S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the order of his removal from service as Gram Sevak dated 3rd of November, 1976, passed by Deputy District Development officer as well as the order in Appeal passed by District Development Officer dated 15th of June, 1977, confirming the order of Deputy District Development Officer and also the order in revision passed by the Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal dated 12th January, 1978. In substance, the petitioner has challenged the order of his removal from service as Gram sevak. ( 2 ) IN order to properly appreciate the challenge to the aforesaid orders, it would be necessary to set out the relevant facts hereunder: ( 3 ) THE petitioner joined in the service in the erstwhile State of Bombay as Gram sevak in 1960. On completion of training is clear from the order at Annexure-B dated 30th March, 1960. Rejoined in the service on 7th April, 1960. He was chargesheeted on 6th November, 1975 by the Deputy District Development Officer, District Kheda, while he was working as Gram Sevak inkhakahar, taluka Khambhat. It is not necessary to go into the nature of charges levelled against him, but is would be necessary only to state that the charges related to his unauthorised absence from duty for a period of five days and his remaining on leave without prior sanction. In the departmental enquiry, which was conducted into the aforesaid charges, the petitioner was removed from serevices vide order dated 3rd of November, 1976. The said order of removal was passed by the Deputy district Development Officer, Kheda District Panchayat, Nadiad. The petitioner preferred an Apeeal to the District Development Officer and the samed was dismissed and further appeal to the Tribunal was also dismissed on 12th January, 1978. The petitioner has, therefore, preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) THIS Petition can be disposed of on the principal contention raised by Mr. H. J. Trivedi, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Mr. Trivedi submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Gram Sevak under the order of the Commissioner, ahmedabad Division, Ahmedabad, dated 23rd March, 1960 as is evident from annexure-B to the petition. ( 4 ) THIS Petition can be disposed of on the principal contention raised by Mr. H. J. Trivedi, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Mr. Trivedi submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Gram Sevak under the order of the Commissioner, ahmedabad Division, Ahmedabad, dated 23rd March, 1960 as is evident from annexure-B to the petition. That order dated 30th March, 1960 speaks about the commissioners order dated 23rd March, 1960 appointing trainees as Gram Sevake in panchmahals District. In the order passed by the Collector of Panchmahals the name of the petitioner appears at S. No. 5 From the preamble to the order, Annexure-B, it becomes clear that the initial order appointing trainees as Gram Sevaks was passed by the commissioner, Ahmedabad Division, Ahmedabad, on 23rd March, 1960. Mr. Trivedi, therefore, contended that since the original appointment order was passed by the commissioner, the Deputy District Development officer could not have passed the impugned order of removal of the petitioner dated 30th November, 1976. Alternatively he submitted that even if the order, Annexure-B dated 30th March, 1960 of the Collector, panchmahals, Godhra is treated as an order of appointment, the order of removal passed by the Deputy District Development Officer could not be sustained as the latter was inferior in rank than the former. There is considerable force in the submission made by mr. Trivedi. ( 5 ) ARTICLE 311 (1) of the constitution provides that no person who is a member of the civil Service of a State or holds a civil post under a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Indisputeably the Deputy district Development Officer is lower in rank, than the erstwhile Commissioners as well as the Collector of a District In view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in mysore State and Road Transport Corporation vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg, 1977 (1) S. L. R 237 since the authority passing the order of removal is found to be subordinate to the appointing authority, the impugned order of removal cannot be sustained. In that case the respondents were appointed by the superientendent of the Traffice Department of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad who was the head of the Road Transport Department of that state. In that case the respondents were appointed by the superientendent of the Traffice Department of the erstwhile State of Hyderabad who was the head of the Road Transport Department of that state. On the coming into force of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the respondents were deemed by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 116 thereof to have been appointed by the appropriate authority in the new State of Mysore. The authority equivalent to or co-ordinate in rank with the Superintendent of the Traffic Department of the erstwhile state of Hyderabad was the General Manager of the Mysore Government Road Transport department. There