JUDGMENT 1. - This is an application under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code praying that the proceedings pending in sessions Case No. 22/88 pending in the Court of Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu be quashed.This case has achequired history. Municipal Board, Pilani directed the demolition of the shop belonging to the petitioner, Sanwar Mal in 1977 and asked for the police assistance to execute the order. On 20th Nov., 1977 when the employees of the Municipal Board, Pilani went on the spot and were in process of removing the illegal possession, it was obstructed to by the accused and along with some other accused persons made an assault on the police party with bricks, stones etc., as a result of which the Executive Officer of the Municipal Committee, Executive Magistrate, Chirava, Dy. S.P. Jhunjhunu and other employees of the Municipal Board and police party were not only obstructed in performing their official duty but were also caused injuries by stones and bricks. It is pertinent to mention here that accused Sanwar Mal and Jitendra Kumar also sustained injuries in that occurrence. 2. Police registered a case vide FIR No. 71 of 1977 at the instance of Vinit Kumar, Sub-Inspector of Police and registered a case for offence under Section 353, 332 and 440 IPC. After investigation of the case, a charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioners on 11.1.78 for offences under Section 332, 333, 353 and 188 Indian Penal Code for which the case was registered and was listed for framing the charge. It took four years to the Court to frame a charge for offence under Sections 332, 333, 353 and 188 Indian Penal Code on 7.1.82. At the time of framing of the charge neither the Public Prosecutor nor the Court nor the learned Counsel for the accused cared to open the Code of Criminal Procedure and to find out as to whether the offence under Section 333 Indian Penal Code could be tried by the learned Magistrate or not and directed the prosecution to produce evidence in the case. The case went for yet another five years and 18 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. Meanwhile, the case was transferred from the Court of Magistrate to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, who continued recording the evidence. The case went for yet another five years and 18 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution. Meanwhile, the case was transferred from the Court of Magistrate to Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, who continued recording the evidence. It was on 19.12.87 that the new incumbent who took over as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhunjhunu, noticed that the charge-sheet had been submitted under Section 333 Indian Penal Code for which a charge has also been framed by Munsif and Judl. Magistrate, Chirava in ignorance of the correct position of law because Section 333 Indian Penal Code was exclusively triable by Magistrate, the minimum sentence being ten years. As this stage the case was for recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code but since the entire proceedings were illegal and without jurisdiction, he gave an opportunity to the party to hear the arguments and vide order dated 31.1.88, he directed the committal of the case to the Court of Sessions. He passed the formal committal order on 16.3.88 and the case thereafter was committed to the Court of Sessions. 3. The parties approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the proceedings on the ground of latches and on the ground that accused had already faced trial before the Magistrate for over a decade and it was thereafter that the initial mistake was deducted that the case was exclusively triable by Court of Sessions and it is thereafter that the denovo trial has been ordered, which could be quashed to secure the ends of justice in the peculiar circumstances of the case. Notice of the petition was given on 25.10.89. 4. It is contended by learned Counsel for the petitioners that it is now well settled that proceedings, if they are prolonged in a Court of law without the fault of the accused and the charges are not very serious then such proceedings should not be continued to proceed. He placed reliance on K.K.P. Tiwari v. S.P. CBI, Raj & Another [1988 (4) SCC 117] , Sirinivas Gopal v. Union of Territory of Arunachal Pradesh [ 1988 (4) SCC 36 ] , T.J. Stephen and Others v. M/s. Parle Bottling Co. (P) Ltd. & Others [(1988 Suppl) SCC 458] and Surya Narain Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 Patna 219) . 5. (P) Ltd. & Others [(1988 Suppl) SCC 458] and Surya Narain Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (AIR 1987 Patna 219) . 5. Learned Counsel for the State has stated that this is a case where the police officers have been beaten and also the Municipal employees, therefore, the party had taken the law in its own hands and on technical point the proceedings should not be quashed. 6. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the entire record. 