ORDER M.V. Tamaskar, J. -- 1. On 4.1.1980 at about 4.30 P.M. there was a scuffle between Shri P.R. Sakhare, Overman, and Shri Retulal, loader of Satpura-2 mine. It was alleged that Shri Sakhare assaulted Shri Retulal and later on Shri Retulal alongwith other co-workers assaulted Shri Sakhare. Subsequently, there was a wild-cat strike from second shift on 4.1.1980 demanding immediate action against Shri Sakhare. The strike continued upto the first shift of 5.1.1980. Meanwhile, discussions took place between the Unions on the one side and the Agent, Satpura-2 mine on the other side. An understanding was reached resulting into appointment of Shri B.L. Nandwana as Enquiry Officer. The matter was inquired and report was submitted to the Agent, Satpura-2. The unit management initiated disciplinary action issuing charge-sheets to nine persons including Shri Sakhare, Overman, and placing them under suspension. This resulted in illegal strike from 29.1.80 in Satpura-2 mine. Subsequently, other mines were also affected. 2. Negotiations were held between the representatives of the Unions and the Management and a settlement/agreement between the representatives of the Management and the representatives of the workman was recorded in form-H under Rule 58 of the Industrial Disputes Central Rules on 5.2.80. 3. There was a strike in the Satpura-2 and PK-I & II and Bagdona mines of the Western Coalfields Ltd. from 29.1.80 to 4.2.80. Consequent upon the strike the Management issued notice dated 1.4.80 calling upon the workmen to call-off the strike. However, on 5.2.80 as stated above the settlement between the parties was arrived at. Clause 3 and 4 of the settlement/agreement are reproduced below:- "3. Regarding the action to be taken for the illegal strike of 29.l.1980 and thereafter, the management will take liberal view. If the Trade Unions wish so they can represent to the Divisional Head quarters, Nagpur. 4. The principle of 'no work, no pay' will be applied for the striking workers for the days on which they were on strike." 4. The understanding was that the management will take liberal view in respect of action to be taken for the said strike it was also stated that 'no work no pay' will he applied for the period on which they were on strike. Thus, both Management and the workers had arrived at a industrial peace in the colliery. The understanding was that the management will take liberal view in respect of action to be taken for the said strike it was also stated that 'no work no pay' will he applied for the period on which they were on strike. Thus, both Management and the workers had arrived at a industrial peace in the colliery. Surprisingly enough the management thereafter issued notices stating that why 8 days wages should not be deducted from the striking workers in terms of section 9 (1) and (2) of the Payment of Wages Act. A copy of the notices is to be found as Annexure-C in the paper book. It has been stated that in terms of the settlement arrived at in form 'H' with the Unions on 5.2.80 the management has taken a lenient view and had sympathetically considered the reduction of quantum of penal recovery of wages from 8 days to 3 days only. This notice became a subject matter of reference by the Central Government vide order date 16.10.80 and referred for adjudication to the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Jabalpur. The order of reference was as under:- "Whether the deduction of 3 days wages by the Management of Pathakhera Collieries for alleged illegal strike in Satpura-I and II, P.K.I & II and Bagdona Mines from 29.1.80 to 4.2.80 was justified? If not, to what relief are the concerned employees entitled'?" The wordings of the reference are quite specific which is in regard to the illegal strike in the Mine. Thus, what was required to be answered by the Labour Court was the legality & validity of the strike and the action taken i.e. deduction of three days wages by the Management of Pathakera Colleries. 5. The Labour Court vide its Award (Annexure-I) dated 16.2.1983 after giving opportunity to the management decided the reference in favour of the workers. While deciding the reference the learned Judge of the Labour Court was impressed by the fact that there was a settlement between the parties and the parties had agreed for the principle of no work no pay or the actual days of strike and there was no question of taking any further penal action in regard to the strike period. While deciding the reference the learned Judge of the Labour Court was impressed by the fact that there was a settlement between the parties and the parties had agreed for the principle of no work no pay or the actual days of strike and there was no question of taking any further penal action in regard to the strike period. The Management has taken a plea that while recording the settlement the undertaking given by the Unions was not incorporated as it was mutually agreed to but the Labour Court has negatived the said submission of the management as it was held to be clearly after-thought and holding that there was no agreement that for the period of strike the management shall recover 3 days additional wages and it was held that the deductions of 3 days wages by the management was not justified and the workers were entitled to the refund of these deductions. 6. This Award has been challenged in this petition firstly on the ground that the deductions being under section 9 (2) proviso of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to decide the matter and the reference made to the Labour Court by the Central Govt. was bad in law. Secondly, there was an statutory settlement and the deductions could be made on the basis of the same. Thirdly, the findings recorded by the Labour Judge were contradictory and perverse and as such the award is vitiated and liable to be set aside. 7. As regards whether the Labour Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter only under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and not under reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court rejected the said argument on the ground that once a reference was made it has to be answered and it has no jurisdiction to refuse to answer the reference. 8. It may be stated that two enactments i.e. Industrial Disputes Act and the Payment of Wages Act are the Central legislation and the scheme of Payment of Wages act does not in any way exclude the jurisdiction of any authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court alone. Section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court alone. Authorities constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act are, therefore, not the civil Courts within the meaning of section 22. The question to he considered in the instant case is as to whether the authorities under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act could have decided the strike illegal. It is significant that expressions like 'lock-out, strike, industrial disputes' are nowhere defined in the Payment of Wages Act and thus the jurisdiction in respect of 'strike' whether it was legal or illegal can he decided only on a reference made by the Central Govt. under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and not by the Payment of Wages Act. In the instant case, the reference was made by the Central Government conferring jurisdiction on the Labour Court to decide the legality or otherwise of the strike and the action to he taken there on. We arc supported in this view by the judgment of the Andhara Pradesh High Court, in the case of Mechanical Superintendent, the Visakhpatnam Port Trust and others v. