Judgment S.B.Sinha and Dharm Pal Sinha JJ. 1. In this application the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to give employment to the petitioner as also all other consequential benefits following therefrom. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 3. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on 26-12-1972 by the Managing Committee of Sarvodaya Nagar, High School situated in the district of Gaya. The said school was granted permission of establishment by an order dated 19-4-1978 by the erstwhile Bihar Secondary Education Board, Patna. On 23-10-1981 the Members of the Special Board inspected the school whereafter management of the said school was taken over by the State of Bihar in terms of a notification dated 13-3-1983 in terms of Sec. 3(3) of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary School (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981. 4. Admittedly on that point of time the petitioner was not a trained teacher. The services of the petitioner was therefore, not taken over. The petitioner joined the training school on 18-5-1982 and his result has been published on 22-3-1983 (Annexre-4). 5. The petitioner made a claim that his services should be taken over from the date of the nationalisation of the said shoool but by an order dated 26-9-1987 the claim of the petitioner has been rejected on the basis of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Naresh Prasad Nirala V/s. State of Bihar reported in 1987 PUR 341. 6. In this a counter-affiavit has been filed wherein it has been contended that as at the time of take over the school in question, only 7 trained teachers were available, their services were taken over by the State Government. It has further been contended that all the 9 posts have now been filled up. 7. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. The learned Counsel submitted that as the impugned order has been passed on the basis of Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Naresh Prasad Nirala, (supra) the said decision having been reversal by the Supreme Court, the respondents should be directed to provide employment to the petitioner in terms of the Supreme Court order (Annexure-1). 8. The learned Counsel submitted that as the impugned order has been passed on the basis of Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Naresh Prasad Nirala, (supra) the said decision having been reversal by the Supreme Court, the respondents should be directed to provide employment to the petitioner in terms of the Supreme Court order (Annexure-1). 8. At has further been submitted that even this Court in Sushri Kanak Verma V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. in CWJC No. 5126 of 1983 has given such direction which is contained in Annexure-2 to the writ application. 9. Sec. 3(3) of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary School (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981 reads as follows: Sec. 3(2) Bihar Madhyamik Siksha Board dwara ese adhiniyam ke prakhyan ki tithi ke tihk purba tak esthapana ki anumati prapt athwa esthapana ki anumati ke liye awadit raadhyamik siksha pradan karnewale aysa vidalaya jinki upyogita Rajya Sarkar ki nazar me pramanit ho aur jo ese adhiniyam ke prakhyan ke tin barse ke bhitar bhumi, bhawan, upkaran upkar ewam chatra sankhya ke mamla me Rajya Sarkar dwara nirdharit sarto ki purti karta ho, ka prabandh asamaniyatran, Grahan, yesi sarto ke sath, jo Rajya sarkar uchit samjhe, rajaptra me adisuchna dwara kar sakegi. Yes a Madhyamik Vidlayaya me ese adhiniyam ke prakhyan purse 9 sikshak pade ke andhar karyarat sikshoke 2 lipik ewam 2 Adeshpal ke Ahartha ewam Upuketata ke jahe ese prayoujnatrth Rajya Sarkar dwara gathit satniti dwara ke jaygei aur Rajkiya Sewa me Niyukti hetu yogyapaye jane par vidhalaya ka prabandh awam niytran gradhan ke sath unha Rajiya sewa me Niyukt kiya Jyage. 10. From a perusal of the said provisions, it is clear that services of such teachers are to be taken over who hold the requisite qualifications at the relevant time. Thus in terms of Sec. 3(3) of the said Act, no teacher has a vested right of appointment. 11. As the petitioner does not have any legal right of appointment in terms of provisions of Sec. 3(3) of the said Act, the question of his obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus does not arise. 12. In Ram Ballabh Singh and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. 11. As the petitioner does not have any legal right of appointment in terms of provisions of Sec. 3(3) of the said Act, the question of his obtaining a writ of or in the nature of mandamus does not arise. 12. In Ram Ballabh Singh and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1986 PLJR 373 a Full Bench of this Court has held that Sec. 3(3) of the said Act did not visualise any automatic transfer of serving all incumbents of a nationalished schools on take over. In that decision it has been held: Second paragraph of Sec. 3(3) meticulously provides for the closet examination of both the qualifications and the suitability of these teachers. This is to be done by a committee constituted by the State Government for this purpose. It is only if these teachers are found suitable that they are to be appointed in fee Government service and not otherwise when the management of the school is taken over. The decision of this Court in Ram Ballabh Prasad Singh, (supra) has been affirmed by the Supreme Court. 13 Admittedly at the relevant time possession of a teachers training certificate was a pre-requisite for taking over of the services of the teachers. The petitioner was admittedly an untrained teacher. He could, therefore, not have been appointed by the State and thus his services had rightly not been taken over. 14. So far as the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Naresh Prasad Nirala V/s. State of Bihar (supra) is concerned the same has not laid down any law within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 15. Even in Sushri Kanak Verma V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. (supra) a learned single Judge of this Court has held: According to Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, the Full Bench decision in 17 PJR 341 (supra), therefore stands overruled, It is not possible to agree with this submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the decision cited in the aforementioned case of Ram Naresh Nirala, (supra) has been overruled by the Supreme Court. From the order passed by the Supreme Court it will appear that the Supreme Court has not decided the case, on merit. From the order passed by the Supreme Court it will appear that the Supreme Court has not decided the case, on merit. On the facts and in the circumstances of that case the Supreme Court only ordered that the petitioner Ram Naresh Prasad Nirala should be taken into employment with effect from the 1st of September, 1988. The order passed by the Supreme Court is based on the facts and circumstances of that case. 16. Thus the decision of this Court in Kanak Vermas case (supra), militates against the contention of the petitioner. 17. In State of Punjab and Ors. V/s. Surinder Kumar and Ors. reported in -- the Supreme Court held as follow : A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore, not entitled to rely upon an order of this Court which direct a temporary employee to be regularised in his services without assigning reasons. It has to be presumed that for special grounds which must have been available to the temporary employees in those case, they were entitled to the relief granted. Merely because grounds are not mentioned in a judgment of this Court it cannot be understood to have been passed without an adequate legal basis therefore. On the question of the requirement to assign reasons for an order, a distinction has to be kept in mind between a court whose judgment is not subject to further appeal and other court. One of the main reasons for disclosing and discussion the grounds in support of a judgment is to enable a higher court, to examine the same in case of a challenge. It is, of course, desirable to assign reasons for every order of judgment but the requirement is not imperative in the case of this Court. It is, therefore futile, to suggest that if this Court has issued an order which apparently seems to be similar to the impugned order, the High Court can also do so. There is still another reasons why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court. The constitution, has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary "for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it" which authority the High Court does not enjoy. There is still another reasons why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court. The constitution, has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary "for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it" which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decision, and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge. 18. In this view of the matter, too the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Naresh Prasad Niralas case (supra) must be held to have been rendered under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and thus this Court cannot exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 19. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.