Judgment S.N.Jha, J. 1. This is a plaintiffs appeal against the judgment of reversal. He filed the suit claiming custody of sale deeds. According to him on 29-6-1974 the defendant executed three sale deeds for a total area of 1 bigha 1 katha 10 dhurs in his favours. While in two of them the consideration money was Rs. 3500 each, in the third sale deed it was Rs. 1,650. According to the plaintiff further, earlier on 13-6-72 the defendant had executed two mortgage deeds in his favour with respect to the same very land for a consideration of Rs. 3,500 At the time of purchase, that amount was adjusted towards part payment of the consideration money with respect to the first two sale deeds to the extent of half i. e. Rs. 1,750 each. Out of the balance amount of Rs. 5,150, Rs. 4950 was paid to the defendant at the time of execution leaving sum of Rs. 200 only payable. The suit was instituted as the defendant did not hand over the sale deeds not show readiness to accept the balance consideration money of Rs. 200 in spite of notice. 2. The defendant admitted the execution of the sale deeds and part adjustment of the consideration money with respect to the two sale deeds. However, according to him, the plaintiff did not pay the balance consideration of Rs. 5,150 even after lapse of time and notice. As a matter of fact, in reply to the pleaders notice, the plaintiff took the stand that he had already paid Rs. 4950 and only sum of Rs. 200 was payable. In the circumstances the defendant cancelled the sale deeds to the knowledge of the plaintiff. 3. The trial court held that the entire consideration money had been . paid by the plaintiff after adjustment of zerpeshagi except Rs. 200. It also held that irrespective of the non-payment of the whole consideration money, right, title and interest in the lands stood transferred from the very date of execution and registration of the sale deeds in terms of Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (in short, the Property Act). 200. It also held that irrespective of the non-payment of the whole consideration money, right, title and interest in the lands stood transferred from the very date of execution and registration of the sale deeds in terms of Sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act (in short, the Property Act). The first appellate court reversed both the findings holding that no consideration amount was paid to the defendant and that the title, which was to pass only after payment of the full consideration money in terms of the recitial of the deed did not pass to the plaintiff. The appellate court has based its findings on the recitals of the sale deeds disbelieving the oral evidence to the contrary led by the plaintiff. 4. At this stage, it would be relevant to briefly refer to the consents of the sale deeds (Exts. 3,3/A and 3/B). There is specific recital in Exs 3 and 3/B that out of the consideration money of Rs. 3,5 )0 each, half of the amount was to be adjusted towards mortgage money of Rs, 3,500 which the defendant had taken from the plaintiff on 13-6-72 vide zerpeshagi deeds (Exts. 4 and 4/A) and the balance amount of Rs. 1,750 each was to be paid at the time of exchange of the registration 1eceipts. Similarly in Ext. 3/A, there is clear recital that the entire consideration money of Rs. 1,650 would be payable at the time of exchange of registration receipts. Thus, according to the deeds after adjustment of sum of Rs. 1,750 each in Exts. 3 and 3/A, the total balance money of Rs. 5,150 remained payable to the defenvlant. It is also stipulited in the deeds that title in the lands was to pass in favour of the plaintiff only after payment of the full consideration money. 5. The plaintiff examined a number of witnesses to prove Ins case that at the time of execution of the registration of the sale deeds he had paid Rs. 4,950 and thus, Rs. 200 only remained due. The appellate court has rejected the oral evidence in view of the contents of the documents. 6. 5. The plaintiff examined a number of witnesses to prove Ins case that at the time of execution of the registration of the sale deeds he had paid Rs. 4,950 and thus, Rs. 200 only remained due. The appellate court has rejected the oral evidence in view of the contents of the documents. 6. Sec. 91 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of a contract, grant or any other disposition of property have been reduced to the form of a document and in all cases in which any matter is so required by law, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or ofther disposition of property or of such matter contained therein, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible. Sec. 9 which provides for exclusion of oral evidence in certain cases o nitting the provisos, reads to follows : When the terms of any such contract grant or other disposition of property or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to or substracting from its terms. The provision is hedged by six provisos which are in the nature of exception to the general rule contained in Sec. 92. They envisage different situations in which oral evidence may be admissible even though it contradicts, varies, adds to or substracts from the terms of contract, grant etc. If such oral evidence does not fall within the ambit of any of these provisos, it would be inadmissible to that extent. 7. Mr. Shivakirti Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that it is a settled law that the parties may adduce evidence to show that the recital of a transfer deed is untrue. Reliance was placed on Baldeo Singh V/s. Dwarika Singh -- and Shiva Narayan V/s. Baidya Nath Tiwari AIR 1975 Pat 386. On the submission of Learned Counsel, the question that arises for consideration is whether a person who claims his rights or interest uuder a document can lead evidence which would in effect amount to repudiation of its terms. 8. Reliance was placed on Baldeo Singh V/s. Dwarika Singh -- and Shiva Narayan V/s. Baidya Nath Tiwari AIR 1975 Pat 386. On the submission of Learned Counsel, the question that arises for consideration is whether a person who claims his rights or interest uuder a document can lead evidence which would in effect amount to repudiation of its terms. 