STATE OF U. P. v. VINAI KUMAR SRIVASTAVA — 1992 DIGILAW 348 (ALL)

JUDGEMENT 1. Aggrieved by an order of VI Addl. Sessions Judge dt. 4-2-1991 in Special Trial No. 1 of 1986 thereby refusing to commence de nova trial of the accused opposite party the State of U.P. have preferred the instant revision. 2. The accused-opposite party V. K. Srivastava was posted as Sales-tax Officer in Varanasi and on a particular date he is alleged to have taken a bribe of Rs. 500/- when a trap was laid. On completion of investigation a charge sheet was filed under S. 161, IPC read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trial commenced and several witnesses were examined by the prosecution in the court of VI Addl. Sessions Judge, Varanasi and the trial was numbered as Special trial No. 1 of 1986. A fire broke out in the precincts of the Civil Courts in Varanasi in Dec. 1988 which destroyed many judicial files. It is said that a file of the said trial was also damaged to some extent in the said fire but was retrieved after some time. On noticing that some part of the record was burnt out the parties were directed to file copies of those documents which they may be possessing for reconstruction of the record. On behalf of the accused opposite party some typed copies of statements of some of the prosecution witnesses were filed. However, the prosecution raised an objection that those copies were not correct statements. Some of the statements were allegedly having some corrections here and there which were objected to be intentional interpolations which may not have been existing in the original statements. 3. This appears to have prompted the public prosecutor to move an application before the trial Judge praying de novo trial and the same having been rejected this revision is being preferred against that order. 4. Km. Nahid A. Moonis, learned AGA for the State has been heard at sufficient length in this revision while Sri V. C. Tewari senior Advocate assisted by Sri A. K. Awasthi have been heard on behalf of the accused opposite party. 5. That on 11-11-1991 this Court directed both the parties to obtain photostat copy of the record of the trial court and file it. 5. That on 11-11-1991 this Court directed both the parties to obtain photostat copy of the record of the trial court and file it. Affidavits have been filed by the Investigating Officer on behalf of the prosecution and the accused opposite party himself on behalf of the defence and the copies filed along with those affidavits are identical. 6. From a close scrutiny of those documents it is apparent that while the copies of the FIR, Chik FIR and most of the relevant papers prepared during investigation were available on the record. The hand written statement of a few witnesses were also available but the typed copies filed were objected to by the other side as not being the true copies of the original. But it must be stated here that the Additions and alterations allegedly made in the typed copies of the original filed by the parties may have to be decided by the trial judge on the basis of his notes as to whether those allegations are correct or not. 7. There is no doubt that some witnesses whose statement are not available at all may have to be examined all over again. Perhaps being convinced with this necessity the prosecutor had moved the application before the trial Judge. 8. Sri V.C. Tewari strenuously argued that there is no provision in the Cr. P.C. which may permit a de novo trial and it was further argued that the entire defence version having been already divulged to the prosecution witnesses while they had appeared earlier, they are likely to improve their statements accordingly which may handicap the defence inasmuch as they may not be cross examined with reference to the earlier statements on account of their non availability or on account of its genuineness being in serious dispute due to those alleged interpolations. Km. Nahid A. Moonis, learned AGA on the other hand has argued that the prosecution case should not suffer particularly in a trap case just because a part of the record has been demaged due to fire in the court premises. 9. It has been emphasised time and again that no party would suffer for any fault on the part of the court. 9. It has been emphasised time and again that no party would suffer for any fault on the part of the court. If the courts could not protect the records and a part of it is damaged because of an accidental fire neither the accused nor the prosecution should suffer for the said damage though may be, that the court itself was not responsible for the said damage. This being the position one is forced to go into the question as to how and when a retrial is proper and what is the purpose of retrial. No one can argue that in no case retrial can be ordered. The word retrial exists in Ss. 386 and 401 of the Cr. P.C. It is true that the expression of the word de novo trial is no more to be found in the present Cr. P.C. (Act No. 4 of 1973) but de novo means a new, therefore, practically no difference exists in the meaning of two terminologies 'De novo trial' and 'retrial'. In any case whenever retrial is ordered the parties shall have known the pleas and details of the defence of the case. Similarly, the enire statement of the prosecution witnesses shall have been known to the accused. 10. Fortunately, however, in the instant case the copies reveal that charges as framed are available on the record and many of the witnesses statements exist. Copies of all the statements of the prosecution witnesses must have been given to the accused and cross-examination can certainly be made with the help of the statements of those witnesses as recorded by the Investigating Officer under S. 161, Cr. P.C. also. Therefore, the argument of Sri Tewari that by ordering a retrial where the prosecution witnesses have been examined once, will amount to prejudicing the defence of an accused is without any, force. 11. It was vehemently pointed out by Km. Nahid A. Moonis that S. 311, Cr. P.C. gives ample scope and power to a court to summon any witness in the interest of justice. There is good reason behind this argument. 