JUDGMENT 1. - This first appeal arises out of a judgment dismissing the plaintiff's suit holding the same as time barred under Issue No. 4. However, the learned trial Court decided issue Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 5 in favour of the plaintiff. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that, Mohammad Aman (appellant-plaintiff), being a contractor, is allegedly engaged in the business of supply of tendu leaves. Admitted facts are that the respondent accorded a contract in favour of the appellant on 20.4.1972 for supply of tendu leaves, and in pursuance thereof, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as security on May 20,1972 through receipt No. 1283, that the appellant completed his part of contract for him but, a dispute arose and thereby a settlement in between the appellant & the respondent was arrived at on June 10, 1974 with certain terms for making payment to the appellant for the tendu leaves supplied by him. It has been averred in the plaint that the transaction as per the settlement took its due time for its completion, and after completion of the transaction as per the settlement, the appellant represented the respondent-department for redeeming the security to the tune of Rs. 50,000/- but, the same was not paid to him despite his persistent and tireless efforts by way of series of letters-cum-reminders. Ultimately, the respondent sent a letter dated the 21st May, 1976 to the appellant asking him to lift tendu leaves of equivalent value of security deposit worth Rs. 50,000/-. To this letter, the appellant allegedly has not agreed and a notice through counsel was sent on July 18,1977 to the respondent for payment of the security deposit. In reply to the appellant's notice, the respondent declined to make the requisite payment to the appellant and it culminated into institution of civil suit on behalf of the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 50,000/- plus Rs. 10,000/- towards interest 12% p.a. 3. The defendant-respondent contested the suit on various grounds urged in the written statement including the plea as to the limitation. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. To prove first three issues, the burden was on the defendant and the rest were to be proved by the plaintiff. After recording the evidence of the parties and hearing both the parties, the learned trial Court (Addl. Sess. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, issues were framed. To prove first three issues, the burden was on the defendant and the rest were to be proved by the plaintiff. After recording the evidence of the parties and hearing both the parties, the learned trial Court (Addl. Sess. Judge No. 2, Jaipur City, Jaipur) vide its judgment dated the 16th December, 1980, decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff except the issue as to the limitation. Under issue No. 4 the learned trial Court deciding it against the plaintiff, held the suit, itself, as time-barred, and it dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal is confined to the findings arrived at by the lower Court under issue no. 4. 4. Pertinently, no cross-appeal or objection has been filed by the either side against the findings arrived at by the lower court under issue Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 5. 5. The dismissal of the suit on the plea of limitation has been assailed in this first appeal on the grounds that, the findings of the lower court under Issue no. 4 are contrary to law and the facts of the case because the starting point of limitation determined by it was wrong. In this regard, it has been asserted that in the case at hand, the limitation should start from 21.5.1976 - the day when the respondent gave a proposal acknowledging the transaction of security deposit, to the plaintiff asking him to lift tendu leaves of equivalent value of security deposit to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-, from M/s Mayur Bidi Industries, Tonk. Taking the aid of the aforesaid letter dated the 21st May, 1967 which according to the appellant was a sort of acknowledgement of his reply/letter, and drawing my attention to Section 18 of the Limitation Act, Shri Narendra Jain on behalf of the appellant, contended that the limitation period should start from 21.5.1976, and that if the limitation period is computed starting from the date of acknowledgement, i.e. 21.5.1976, then definitely, the suit was within prescribed period of limitation. 6. As against ibid, learned counsel for the respondent urged that in the plaint, the plaintiff nowhere averred that the limitation should ,Start from 21.5.1976 - the day when the respondent acknowledged the claim of the plaintiff by sending its letter No. RSIC/PROD/MBI/F.15(-)76-77/dated 21.5.1976. 7. 6. As against ibid, learned counsel for the respondent urged that in the plaint, the plaintiff nowhere averred that the limitation should ,Start from 21.5.1976 - the day when the respondent acknowledged the claim of the plaintiff by sending its letter No. RSIC/PROD/MBI/F.15(-)76-77/dated 21.5.1976. 