was no post of Superintendent of the Traffic in the Mysore government Road Transport Department in the State of Mysore but that, said Supreme court, was of no consequence. The Supreme Court therefore, held that the respondents could not have been dismissed from service by an authority lower or subordinate in rank to the General Manager of the Transport Department as it tantamounted to deprivation of the guarantee with the contentions based on sections 115 (7) and 116 of the States of reorganisation Act, 1956, their Lordships observed as under :-"it is also well settled that it is not possible by means of any legislative provision or rule to take away the guarantee provided by Article 311 (1) of the constitution which lays down that no public servant shall be dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and if any such legislative provision on rule lays down otherwise, it will clearly be ultra vires. . . . It follows, therefore, that the protections including the Constitutional protection enshrined in Article 311 (1) of the Constitution enjoyed by persons holding civil posts under the State like the first respondents prior to the coming into force of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 could not, after the appointed day i. e. November 1, 1956, be taken away whittled down or impaired by legislative enactment or rule. "relying on its earlier decision in State of U. P. and Ors vs. Ram Naresh Lal, (13) (1970) 3 S. C. C. 1973 that the power could be conferred on an officer other than the appointing authority to dismiss a Government servant provided he was not subordinate in rank to the appointing officer or authority, the Supreme Court after stating the facts in paragraph 13 of the judgment proceeded to observe as under:"the fact that there was no post of Superintendent of the Traffic in the Mysore government Road Transport Department in the State of Mysore is of no consequence. Such being the position the first respondents could not have been dismissed from service by an authority lower or subordinate in rank to the general Manager of the Transport Department as it would tantamount to deprivation of the guarantee enshrined in Article 311 of the Constitution read with Section 115 (7) of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956. "it is, therefore, clear from this decision of the Supreme Court that the authority which passes the order of dismissal or removal shall not be subordinate to the authority appointing the civil servant. In the instant case the petitioner was appointed by the commissioner, Ahmedabad Division, who was superior in rank to the Deputy District development Officer who has passed the impugned order of removal. Even if it is held in view of Annexure-B to the petition that the appointing authority was the Collector of panchmahals, Godhra, the order of removal cannot be sustained from the simple reason that a Deputy District Development Officer is lower in rank than the Collector. In either view of the matter the order of removal must be quashed. ( 6 ) THAT brings me to the next question as to what consequential relief should be given to the petitioner. Mr. H. J. Trivedy as stated at the Bar that the petitioner has now superannuated and the question of reinstating the petitioner to his original post would not arise. As regards backwages, it is stated that the petitioner has not been gainfully employed anywhere and that he has been jobless. It is also found that subsequently the only earning member of the family, viz. the elder son of the petitioner has also met with an accident on the day of his marriage while returning from wedding party. As regards backwages, it is stated that the petitioner has not been gainfully employed anywhere and that he has been jobless. It is also found that subsequently the only earning member of the family, viz. the elder son of the petitioner has also met with an accident on the day of his marriage while returning from wedding party. He has been seriously injured, which has practically made him infirm and incapable to work. It is the case of the petitioner that the entire family in absence of income from his son is now rendered destitute and petitioner is not in a position to maintain the family. In the facts and circumstances of this case and in view of the fact that the order of his removal from service cannot be upheldon any count, appropriate relief shall have to be granted to the petitioner towards backwages. However, it shall have to be kept in mind that the petitioner has not actually performed his duties, and therefore it should not be paid the backwages for not rendering any services. At the same time, it is the illegal action of the respondent that has kept the petitioner away from his job and keeping that factor also in mind, in my opinion, it would be just and proper to award 60% of the backwages to the petitioner from the date he was removed till the date he would have superannuated. The respondents are directed to pay such a backwages with consequential benefits to the petitioner within a period of three months after the date of receipt of the writ of this order. The Rule is made absolute accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Direct service is permitted. .