was filed and a look at para 9 of the representation will show that it is mentioned therein "....some of the documents supplied to the detenue are not legible. On behalf of the detenue a representation was filed and a look at para 9 of the representation will show that it is mentioned therein "....some of the documents supplied to the detenue are not legible. Para No.4 at page 2 of the grounds of detention, Ex.3, at page 5, page 18 of the papdtt book, page Nos. 60 and 61 of the paper book are not legible and, therefore, the detenue cannot make an effective representation. Therefore, the detention order is liable to be quashed." The detenue had produced certain copies of some documents for a perusal of this Court and it will appear that pages 19,60 and 61 of the documents supplied to the detenue to enable him to make effective representation are not legible. This Court had occasion to examine the effect of supply of illegible documents in the case of Gafoor Khan Karu v. Union of India and another, decided on September 24, 1991 , to which one of us (M.B. Sharma J.) was a party, and in the aforesaid case the court said that the documents supplied to the detenue must be legible in order to enable him to make an effective representation because there is mandate in clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution as well as sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act that opportunity should be given to the detenue to make effective representation, and that right can only be exercised if the documents supplied are legible. We have already referred to the representation of detenue wherein the detenue requested for supply of the legible documents but the documents were not supplied In the case of Chandra Shekhar Ojha v. A.K. Karnik, 1982 Cr. L.J. 1642 , it was held that, the supply of wholly blank or illegible documents amounts to non-supply of copies of the relevant documents which were relied upon for passing the detention order and non-supply of the relevant documents rendered the detention itself void ab initio. L.J. 1642 , it was held that, the supply of wholly blank or illegible documents amounts to non-supply of copies of the relevant documents which were relied upon for passing the detention order and non-supply of the relevant documents rendered the detention itself void ab initio. We are of the opinion that as and when the documents on which reliance has been placed by the detaining authority in making the detention order and formulating the grounds of detention, are supplied to a detenue, to enable him to make representation, due care and caution must be taken to supply legible copies of those documents and if the copies supplied to the detenue are illegible, then continued detention of the detenue cannot be held to be legal. In the case of Subas Das v. Union of India, 1988 Cr. L.J. NOC 84 , it was held that where the copies of documents supplied to the detenue were illegible and even after the request for supply of legible copies no action was taken till the order of detention was con-firmed, the order of detention was invalid. We are therefore of the opinion that so far as the case of detenue Ghanshyam Soni is concerned, as a result of non-supply of some of the legible copies of the documents relied upon by the detaining authority, renders his detention illegal. 18. One more ground has been urged in relation to detenue Sunil Longiya and it is that the detenue had requested on February 22,1992 to the detaining authority for sending his representation to the Central Government. The State Government had rejected the representation of the detenue on February 10,1992 and there is no obligations on the State Government to send a copy of his representation to the Central Government and it is for the detenue to make representation directly to the Central Government, moreso, when in the present case where the representation was already rejected by the State Government on February 19,1992 and no representation was pending consideration with the State Government. 19. 19. The result of the above discussion is that D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1194/1992, Gyan Chand Jain v. State of Rajasthan and others in relation to detenue Sunil Longiya is hereby dismissed and D.B. Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1472 /1992, Dwarka Prasad Soni v. State of Rajasthan and others in relation to detenue Ghanshyam Soni is hereby allowed and his detention order dated January 28,1992, made under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 is held to be invalid and is hereby quashed and set aside. It is hereby directed that detenue Ghanshyam Soni shall be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.Petition No. 1194/1992 Dismissed, Petition No. 1472/1992 Allowed. *******