7. Immediately, Shri Narendra Jain, tout au contrarire, vociforcely drew my attention to para 6 of the plaint, and asserted that it has specifically been averred therein that the respondent acknowledged the liability by sending their letter on 21st May, 1976 by way of proposing and making an offor to him that the plaintiff could lift tendu leaves from M/s Mayur Bidi Industries, Tonk valuing at equivalent to the amount of security deposit. Then Shri Jain urged that in para 11 of the plaint, also, it has been averred that the plaintiff is entitled to the claim of Rs. 10,000/- from 21.5.1976 towards interest @12% p.a. 8. Having regard to the aforesaid contention and the averments in paras 6 & 11 of the plaint, I am of the opinion that the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent has no merits. 9. And, the only question which arises for consideration for the purpose of this appeal is, whether the suit of the plaintiff was within the period of limitation. Let me at once have a glance over some decisions referred to before me relevant for the present question. 10. In Bindeshwari Prasad v. District Board of Saran, AIR 1961 Patna 134 , it has been observed as under : "The section requires a definite acknowledgement of liability. A document, alleged to contain an acknowledgement of liability, must, therefore, be liberally construed, that is to say, in construing such document regard must be had to the meaning of the writer, judging from the document, read as a whole, and such surrounding circumstances as the court can take into consideration in construing the document, rather than to the literal meaning of the words used. The section requires a conscious acknowledgement of subsisting liability. The section requires a conscious acknowledgement of subsisting liability. The construction of documents alleged to contain acknowledgements of liability is governed by the same principles as those that apply to the construction of other documents." According to the decision in Bindeshwari Prasad's case (supra), an acknowledgement may be sufficient though it is accompanied by a refusal to pay and as such it cannot be said that the acknowledgement contemplated by the section is one which implies a promise by defendant to fulfil his obligation. 11. In S.F. Mazda v. Durga Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 1236 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as under:- "Acknowledgement as prescribed by Section 19 merely renews debt; it does not create a new right of action. It is a mere acknowledgement of the liability in respect of the right in question; it need not be accompanied by a promise to pay either expressly or even by implication." ".... In construing words used in the statements made in writing on which a plea of acknowledgement rests oral evidence has been expressly excluded but surrounding circumstances can always be considered. Stated generally, courts lean in favour of a liberal construction of such statements though it does not mean that where no admission is made one should be inferred, or where a statement was made clearly without intending to admit the existence of jural relationship such intention could be fastened on the maker of the statement by an involved or far-fetched process of reasoning." 12. Similarly in L.C. Mills v. Aluminium Corpn. of India, AIR 1971 SC 1482 , their lordships of the Supreme Court held that the acknowledgement must relate to present subsisting liability and indicate existence of jural relationship between parties and intention to admit such relationship, and the intention can be implied, which can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. 13. Now, I would like to examine the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, in the light of the principles of law laid down in the decisions (ut supta). In the case at hand, no doubt, letter dated 21.5.1976 was written and issued by the respondent. Its genuineness has also not been doubted either in written statement, evidence, and even either before the trial Court or this Court. In the case at hand, no doubt, letter dated 21.5.1976 was written and issued by the respondent. Its genuineness has also not been doubted either in written statement, evidence, and even either before the trial Court or this Court. As stated earlier, admittedly, the transactions were continuing on June 10, 1974 when new settlement was entered into by both the parties, and in view of the said settlement the transaction under the contract in question could not last rather they continued after 10.6.1974. The question of refund of the earnest money or security deposit would have arisen after the term of settlement dated 10.6.1974 ended. Even according to the findings arrived at by the trial Court under issue No. 2 & 3 which have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, and