7. The trial of the accused in this case has taken more period than for which in totality the accused could be punished even if the case was proved against them. 1977 to 1992 i.e. 15 years' period is too long a period to continue a criminal prosecution for offence under Sections 188, 332, 353 and 333 Indian Penal Code where the injuries for which Section 333 Indian Penal Code has been sought to be made out is a fracture of the metacorpal and proximal fling of the right hand little fingure which can very conveniently be turned as a minor injury for the purpose of a case like the present. This fracture is on the person of Girdhari Singh, a police Constable No. 536. Bashir Khan also sustained an injury but according to the Doctor there was a doubt for the fracture of the nasal bone and, therefore, his X-ray plat was referred to Radiologist of SMS Hospital, Jaipur for confirmation of opinion which opinion, I was unable to trace in the entire record. Be that as it may, they are the total injuries as against this, Surajmal sustained five injuries including injury on the left parital and frontal region of the head and Jitendra Kumar sustained seven injuries. 8. This case is squarely covered by the decisions cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner. In T. Stephen and Others v. M/s. Parle Bottling Co. (P) Ltd. & Others (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under : "Once the order of the High Court is vacated the order of the learned Magistrate would revive and the prosecution as directed by the learned Magistrate has now to continue. The petitioner of the complainant at page 21 of the paper-book shows that the offence was committed between 1967 and 1969 which is some 20 years back. The petitioner of the complainant at page 21 of the paper-book shows that the offence was committed between 1967 and 1969 which is some 20 years back. While we have no sympathy for the respondent 2 and we are clearly of the opinion that he has no equity in his favour and the delay after the complaint had been field has been mostly on account of his mala fide move, we do not think it would be in the interest of justice to allow a prosecution to start 20 years after the offence has been committed. If we could convict the respondent 2 in accordance with law, we would have been prepared to do so taking the facts of the case and conduct of the respondent into consideration but that would not be possible within the framework of the law of procedure. We, therefore, do not propose to allow the learned Magistrate to proceed with the trial of the case at this belated stage." 9. In Surya Narain Singh and Others v. State of Bihar (supra), the Full Bench of the Patna High Court observed as under : "The constitutional right of a speedy trial extends to and is applicable to capital offences punishable with death as well. The scope of Article 21 does not stop at the prison gates and the umbrella of the speedy trial rule which is an integral part of Article 21, is equally available to the accused during investigation, trial and even the post-trial field of capital offences punishable with death." "A callaous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offences punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21." 10. In Srinivas Gopal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (supra) their lordships of the Supreme Court have held as under:- "The offence of rash and negligent driving is neither a grave and heinous offence nor an offence against the community as such, though all criminal offences are crimes against society. Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant-91/2 years. Quick justice is asine qua non of Article 21. Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant-91/2 years. Quick justice is asine qua non of Article 21. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 91/2 years without any cause at all, cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. It is, therefore, just and fair and in accordance with enquiry to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further. If the principles of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied, the taking of cognizance of the offence was barred by Section 468 of the Code." 11. In K.K. Tiwari v. S.P., CBI, Raj. (supra) the Division Bench of this Court has held as under:- "After carefully considering the various facts of the problem and considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court and the Full Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in Maheswardhari Singh's case, we agree with the proposition of law laid down by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in that case, that in the ordinary circumstance, a callous inordinate prolonged delay of seven years or more which does not arise on account of fault of the accused or otherwise, not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason in investigation and trial for an offence other than capital ones would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy public trial under Article 21." 12. In view of the aforesaid in my opinion, it would betravisity of justice to continue the proceedings any further. 13. I, therefore, deem it proper to exercise the inherent jurisdiction of this Court in order to secure the ends of justice and quash the proceeding pending in the Court of Sessions, Jhunjhunu in Sessions case No. 22/88. 14. This petition is allowed as aforesaid.Petition allowed. *******