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, Visakhapatnam and others 1. The relevant portion dealing on the subject is reproduced below- 1. AIR 1969 AP .200 "It is true that the workers cannot approach an Industrial Court and seek relief under the Industrial Disputes Act unless the Government makes a reference under that Act to that tribunal. But that cannot enlarge the extent of the jurisdiction of the authority constituted under the Payment of Wages Act. It is not without significance that expressions like lockout, strike, industrial dispute etc., are nowhere mentioned in the Payment of Wages Act. I, therefore, hold that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to grant relief under section 15 (3). Having regard to the findings of the Payment of Wages Authority my conclusion is unfortunate hut I cannot allow my sympathy for the workers to lead me to make, what I imagime, is bad law." The Punjab High Court has also taken similar view in General Engineering Employees' Union v. T.R. Bhagwath & others 2. 2.1966 (1) LLJ 568 9. Having regard to the findings of the Payment of Wages Authority my conclusion is unfortunate hut I cannot allow my sympathy for the workers to lead me to make, what I imagime, is bad law." The Punjab High Court has also taken similar view in General Engineering Employees' Union v. T.R. Bhagwath & others 2. 2.1966 (1) LLJ 568 9. The view taken in the instant case is further re-enforced by the Andhra Pradesh and another Full Bench decision reported in M. Radhakrishna Reddy v. B.V. Bus Service 3, while dealing with the provisions of section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions of section 15 read with section 22 of the Payment of Wages act it was held that the provisions of section 15 read with section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act do not bar the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes act to entertain the application for recovery of wages due to an employee i.e. the two jurisdictions, one under the Payment of Wages Act and another under the Industrial Disputes Act can co-exist. The Full Bench decision is also based on the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva4; the Full Bench expressed the view as under:-- 3.AIR I986 AP 102. 4. AIR 1964 SC 752 . "We may look into the other provisions of the Payment of Wages Act to find out whether they expressly or by necessary implication exclude recourse to remedies available under some other law. In this context S. 22 is the only provision relevant for the purpose. It only bars the entertainment of a suit by a civil Court for the recovery of wages. Thus, there is no express provision in the Act prohibiting an employee from seeking a remedy available to him under the Industrial Dispute Act for recovery of wages. Then we have to see whether the provisions of the Act by necessary implication operate as a bar to the filing of an application under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act." 9-A. In the Full Bench decision of our Court in Mohammad Is mail v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and another; considered similar arguments in respect of Payment of Wages A ct and the argument was that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was excluded. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and another; considered similar arguments in respect of Payment of Wages A ct and the argument was that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was excluded. The reference was in the following terms:- "Whether an application under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is barred by virtue of section 22 of the Payment of Wages Act where an application lies also under sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act for recovery of that amount'?" After referring the various judgments and also the judgment in Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva and others and in Town Municipal Council Athani v. Presiding Officer, labour Court, Hubli and others, it was held that in case where section 15 do not provide any adequate remedy, the remedy can he sought either under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act or by raising an industrial disputes under the Act and having it decided under the various provisions of the Act, i.e. to say the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is wider under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act than under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The conclusions reached by the Full Bench as given in para 9 are reproduced below:- We, therefore, answer the question in the negative by saying that an application under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not barred by virtue of sec. 22 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936, in respect of claims that could he preferred under sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and that the two Division Bench decisions of this Court referred to above did not lay down the correct law." In the instant case, what is required to he decided is whether there was an illegal strike for the period from 29.1.80 to 4.2.1980 and whether the settlement arrived at between the parties could he set at naught and whether the payment of wages authorities could decide such a question while deciding the deductions made under section 9 (2) proviso, of the Act. 10. The petitioner has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur1; wherein it has been laid down that the payment of gratuity Act is a complete code containing detailed provisions covering all the essential features of a scheme for payment of gratuity. 10. The petitioner has relied on judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jullundur1; wherein it has been laid down that the payment of gratuity Act is a complete code containing detailed provisions covering all the essential features of a scheme for payment of gratuity. Parliament intended that proceedings for payment of gratuity due under the Payment of Gratuity Act must be taken under that Act and not under any other Act. In the present case, the question for consideration is whether the Payment of Wages Act can be said to be a complete code in respect of all types of disputes. The Andhra Pradesh Full Bench while considering this aspect of the case and referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in para. 27 has come to the conclusion as under:- 1.1980. JLJ 177. 2. AIR 1964 SC 752 . 3. AIR 1969 SC 1335 . 