11. It was vehemently pointed out by Km. Nahid A. Moonis that S. 311, Cr. P.C. gives ample scope and power to a court to summon any witness in the interest of justice. There is good reason behind this argument. In a case where the deposition of a witness recorded in the court is available on the record but some interpolation is said to have been made, the trial court can and should always correct those mistakes by referring to his own notes or by recalling the witness exercising powers under S. 311, Cr. P. C. 12. In the recent past there have been cases in this court where the trial court records were destoryed on account of fire if the District Court after the trial court had recorded the conviction. At the time of hearing of the appeal against that conviction if this court a question arose as to how this court was to exercise the power of the appellant court after examining the record when the record itself was not available. It was emphasised that all efforts must be made to reconstruct the record. (See Sita Ram v. State, 1990 AWC page 585). 13. But where trial court's record is partially, damaged and the trial is still going on, grave injustice may flow if it is held that the trial court cannot reexamine those witnesses at the request of the prosecution. Whether such re-examination of witnesses is described as denovo trial or retrial, may only be of academic interest. 14. 13. But where trial court's record is partially, damaged and the trial is still going on, grave injustice may flow if it is held that the trial court cannot reexamine those witnesses at the request of the prosecution. Whether such re-examination of witnesses is described as denovo trial or retrial, may only be of academic interest. 14. In Ukha Kolhe v. The State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1531 : (1963 (2) Cri LJ 418) it has been held that (at page 423):- "An order for retrial of criminal case is made in exceptional cases , and not unless the appellate court is satisfied that the court trying the proceeding had no jurisdiction to try it or that the trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or irregularities or on account of misconception of the nature of the proceedings and on that account in substance there had been no real trial or that the prosecutor or an accused was, for reasons over which he had no control, prevented from leading or tendering evidence material to the charge, are in the interest of justice the appellate court deems it appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of the case, that the accused should be put on his trial again. An order of retrial wipes out from the record the earlier proceedings, and exposes the person accused to another trial which affords the prosecutor art opportunity to rectify the infirmities disclosed in the earlier trial, and will not ordinarily be countenanced when it is made merely to enable the prosecutor to lead evidence which he could but has not cared to lead either on account of insufficient appreciation of the nature of the case or for other reasons." 15. In Akalu Ahir v. Ram Deo Ram reported in AIR 1973 SC 2145 : (1973 Cri LJ 1404) the Supreme Court has said that normally retrial could not be ordered unless there is some infirmities rendering the trial defective. 16. In the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court the appellate courts order directing retrial by the trial court was being considered but the cautions issued by the Supreme Court would apply in case when a retrial is ordered. 16. In the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court the appellate courts order directing retrial by the trial court was being considered but the cautions issued by the Supreme Court would apply in case when a retrial is ordered. May be before conviction is recorded by the trial court or after but in the facts of the two cases it has to be held that the Supreme Court had come to the conclusion that power of recording additional evidence by the appellate court or power of evaluating evidence by the appellate court could well have been exercised and, therefore, retrial was not-necessary. 17. In Madhusudan Pradhan v. The State reported in 1963 (2) Cr LJ 103 a retrial was ordered in the interest of justice after setting aside the conviction of the appellant by the High Court. 18. In the case of Sevugeperumal reported in AIR 1943 Madras 391 the High Court directed a retrial because of infirmities committed by the trial court. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion it appears imperative to hold that in cases where the trial is going on and part of the record is missing, the trial court shall have to reconstruct the record. In that process it may have to decide objections regarding the interpolations, etc. where copies of statements are produced and where the statements are absent, the court may have to recall those witnesses for re-examination. 20. For, it must be remembered that matters of judicial record are unquestionable and are not open to doubt. Neither judges can be dragged into the arena of controversy nor can be judgments be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation. If the judge says in his judgment that something was done, said or admitted before him, it has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what happened at a hearing recorded in the judgment of the court are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such a statement on affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in the court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment it is incumbent upon the party. While matter is still fresh in the mind of the Judge, to approach the said Judge by suitable application. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If a party thinks that the happenings in the court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment it is incumbent upon the party. While matter is still fresh in the mind of the Judge, to approach the said Judge by suitable application. That is the only way to have the record corrected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak, AIR 1982 SC 1249 : (1982 Cri LJ 1581). 21. A perusal of the impugned order of the trial court indicates that it had rejected the prayer of the State to direct a de novo trial and simultaneously had directed the parties to file copies of the statements in their possession so that he could first attempt to reconstruct the record. Assumption on the part of the State that in rejecting the prayer for a de novo trial the learned trial Judge must have made up its mind not to examine or recall or re-examine any witness or the accused and would have proceeded to deliver judgment on the existing truncketed materials on the record, is wholly misplaced. 22. This revision consequently succeeds in part. The trial Judge will first reconstruct the record and then proceed with the trial in accordance with law keeping in view the observations made above. It is further directed that the trial Judge will endeavour to conclude the trial on day to day basis within the year 1992. Petition allowed in part.