8. In Baldeo Singh (supra), a Division Bench of this Court observed; BUR (1)-28 Though the sale deed may recite that the consideration has been paid, but there is nothing to prevent the parties from adducing evidence to show that the recital is untrue and that, in fact, the consideration was not paid this will not be barred by Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act. It would, however appear that that was a case in which even according to the plaintiff, the consideration money had not been paid at the time of the execution and registration of the deed and the question for consideration was whether without payment of consideration money, title could pass the plaintiff under Sec. 54 of the Property Act. Shiva Narayan Sah (supra) was a case where both the courts below has held that the plaintiff did tender the balance consideration money to the defendant which he refused to accept and hand over the registration receipts and it was held, on facts of the case, that title had passed to the defendant. In both these cases the plea of non-payment of consideration money had ben taken by the vendor-defendant. 9. Counsel also referred to the case of Kishan Ram Marwari V/s. Smt Godawari Debi AIR 1940 Pat 379; Ram Rup Singh V/s. Jang Bahadur Singh AIR 1951 Pat. 566; Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh V/s. Appa Saheb Taliaram Nimbalkar, -- , Kishan Ram Marwari was again a case in which plea of non-payment was taken by the vendor. All that was said in the case was that the evidence as the manner in which the consideration was paid is not evidence tending to vary the terms of a written contract. In Ram RUB Singhs case, dealing with the contention that the rights and liabilities fixed under a document can be proved under Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act only by the terms of the document and not otherwise it was said that if the document is silent on certain points extrinsic oral evidence is admissible. In Ram RUB Singhs case, dealing with the contention that the rights and liabilities fixed under a document can be proved under Sec. 92 of the Evidence Act only by the terms of the document and not otherwise it was said that if the document is silent on certain points extrinsic oral evidence is admissible. That was also a case of vendor taking that kind of plea. In the case of Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh, their Lordships held that at where document consists of two distinct parts one comprising the preamble or the preliminary recital of a past fact and the other containing terms regarding, dispositions of property, any oral evidence contradicting varying adding to etc. any part of the preamble on preliminary recital of the past fact could not attract the mischief of Section 92 which prohibits only varying of the terms of the contract and not any other part. 10. learned Counsel could not cite any direct case where the vendee claiming rights under document was permitted to adduce oral evidence to the effect that the contents of the document were untrue. He did not dispute the proposition that any oral evidence contradicting, varying the terms of a document is admissible only if it falls within the ambit of any of the provisos to Section 92. He however, submitted that there may be cases where notwithstanding the agreement and the recital in the document regarding payment of consideration at the time of exchange of registration receipts, the payment is made earlier than that and it would be preposterous to hold that the vendee cannot adduce such an evidence. According to me, such an oral evidence would be in the nature of extrinsic evidence with respect to a subsequent event and would not amount to varying or contracting the terms. 11. On general principles there can be hardly any doubt that a person claiming rights, benefits or advantages from one part of a document cannot reject the rest. According to me, such an oral evidence would be in the nature of extrinsic evidence with respect to a subsequent event and would not amount to varying or contracting the terms. 11. On general principles there can be hardly any doubt that a person claiming rights, benefits or advantages from one part of a document cannot reject the rest. He cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time I am of the view that while a vendor whether a plaintiff or defendant can take the plea of want or failure of consideration on the ground of fraud, coercion and so on contrary to the recitals of the document to entitle him to any decree or order relating to the document or to invalidate the same, as the case may be and adduce oral evidence that he was no paid the consideration money, the vendee cannot say that the content of the deed regarding deferred payment is untrue and that payment has been made at the time of execution itself. He cannot condemn the document under which he claim his right. That would be in consonance with the general principle that where the terms of the document are clear, unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of the point would, be inadmissible. 12. In the instant case, the plaintiff took the stand that although as per the terms of the deed, scribed and executed on the same day Rs. 5,150 was due as consideration money, as a matter of fact Rs. 4,950 had already been paid to the defendant at the time of execution and the balance sum of Rs. 200 could not be paid as he fell short of money. That in my opinion, would clearly amount to varying, contradicting to the term of the deed. The submission of the counsel that the oral evidence was only in the nature of addition on a point on which the deed was silent has no substance. The two versions, one stated in the sale deeds and other professed in oral evidence, are mutual irreconcilable and cannot stand together. Counsel was not in a position to show that the material part of the oral evidence on the basis of which he has been non-suited by the appellate court is covered by any of the provisos of Sec. 92. Counsel was not in a position to show that the material part of the oral evidence on the basis of which he has been non-suited by the appellate court is covered by any of the provisos of Sec. 92. In this view of the matter, I have no hesitation in holding that the appellate Court came to the correct conclusion in holding that the balance consideration of Rs. 5150 was never paid. There is no error in the other finding of the appellate court either that in terms of the sale deeds, the title could pass only after payment of full consideration money and not earlier and therefore, it did not pass to the plaintiff and consequently, he was not entitled to custody of the sale deeds. 13. In the result, I find no error in the impugned judgment. This appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. Since the respondent has not appeared, I make no order as to costs.