which has become final as having not been challenged by the respondent, original agreement dated 30.4.1972 had not ended rather it continued by virtue of subsequent settlement dated 10.6.1974 having merged into it, and that being so, the trial Court held that the plaintiff is entitled to claim even under the original agreement, all benefits derived therefrom. Moreover, when the plaintiff claimed the refund of earnest money or the security deposit by making his tireless efforts by letters one after the other, the respondent vide its letter dated the 21st May, 1976, admittedly proposed requesting the plaintiff to send his acceptance for lifting of old stock of tendu leaves lying with its Administrative Officer, Mayur Bidi Industries, Tonk against the security amount of the plaintiff. Had there been no claim of the plaintiff, it is not understandable why the respondent proposed to lift the tendu leaves from Mayur Bidi Industries Tonk that too against the security amount of the plaintiff. Having regard to the surrounding circumstances, it cannot be said that the letter dated the 21st May, 1976 does not relate to the present subsisting liability. Rather it indicates the existence of jural relationship between the parties. Having regard to the surrounding circumstances, it cannot be said that the letter dated the 21st May, 1976 does not relate to the present subsisting liability. Rather it indicates the existence of jural relationship between the parties. In view of the wordings of the letter dated the 21st May, 1976, as already taken note of above, I am of the opinion that it can easily be construed as acknowledgement as to the security amount, as the letter acknowledged the existence of the said jural ralationship so also the liability to the amount of security deposit and that being so, it amounted to a clear acknowledgement under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. 14. I may add that asking for acceptance to received tendu leaves in lieu of amount of security 'amount under letter dated the 21st May, 1976, clearly implies that in case of non-acceptance thereof, the security amount will be made in cash and not in kind as proposed in letter in question. But it cannot give any meaning that in case the appellant does not agree to lift tendu leaves, the amount shall stand forfeited. Rather, the wordings of the letter in question make it clear that the respondent acknowledged and accepted the liability as to the refund of the earnest money or the security amount to the plaintiff on May 21, 1976, and from the admissions made therein, the plaintiff can derive the benefit to construe the letter as an acknowledgement of the liability governing under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. It makes no difference that it was acknowledged in kind and not in cash. In this view of the matter, the suit was not liable to be dismissed on the ground of its being barred by limitation and the lower court was in error in doing so. 15. Further stress was also laid on the contention that the lower court has wrongly eschewed as irrelevant for the observations of the Supreme Court in AIR 1979 SC 1144 . The principles of law laid down in AIR 1979 SC 1144 are obviously not questioned and doubted. In it, it has been held that if the claim of a citizen is genuine and bona fide, the question of limitation should be irrelevant particularly when the claim is against a public body, like the respondent-Corporation. The principles of law laid down in AIR 1979 SC 1144 are obviously not questioned and doubted. In it, it has been held that if the claim of a citizen is genuine and bona fide, the question of limitation should be irrelevant particularly when the claim is against a public body, like the respondent-Corporation. That apart, the learned trial Court decided all issues except as to the limitation in favour of the plaintiff clearly holding that he is entitled to the claim of recovery of the suit amount. And, further, the respondent, itself was ready under letter dated the 21st May, 1976 allowing the plaintiff to lift the tendu leaves from M/s Mayur Bidi Industries, Tonk, against the security amount. It tends to disclose that the plaintiff's claim was genuine and bonafide and in that view of the matter, in the light of the decision in AIR 1979 SC 1144 , the question of limitation was irrelevant in the surrounding circumstances of the case at hand, pointed out above. 16. In the result, this appeal must succeed and is hereby allowed. The judgment of the trial Court dismissing the plaintiff's suites time barred, under the findings on issue No. 4, is set aside. The suit of the plaintiff be decreed in toto with costs throughout besides interest @ 6% per annum on Rs. 60,000/- from the date of filing of the suit till the realisation of the decretal amount. The appellant shall also be entitled to the costs of this appeal. The record be sent back forthwith so as to draw the decree immediately.Appeal allowed. *******