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1992 DIGILAW 354 (KER)

Jayarajan v. Jayarajan

1992-09-16

PAREED PILLAY

body1992
Judgment :- Appellant's father filed complaint against the respondent alleging offence under S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Complaint was filed on 25-4-1990. Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. Appellant's father died on 11-8-1990. Appellant filed an application for permission to prosecute the complaint. Magistrate dismissed the application and acquitted the, accused. The order of the Magistrate is challenged by the appellant. 2. The learned Magistrate held that in the absence of the complainant the only course open to the Court is to dismiss the complaint and acquit the accused. 3. The question that arises for consideration is whether the complainant's son is entitled to prosecute the complaint after the complainant's death. 4. Under S.256 (1) Cr.P.C. Magistrate may adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day in the absence of the complainant. The section provides that in a case where summons has been issued on a complaint and on the day appointed for the appearance of the accused or on any day subsequent thereto to which the hearing has been adjourned the Magistrate can acquit the accused if the complainant is absent. It is not the invariable rule that he should acquit the accused the moment he finds complainant absent in the Court. For proper reasons he can adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Proviso to sub-section (1) of S.256 enables the Magistrate to excuse the personal attendance of the complainant in a case where he is represented by a pleader or by the officer conducting the prosecution of if he is of opinion that the personal attendance of the complainant is not necessary. Sub-section (2) makes the position clear that sub-section (1) shall apply to cases where non-appearance of the complainant is due to his death thus in a case where the complainant could not appear before the Court due to any reason or where the absence is on account of death the Magistrate is vested with power to postpone the hearing of the case. S.256 does not postulate that whenever the complainant is absent and whatever be the cause for it the Magistrate has no option but to acquit the accused. S.256 does not postulate that whenever the complainant is absent and whatever be the cause for it the Magistrate has no option but to acquit the accused. Though absence of the complainant on the day fixed for the hearing may entail the dismissal of the complaint and acquittal of the accused wide discretion is there for the Magistrate to adjourn the case for hearing to some other day if he finds proper reasons to do so. Certainly that power is there in the case of the complainant's absence on account of his death. 5. Section 256 (1) of the present Code more or less corresponds to S.247of the old Code (Criminal Procedure Code 1898). Sub-section (2) of S.256 has been newly added. Even under the old Code Bombay High Court had occasion to hold that the trying Magistrate has discretion in proper cases to allow the complainant to continue by a proper and fit complainant. In Mahomed Azarn v. Emperor (AIR 1926 Bom. 178) the Court held thus: "In a case of non-cognizable offence instituted upon a complaint the axiom of actio personalis moritur cum persona. in civil law confined to torts. does not apply. and the trying Magistrate has discretion in proper cases to allow the complainant to continue by a proper and fit complainant. if the latter is willing." The above view has been adopted in Subhamma v Kannappachari (AIR 1969 Mys. 221) where the Mysore High Court held that the death of the complainant in a case of non-cognizable offence does not bate the prosecution and it is within the discretion of the trying Magistrate in a proper case to allow the complaint to continue by a proper and fit complainant if the later swilling. But some other High Courts have taken a contrary stand. 6. As to the question whether the complainant's death ends the proceedings in a summons-case. the law Commission in its 41st report observed: "A question has arisen whether the complainant's death ends the proceedings in a summons case; and we find that different views have been expressed on this question. As a matter of policy we think. the answer should depend on the nature of the case and the stage of the proceedings at which death occurs. It is impracticable to detail the various situations that may arise and the considerations that may have to be weighed. We think. in the circumstances. As a matter of policy we think. the answer should depend on the nature of the case and the stage of the proceedings at which death occurs. It is impracticable to detail the various situations that may arise and the considerations that may have to be weighed. We think. in the circumstances. that the decision should be left to the judicial discretion of the court. and. the legal provision need only be that death and absence stand on the same footing. We trust this will in practice work satisfactorily." As sub-section (2) of the Section is intended to achieve this objective it cannot be held that the Magistrate has no option but to acquit the accused when the complainant is dead. In other words. in appropriate cases the Magistrate can grant permission to the son of the deceased complainant to proceed with the complaint. The order of the Magistrate dismissing the complaint and acquitting the accused is set aside. The Magistrate is directed to grant permission to the appellant to proceed with the. complaint. Criminal Appeal is allowed.