4. AIR 1979 SC 1981 . "27. Having regard to this decision we have to examine the various provisions of the Payment of Wages Act to see whether it was enacted as a complete code dealing with all the matters relating to the payment of Wages. We have given above a gist of the relevant provisions of the Act. The various provisions of the Act as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Payment of Wages Inspector v. S. Mehta-1, clearly indicate that- (1969) Lab. LJ. 762 = (1969) Lab. I.C. 807 The only applications which the Authority can entertain are those where deductions unauthorised under the Act are made from wages or there has been' delay in payment beyond the wage period fixed or prescribed under Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act and that the authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to enter into a question of potential wages i.e. whether the workman pleads that he ought to have been upgraded as persons junior to him were upgraded and that he ought to have been paid Wages on a scale paid to those so upgraded... 4 and 5 of the Act and that the authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to enter into a question of potential wages i.e. whether the workman pleads that he ought to have been upgraded as persons junior to him were upgraded and that he ought to have been paid Wages on a scale paid to those so upgraded... and that- "in determining the scope of these incidental matters care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction was not unreasonably or unduly expended." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have categorically laid down that a claim such as the one for compensation payable under section 25 FF or 25 FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act being wages within the meaning of S. 2 (vi) (d) of the Payment of Wages Act, on the ground that his payment was delayed by the employer could not be entertained under that Act. It was further clarified that in considering such a question it was not open to the Authority to decide whether there was any interruption in the employment of the workmen. Though certain amount claimed by a workman comes within the definition of Wages "under the Payment of Wages Act, still a claim relating to that amount cannot be entertained by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act. It is thus, manifest that every claim for wages is not entertain able under S. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. So it is evident from the various provisions incorporated in the Act that it is not intended to be a self contained Code dealing with all matters relating to payment of wages. if that is so, question of ouster of jurisdiction of the Labour Court under S. 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act by virtue of the provisions of the payment of Wages Act does not arise." 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the two judgments reported in 1988 Lab. I.C. 682. In the said judgment question was whether principles of natural justice would be applicable when deductions are made under sec. 9 of the Payment of Wages Act which are normal or ordinary deductions for the period of absence as contemplated under section 9(2) and the proviso to section 9(2). I.C. 682. In the said judgment question was whether principles of natural justice would be applicable when deductions are made under sec. 9 of the Payment of Wages Act which are normal or ordinary deductions for the period of absence as contemplated under section 9(2) and the proviso to section 9(2). The Judges were not considering a question wherein a specific settlement was arrived at under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the management had agreed to take liberal view in the matter. In such a situation whether the payment of wages authorities would have jurisdiction to consider the validity or otherwise of the said settlement under the limited jurisdiction under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Another judgment cited by the petitioner is 1980 (II) Labour Law notes 1145. In the said case the Court was not considering the question of jurisdiction and the scope o(the jurisdiction under the two Acts, and it was only concerned with the scope of section 9(1) and (2) and proviso under the Payment of Wages Act, as regards granting of opportunity and violation of principles of natural justice. A perusal of the judgment para 7 discloses that reference was pending before the Industrial Tribunal under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and the learned Judge refused to express any opinion in respect of the same. As such, the question of jurisdiction was not considered in the two cases whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide the matter on a reference made under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. Having considered the judgment referred to above we hold that: (1) Both the Payment of Wages Act as well as the Industrial Disputes Act are special enactments and as such the principle 'generaila specilibus non derogate is not applicable. (2) The remedies provided under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act as well as reference under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act arc independent and alternative and one does not exclude the other. (3) The remedy under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is wide in scope and more favourable to the workman than the remedy under section 15 of the Payment of Wages act. (3) The remedy under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is wide in scope and more favourable to the workman than the remedy under section 15 of the Payment of Wages act. (4) when a workman is governed by the provisions of both the Payment of Wages act as well as the Industrial Disputes Act it is open to him to avail either of the remedies provided under those Acts. 13. We are of the opinion that the approach of the Court should be informed by social justice and taking into consideration the machinery provided under the Industrial Disputes Act and the settlement arrived at between the parties the management had agreed not to take any penal action against the workers and in that back ground the Labour Court was justified in answering the reference that deductions were improper. Industrial Jurisprudence is an alloy of law and social justice where it is one thing to say that the action is legal and another that it is justified. The Labour Court while answering the reference could well say that the management had a right to take action under proviso to section 9 of the Payment of Wages Act but having come to a settlement and having assured a liberal action in the matter could not have turned back and deducted the wages for the period of three days under the proviso to section 9(2) of the Act, thus, the approach of the Labour Court was just and proper. In the circumstances of the case and the reference was properly answered. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that having submitted to the jurisdiction the petitioner cannot challenge the validity of the reference or competence of the Court to decide the reference. We do not agree with the submissions made by the respondents as it is always open for the parties to challenge the jurisdiction before the higher forum as it is purely a question of law. 15. For the reasons stated above the petition has no substance and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Security amount, if deposited, he refunded to the petitioner.